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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2016-01-12 13:27:18 -0800
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2016-01-12 13:27:18 -0800
commit4f31d774dd5239e563f22ffe1403292414e6f779 (patch)
tree5edfdcc2adf491f340510694b8718d09378fdd15 /arch/um/Kconfig.um
parent1baa5efbeb6eb75de697f7b5931094be33f12005 (diff)
parent3e46b25376321db119bc8507ce8c8841c580e736 (diff)
Merge branch 'for-linus-4.5-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rw/uml
Pull UML updates from Richard Weinberger: "This contains beside of random fixes/cleanups two bigger changes: - seccomp support by Mickaël Salaün - IRQ rework by Anton Ivanov" * 'for-linus-4.5-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rw/uml: um: Use race-free temporary file creation um: Do not set unsecure permission for temporary file um: Fix build error and kconfig for i386 um: Add seccomp support um: Add full asm/syscall.h support selftests/seccomp: Remove the need for HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK um: Fix ptrace GETREGS/SETREGS bugs um: link with -lpthread um: Update UBD to use pread/pwrite family of functions um: Do not change hard IRQ flags in soft IRQ processing um: Prevent IRQ handler reentrancy uml: flush stdout before forking uml: fix hostfs mknod()
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/um/Kconfig.um')
-rw-r--r--arch/um/Kconfig.um16
1 files changed, 16 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/um/Kconfig.um b/arch/um/Kconfig.um
index 28a9885e3a37..4b2ed5858b2e 100644
--- a/arch/um/Kconfig.um
+++ b/arch/um/Kconfig.um
@@ -104,3 +104,19 @@ config PGTABLE_LEVELS
int
default 3 if 3_LEVEL_PGTABLES
default 2
+
+config SECCOMP
+ def_bool y
+ prompt "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
+ ---help---
+ This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applications
+ that may need to compute untrusted bytecode during their
+ execution. By using pipes or other transports made available to
+ the process as file descriptors supporting the read/write
+ syscalls, it's possible to isolate those applications in
+ their own address space using seccomp. Once seccomp is
+ enabled via prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP), it cannot be disabled
+ and the task is only allowed to execute a few safe syscalls
+ defined by each seccomp mode.
+
+ If unsure, say Y.