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<title>pm24.git/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln, branch master</title>
<subtitle>Unnamed repository; edit this file 'description' to name the repository.
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.kobert.dev/pm24.git/atom?h=master</id>
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<updated>2024-08-27T07:16:35Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Documentation/srso: Document a method for checking safe RET operates properly</title>
<updated>2024-08-27T07:16:35Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Borislav Petkov (AMD)</name>
<email>bp@alien8.de</email>
</author>
<published>2024-07-31T16:05:31Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.kobert.dev/pm24.git/commit/?id=40153505259d8dc0e4ea6889fca5e567c42b76a9'/>
<id>urn:sha1:40153505259d8dc0e4ea6889fca5e567c42b76a9</id>
<content type='text'>
Add a method to quickly verify whether safe RET operates properly on
a given system using perf tool.

Also, add a selftest which does the same thing.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240731160531.28640-1-bp@kernel.org
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/bugs: Remove duplicate Spectre cmdline option descriptions</title>
<updated>2024-06-28T13:28:38Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Josh Poimboeuf</name>
<email>jpoimboe@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-06-26T06:02:01Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.kobert.dev/pm24.git/commit/?id=4586c93ebf410c2b7f480cc4762edd59012a66c0'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4586c93ebf410c2b7f480cc4762edd59012a66c0</id>
<content type='text'>
Duplicating the documentation of all the Spectre kernel cmdline options
in two separate files is unwieldy and error-prone.  Instead just add a
reference to kernel-parameters.txt from spectre.rst.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Daniel Sneddon &lt;daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/450b5f4ffe891a8cc9736ec52b0c6f225bab3f4b.1719381528.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'docs-6.10' of git://git.lwn.net/linux</title>
<updated>2024-05-13T17:51:53Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-05-13T17:51:53Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:8815da98e06a930ce7e6a1ffaf1b1590e79fd94f</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull documentation updates from Jonathan Corbet:
 "Another not-too-busy cycle for documentation, including:

   - Some build-system changes to detect the variable fonts installed by
     some distributions that can break the PDF build.

   - Various updates and additions to the Spanish, Chinese, Italian, and
     Japanese translations.

   - Update the stable-kernel rules to match modern practice

  ... and the usual array of corrections, updates, and typo fixes"

* tag 'docs-6.10' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (42 commits)
  cgroup: Add documentation for missing zswap memory.stat
  kernel-doc: Added "*" in $type_constants2 to fix 'make htmldocs' warning.
  docs:core-api: fixed typos and grammar in printk-index page
  Documentation: tracing: Fix spelling mistakes
  docs/zh_CN/rust: Update the translation of quick-start to 6.9-rc4
  docs/zh_CN/rust: Update the translation of general-information to 6.9-rc4
  docs/zh_CN/rust: Update the translation of coding-guidelines to 6.9-rc4
  docs/zh_CN/rust: Update the translation of arch-support to 6.9-rc4
  docs: stable-kernel-rules: fix typo sent-&gt;send
  docs/zh_CN: remove two inconsistent spaces
  docs: scripts/check-variable-fonts.sh: Improve commands for detection
  docs: stable-kernel-rules: create special tag to flag 'no backporting'
  docs: stable-kernel-rules: explain use of stable@kernel.org (w/o @vger.)
  docs: stable-kernel-rules: remove code-labels tags and a indention level
  docs: stable-kernel-rules: call mainline by its name and change example
  docs: stable-kernel-rules: reduce redundancy
  docs, kprobes: Add riscv as supported architecture
  Docs: typos/spelling
  docs: kernel_include.py: Cope with docutils 0.21
  docs: ja_JP/howto: Catch up update in v6.8
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Docs: typos/spelling</title>
<updated>2024-05-02T16:02:29Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Remington Brasga</name>
<email>rbrasga@uci.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2024-04-29T22:55:27Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:da51bbcdbace8f43adf6066934c3926b656376e5</id>
<content type='text'>
Fix spelling and grammar in Docs descriptions

Signed-off-by: Remington Brasga &lt;rbrasga@uci.edu&gt;
Reviewed-by: Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240429225527.2329-1-rbrasga@uci.edu
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling: fix return type of PR_SCHED_CORE_GET</title>
<updated>2024-04-24T19:04:27Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Weißschuh</name>
<email>linux@weissschuh.net</email>
</author>
<published>2024-04-23T10:34:25Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:8af2d1ab78f2342f8c4c3740ca02d86f0ebfac5a</id>
<content type='text'>
sched_core_share_pid() copies the cookie to userspace with
put_user(id, (u64 __user *)uaddr), expecting 64 bits of space.
The "unsigned long" datatype that is documented in core-scheduling.rst
however is only 32 bits large on 32 bit architectures.

Document "unsigned long long" as the correct data type that is always
64bits large.

This matches what the selftest cs_prctl_test.c has been doing all along.

Fixes: 0159bb020ca9 ("Documentation: Add usecases, design and interface for core scheduling")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/util-linux/df7a25a0-7923-4f8b-a527-5e6f0064074d@t-8ch.de/
Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh &lt;linux@weissschuh.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: Chris Hyser &lt;chris.hyser@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240423-core-scheduling-cookie-v1-1-5753a35f8dfc@weissschuh.net
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/bugs: Remove CONFIG_BHI_MITIGATION_AUTO and spectre_bhi=auto</title>
<updated>2024-04-12T10:05:54Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Josh Poimboeuf</name>
<email>jpoimboe@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-04-11T05:40:50Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.kobert.dev/pm24.git/commit/?id=36d4fe147c870f6d3f6602befd7ef44393a1c87a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:36d4fe147c870f6d3f6602befd7ef44393a1c87a</id>
<content type='text'>
Unlike most other mitigations' "auto" options, spectre_bhi=auto only
mitigates newer systems, which is confusing and not particularly useful.

Remove it.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov &lt;nik.borisov@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/412e9dc87971b622bbbaf64740ebc1f140bff343.1712813475.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/bugs: Clarify that syscall hardening isn't a BHI mitigation</title>
<updated>2024-04-11T08:30:33Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Josh Poimboeuf</name>
<email>jpoimboe@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-04-11T05:40:48Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.kobert.dev/pm24.git/commit/?id=5f882f3b0a8bf0788d5a0ee44b1191de5319bb8a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5f882f3b0a8bf0788d5a0ee44b1191de5319bb8a</id>
<content type='text'>
While syscall hardening helps prevent some BHI attacks, there's still
other low-hanging fruit remaining.  Don't classify it as a mitigation
and make it clear that the system may still be vulnerable if it doesn't
have a HW or SW mitigation enabled.

Fixes: ec9404e40e8f ("x86/bhi: Add BHI mitigation knob")
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/b5951dae3fdee7f1520d5136a27be3bdfe95f88b.1712813475.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/bugs: Fix BHI documentation</title>
<updated>2024-04-11T08:30:25Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Josh Poimboeuf</name>
<email>jpoimboe@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-04-11T05:40:45Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.kobert.dev/pm24.git/commit/?id=dfe648903f42296866d79f10d03f8c85c9dfba30'/>
<id>urn:sha1:dfe648903f42296866d79f10d03f8c85c9dfba30</id>
<content type='text'>
Fix up some inaccuracies in the BHI documentation.

Fixes: ec9404e40e8f ("x86/bhi: Add BHI mitigation knob")
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov &lt;nik.borisov@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/8c84f7451bfe0dd08543c6082a383f390d4aa7e2.1712813475.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/bhi: Mitigate KVM by default</title>
<updated>2024-04-08T17:27:06Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Pawan Gupta</name>
<email>pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-03-11T15:57:09Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.kobert.dev/pm24.git/commit/?id=95a6ccbdc7199a14b71ad8901cb788ba7fb5167b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:95a6ccbdc7199a14b71ad8901cb788ba7fb5167b</id>
<content type='text'>
BHI mitigation mode spectre_bhi=auto does not deploy the software
mitigation by default. In a cloud environment, it is a likely scenario
where userspace is trusted but the guests are not trusted. Deploying
system wide mitigation in such cases is not desirable.

Update the auto mode to unconditionally mitigate against malicious
guests. Deploy the software sequence at VMexit in auto mode also, when
hardware mitigation is not available. Unlike the force =on mode,
software sequence is not deployed at syscalls in auto mode.

Suggested-by: Alexandre Chartre &lt;alexandre.chartre@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon &lt;daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre &lt;alexandre.chartre@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@kernel.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/bhi: Add BHI mitigation knob</title>
<updated>2024-04-08T17:27:05Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Pawan Gupta</name>
<email>pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-03-11T15:57:05Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.kobert.dev/pm24.git/commit/?id=ec9404e40e8f36421a2b66ecb76dc2209fe7f3ef'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ec9404e40e8f36421a2b66ecb76dc2209fe7f3ef</id>
<content type='text'>
Branch history clearing software sequences and hardware control
BHI_DIS_S were defined to mitigate Branch History Injection (BHI).

Add cmdline spectre_bhi={on|off|auto} to control BHI mitigation:

 auto - Deploy the hardware mitigation BHI_DIS_S, if available.
 on   - Deploy the hardware mitigation BHI_DIS_S, if available,
        otherwise deploy the software sequence at syscall entry and
	VMexit.
 off  - Turn off BHI mitigation.

The default is auto mode which does not deploy the software sequence
mitigation.  This is because of the hardening done in the syscall
dispatch path, which is the likely target of BHI.

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon &lt;daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre &lt;alexandre.chartre@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@kernel.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
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