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authorKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>2023-04-07 12:27:14 -0700
committerKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>2024-02-29 13:38:02 -0800
commit4ce615e798a752d4431fcc52960478906dec2f0e (patch)
treed76038c7680c29c84a99c9c02dd327e0788e685a /include/linux/fortify-string.h
parent1a78f8cb5daac77405e449f5305ad72c01818a46 (diff)
fortify: Provide KUnit counters for failure testing
The standard C string APIs were not designed to have a failure mode; they were expected to always succeed without memory safety issues. Normally, CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE will use fortify_panic() to stop processing, as truncating a read or write may provide an even worse system state. However, this creates a problem for testing under things like KUnit, which needs a way to survive failures. When building with CONFIG_KUNIT, provide a failure path for all users of fortify_panic, and track whether the failure was a read overflow or a write overflow, for KUnit tests to examine. Inspired by similar logic in the slab tests. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/linux/fortify-string.h')
-rw-r--r--include/linux/fortify-string.h43
1 files changed, 23 insertions, 20 deletions
diff --git a/include/linux/fortify-string.h b/include/linux/fortify-string.h
index 4f6767dcd933..fbfb90479b8f 100644
--- a/include/linux/fortify-string.h
+++ b/include/linux/fortify-string.h
@@ -15,8 +15,10 @@
#define FORTIFY_REASON(func, write) (FIELD_PREP(BIT(0), write) | \
FIELD_PREP(GENMASK(7, 1), func))
-#define fortify_panic(func, write) \
- __fortify_panic(FORTIFY_REASON(func, write))
+#ifndef fortify_panic
+# define fortify_panic(func, write, retfail) \
+ __fortify_panic(FORTIFY_REASON(func, write))
+#endif
#define FORTIFY_READ 0
#define FORTIFY_WRITE 1
@@ -181,7 +183,7 @@ char *strncpy(char * const POS p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t size)
if (__compiletime_lessthan(p_size, size))
__write_overflow();
if (p_size < size)
- fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strncpy, FORTIFY_WRITE);
+ fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strncpy, FORTIFY_WRITE, p);
return __underlying_strncpy(p, q, size);
}
@@ -212,7 +214,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE __kernel_size_t strnlen(const char * const POS p, __kernel_size
/* Do not check characters beyond the end of p. */
ret = __real_strnlen(p, maxlen < p_size ? maxlen : p_size);
if (p_size <= ret && maxlen != ret)
- fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strnlen, FORTIFY_READ);
+ fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strnlen, FORTIFY_READ, ret);
return ret;
}
@@ -248,7 +250,7 @@ __kernel_size_t __fortify_strlen(const char * const POS p)
return __underlying_strlen(p);
ret = strnlen(p, p_size);
if (p_size <= ret)
- fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strlen, FORTIFY_READ);
+ fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strlen, FORTIFY_READ, ret);
return ret;
}
@@ -299,7 +301,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE ssize_t sized_strscpy(char * const POS p, const char * const PO
* p_size.
*/
if (len > p_size)
- fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strscpy, FORTIFY_WRITE);
+ fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strscpy, FORTIFY_WRITE, -E2BIG);
/*
* We can now safely call vanilla strscpy because we are protected from:
@@ -357,7 +359,7 @@ size_t strlcat(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q, size_t avail)
/* Give up if string is already overflowed. */
if (p_size <= p_len)
- fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strlcat, FORTIFY_READ);
+ fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strlcat, FORTIFY_READ, wanted);
if (actual >= avail) {
copy_len = avail - p_len - 1;
@@ -366,7 +368,7 @@ size_t strlcat(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q, size_t avail)
/* Give up if copy will overflow. */
if (p_size <= actual)
- fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strlcat, FORTIFY_WRITE);
+ fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strlcat, FORTIFY_WRITE, wanted);
__underlying_memcpy(p + p_len, q, copy_len);
p[actual] = '\0';
@@ -395,7 +397,7 @@ char *strcat(char * const POS p, const char *q)
const size_t p_size = __member_size(p);
if (strlcat(p, q, p_size) >= p_size)
- fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strcat, FORTIFY_WRITE);
+ fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strcat, FORTIFY_WRITE, p);
return p;
}
@@ -431,13 +433,13 @@ char *strncat(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q, __kernel_size_t coun
p_len = strlen(p);
copy_len = strnlen(q, count);
if (p_size < p_len + copy_len + 1)
- fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strncat, FORTIFY_WRITE);
+ fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strncat, FORTIFY_WRITE, p);
__underlying_memcpy(p + p_len, q, copy_len);
p[p_len + copy_len] = '\0';
return p;
}
-__FORTIFY_INLINE void fortify_memset_chk(__kernel_size_t size,
+__FORTIFY_INLINE bool fortify_memset_chk(__kernel_size_t size,
const size_t p_size,
const size_t p_size_field)
{
@@ -472,7 +474,8 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE void fortify_memset_chk(__kernel_size_t size,
* lengths are unknown.)
*/
if (p_size != SIZE_MAX && p_size < size)
- fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_memset, FORTIFY_WRITE);
+ fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_memset, FORTIFY_WRITE, true);
+ return false;
}
#define __fortify_memset_chk(p, c, size, p_size, p_size_field) ({ \
@@ -571,9 +574,9 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE bool fortify_memcpy_chk(__kernel_size_t size,
* lengths are unknown.)
*/
if (p_size != SIZE_MAX && p_size < size)
- fortify_panic(func, FORTIFY_WRITE);
+ fortify_panic(func, FORTIFY_WRITE, true);
else if (q_size != SIZE_MAX && q_size < size)
- fortify_panic(func, FORTIFY_READ);
+ fortify_panic(func, FORTIFY_READ, true);
/*
* Warn when writing beyond destination field size.
@@ -673,7 +676,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE void *memscan(void * const POS0 p, int c, __kernel_size_t size)
if (__compiletime_lessthan(p_size, size))
__read_overflow();
if (p_size < size)
- fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_memscan, FORTIFY_READ);
+ fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_memscan, FORTIFY_READ, NULL);
return __real_memscan(p, c, size);
}
@@ -690,7 +693,7 @@ int memcmp(const void * const POS0 p, const void * const POS0 q, __kernel_size_t
__read_overflow2();
}
if (p_size < size || q_size < size)
- fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_memcmp, FORTIFY_READ);
+ fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_memcmp, FORTIFY_READ, INT_MIN);
return __underlying_memcmp(p, q, size);
}
@@ -702,7 +705,7 @@ void *memchr(const void * const POS0 p, int c, __kernel_size_t size)
if (__compiletime_lessthan(p_size, size))
__read_overflow();
if (p_size < size)
- fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_memchr, FORTIFY_READ);
+ fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_memchr, FORTIFY_READ, NULL);
return __underlying_memchr(p, c, size);
}
@@ -714,7 +717,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE void *memchr_inv(const void * const POS0 p, int c, size_t size)
if (__compiletime_lessthan(p_size, size))
__read_overflow();
if (p_size < size)
- fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_memchr_inv, FORTIFY_READ);
+ fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_memchr_inv, FORTIFY_READ, NULL);
return __real_memchr_inv(p, c, size);
}
@@ -727,7 +730,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE void *kmemdup(const void * const POS0 p, size_t size, gfp_t gfp
if (__compiletime_lessthan(p_size, size))
__read_overflow();
if (p_size < size)
- fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_kmemdup, FORTIFY_READ);
+ fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_kmemdup, FORTIFY_READ, NULL);
return __real_kmemdup(p, size, gfp);
}
@@ -764,7 +767,7 @@ char *strcpy(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q)
__write_overflow();
/* Run-time check for dynamic size overflow. */
if (p_size < size)
- fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strcpy, FORTIFY_WRITE);
+ fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strcpy, FORTIFY_WRITE, p);
__underlying_memcpy(p, q, size);
return p;
}