diff options
author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2023-07-03 15:32:22 -0700 |
---|---|---|
committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2023-07-03 15:32:22 -0700 |
commit | e8069f5a8e3bdb5fdeeff895780529388592ee7a (patch) | |
tree | ce35ab85db9b66a7e488707fccdb33ce54f696dd /arch/s390 | |
parent | eded37770c9f80ecd5ba842359c4f1058d9812c3 (diff) | |
parent | 255006adb3da71bb75c334453786df781b415f54 (diff) |
Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm
Pull kvm updates from Paolo Bonzini:
"ARM64:
- Eager page splitting optimization for dirty logging, optionally
allowing for a VM to avoid the cost of hugepage splitting in the
stage-2 fault path.
- Arm FF-A proxy for pKVM, allowing a pKVM host to safely interact
with services that live in the Secure world. pKVM intervenes on
FF-A calls to guarantee the host doesn't misuse memory donated to
the hyp or a pKVM guest.
- Support for running the split hypervisor with VHE enabled, known as
'hVHE' mode. This is extremely useful for testing the split
hypervisor on VHE-only systems, and paves the way for new use cases
that depend on having two TTBRs available at EL2.
- Generalized framework for configurable ID registers from userspace.
KVM/arm64 currently prevents arbitrary CPU feature set
configuration from userspace, but the intent is to relax this
limitation and allow userspace to select a feature set consistent
with the CPU.
- Enable the use of Branch Target Identification (FEAT_BTI) in the
hypervisor.
- Use a separate set of pointer authentication keys for the
hypervisor when running in protected mode, as the host is untrusted
at runtime.
- Ensure timer IRQs are consistently released in the init failure
paths.
- Avoid trapping CTR_EL0 on systems with Enhanced Virtualization
Traps (FEAT_EVT), as it is a register commonly read from userspace.
- Erratum workaround for the upcoming AmpereOne part, which has
broken hardware A/D state management.
RISC-V:
- Redirect AMO load/store misaligned traps to KVM guest
- Trap-n-emulate AIA in-kernel irqchip for KVM guest
- Svnapot support for KVM Guest
s390:
- New uvdevice secret API
- CMM selftest and fixes
- fix racy access to target CPU for diag 9c
x86:
- Fix missing/incorrect #GP checks on ENCLS
- Use standard mmu_notifier hooks for handling APIC access page
- Drop now unnecessary TR/TSS load after VM-Exit on AMD
- Print more descriptive information about the status of SEV and
SEV-ES during module load
- Add a test for splitting and reconstituting hugepages during and
after dirty logging
- Add support for CPU pinning in demand paging test
- Add support for AMD PerfMonV2, with a variety of cleanups and minor
fixes included along the way
- Add a "nx_huge_pages=never" option to effectively avoid creating NX
hugepage recovery threads (because nx_huge_pages=off can be toggled
at runtime)
- Move handling of PAT out of MTRR code and dedup SVM+VMX code
- Fix output of PIC poll command emulation when there's an interrupt
- Add a maintainer's handbook to document KVM x86 processes,
preferred coding style, testing expectations, etc.
- Misc cleanups, fixes and comments
Generic:
- Miscellaneous bugfixes and cleanups
Selftests:
- Generate dependency files so that partial rebuilds work as
expected"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (153 commits)
Documentation/process: Add a maintainer handbook for KVM x86
Documentation/process: Add a label for the tip tree handbook's coding style
KVM: arm64: Fix misuse of KVM_ARM_VCPU_POWER_OFF bit index
RISC-V: KVM: Remove unneeded semicolon
RISC-V: KVM: Allow Svnapot extension for Guest/VM
riscv: kvm: define vcpu_sbi_ext_pmu in header
RISC-V: KVM: Expose IMSIC registers as attributes of AIA irqchip
RISC-V: KVM: Add in-kernel virtualization of AIA IMSIC
RISC-V: KVM: Expose APLIC registers as attributes of AIA irqchip
RISC-V: KVM: Add in-kernel emulation of AIA APLIC
RISC-V: KVM: Implement device interface for AIA irqchip
RISC-V: KVM: Skeletal in-kernel AIA irqchip support
RISC-V: KVM: Set kvm_riscv_aia_nr_hgei to zero
RISC-V: KVM: Add APLIC related defines
RISC-V: KVM: Add IMSIC related defines
RISC-V: KVM: Implement guest external interrupt line management
KVM: x86: Remove PRIx* definitions as they are solely for user space
s390/uv: Update query for secret-UVCs
s390/uv: replace scnprintf with sysfs_emit
s390/uvdevice: Add 'Lock Secret Store' UVC
...
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/s390')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/s390/boot/uv.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h | 32 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/s390/include/uapi/asm/uvdevice.h | 53 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/s390/kernel/uv.c | 108 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/s390/kvm/diag.c | 8 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c | 6 |
7 files changed, 174 insertions, 41 deletions
diff --git a/arch/s390/boot/uv.c b/arch/s390/boot/uv.c index 0a077c0a2056..1e66d2cbb096 100644 --- a/arch/s390/boot/uv.c +++ b/arch/s390/boot/uv.c @@ -47,6 +47,10 @@ void uv_query_info(void) uv_info.conf_dump_finalize_len = uvcb.conf_dump_finalize_len; uv_info.supp_att_req_hdr_ver = uvcb.supp_att_req_hdr_ver; uv_info.supp_att_pflags = uvcb.supp_att_pflags; + uv_info.supp_add_secret_req_ver = uvcb.supp_add_secret_req_ver; + uv_info.supp_add_secret_pcf = uvcb.supp_add_secret_pcf; + uv_info.supp_secret_types = uvcb.supp_secret_types; + uv_info.max_secrets = uvcb.max_secrets; } #ifdef CONFIG_PROTECTED_VIRTUALIZATION_GUEST diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h index 28a9ad57b6f1..d6bb2f4f78d1 100644 --- a/arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h +++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h @@ -58,6 +58,9 @@ #define UVC_CMD_SET_SHARED_ACCESS 0x1000 #define UVC_CMD_REMOVE_SHARED_ACCESS 0x1001 #define UVC_CMD_RETR_ATTEST 0x1020 +#define UVC_CMD_ADD_SECRET 0x1031 +#define UVC_CMD_LIST_SECRETS 0x1033 +#define UVC_CMD_LOCK_SECRETS 0x1034 /* Bits in installed uv calls */ enum uv_cmds_inst { @@ -88,6 +91,9 @@ enum uv_cmds_inst { BIT_UVC_CMD_DUMP_CPU = 26, BIT_UVC_CMD_DUMP_COMPLETE = 27, BIT_UVC_CMD_RETR_ATTEST = 28, + BIT_UVC_CMD_ADD_SECRET = 29, + BIT_UVC_CMD_LIST_SECRETS = 30, + BIT_UVC_CMD_LOCK_SECRETS = 31, }; enum uv_feat_ind { @@ -117,7 +123,7 @@ struct uv_cb_qui { u32 reserved70[3]; /* 0x0070 */ u32 max_num_sec_conf; /* 0x007c */ u64 max_guest_stor_addr; /* 0x0080 */ - u8 reserved88[158 - 136]; /* 0x0088 */ + u8 reserved88[0x9e - 0x88]; /* 0x0088 */ u16 max_guest_cpu_id; /* 0x009e */ u64 uv_feature_indications; /* 0x00a0 */ u64 reserveda8; /* 0x00a8 */ @@ -129,7 +135,12 @@ struct uv_cb_qui { u64 reservedd8; /* 0x00d8 */ u64 supp_att_req_hdr_ver; /* 0x00e0 */ u64 supp_att_pflags; /* 0x00e8 */ - u8 reservedf0[256 - 240]; /* 0x00f0 */ + u64 reservedf0; /* 0x00f0 */ + u64 supp_add_secret_req_ver; /* 0x00f8 */ + u64 supp_add_secret_pcf; /* 0x0100 */ + u64 supp_secret_types; /* 0x0180 */ + u16 max_secrets; /* 0x0110 */ + u8 reserved112[0x120 - 0x112]; /* 0x0112 */ } __packed __aligned(8); /* Initialize Ultravisor */ @@ -292,6 +303,19 @@ struct uv_cb_dump_complete { u64 reserved30[5]; } __packed __aligned(8); +/* + * A common UV call struct for pv guests that contains a single address + * Examples: + * Add Secret + * List Secrets + */ +struct uv_cb_guest_addr { + struct uv_cb_header header; + u64 reserved08[3]; + u64 addr; + u64 reserved28[4]; +} __packed __aligned(8); + static inline int __uv_call(unsigned long r1, unsigned long r2) { int cc; @@ -365,6 +389,10 @@ struct uv_info { unsigned long conf_dump_finalize_len; unsigned long supp_att_req_hdr_ver; unsigned long supp_att_pflags; + unsigned long supp_add_secret_req_ver; + unsigned long supp_add_secret_pcf; + unsigned long supp_secret_types; + unsigned short max_secrets; }; extern struct uv_info uv_info; diff --git a/arch/s390/include/uapi/asm/uvdevice.h b/arch/s390/include/uapi/asm/uvdevice.h index 10a5ac918e02..b9c2f14a6af3 100644 --- a/arch/s390/include/uapi/asm/uvdevice.h +++ b/arch/s390/include/uapi/asm/uvdevice.h @@ -32,6 +32,33 @@ struct uvio_attest { __u16 reserved136; /* 0x0136 */ }; +/** + * uvio_uvdev_info - Information of supported functions + * @supp_uvio_cmds - supported IOCTLs by this device + * @supp_uv_cmds - supported UVCs corresponding to the IOCTL + * + * UVIO request to get information about supported request types by this + * uvdevice and the Ultravisor. Everything is output. Bits are in LSB0 + * ordering. If the bit is set in both, @supp_uvio_cmds and @supp_uv_cmds, the + * uvdevice and the Ultravisor support that call. + * + * Note that bit 0 (UVIO_IOCTL_UVDEV_INFO_NR) is always zero for `supp_uv_cmds` + * as there is no corresponding UV-call. + */ +struct uvio_uvdev_info { + /* + * If bit `n` is set, this device supports the IOCTL with nr `n`. + */ + __u64 supp_uvio_cmds; + /* + * If bit `n` is set, the Ultravisor(UV) supports the UV-call + * corresponding to the IOCTL with nr `n` in the calling contextx (host + * or guest). The value is only valid if the corresponding bit in + * @supp_uvio_cmds is set as well. + */ + __u64 supp_uv_cmds; +}; + /* * The following max values define an upper length for the IOCTL in/out buffers. * However, they do not represent the maximum the Ultravisor allows which is @@ -42,10 +69,34 @@ struct uvio_attest { #define UVIO_ATT_ARCB_MAX_LEN 0x100000 #define UVIO_ATT_MEASUREMENT_MAX_LEN 0x8000 #define UVIO_ATT_ADDITIONAL_MAX_LEN 0x8000 +#define UVIO_ADD_SECRET_MAX_LEN 0x100000 +#define UVIO_LIST_SECRETS_LEN 0x1000 #define UVIO_DEVICE_NAME "uv" #define UVIO_TYPE_UVC 'u' -#define UVIO_IOCTL_ATT _IOWR(UVIO_TYPE_UVC, 0x01, struct uvio_ioctl_cb) +enum UVIO_IOCTL_NR { + UVIO_IOCTL_UVDEV_INFO_NR = 0x00, + UVIO_IOCTL_ATT_NR, + UVIO_IOCTL_ADD_SECRET_NR, + UVIO_IOCTL_LIST_SECRETS_NR, + UVIO_IOCTL_LOCK_SECRETS_NR, + /* must be the last entry */ + UVIO_IOCTL_NUM_IOCTLS +}; + +#define UVIO_IOCTL(nr) _IOWR(UVIO_TYPE_UVC, nr, struct uvio_ioctl_cb) +#define UVIO_IOCTL_UVDEV_INFO UVIO_IOCTL(UVIO_IOCTL_UVDEV_INFO_NR) +#define UVIO_IOCTL_ATT UVIO_IOCTL(UVIO_IOCTL_ATT_NR) +#define UVIO_IOCTL_ADD_SECRET UVIO_IOCTL(UVIO_IOCTL_ADD_SECRET_NR) +#define UVIO_IOCTL_LIST_SECRETS UVIO_IOCTL(UVIO_IOCTL_LIST_SECRETS_NR) +#define UVIO_IOCTL_LOCK_SECRETS UVIO_IOCTL(UVIO_IOCTL_LOCK_SECRETS_NR) + +#define UVIO_SUPP_CALL(nr) (1ULL << (nr)) +#define UVIO_SUPP_UDEV_INFO UVIO_SUPP_CALL(UVIO_IOCTL_UDEV_INFO_NR) +#define UVIO_SUPP_ATT UVIO_SUPP_CALL(UVIO_IOCTL_ATT_NR) +#define UVIO_SUPP_ADD_SECRET UVIO_SUPP_CALL(UVIO_IOCTL_ADD_SECRET_NR) +#define UVIO_SUPP_LIST_SECRETS UVIO_SUPP_CALL(UVIO_IOCTL_LIST_SECRETS_NR) +#define UVIO_SUPP_LOCK_SECRETS UVIO_SUPP_CALL(UVIO_IOCTL_LOCK_SECRETS_NR) #endif /* __S390_ASM_UVDEVICE_H */ diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c b/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c index 3c62d1b218b1..66f0eb1c872b 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c +++ b/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c @@ -23,12 +23,20 @@ int __bootdata_preserved(prot_virt_guest); #endif +/* + * uv_info contains both host and guest information but it's currently only + * expected to be used within modules if it's the KVM module or for + * any PV guest module. + * + * The kernel itself will write these values once in uv_query_info() + * and then make some of them readable via a sysfs interface. + */ struct uv_info __bootdata_preserved(uv_info); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(uv_info); #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM) int __bootdata_preserved(prot_virt_host); EXPORT_SYMBOL(prot_virt_host); -EXPORT_SYMBOL(uv_info); static int __init uv_init(phys_addr_t stor_base, unsigned long stor_len) { @@ -462,13 +470,13 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(arch_make_page_accessible); #if defined(CONFIG_PROTECTED_VIRTUALIZATION_GUEST) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM) static ssize_t uv_query_facilities(struct kobject *kobj, - struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *page) + struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf) { - return scnprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "%lx\n%lx\n%lx\n%lx\n", - uv_info.inst_calls_list[0], - uv_info.inst_calls_list[1], - uv_info.inst_calls_list[2], - uv_info.inst_calls_list[3]); + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%lx\n%lx\n%lx\n%lx\n", + uv_info.inst_calls_list[0], + uv_info.inst_calls_list[1], + uv_info.inst_calls_list[2], + uv_info.inst_calls_list[3]); } static struct kobj_attribute uv_query_facilities_attr = @@ -493,30 +501,27 @@ static struct kobj_attribute uv_query_supp_se_hdr_pcf_attr = __ATTR(supp_se_hdr_pcf, 0444, uv_query_supp_se_hdr_pcf, NULL); static ssize_t uv_query_dump_cpu_len(struct kobject *kobj, - struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *page) + struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf) { - return scnprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "%lx\n", - uv_info.guest_cpu_stor_len); + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%lx\n", uv_info.guest_cpu_stor_len); } static struct kobj_attribute uv_query_dump_cpu_len_attr = __ATTR(uv_query_dump_cpu_len, 0444, uv_query_dump_cpu_len, NULL); static ssize_t uv_query_dump_storage_state_len(struct kobject *kobj, - struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *page) + struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf) { - return scnprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "%lx\n", - uv_info.conf_dump_storage_state_len); + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%lx\n", uv_info.conf_dump_storage_state_len); } static struct kobj_attribute uv_query_dump_storage_state_len_attr = __ATTR(dump_storage_state_len, 0444, uv_query_dump_storage_state_len, NULL); static ssize_t uv_query_dump_finalize_len(struct kobject *kobj, - struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *page) + struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf) { - return scnprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "%lx\n", - uv_info.conf_dump_finalize_len); + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%lx\n", uv_info.conf_dump_finalize_len); } static struct kobj_attribute uv_query_dump_finalize_len_attr = @@ -532,53 +537,86 @@ static struct kobj_attribute uv_query_feature_indications_attr = __ATTR(feature_indications, 0444, uv_query_feature_indications, NULL); static ssize_t uv_query_max_guest_cpus(struct kobject *kobj, - struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *page) + struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf) { - return scnprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", - uv_info.max_guest_cpu_id + 1); + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n", uv_info.max_guest_cpu_id + 1); } static struct kobj_attribute uv_query_max_guest_cpus_attr = __ATTR(max_cpus, 0444, uv_query_max_guest_cpus, NULL); static ssize_t uv_query_max_guest_vms(struct kobject *kobj, - struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *page) + struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf) { - return scnprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", - uv_info.max_num_sec_conf); + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n", uv_info.max_num_sec_conf); } static struct kobj_attribute uv_query_max_guest_vms_attr = __ATTR(max_guests, 0444, uv_query_max_guest_vms, NULL); static ssize_t uv_query_max_guest_addr(struct kobject *kobj, - struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *page) + struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf) { - return scnprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "%lx\n", - uv_info.max_sec_stor_addr); + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%lx\n", uv_info.max_sec_stor_addr); } static struct kobj_attribute uv_query_max_guest_addr_attr = __ATTR(max_address, 0444, uv_query_max_guest_addr, NULL); static ssize_t uv_query_supp_att_req_hdr_ver(struct kobject *kobj, - struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *page) + struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf) { - return scnprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "%lx\n", uv_info.supp_att_req_hdr_ver); + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%lx\n", uv_info.supp_att_req_hdr_ver); } static struct kobj_attribute uv_query_supp_att_req_hdr_ver_attr = __ATTR(supp_att_req_hdr_ver, 0444, uv_query_supp_att_req_hdr_ver, NULL); static ssize_t uv_query_supp_att_pflags(struct kobject *kobj, - struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *page) + struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf) { - return scnprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "%lx\n", uv_info.supp_att_pflags); + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%lx\n", uv_info.supp_att_pflags); } static struct kobj_attribute uv_query_supp_att_pflags_attr = __ATTR(supp_att_pflags, 0444, uv_query_supp_att_pflags, NULL); +static ssize_t uv_query_supp_add_secret_req_ver(struct kobject *kobj, + struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf) +{ + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%lx\n", uv_info.supp_add_secret_req_ver); +} + +static struct kobj_attribute uv_query_supp_add_secret_req_ver_attr = + __ATTR(supp_add_secret_req_ver, 0444, uv_query_supp_add_secret_req_ver, NULL); + +static ssize_t uv_query_supp_add_secret_pcf(struct kobject *kobj, + struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf) +{ + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%lx\n", uv_info.supp_add_secret_pcf); +} + +static struct kobj_attribute uv_query_supp_add_secret_pcf_attr = + __ATTR(supp_add_secret_pcf, 0444, uv_query_supp_add_secret_pcf, NULL); + +static ssize_t uv_query_supp_secret_types(struct kobject *kobj, + struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf) +{ + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%lx\n", uv_info.supp_secret_types); +} + +static struct kobj_attribute uv_query_supp_secret_types_attr = + __ATTR(supp_secret_types, 0444, uv_query_supp_secret_types, NULL); + +static ssize_t uv_query_max_secrets(struct kobject *kobj, + struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf) +{ + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n", uv_info.max_secrets); +} + +static struct kobj_attribute uv_query_max_secrets_attr = + __ATTR(max_secrets, 0444, uv_query_max_secrets, NULL); + static struct attribute *uv_query_attrs[] = { &uv_query_facilities_attr.attr, &uv_query_feature_indications_attr.attr, @@ -592,6 +630,10 @@ static struct attribute *uv_query_attrs[] = { &uv_query_dump_cpu_len_attr.attr, &uv_query_supp_att_req_hdr_ver_attr.attr, &uv_query_supp_att_pflags_attr.attr, + &uv_query_supp_add_secret_req_ver_attr.attr, + &uv_query_supp_add_secret_pcf_attr.attr, + &uv_query_supp_secret_types_attr.attr, + &uv_query_max_secrets_attr.attr, NULL, }; @@ -600,18 +642,18 @@ static struct attribute_group uv_query_attr_group = { }; static ssize_t uv_is_prot_virt_guest(struct kobject *kobj, - struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *page) + struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf) { int val = 0; #ifdef CONFIG_PROTECTED_VIRTUALIZATION_GUEST val = prot_virt_guest; #endif - return scnprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", val); + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n", val); } static ssize_t uv_is_prot_virt_host(struct kobject *kobj, - struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *page) + struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf) { int val = 0; @@ -619,7 +661,7 @@ static ssize_t uv_is_prot_virt_host(struct kobject *kobj, val = prot_virt_host; #endif - return scnprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", val); + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n", val); } static struct kobj_attribute uv_prot_virt_guest = diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/diag.c b/arch/s390/kvm/diag.c index 807fa9da1e72..3c65b8258ae6 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kvm/diag.c +++ b/arch/s390/kvm/diag.c @@ -166,6 +166,7 @@ static int diag9c_forwarding_overrun(void) static int __diag_time_slice_end_directed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { struct kvm_vcpu *tcpu; + int tcpu_cpu; int tid; tid = vcpu->run->s.regs.gprs[(vcpu->arch.sie_block->ipa & 0xf0) >> 4]; @@ -181,14 +182,15 @@ static int __diag_time_slice_end_directed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) goto no_yield; /* target guest VCPU already running */ - if (READ_ONCE(tcpu->cpu) >= 0) { + tcpu_cpu = READ_ONCE(tcpu->cpu); + if (tcpu_cpu >= 0) { if (!diag9c_forwarding_hz || diag9c_forwarding_overrun()) goto no_yield; /* target host CPU already running */ - if (!vcpu_is_preempted(tcpu->cpu)) + if (!vcpu_is_preempted(tcpu_cpu)) goto no_yield; - smp_yield_cpu(tcpu->cpu); + smp_yield_cpu(tcpu_cpu); VCPU_EVENT(vcpu, 5, "diag time slice end directed to %d: yield forwarded", tid); diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c b/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c index 17b81659cdb2..670019696464 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c +++ b/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c @@ -2156,6 +2156,10 @@ static unsigned long kvm_s390_next_dirty_cmma(struct kvm_memslots *slots, ms = container_of(mnode, struct kvm_memory_slot, gfn_node[slots->node_idx]); ofs = 0; } + + if (cur_gfn < ms->base_gfn) + ofs = 0; + ofs = find_next_bit(kvm_second_dirty_bitmap(ms), ms->npages, ofs); while (ofs >= ms->npages && (mnode = rb_next(mnode))) { ms = container_of(mnode, struct kvm_memory_slot, gfn_node[slots->node_idx]); diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c b/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c index 8d6b765abf29..0333ee482eb8 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c +++ b/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c @@ -177,7 +177,8 @@ static int setup_apcb00(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long *apcb_s, sizeof(struct kvm_s390_apcb0))) return -EFAULT; - bitmap_and(apcb_s, apcb_s, apcb_h, sizeof(struct kvm_s390_apcb0)); + bitmap_and(apcb_s, apcb_s, apcb_h, + BITS_PER_BYTE * sizeof(struct kvm_s390_apcb0)); return 0; } @@ -203,7 +204,8 @@ static int setup_apcb11(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long *apcb_s, sizeof(struct kvm_s390_apcb1))) return -EFAULT; - bitmap_and(apcb_s, apcb_s, apcb_h, sizeof(struct kvm_s390_apcb1)); + bitmap_and(apcb_s, apcb_s, apcb_h, + BITS_PER_BYTE * sizeof(struct kvm_s390_apcb1)); return 0; } |