<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>pm24.git/kernel/sysctl.c, branch v5.2-rc4</title>
<subtitle>Unnamed repository; edit this file 'description' to name the repository.
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.kobert.dev/pm24.git/atom?h=v5.2-rc4</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.kobert.dev/pm24.git/atom?h=v5.2-rc4'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.kobert.dev/pm24.git/'/>
<updated>2019-05-21T08:50:45Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>treewide: Add SPDX license identifier for missed files</title>
<updated>2019-05-21T08:50:45Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-19T12:08:55Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.kobert.dev/pm24.git/commit/?id=457c89965399115e5cd8bf38f9c597293405703d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:457c89965399115e5cd8bf38f9c597293405703d</id>
<content type='text'>
Add SPDX license identifiers to all files which:

 - Have no license information of any form

 - Have EXPORT_.*_SYMBOL_GPL inside which was used in the
   initial scan/conversion to ignore the file

These files fall under the project license, GPL v2 only. The resulting SPDX
license identifier is:

  GPL-2.0-only

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kernel/sysctl.c: fix proc_do_large_bitmap for large input buffers</title>
<updated>2019-05-15T02:52:51Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Sandeen</name>
<email>sandeen@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-14T22:45:13Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.kobert.dev/pm24.git/commit/?id=3116ad38f51c98c81175151bd7358858a92a6031'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3116ad38f51c98c81175151bd7358858a92a6031</id>
<content type='text'>
Today, proc_do_large_bitmap() truncates a large write input buffer to
PAGE_SIZE - 1, which may result in misparsed numbers at the (truncated)
end of the buffer.  Further, it fails to notify the caller that the
buffer was truncated, so it doesn't get called iteratively to finish the
entire input buffer.

Tell the caller if there's more work to do by adding the skipped amount
back to left/*lenp before returning.

To fix the misparsing, reset the position if we have completely consumed
a truncated buffer (or if just one char is left, which may be a "-" in a
range), and ask the caller to come back for more.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190320222831.8243-7-mcgrof@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen &lt;sandeen@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain &lt;mcgrof@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Eric Sandeen &lt;sandeen@sandeen.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sysctl: return -EINVAL if val violates minmax</title>
<updated>2019-05-15T02:52:51Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Christian Brauner</name>
<email>christian@brauner.io</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-14T22:44:55Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.kobert.dev/pm24.git/commit/?id=e260ad01f0aa9e96b5386d5cd7184afd949dc457'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e260ad01f0aa9e96b5386d5cd7184afd949dc457</id>
<content type='text'>
Currently when userspace gives us a values that overflow e.g.  file-max
and other callers of __do_proc_doulongvec_minmax() we simply ignore the
new value and leave the current value untouched.

This can be problematic as it gives the illusion that the limit has
indeed be bumped when in fact it failed.  This commit makes sure to
return EINVAL when an overflow is detected.  Please note that this is a
userspace facing change.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190210203943.8227-4-christian@brauner.io
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;christian@brauner.io&gt;
Acked-by: Luis Chamberlain &lt;mcgrof@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Dominik Brodowski &lt;linux@dominikbrodowski.net&gt;
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Joe Lawrence &lt;joe.lawrence@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Waiman Long &lt;longman@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kernel/sysctl.c: switch to bitmap_zalloc()</title>
<updated>2019-05-15T02:52:51Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Andy Shevchenko</name>
<email>andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-14T22:44:52Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.kobert.dev/pm24.git/commit/?id=475dae385497dde3f25271ce77b526a1e54a472a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:475dae385497dde3f25271ce77b526a1e54a472a</id>
<content type='text'>
Switch to bitmap_zalloc() to show clearly what we are allocating.
Besides that it returns pointer of bitmap type instead of opaque void *.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190304094037.57756-1-andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko &lt;andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Luis Chamberlain &lt;mcgrof@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>userfaultfd/sysctl: add vm.unprivileged_userfaultfd</title>
<updated>2019-05-14T16:47:45Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Xu</name>
<email>peterx@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-14T00:16:41Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.kobert.dev/pm24.git/commit/?id=cefdca0a86be517bc390fc4541e3674b8e7803b0'/>
<id>urn:sha1:cefdca0a86be517bc390fc4541e3674b8e7803b0</id>
<content type='text'>
Userfaultfd can be misued to make it easier to exploit existing
use-after-free (and similar) bugs that might otherwise only make a
short window or race condition available.  By using userfaultfd to
stall a kernel thread, a malicious program can keep some state that it
wrote, stable for an extended period, which it can then access using an
existing exploit.  While it doesn't cause the exploit itself, and while
it's not the only thing that can stall a kernel thread when accessing a
memory location, it's one of the few that never needs privilege.

We can add a flag, allowing userfaultfd to be restricted, so that in
general it won't be useable by arbitrary user programs, but in
environments that require userfaultfd it can be turned back on.

Add a global sysctl knob "vm.unprivileged_userfaultfd" to control
whether userfaultfd is allowed by unprivileged users.  When this is
set to zero, only privileged users (root user, or users with the
CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability) will be able to use the userfaultfd
syscalls.

Andrea said:

: The only difference between the bpf sysctl and the userfaultfd sysctl
: this way is that the bpf sysctl adds the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability
: requirement, while userfaultfd adds the CAP_SYS_PTRACE requirement,
: because the userfaultfd monitor is more likely to need CAP_SYS_PTRACE
: already if it's doing other kind of tracking on processes runtime, in
: addition of userfaultfd.  In other words both syscalls works only for
: root, when the two sysctl are opt-in set to 1.

[dgilbert@redhat.com: changelog additions]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: documentation tweak, per Mike]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190319030722.12441-2-peterx@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Peter Xu &lt;peterx@redhat.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Andrea Arcangeli &lt;aarcange@redhat.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Mike Rapoport &lt;rppt@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport &lt;rppt@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andrea Arcangeli &lt;aarcange@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Cc: Luis Chamberlain &lt;mcgrof@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Maxime Coquelin &lt;maxime.coquelin@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Maya Gokhale &lt;gokhale2@llnl.gov&gt;
Cc: Jerome Glisse &lt;jglisse@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov &lt;xemul@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Johannes Weiner &lt;hannes@cmpxchg.org&gt;
Cc: Martin Cracauer &lt;cracauer@cons.org&gt;
Cc: Denis Plotnikov &lt;dplotnikov@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Marty McFadden &lt;mcfadden8@llnl.gov&gt;
Cc: Mike Kravetz &lt;mike.kravetz@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Mel Gorman &lt;mgorman@suse.de&gt;
Cc: "Kirill A . Shutemov" &lt;kirill@shutemov.name&gt;
Cc: "Dr . David Alan Gilbert" &lt;dgilbert@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv6: Add rate limit mask for ICMPv6 messages</title>
<updated>2019-04-18T23:58:37Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephen Suryaputra</name>
<email>ssuryaextr@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-17T20:35:49Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.kobert.dev/pm24.git/commit/?id=0bc199854405543b0debe67c735c0aae94f1d319'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0bc199854405543b0debe67c735c0aae94f1d319</id>
<content type='text'>
To make ICMPv6 closer to ICMPv4, add ratemask parameter. Since the ICMP
message types use larger numeric values, a simple bitmask doesn't fit.
I use large bitmap. The input and output are the in form of list of
ranges. Set the default to rate limit all error messages but Packet Too
Big. For Packet Too Big, use ratemask instead of hard-coded.

There are functions where icmpv6_xrlim_allow() and icmpv6_global_allow()
aren't called. This patch only adds them to icmpv6_echo_reply().

Rate limiting error messages is mandated by RFC 4443 but RFC 4890 says
that it is also acceptable to rate limit informational messages. Thus,
I removed the current hard-coded behavior of icmpv6_mask_allow() that
doesn't rate limit informational messages.

v2: Add dummy function proc_do_large_bitmap() if CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL
    isn't defined, expand the description in ip-sysctl.txt and remove
    unnecessary conditional before kfree().
v3: Inline the bitmap instead of dynamically allocated. Still is a
    pointer to it is needed because of the way proc_do_large_bitmap work.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Suryaputra &lt;ssuryaextr@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kernel/sysctl.c: fix out-of-bounds access when setting file-max</title>
<updated>2019-04-06T02:02:31Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Will Deacon</name>
<email>will.deacon@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-06T01:39:38Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.kobert.dev/pm24.git/commit/?id=9002b21465fa4d829edfc94a5a441005cffaa972'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9002b21465fa4d829edfc94a5a441005cffaa972</id>
<content type='text'>
Commit 32a5ad9c2285 ("sysctl: handle overflow for file-max") hooked up
min/max values for the file-max sysctl parameter via the .extra1 and
.extra2 fields in the corresponding struct ctl_table entry.

Unfortunately, the minimum value points at the global 'zero' variable,
which is an int.  This results in a KASAN splat when accessed as a long
by proc_doulongvec_minmax on 64-bit architectures:

  | BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in __do_proc_doulongvec_minmax+0x5d8/0x6a0
  | Read of size 8 at addr ffff2000133d1c20 by task systemd/1
  |
  | CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Not tainted 5.1.0-rc3-00012-g40b114779944 #2
  | Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
  | Call trace:
  |  dump_backtrace+0x0/0x228
  |  show_stack+0x14/0x20
  |  dump_stack+0xe8/0x124
  |  print_address_description+0x60/0x258
  |  kasan_report+0x140/0x1a0
  |  __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x18/0x20
  |  __do_proc_doulongvec_minmax+0x5d8/0x6a0
  |  proc_doulongvec_minmax+0x4c/0x78
  |  proc_sys_call_handler.isra.19+0x144/0x1d8
  |  proc_sys_write+0x34/0x58
  |  __vfs_write+0x54/0xe8
  |  vfs_write+0x124/0x3c0
  |  ksys_write+0xbc/0x168
  |  __arm64_sys_write+0x68/0x98
  |  el0_svc_common+0x100/0x258
  |  el0_svc_handler+0x48/0xc0
  |  el0_svc+0x8/0xc
  |
  | The buggy address belongs to the variable:
  |  zero+0x0/0x40
  |
  | Memory state around the buggy address:
  |  ffff2000133d1b00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa 04 fa fa fa
  |  ffff2000133d1b80: fa fa fa fa 04 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 04 fa fa fa
  | &gt;ffff2000133d1c00: fa fa fa fa 04 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00
  |                                ^
  |  ffff2000133d1c80: fa fa fa fa 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00
  |  ffff2000133d1d00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

Fix the splat by introducing a unsigned long 'zero_ul' and using that
instead.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190403153409.17307-1-will.deacon@arm.com
Fixes: 32a5ad9c2285 ("sysctl: handle overflow for file-max")
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Christian Brauner &lt;christian@brauner.io&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Matteo Croce &lt;mcroce@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kernel/sysctl.c: define minmax conv functions in terms of non-minmax versions</title>
<updated>2019-03-12T17:04:00Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Zev Weiss</name>
<email>zev@bewilderbeest.net</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-12T06:28:06Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.kobert.dev/pm24.git/commit/?id=2bc4fc60fb3e1a4cae429b889720755ebe9085bb'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2bc4fc60fb3e1a4cae429b889720755ebe9085bb</id>
<content type='text'>
do_proc_do[u]intvec_minmax_conv() had included open-coded versions of
do_proc_do[u]intvec_conv(); the duplication led to buggy inconsistencies
(missing range checks).  To reduce the likelihood of such problems in the
future, we can instead refactor both to be defined in terms of their
non-bounded counterparts (plus the added check).

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190207165138.5oud57vq4ozwb4kh@hatter.bewilderbeest.net
Signed-off-by: Zev Weiss &lt;zev@bewilderbeest.net&gt;
Cc: Brendan Higgins &lt;brendanhiggins@google.com&gt;
Cc: Iurii Zaikin &lt;yzaikin@google.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Luis Chamberlain &lt;mcgrof@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kernel/sysctl.c: add missing range check in do_proc_dointvec_minmax_conv</title>
<updated>2019-03-12T17:04:00Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Zev Weiss</name>
<email>zev@bewilderbeest.net</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-12T06:28:02Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.kobert.dev/pm24.git/commit/?id=8cf7630b29701d364f8df4a50e4f1f5e752b2778'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8cf7630b29701d364f8df4a50e4f1f5e752b2778</id>
<content type='text'>
This bug has apparently existed since the introduction of this function
in the pre-git era (4500e91754d3 in Thomas Gleixner's history.git,
"[NET]: Add proc_dointvec_userhz_jiffies, use it for proper handling of
neighbour sysctls.").

As a minimal fix we can simply duplicate the corresponding check in
do_proc_dointvec_conv().

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190207123426.9202-3-zev@bewilderbeest.net
Signed-off-by: Zev Weiss &lt;zev@bewilderbeest.net&gt;
Cc: Brendan Higgins &lt;brendanhiggins@google.com&gt;
Cc: Iurii Zaikin &lt;yzaikin@google.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Luis Chamberlain &lt;mcgrof@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;	[2.6.2+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net</title>
<updated>2019-03-11T15:54:01Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-11T15:54:01Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.kobert.dev/pm24.git/commit/?id=8f49a658b4ea1d0205068da76b7c8c844817dc44'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8f49a658b4ea1d0205068da76b7c8c844817dc44</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull networking fixes from David Miller:
 "First batch of fixes in the new merge window:

   1) Double dst_cache free in act_tunnel_key, from Wenxu.

   2) Avoid NULL deref in IN_DEV_MFORWARD() by failing early in the
      ip_route_input_rcu() path, from Paolo Abeni.

   3) Fix appletalk compile regression, from Arnd Bergmann.

   4) If SLAB objects reach the TCP sendpage method we are in serious
      trouble, so put a debugging check there. From Vasily Averin.

   5) Memory leak in hsr layer, from Mao Wenan.

   6) Only test GSO type on GSO packets, from Willem de Bruijn.

   7) Fix crash in xsk_diag_put_umem(), from Eric Dumazet.

   8) Fix VNIC mailbox length in nfp, from Dirk van der Merwe.

   9) Fix race in ipv4 route exception handling, from Xin Long.

  10) Missing DMA memory barrier in hns3 driver, from Jian Shen.

  11) Use after free in __tcf_chain_put(), from Vlad Buslov.

  12) Handle inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add() failures, from Guillaume Nault.

  13) Return value correction when ip_mc_may_pull() fails, from Eric
      Dumazet.

  14) Use after free in x25_device_event(), also from Eric"

* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net: (72 commits)
  gro_cells: make sure device is up in gro_cells_receive()
  vxlan: test dev-&gt;flags &amp; IFF_UP before calling gro_cells_receive()
  net/x25: fix use-after-free in x25_device_event()
  isdn: mISDNinfineon: fix potential NULL pointer dereference
  net: hns3: fix to stop multiple HNS reset due to the AER changes
  ip: fix ip_mc_may_pull() return value
  net: keep refcount warning in reqsk_free()
  net: stmmac: Avoid one more sometimes uninitialized Clang warning
  net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: Set correct interface mode for CPU/DSA ports
  rxrpc: Fix client call queueing, waiting for channel
  tcp: handle inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add() failures
  net: ethernet: sun: Zero initialize class in default case in niu_add_ethtool_tcam_entry
  8139too : Add support for U.S. Robotics USR997901A 10/100 Cardbus NIC
  fou, fou6: avoid uninit-value in gue_err() and gue6_err()
  net: sched: fix potential use-after-free in __tcf_chain_put()
  vhost: silence an unused-variable warning
  vsock/virtio: fix kernel panic from virtio_transport_reset_no_sock
  connector: fix unsafe usage of -&gt;real_parent
  vxlan: do not need BH again in vxlan_cleanup()
  net: hns3: add dma_rmb() for rx description
  ...
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
