pm24.git/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM, branch rust-6.13

documentation: add IPE documentation

2024-08-20T18:03:47Z

Add IPE's admin and developer documentation to the kernel tree. Co-developed-by: Fan Wu Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers Signed-off-by: Fan Wu Signed-off-by: Paul Moore

tomoyo: update project links

2024-06-03T13:43:11Z

TOMOYO project has moved to SourceForge.net . Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa

security/loadpin: Update the changing interface in the source code.

2021-03-15T19:32:32Z

Loadpin cmdline interface "enabled" has been renamed to "enforce" for a long time, but the User Description Document was not updated. (Meaning unchanged) And kernel_read_file* were moved from linux/fs.h to its own linux/kernel_read_file.h include file. So update that change here. Signed-off-by: Jiele zhao Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210308020358.102836-1-unclexiaole@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet

docs: SafeSetID: fix a warning

2020-10-28T17:42:02Z

As reported by Sphinx 2.4.4: docs/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/SafeSetID.rst:110: WARNING: Title underline too short. Note on GID policies and setgroups() ================== Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/4afa281c170daabd1ce522653d5d5d5078ebd92c.1603791716.git.mchehab+huawei@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet

LSM: SafeSetID: Add GID security policy handling

2020-10-13T16:17:35Z

The SafeSetID LSM has functionality for restricting setuid() calls based on its configured security policies. This patch adds the analogous functionality for setgid() calls. This is mostly a copy-and-paste change with some code deduplication, plus slight modifications/name changes to the policy-rule-related structs (now contain GID rules in addition to the UID ones) and some type generalization since SafeSetID now needs to deal with kgid_t and kuid_t types. Signed-off-by: Thomas Cedeno Signed-off-by: Micah Morton

doc: yama: Swap HTTP for HTTPS and replace dead link

2020-07-13T15:40:42Z

Replace one dead link for the same person's original presentation on the topic and swap an HTTP URL with HTTPS. While here, linkify the text to make it more readable when rendered. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200708073346.13177-1-grandmaster@al2klimov.de/ Co-developed-by: Alexander A. Klimov Signed-off-by: Alexander A. Klimov Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/202007091141.C008B89EC@keescook Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet

Replace HTTP links with HTTPS ones: documentation

2020-06-08T15:30:19Z

Rationale: Reduces attack surface on kernel devs opening the links for MITM as HTTPS traffic is much harder to manipulate. Deterministic algorithm: For each file: For each line: If doesn't contain `\bxmlns\b`: For each link, `\bhttp://[^# \t\r\n]*(?:\w|/)`: If both the HTTP and HTTPS versions return 200 OK and serve the same content: Replace HTTP with HTTPS. Signed-off-by: Alexander A. Klimov Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200526060544.25127-1-grandmaster@al2klimov.de Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet

docs: SafeSetID.rst: Remove spurious '???' characters

2019-10-11T15:58:38Z

It appears that some smart quotes were changed to "???" by even smarter software; change them to the dumb but legible variety. Signed-off-by: Christian Kujau Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet

security/loadpin: Allow to exclude specific file types

2019-05-31T20:57:40Z

Linux kernel already provide MODULE_SIG and KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG to make sure loaded kernel module and kernel image are trusted. This patch adds a kernel command line option "loadpin.exclude" which allows to exclude specific file types from LoadPin. This is useful when people want to use different mechanisms to verify module and kernel image while still use LoadPin to protect the integrity of other files kernel loads. Signed-off-by: Ke Wu Reviewed-by: James Morris [kees: fix array size issue reported by Coverity via Colin Ian King] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook

LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls

2019-01-25T19:22:45Z

SafeSetID gates the setid family of syscalls to restrict UID/GID transitions from a given UID/GID to only those approved by a system-wide whitelist. These restrictions also prohibit the given UIDs/GIDs from obtaining auxiliary privileges associated with CAP_SET{U/G}ID, such as allowing a user to set up user namespace UID mappings. For now, only gating the set*uid family of syscalls is supported, with support for set*gid coming in a future patch set. Signed-off-by: Micah Morton Acked-by: Kees Cook Signed-off-by: James Morris