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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2017-07-15 12:44:02 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2017-07-15 12:44:02 -0700
commit52f6c588c77b76d548201470c2a28263a41b462b (patch)
treecbb4207714e82f10932a546469bfb3db84051c33 /lib/bch.c
parent78dcf73421a879d22319d3889119945b85954a68 (diff)
parent72e5c740f6335e27253b8ff64d23d00337091535 (diff)
Merge tag 'random_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random
Pull random updates from Ted Ts'o: "Add wait_for_random_bytes() and get_random_*_wait() functions so that callers can more safely get random bytes if they can block until the CRNG is initialized. Also print a warning if get_random_*() is called before the CRNG is initialized. By default, only one single-line warning will be printed per boot. If CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM is defined, then a warning will be printed for each function which tries to get random bytes before the CRNG is initialized. This can get spammy for certain architecture types, so it is not enabled by default" * tag 'random_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random: random: reorder READ_ONCE() in get_random_uXX random: suppress spammy warnings about unseeded randomness random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness net/route: use get_random_int for random counter net/neighbor: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit hash random rhashtable: use get_random_u32 for hash_rnd ceph: ensure RNG is seeded before using iscsi: ensure RNG is seeded before use cifs: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit lock random random: add get_random_{bytes,u32,u64,int,long,once}_wait family random: add wait_for_random_bytes() API
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