<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>pm24.git/include/linux/security.h, branch v3.7-rc3</title>
<subtitle>Unnamed repository; edit this file 'description' to name the repository.
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.kobert.dev/pm24.git/atom?h=v3.7-rc3</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.kobert.dev/pm24.git/atom?h=v3.7-rc3'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.kobert.dev/pm24.git/'/>
<updated>2012-10-12T00:02:04Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>consitify do_mount() arguments</title>
<updated>2012-10-12T00:02:04Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2012-10-11T15:42:01Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.kobert.dev/pm24.git/commit/?id=808d4e3cfdcc52b19276175464f6dbca4df13b09'/>
<id>urn:sha1:808d4e3cfdcc52b19276175464f6dbca4df13b09</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security</title>
<updated>2012-10-03T04:38:48Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2012-10-03T04:38:48Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.kobert.dev/pm24.git/commit/?id=88265322c14cce39f7afbc416726ef4fac413298'/>
<id>urn:sha1:88265322c14cce39f7afbc416726ef4fac413298</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
 "Highlights:

   - Integrity: add local fs integrity verification to detect offline
     attacks
   - Integrity: add digital signature verification
   - Simple stacking of Yama with other LSMs (per LSS discussions)
   - IBM vTPM support on ppc64
   - Add new driver for Infineon I2C TIS TPM
   - Smack: add rule revocation for subject labels"

Fixed conflicts with the user namespace support in kernel/auditsc.c and
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c.

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (39 commits)
  Documentation: Update git repository URL for Smack userland tools
  ima: change flags container data type
  Smack: setprocattr memory leak fix
  Smack: implement revoking all rules for a subject label
  Smack: remove task_wait() hook.
  ima: audit log hashes
  ima: generic IMA action flag handling
  ima: rename ima_must_appraise_or_measure
  audit: export audit_log_task_info
  tpm: fix tpm_acpi sparse warning on different address spaces
  samples/seccomp: fix 31 bit build on s390
  ima: digital signature verification support
  ima: add support for different security.ima data types
  ima: add ima_inode_setxattr/removexattr function and calls
  ima: add inode_post_setattr call
  ima: replace iint spinblock with rwlock/read_lock
  ima: allocating iint improvements
  ima: add appraise action keywords and default rules
  ima: integrity appraisal extension
  vfs: move ima_file_free before releasing the file
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace</title>
<updated>2012-10-02T18:11:09Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2012-10-02T18:11:09Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.kobert.dev/pm24.git/commit/?id=437589a74b6a590d175f86cf9f7b2efcee7765e7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:437589a74b6a590d175f86cf9f7b2efcee7765e7</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull user namespace changes from Eric Biederman:
 "This is a mostly modest set of changes to enable basic user namespace
  support.  This allows the code to code to compile with user namespaces
  enabled and removes the assumption there is only the initial user
  namespace.  Everything is converted except for the most complex of the
  filesystems: autofs4, 9p, afs, ceph, cifs, coda, fuse, gfs2, ncpfs,
  nfs, ocfs2 and xfs as those patches need a bit more review.

  The strategy is to push kuid_t and kgid_t values are far down into
  subsystems and filesystems as reasonable.  Leaving the make_kuid and
  from_kuid operations to happen at the edge of userspace, as the values
  come off the disk, and as the values come in from the network.
  Letting compile type incompatible compile errors (present when user
  namespaces are enabled) guide me to find the issues.

  The most tricky areas have been the places where we had an implicit
  union of uid and gid values and were storing them in an unsigned int.
  Those places were converted into explicit unions.  I made certain to
  handle those places with simple trivial patches.

  Out of that work I discovered we have generic interfaces for storing
  quota by projid.  I had never heard of the project identifiers before.
  Adding full user namespace support for project identifiers accounts
  for most of the code size growth in my git tree.

  Ultimately there will be work to relax privlige checks from
  "capable(FOO)" to "ns_capable(user_ns, FOO)" where it is safe allowing
  root in a user names to do those things that today we only forbid to
  non-root users because it will confuse suid root applications.

  While I was pushing kuid_t and kgid_t changes deep into the audit code
  I made a few other cleanups.  I capitalized on the fact we process
  netlink messages in the context of the message sender.  I removed
  usage of NETLINK_CRED, and started directly using current-&gt;tty.

  Some of these patches have also made it into maintainer trees, with no
  problems from identical code from different trees showing up in
  linux-next.

  After reading through all of this code I feel like I might be able to
  win a game of kernel trivial pursuit."

Fix up some fairly trivial conflicts in netfilter uid/git logging code.

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (107 commits)
  userns: Convert the ufs filesystem to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
  userns: Convert the udf filesystem to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
  userns: Convert ubifs to use kuid/kgid
  userns: Convert squashfs to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
  userns: Convert reiserfs to use kuid and kgid where appropriate
  userns: Convert jfs to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
  userns: Convert jffs2 to use kuid and kgid where appropriate
  userns: Convert hpfs to use kuid and kgid where appropriate
  userns: Convert btrfs to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
  userns: Convert bfs to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
  userns: Convert affs to use kuid/kgid wherwe appropriate
  userns: On alpha modify linux_to_osf_stat to use convert from kuids and kgids
  userns: On ia64 deal with current_uid and current_gid being kuid and kgid
  userns: On ppc convert current_uid from a kuid before printing.
  userns: Convert s390 getting uid and gid system calls to use kuid and kgid
  userns: Convert s390 hypfs to use kuid and kgid where appropriate
  userns: Convert binder ipc to use kuids
  userns: Teach security_path_chown to take kuids and kgids
  userns: Add user namespace support to IMA
  userns: Convert EVM to deal with kuids and kgids in it's hmac computation
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>c/r: prctl: fix build error for no-MMU case</title>
<updated>2012-09-25T15:59:21Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Salter</name>
<email>msalter@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-09-25T00:17:38Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.kobert.dev/pm24.git/commit/?id=be8cfc4af15cf611dfeb66a1fb5df43d5f1e280a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:be8cfc4af15cf611dfeb66a1fb5df43d5f1e280a</id>
<content type='text'>
Commit 1ad75b9e1628 ("c/r: prctl: add minimal address test to
PR_SET_MM") added some address checking to prctl_set_mm() used by
checkpoint-restore.  This causes a build error for no-MMU systems:

   kernel/sys.c: In function 'prctl_set_mm':
   kernel/sys.c:1868:34: error: 'mmap_min_addr' undeclared (first use in this function)

The test for mmap_min_addr doesn't make a lot of sense for no-MMU code
as noted in commit 6e1415467614 ("NOMMU: Optimise away the
{dac_,}mmap_min_addr tests").

This patch defines mmap_min_addr as 0UL in the no-MMU case so that the
compiler will optimize away tests for "addr &lt; mmap_min_addr".

Signed-off-by: Mark Salter &lt;msalter@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov &lt;gorcunov@openvz.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;	[3.6.x]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>userns: Teach security_path_chown to take kuids and kgids</title>
<updated>2012-09-21T10:13:25Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-06-01T22:14:19Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.kobert.dev/pm24.git/commit/?id=d2b31ca644fdc8704de3367a6a56a5c958c77f53'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d2b31ca644fdc8704de3367a6a56a5c958c77f53</id>
<content type='text'>
Don't make the security modules deal with raw user space uid and
gids instead pass in a kuid_t and a kgid_t so that security modules
only have to deal with internal kernel uids and gids.

Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Kentaro Takeda &lt;takedakn@nttdata.co.jp&gt;
Cc: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: allow Yama to be unconditionally stacked</title>
<updated>2012-09-05T21:12:31Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2012-09-04T20:32:13Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.kobert.dev/pm24.git/commit/?id=c6993e4ac002c92bc75379212e9179c36d4bf7ee'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c6993e4ac002c92bc75379212e9179c36d4bf7ee</id>
<content type='text'>
Unconditionally call Yama when CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED is selected,
no matter what LSM module is primary.

Ubuntu and Chrome OS already carry patches to do this, and Fedora
has voiced interest in doing this as well. Instead of having multiple
distributions (or LSM authors) carrying these patches, just allow Yama
to be called unconditionally when selected by the new CONFIG.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Yama: higher restrictions should block PTRACE_TRACEME</title>
<updated>2012-08-10T09:58:07Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2012-08-10T02:01:26Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.kobert.dev/pm24.git/commit/?id=9d8dad742ad1c74d7e7210ee05d0b44961d5ea16'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9d8dad742ad1c74d7e7210ee05d0b44961d5ea16</id>
<content type='text'>
The higher ptrace restriction levels should be blocking even
PTRACE_TRACEME requests. The comments in the LSM documentation are
misleading about when the checks happen (the parent does not go through
security_ptrace_access_check() on a PTRACE_TRACEME call).

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.5.x and later
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>take security_mmap_file() outside of -&gt;mmap_sem</title>
<updated>2012-06-01T14:37:01Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2012-05-30T21:11:23Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.kobert.dev/pm24.git/commit/?id=8b3ec6814c83d76b85bd13badc48552836c24839'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8b3ec6814c83d76b85bd13badc48552836c24839</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>split -&gt;file_mmap() into -&gt;mmap_addr()/-&gt;mmap_file()</title>
<updated>2012-05-31T17:11:54Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2012-05-30T17:30:51Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.kobert.dev/pm24.git/commit/?id=e5467859f7f79b69fc49004403009dfdba3bec53'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e5467859f7f79b69fc49004403009dfdba3bec53</id>
<content type='text'>
... i.e. file-dependent and address-dependent checks.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>split cap_mmap_addr() out of cap_file_mmap()</title>
<updated>2012-05-31T17:10:54Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2012-05-30T17:11:37Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.kobert.dev/pm24.git/commit/?id=d007794a182bc072a7b7479909dbd0d67ba341be'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d007794a182bc072a7b7479909dbd0d67ba341be</id>
<content type='text'>
... switch callers.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
