diff options
author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2016-01-12 13:27:18 -0800 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2016-01-12 13:27:18 -0800 |
commit | 4f31d774dd5239e563f22ffe1403292414e6f779 (patch) | |
tree | 5edfdcc2adf491f340510694b8718d09378fdd15 /arch/um/Kconfig.um | |
parent | 1baa5efbeb6eb75de697f7b5931094be33f12005 (diff) | |
parent | 3e46b25376321db119bc8507ce8c8841c580e736 (diff) |
Merge branch 'for-linus-4.5-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rw/uml
Pull UML updates from Richard Weinberger:
"This contains beside of random fixes/cleanups two bigger changes:
- seccomp support by Mickaël Salaün
- IRQ rework by Anton Ivanov"
* 'for-linus-4.5-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rw/uml:
um: Use race-free temporary file creation
um: Do not set unsecure permission for temporary file
um: Fix build error and kconfig for i386
um: Add seccomp support
um: Add full asm/syscall.h support
selftests/seccomp: Remove the need for HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK
um: Fix ptrace GETREGS/SETREGS bugs
um: link with -lpthread
um: Update UBD to use pread/pwrite family of functions
um: Do not change hard IRQ flags in soft IRQ processing
um: Prevent IRQ handler reentrancy
uml: flush stdout before forking
uml: fix hostfs mknod()
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/um/Kconfig.um')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/um/Kconfig.um | 16 |
1 files changed, 16 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/um/Kconfig.um b/arch/um/Kconfig.um index 28a9885e3a37..4b2ed5858b2e 100644 --- a/arch/um/Kconfig.um +++ b/arch/um/Kconfig.um @@ -104,3 +104,19 @@ config PGTABLE_LEVELS int default 3 if 3_LEVEL_PGTABLES default 2 + +config SECCOMP + def_bool y + prompt "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode" + ---help--- + This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applications + that may need to compute untrusted bytecode during their + execution. By using pipes or other transports made available to + the process as file descriptors supporting the read/write + syscalls, it's possible to isolate those applications in + their own address space using seccomp. Once seccomp is + enabled via prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP), it cannot be disabled + and the task is only allowed to execute a few safe syscalls + defined by each seccomp mode. + + If unsure, say Y. |