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| author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2018-01-21 10:48:35 -0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2018-01-21 10:48:35 -0800 |
| commit | 5515114211c5096987b8e622c2ca57929cebabaa (patch) | |
| tree | 73924d90c4a9435b9eb0b29093b7b8a121c78864 /Makefile | |
| parent | 319f1e04c7e7016233f998a1a48cd3d17da2108f (diff) | |
| parent | 3f7d875566d8e79c5e0b2c9a413e91b2c29e0854 (diff) | |
Merge branch 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 pti fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
"A small set of fixes for the meltdown/spectre mitigations:
- Make kprobes aware of retpolines to prevent probes in the retpoline
thunks.
- Make the machine check exception speculation protected. MCE used to
issue an indirect call directly from the ASM entry code. Convert
that to a direct call into a C-function and issue the indirect call
from there so the compiler can add the retpoline protection,
- Make the vmexit_fill_RSB() assembly less stupid
- Fix a typo in the PTI documentation"
* 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/retpoline: Optimize inline assembler for vmexit_fill_RSB
x86/pti: Document fix wrong index
kprobes/x86: Disable optimizing on the function jumps to indirect thunk
kprobes/x86: Blacklist indirect thunk functions for kprobes
retpoline: Introduce start/end markers of indirect thunk
x86/mce: Make machine check speculation protected
Diffstat (limited to 'Makefile')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions