x86/xen: eliminate xen-asm_64.S

With 32-bit pv-guest support removed xen-asm_64.S can be merged with
xen-asm.S

Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>

1 files changed, 179 insertions, 1 deletions

diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S b/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S
index c59d077510bf..1cb0e84b9161 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S
@@ -6,12 +6,18 @@
  * operations here; the indirect forms are better handled in C.
  */
 
+#include <asm/errno.h>
 #include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
 #include <asm/percpu.h>
 #include <asm/processor-flags.h>
-#include <asm/frame.h>
+#include <asm/segment.h>
+#include <asm/thread_info.h>
 #include <asm/asm.h>
+#include <asm/frame.h>
+
+#include <xen/interface/xen.h>
 
+#include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/linkage.h>
 
 /*
@@ -137,3 +143,175 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(xen_read_cr2_direct)
 	FRAME_END
 	ret
 SYM_FUNC_END(xen_read_cr2_direct);
+
+.macro xen_pv_trap name
+SYM_CODE_START(xen_\name)
+	pop %rcx
+	pop %r11
+	jmp  \name
+SYM_CODE_END(xen_\name)
+_ASM_NOKPROBE(xen_\name)
+.endm
+
+xen_pv_trap asm_exc_divide_error
+xen_pv_trap asm_xenpv_exc_debug
+xen_pv_trap asm_exc_int3
+xen_pv_trap asm_xenpv_exc_nmi
+xen_pv_trap asm_exc_overflow
+xen_pv_trap asm_exc_bounds
+xen_pv_trap asm_exc_invalid_op
+xen_pv_trap asm_exc_device_not_available
+xen_pv_trap asm_exc_double_fault
+xen_pv_trap asm_exc_coproc_segment_overrun
+xen_pv_trap asm_exc_invalid_tss
+xen_pv_trap asm_exc_segment_not_present
+xen_pv_trap asm_exc_stack_segment
+xen_pv_trap asm_exc_general_protection
+xen_pv_trap asm_exc_page_fault
+xen_pv_trap asm_exc_spurious_interrupt_bug
+xen_pv_trap asm_exc_coprocessor_error
+xen_pv_trap asm_exc_alignment_check
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE
+xen_pv_trap asm_exc_machine_check
+#endif /* CONFIG_X86_MCE */
+xen_pv_trap asm_exc_simd_coprocessor_error
+#ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION
+xen_pv_trap entry_INT80_compat
+#endif
+xen_pv_trap asm_exc_xen_hypervisor_callback
+
+	__INIT
+SYM_CODE_START(xen_early_idt_handler_array)
+	i = 0
+	.rept NUM_EXCEPTION_VECTORS
+	pop %rcx
+	pop %r11
+	jmp early_idt_handler_array + i*EARLY_IDT_HANDLER_SIZE
+	i = i + 1
+	.fill xen_early_idt_handler_array + i*XEN_EARLY_IDT_HANDLER_SIZE - ., 1, 0xcc
+	.endr
+SYM_CODE_END(xen_early_idt_handler_array)
+	__FINIT
+
+hypercall_iret = hypercall_page + __HYPERVISOR_iret * 32
+/*
+ * Xen64 iret frame:
+ *
+ *	ss
+ *	rsp
+ *	rflags
+ *	cs
+ *	rip		<-- standard iret frame
+ *
+ *	flags
+ *
+ *	rcx		}
+ *	r11		}<-- pushed by hypercall page
+ * rsp->rax		}
+ */
+SYM_CODE_START(xen_iret)
+	pushq $0
+	jmp hypercall_iret
+SYM_CODE_END(xen_iret)
+
+SYM_CODE_START(xen_sysret64)
+	/*
+	 * We're already on the usermode stack at this point, but
+	 * still with the kernel gs, so we can easily switch back.
+	 *
+	 * tss.sp2 is scratch space.
+	 */
+	movq %rsp, PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_tss_rw + TSS_sp2)
+	movq PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %rsp
+
+	pushq $__USER_DS
+	pushq PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_tss_rw + TSS_sp2)
+	pushq %r11
+	pushq $__USER_CS
+	pushq %rcx
+
+	pushq $VGCF_in_syscall
+	jmp hypercall_iret
+SYM_CODE_END(xen_sysret64)
+
+/*
+ * Xen handles syscall callbacks much like ordinary exceptions, which
+ * means we have:
+ * - kernel gs
+ * - kernel rsp
+ * - an iret-like stack frame on the stack (including rcx and r11):
+ *	ss
+ *	rsp
+ *	rflags
+ *	cs
+ *	rip
+ *	r11
+ * rsp->rcx
+ */
+
+/* Normal 64-bit system call target */
+SYM_FUNC_START(xen_syscall_target)
+	popq %rcx
+	popq %r11
+
+	/*
+	 * Neither Xen nor the kernel really knows what the old SS and
+	 * CS were.  The kernel expects __USER_DS and __USER_CS, so
+	 * report those values even though Xen will guess its own values.
+	 */
+	movq $__USER_DS, 4*8(%rsp)
+	movq $__USER_CS, 1*8(%rsp)
+
+	jmp entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe
+SYM_FUNC_END(xen_syscall_target)
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION
+
+/* 32-bit compat syscall target */
+SYM_FUNC_START(xen_syscall32_target)
+	popq %rcx
+	popq %r11
+
+	/*
+	 * Neither Xen nor the kernel really knows what the old SS and
+	 * CS were.  The kernel expects __USER32_DS and __USER32_CS, so
+	 * report those values even though Xen will guess its own values.
+	 */
+	movq $__USER32_DS, 4*8(%rsp)
+	movq $__USER32_CS, 1*8(%rsp)
+
+	jmp entry_SYSCALL_compat_after_hwframe
+SYM_FUNC_END(xen_syscall32_target)
+
+/* 32-bit compat sysenter target */
+SYM_FUNC_START(xen_sysenter_target)
+	/*
+	 * NB: Xen is polite and clears TF from EFLAGS for us.  This means
+	 * that we don't need to guard against single step exceptions here.
+	 */
+	popq %rcx
+	popq %r11
+
+	/*
+	 * Neither Xen nor the kernel really knows what the old SS and
+	 * CS were.  The kernel expects __USER32_DS and __USER32_CS, so
+	 * report those values even though Xen will guess its own values.
+	 */
+	movq $__USER32_DS, 4*8(%rsp)
+	movq $__USER32_CS, 1*8(%rsp)
+
+	jmp entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe
+SYM_FUNC_END(xen_sysenter_target)
+
+#else /* !CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION */
+
+SYM_FUNC_START_ALIAS(xen_syscall32_target)
+SYM_FUNC_START(xen_sysenter_target)
+	lea 16(%rsp), %rsp	/* strip %rcx, %r11 */
+	mov $-ENOSYS, %rax
+	pushq $0
+	jmp hypercall_iret
+SYM_FUNC_END(xen_sysenter_target)
+SYM_FUNC_END_ALIAS(xen_syscall32_target)
+
+#endif	/* CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION */