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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2024-03-11 17:44:11 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2024-03-11 17:44:11 -0700
commit38b334fc767e44816be087b3ec5d84b1438b735f (patch)
tree6ee0cc2a1f738df713708ab6d83d6d3b44327eda /arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
parent2edfd1046f555db6456514bc8ffe0847537e54f4 (diff)
parentc0935fca6ba4799e5efc6daeee37887e84707d01 (diff)
Merge tag 'x86_sev_for_v6.9_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 SEV updates from Borislav Petkov: - Add the x86 part of the SEV-SNP host support. This will allow the kernel to be used as a KVM hypervisor capable of running SNP (Secure Nested Paging) guests. Roughly speaking, SEV-SNP is the ultimate goal of the AMD confidential computing side, providing the most comprehensive confidential computing environment up to date. This is the x86 part and there is a KVM part which did not get ready in time for the merge window so latter will be forthcoming in the next cycle. - Rework the early code's position-dependent SEV variable references in order to allow building the kernel with clang and -fPIE/-fPIC and -mcmodel=kernel - The usual set of fixes, cleanups and improvements all over the place * tag 'x86_sev_for_v6.9_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (36 commits) x86/sev: Disable KMSAN for memory encryption TUs x86/sev: Dump SEV_STATUS crypto: ccp - Have it depend on AMD_IOMMU iommu/amd: Fix failure return from snp_lookup_rmpentry() x86/sev: Fix position dependent variable references in startup code crypto: ccp: Make snp_range_list static x86/Kconfig: Remove CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT Documentation: virt: Fix up pre-formatted text block for SEV ioctls crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_SET_CONFIG command crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_COMMIT command crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS command x86/cpufeatures: Enable/unmask SEV-SNP CPU feature KVM: SEV: Make AVIC backing, VMSA and VMCB memory allocation SNP safe crypto: ccp: Add panic notifier for SEV/SNP firmware shutdown on kdump iommu/amd: Clean up RMP entries for IOMMU pages during SNP shutdown crypto: ccp: Handle legacy SEV commands when SNP is enabled crypto: ccp: Handle non-volatile INIT_EX data when SNP is enabled crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy TMR allocation when SNP is enabled x86/sev: Introduce an SNP leaked pages list crypto: ccp: Provide an API to issue SEV and SNP commands ...
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c')
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c7
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index c44e6f0c8972..e5d7dcaea209 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1309,8 +1309,13 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
/*
* AMD's AutoIBRS is equivalent to Intel's eIBRS - use the Intel feature
* flag and protect from vendor-specific bugs via the whitelist.
+ *
+ * Don't use AutoIBRS when SNP is enabled because it degrades host
+ * userspace indirect branch performance.
*/
- if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL) || cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS)) {
+ if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL) ||
+ (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS) &&
+ !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP))) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED);
if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_EIBRS_PBRSB) &&
!(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO))