nfs: disintegrate UAPI for nfs

This is to complete part of the Userspace API (UAPI) disintegration for which
the preparatory patches were pulled recently.  After these patches, userspace
headers will be segregated into:

        include/uapi/linux/.../foo.h

for the userspace interface stuff, and:

        include/linux/.../foo.h

for the strictly kernel internal stuff.

Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>

1 files changed, 29 insertions, 28 deletions

diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index 1b464390dde8..aa30d19e9edd 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -352,6 +352,7 @@ int __inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 /**
  * sb_permission - Check superblock-level permissions
  * @sb: Superblock of inode to check permission on
+ * @inode: Inode to check permission on
  * @mask: Right to check for (%MAY_READ, %MAY_WRITE, %MAY_EXEC)
  *
  * Separate out file-system wide checks from inode-specific permission checks.
@@ -656,6 +657,7 @@ int sysctl_protected_hardlinks __read_mostly = 1;
 /**
  * may_follow_link - Check symlink following for unsafe situations
  * @link: The path of the symlink
+ * @nd: nameidata pathwalk data
  *
  * In the case of the sysctl_protected_symlinks sysctl being enabled,
  * CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE needs to be specifically ignored if the symlink is
@@ -678,7 +680,7 @@ static inline int may_follow_link(struct path *link, struct nameidata *nd)
 
 	/* Allowed if owner and follower match. */
 	inode = link->dentry->d_inode;
-	if (current_cred()->fsuid == inode->i_uid)
+	if (uid_eq(current_cred()->fsuid, inode->i_uid))
 		return 0;
 
 	/* Allowed if parent directory not sticky and world-writable. */
@@ -687,7 +689,7 @@ static inline int may_follow_link(struct path *link, struct nameidata *nd)
 		return 0;
 
 	/* Allowed if parent directory and link owner match. */
-	if (parent->i_uid == inode->i_uid)
+	if (uid_eq(parent->i_uid, inode->i_uid))
 		return 0;
 
 	path_put_conditional(link, nd);
@@ -757,7 +759,7 @@ static int may_linkat(struct path *link)
 	/* Source inode owner (or CAP_FOWNER) can hardlink all they like,
 	 * otherwise, it must be a safe source.
 	 */
-	if (cred->fsuid == inode->i_uid || safe_hardlink_source(inode) ||
+	if (uid_eq(cred->fsuid, inode->i_uid) || safe_hardlink_source(inode) ||
 	    capable(CAP_FOWNER))
 		return 0;
 
@@ -1795,8 +1797,6 @@ static int path_init(int dfd, const char *name, unsigned int flags,
 		     struct nameidata *nd, struct file **fp)
 {
 	int retval = 0;
-	int fput_needed;
-	struct file *file;
 
 	nd->last_type = LAST_ROOT; /* if there are only slashes... */
 	nd->flags = flags | LOOKUP_JUMPED;
@@ -1848,44 +1848,41 @@ static int path_init(int dfd, const char *name, unsigned int flags,
 			get_fs_pwd(current->fs, &nd->path);
 		}
 	} else {
+		struct fd f = fdget_raw(dfd);
 		struct dentry *dentry;
 
-		file = fget_raw_light(dfd, &fput_needed);
-		retval = -EBADF;
-		if (!file)
-			goto out_fail;
+		if (!f.file)
+			return -EBADF;
 
-		dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
+		dentry = f.file->f_path.dentry;
 
 		if (*name) {
-			retval = -ENOTDIR;
-			if (!S_ISDIR(dentry->d_inode->i_mode))
-				goto fput_fail;
+			if (!S_ISDIR(dentry->d_inode->i_mode)) {
+				fdput(f);
+				return -ENOTDIR;
+			}
 
 			retval = inode_permission(dentry->d_inode, MAY_EXEC);
-			if (retval)
-				goto fput_fail;
+			if (retval) {
+				fdput(f);
+				return retval;
+			}
 		}
 
-		nd->path = file->f_path;
+		nd->path = f.file->f_path;
 		if (flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
-			if (fput_needed)
-				*fp = file;
+			if (f.need_put)
+				*fp = f.file;
 			nd->seq = __read_seqcount_begin(&nd->path.dentry->d_seq);
 			lock_rcu_walk();
 		} else {
-			path_get(&file->f_path);
-			fput_light(file, fput_needed);
+			path_get(&nd->path);
+			fdput(f);
 		}
 	}
 
 	nd->inode = nd->path.dentry->d_inode;
 	return 0;
-
-fput_fail:
-	fput_light(file, fput_needed);
-out_fail:
-	return retval;
 }
 
 static inline int lookup_last(struct nameidata *nd, struct path *path)
@@ -2414,7 +2411,7 @@ static int atomic_open(struct nameidata *nd, struct dentry *dentry,
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	mode = op->mode & S_IALLUGO;
+	mode = op->mode;
 	if ((open_flag & O_CREAT) && !IS_POSIXACL(dir))
 		mode &= ~current_umask();
 
@@ -2452,7 +2449,7 @@ static int atomic_open(struct nameidata *nd, struct dentry *dentry,
 	}
 
 	if (open_flag & O_CREAT) {
-		error = may_o_create(&nd->path, dentry, op->mode);
+		error = may_o_create(&nd->path, dentry, mode);
 		if (error) {
 			create_error = error;
 			if (open_flag & O_EXCL)
@@ -2489,6 +2486,10 @@ static int atomic_open(struct nameidata *nd, struct dentry *dentry,
 			dput(dentry);
 			dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
 		}
+		if (create_error && dentry->d_inode == NULL) {
+			error = create_error;
+			goto out;
+		}
 		goto looked_up;
 	}
 
@@ -3965,7 +3966,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(user_path_at);
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(follow_down_one);
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(follow_down);
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(follow_up);
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_write_access); /* binfmt_aout */
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_write_access); /* nfsd */
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(getname);
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(lock_rename);
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(lookup_one_len);