<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>pm24.git/include/linux/syscalls.h, branch rust-fixes-6.10</title>
<subtitle>Unnamed repository; edit this file 'description' to name the repository.
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.kobert.dev/pm24.git/atom?h=rust-fixes-6.10</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.kobert.dev/pm24.git/atom?h=rust-fixes-6.10'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.kobert.dev/pm24.git/'/>
<updated>2024-05-24T02:40:26Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>mseal: add mseal syscall</title>
<updated>2024-05-24T02:40:26Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jeff Xu</name>
<email>jeffxu@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-04-15T16:35:21Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.kobert.dev/pm24.git/commit/?id=8be7258aad44b5e25977a98db136f677fa6f4370'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8be7258aad44b5e25977a98db136f677fa6f4370</id>
<content type='text'>
The new mseal() is an syscall on 64 bit CPU, and with following signature:

int mseal(void addr, size_t len, unsigned long flags)
addr/len: memory range.
flags: reserved.

mseal() blocks following operations for the given memory range.

1&gt; Unmapping, moving to another location, and shrinking the size,
   via munmap() and mremap(), can leave an empty space, therefore can
   be replaced with a VMA with a new set of attributes.

2&gt; Moving or expanding a different VMA into the current location,
   via mremap().

3&gt; Modifying a VMA via mmap(MAP_FIXED).

4&gt; Size expansion, via mremap(), does not appear to pose any specific
   risks to sealed VMAs. It is included anyway because the use case is
   unclear. In any case, users can rely on merging to expand a sealed VMA.

5&gt; mprotect() and pkey_mprotect().

6&gt; Some destructive madvice() behaviors (e.g. MADV_DONTNEED) for anonymous
   memory, when users don't have write permission to the memory. Those
   behaviors can alter region contents by discarding pages, effectively a
   memset(0) for anonymous memory.

Following input during RFC are incooperated into this patch:

Jann Horn: raising awareness and providing valuable insights on the
destructive madvise operations.
Linus Torvalds: assisting in defining system call signature and scope.
Liam R. Howlett: perf optimization.
Theo de Raadt: sharing the experiences and insight gained from
  implementing mimmutable() in OpenBSD.

Finally, the idea that inspired this patch comes from Stephen Röttger's
work in Chrome V8 CFI.

[jeffxu@chromium.org: add branch prediction hint, per Pedro]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240423192825.1273679-2-jeffxu@chromium.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240415163527.626541-3-jeffxu@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu &lt;jeffxu@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett &lt;Liam.Howlett@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Pedro Falcato &lt;pedro.falcato@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Guenter Roeck &lt;groeck@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Cc: Jeff Xu &lt;jeffxu@google.com&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Cc: Jorge Lucangeli Obes &lt;jorgelo@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) &lt;willy@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Muhammad Usama Anjum &lt;usama.anjum@collabora.com&gt;
Cc: Pedro Falcato &lt;pedro.falcato@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Stephen Röttger &lt;sroettger@google.com&gt;
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan &lt;surenb@google.com&gt;
Cc: Amer Al Shanawany &lt;amer.shanawany@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Javier Carrasco &lt;javier.carrasco.cruz@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Shuah Khan &lt;shuah@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lsm: use 32-bit compatible data types in LSM syscalls</title>
<updated>2024-03-14T15:31:26Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Casey Schaufler</name>
<email>casey@schaufler-ca.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-03-14T15:31:26Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.kobert.dev/pm24.git/commit/?id=a5a858f622a0aff5cdb5e271442cd01b2a01467f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a5a858f622a0aff5cdb5e271442cd01b2a01467f</id>
<content type='text'>
Change the size parameters in lsm_list_modules(), lsm_set_self_attr()
and lsm_get_self_attr() from size_t to u32. This avoids the need to
have different interfaces for 32 and 64 bit systems.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: a04a1198088a ("LSM: syscalls for current process attributes")
Fixes: ad4aff9ec25f ("LSM: Create lsm_list_modules system call")
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Reported-and-reviewed-by: Dmitry V. Levin &lt;ldv@strace.io&gt;
[PM: subject and metadata tweaks, syscall.h fixes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/entry/ia32: Ensure s32 is sign extended to s64</title>
<updated>2024-01-24T10:49:19Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Richard Palethorpe</name>
<email>rpalethorpe@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-01-10T13:01:22Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.kobert.dev/pm24.git/commit/?id=56062d60f117dccfb5281869e0ab61e090baf864'/>
<id>urn:sha1:56062d60f117dccfb5281869e0ab61e090baf864</id>
<content type='text'>
Presently ia32 registers stored in ptregs are unconditionally cast to
unsigned int by the ia32 stub. They are then cast to long when passed to
__se_sys*, but will not be sign extended.

This takes the sign of the syscall argument into account in the ia32
stub. It still casts to unsigned int to avoid implementation specific
behavior. However then casts to int or unsigned int as necessary. So that
the following cast to long sign extends the value.

This fixes the io_pgetevents02 LTP test when compiled with -m32. Presently
the systemcall io_pgetevents_time64() unexpectedly accepts -1 for the
maximum number of events.

It doesn't appear other systemcalls with signed arguments are effected
because they all have compat variants defined and wired up.

Fixes: ebeb8c82ffaf ("syscalls/x86: Use 'struct pt_regs' based syscall calling for IA32_EMULATION and x32")
Suggested-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe &lt;rpalethorpe@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov &lt;nik.borisov@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240110130122.3836513-1-nik.borisov@suse.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/ltp/20210921130127.24131-1-rpalethorpe@suse.com/
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs: rework listmount() implementation</title>
<updated>2024-01-13T12:06:25Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Christian Brauner</name>
<email>brauner@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-01-12T08:09:14Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.kobert.dev/pm24.git/commit/?id=ba5afb9a84df2e6b26a1b6389b98849cd16ea757'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ba5afb9a84df2e6b26a1b6389b98849cd16ea757</id>
<content type='text'>
Linus pointed out that there's error handling and naming issues in the
that we should rewrite:

* Perform the access checks for the buffer before actually doing any
  work instead of doing it during the iteration.
* Rename the arguments to listmount() and do_listmount() to clarify what
  the arguments are used for.
* Get rid of the pointless ctr variable and overflow checking.
* Get rid of the pointless speculation check.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAHk-=wjh6Cypo8WC-McXgSzCaou3UXccxB+7PVeSuGR8AjCphg@mail.gmail.com
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20240105' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm</title>
<updated>2024-01-09T20:57:46Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-01-09T20:57:46Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.kobert.dev/pm24.git/commit/?id=063a7ce32ddc2c4f2404b0dfd29e60e3dbcdffac'/>
<id>urn:sha1:063a7ce32ddc2c4f2404b0dfd29e60e3dbcdffac</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull security module updates from Paul Moore:

 - Add three new syscalls: lsm_list_modules(), lsm_get_self_attr(), and
   lsm_set_self_attr().

   The first syscall simply lists the LSMs enabled, while the second and
   third get and set the current process' LSM attributes. Yes, these
   syscalls may provide similar functionality to what can be found under
   /proc or /sys, but they were designed to support multiple,
   simultaneaous (stacked) LSMs from the start as opposed to the current
   /proc based solutions which were created at a time when only one LSM
   was allowed to be active at a given time.

   We have spent considerable time discussing ways to extend the
   existing /proc interfaces to support multiple, simultaneaous LSMs and
   even our best ideas have been far too ugly to support as a kernel
   API; after +20 years in the kernel, I felt the LSM layer had
   established itself enough to justify a handful of syscalls.

   Support amongst the individual LSM developers has been nearly
   unanimous, with a single objection coming from Tetsuo (TOMOYO) as he
   is worried that the LSM_ID_XXX token concept will make it more
   difficult for out-of-tree LSMs to survive. Several members of the LSM
   community have demonstrated the ability for out-of-tree LSMs to
   continue to exist by picking high/unused LSM_ID values as well as
   pointing out that many kernel APIs rely on integer identifiers, e.g.
   syscalls (!), but unfortunately Tetsuo's objections remain.

   My personal opinion is that while I have no interest in penalizing
   out-of-tree LSMs, I'm not going to penalize in-tree development to
   support out-of-tree development, and I view this as a necessary step
   forward to support the push for expanded LSM stacking and reduce our
   reliance on /proc and /sys which has occassionally been problematic
   for some container users. Finally, we have included the linux-api
   folks on (all?) recent revisions of the patchset and addressed all of
   their concerns.

 - Add a new security_file_ioctl_compat() LSM hook to handle the 32-bit
   ioctls on 64-bit systems problem.

   This patch includes support for all of the existing LSMs which
   provide ioctl hooks, although it turns out only SELinux actually
   cares about the individual ioctls. It is worth noting that while
   Casey (Smack) and Tetsuo (TOMOYO) did not give explicit ACKs to this
   patch, they did both indicate they are okay with the changes.

 - Fix a potential memory leak in the CALIPSO code when IPv6 is disabled
   at boot.

   While it's good that we are fixing this, I doubt this is something
   users are seeing in the wild as you need to both disable IPv6 and
   then attempt to configure IPv6 labeled networking via
   NetLabel/CALIPSO; that just doesn't make much sense.

   Normally this would go through netdev, but Jakub asked me to take
   this patch and of all the trees I maintain, the LSM tree seemed like
   the best fit.

 - Update the LSM MAINTAINERS entry with additional information about
   our process docs, patchwork, bug reporting, etc.

   I also noticed that the Lockdown LSM is missing a dedicated
   MAINTAINERS entry so I've added that to the pull request. I've been
   working with one of the major Lockdown authors/contributors to see if
   they are willing to step up and assume a Lockdown maintainer role;
   hopefully that will happen soon, but in the meantime I'll continue to
   look after it.

 - Add a handful of mailmap entries for Serge Hallyn and myself.

* tag 'lsm-pr-20240105' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm: (27 commits)
  lsm: new security_file_ioctl_compat() hook
  lsm: Add a __counted_by() annotation to lsm_ctx.ctx
  calipso: fix memory leak in netlbl_calipso_add_pass()
  selftests: remove the LSM_ID_IMA check in lsm/lsm_list_modules_test
  MAINTAINERS: add an entry for the lockdown LSM
  MAINTAINERS: update the LSM entry
  mailmap: add entries for Serge Hallyn's dead accounts
  mailmap: update/replace my old email addresses
  lsm: mark the lsm_id variables are marked as static
  lsm: convert security_setselfattr() to use memdup_user()
  lsm: align based on pointer length in lsm_fill_user_ctx()
  lsm: consolidate buffer size handling into lsm_fill_user_ctx()
  lsm: correct error codes in security_getselfattr()
  lsm: cleanup the size counters in security_getselfattr()
  lsm: don't yet account for IMA in LSM_CONFIG_COUNT calculation
  lsm: drop LSM_ID_IMA
  LSM: selftests for Linux Security Module syscalls
  SELinux: Add selfattr hooks
  AppArmor: Add selfattr hooks
  Smack: implement setselfattr and getselfattr hooks
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>add listmount(2) syscall</title>
<updated>2023-12-14T10:49:17Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Miklos Szeredi</name>
<email>mszeredi@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-10-25T14:02:03Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.kobert.dev/pm24.git/commit/?id=b4c2bea8ceaa50cd42a8f73667389d801a3ecf2d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b4c2bea8ceaa50cd42a8f73667389d801a3ecf2d</id>
<content type='text'>
Add way to query the children of a particular mount.  This is a more
flexible way to iterate the mount tree than having to parse
/proc/self/mountinfo.

Lookup the mount by the new 64bit mount ID. If a mount needs to be
queried based on path, then statx(2) can be used to first query the
mount ID belonging to the path.

Return an array of new (64bit) mount ID's. Without privileges only
mounts are listed which are reachable from the task's root.

Folded into this patch are several later improvements. Keeping them
separate would make the history pointlessly confusing:

* Recursive listing of mounts is the default now (cf. [1]).
* Remove explicit LISTMOUNT_UNREACHABLE flag (cf. [1]) and fail if mount
  is unreachable from current root. This also makes permission checking
  consistent with statmount() (cf. [3]).
* Start listing mounts in unique mount ID order (cf. [2]) to allow
  continuing listmount() from a midpoint.
* Allow to continue listmount(). The @request_mask parameter is renamed
  and to @param to be usable by both statmount() and listmount().
  If @param is set to a mount id then listmount() will continue listing
  mounts from that id on. This allows listing mounts in multiple
  listmount invocations without having to resize the buffer. If @param
  is zero then the listing starts from the beginning (cf. [4]).
* Don't return EOVERFLOW, instead return the buffer size which allows to
  detect a full buffer as well (cf. [4]).

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231025140205.3586473-6-mszeredi@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Ian Kent &lt;raven@themaw.net&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231128160337.29094-2-mszeredi@redhat.com [1] (folded)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231128160337.29094-3-mszeredi@redhat.com [2] (folded)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231128160337.29094-4-mszeredi@redhat.com [3] (folded)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231128160337.29094-5-mszeredi@redhat.com [4] (folded)
[Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;: various smaller fixes]
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>add statmount(2) syscall</title>
<updated>2023-12-11T18:11:02Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Miklos Szeredi</name>
<email>mszeredi@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-10-25T14:02:02Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.kobert.dev/pm24.git/commit/?id=46eae99ef73302f9fb3dddcd67c374b3dffe8fd6'/>
<id>urn:sha1:46eae99ef73302f9fb3dddcd67c374b3dffe8fd6</id>
<content type='text'>
Add a way to query attributes of a single mount instead of having to parse
the complete /proc/$PID/mountinfo, which might be huge.

Lookup the mount the new 64bit mount ID.  If a mount needs to be queried
based on path, then statx(2) can be used to first query the mount ID
belonging to the path.

Design is based on a suggestion by Linus:

  "So I'd suggest something that is very much like "statfsat()", which gets
   a buffer and a length, and returns an extended "struct statfs" *AND*
   just a string description at the end."

The interface closely mimics that of statx.

Handle ASCII attributes by appending after the end of the structure (as per
above suggestion).  Pointers to strings are stored in u64 members to make
the structure the same regardless of pointer size.  Strings are nul
terminated.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAHk-=wh5YifP7hzKSbwJj94+DZ2czjrZsczy6GBimiogZws=rg@mail.gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231025140205.3586473-5-mszeredi@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Ian Kent &lt;raven@themaw.net&gt;
[Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;: various minor changes]
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>LSM: Create lsm_list_modules system call</title>
<updated>2023-11-13T03:54:42Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Casey Schaufler</name>
<email>casey@schaufler-ca.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-09-12T20:56:50Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.kobert.dev/pm24.git/commit/?id=ad4aff9ec25f400608283c10d634cc4eeda83a02'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ad4aff9ec25f400608283c10d634cc4eeda83a02</id>
<content type='text'>
Create a system call to report the list of Linux Security Modules
that are active on the system. The list is provided as an array
of LSM ID numbers.

The calling application can use this list determine what LSM
specific actions it might take. That might include choosing an
output format, determining required privilege or bypassing
security module specific behavior.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mickaël Salaün &lt;mic@digikod.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>LSM: syscalls for current process attributes</title>
<updated>2023-11-13T03:54:42Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Casey Schaufler</name>
<email>casey@schaufler-ca.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-09-12T20:56:49Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.kobert.dev/pm24.git/commit/?id=a04a1198088a1378d0389c250cc684f649bcc91e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a04a1198088a1378d0389c250cc684f649bcc91e</id>
<content type='text'>
Create a system call lsm_get_self_attr() to provide the security
module maintained attributes of the current process.
Create a system call lsm_set_self_attr() to set a security
module maintained attribute of the current process.
Historically these attributes have been exposed to user space via
entries in procfs under /proc/self/attr.

The attribute value is provided in a lsm_ctx structure. The structure
identifies the size of the attribute, and the attribute value. The format
of the attribute value is defined by the security module. A flags field
is included for LSM specific information. It is currently unused and must
be 0. The total size of the data, including the lsm_ctx structure and any
padding, is maintained as well.

struct lsm_ctx {
        __u64 id;
        __u64 flags;
        __u64 len;
        __u64 ctx_len;
        __u8 ctx[];
};

Two new LSM hooks are used to interface with the LSMs.
security_getselfattr() collects the lsm_ctx values from the
LSMs that support the hook, accounting for space requirements.
security_setselfattr() identifies which LSM the attribute is
intended for and passes it along.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'asm-generic-6.7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/asm-generic</title>
<updated>2023-11-02T01:28:33Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-11-02T01:28:33Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.kobert.dev/pm24.git/commit/?id=1e0c505e13162a2abe7c984309cfe2ae976b428d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1e0c505e13162a2abe7c984309cfe2ae976b428d</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull ia64 removal and asm-generic updates from Arnd Bergmann:

 - The ia64 architecture gets its well-earned retirement as planned,
   now that there is one last (mostly) working release that will be
   maintained as an LTS kernel.

 - The architecture specific system call tables are updated for the
   added map_shadow_stack() syscall and to remove references to the
   long-gone sys_lookup_dcookie() syscall.

* tag 'asm-generic-6.7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/asm-generic:
  hexagon: Remove unusable symbols from the ptrace.h uapi
  asm-generic: Fix spelling of architecture
  arch: Reserve map_shadow_stack() syscall number for all architectures
  syscalls: Cleanup references to sys_lookup_dcookie()
  Documentation: Drop or replace remaining mentions of IA64
  lib/raid6: Drop IA64 support
  Documentation: Drop IA64 from feature descriptions
  kernel: Drop IA64 support from sig_fault handlers
  arch: Remove Itanium (IA-64) architecture
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
