Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next

Pull networking updates from David Miller:

 1) More iov_iter conversion work from Al Viro.

    [ The "crypto: switch af_alg_make_sg() to iov_iter" commit was
      wrong, and this pull actually adds an extra commit on top of the
      branch I'm pulling to fix that up, so that the pre-merge state is
      ok.   - Linus ]

 2) Various optimizations to the ipv4 forwarding information base trie
    lookup implementation.  From Alexander Duyck.

 3) Remove sock_iocb altogether, from CHristoph Hellwig.

 4) Allow congestion control algorithm selection via routing metrics.
    From Daniel Borkmann.

 5) Make ipv4 uncached route list per-cpu, from Eric Dumazet.

 6) Handle rfs hash collisions more gracefully, also from Eric Dumazet.

 7) Add xmit_more support to r8169, e1000, and e1000e drivers.  From
    Florian Westphal.

 8) Transparent Ethernet Bridging support for GRO, from Jesse Gross.

 9) Add BPF packet actions to packet scheduler, from Jiri Pirko.

10) Add support for uniqu flow IDs to openvswitch, from Joe Stringer.

11) New NetCP ethernet driver, from Muralidharan Karicheri and Wingman
    Kwok.

12) More sanely handle out-of-window dupacks, which can result in
    serious ACK storms.  From Neal Cardwell.

13) Various rhashtable bug fixes and enhancements, from Herbert Xu,
    Patrick McHardy, and Thomas Graf.

14) Support xmit_more in be2net, from Sathya Perla.

15) Group Policy extensions for vxlan, from Thomas Graf.

16) Remove Checksum Offload support for vxlan, from Tom Herbert.

17) Like ipv4, support lockless transmit over ipv6 UDP sockets.  From
    Vlad Yasevich.

* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1494+1 commits)
  crypto: fix af_alg_make_sg() conversion to iov_iter
  ipv4: Namespecify TCP PMTU mechanism
  i40e: Fix for stats init function call in Rx setup
  tcp: don't include Fast Open option in SYN-ACK on pure SYN-data
  openvswitch: Only set TUNNEL_VXLAN_OPT if VXLAN-GBP metadata is set
  ipv6: Make __ipv6_select_ident static
  ipv6: Fix fragment id assignment on LE arches.
  bridge: Fix inability to add non-vlan fdb entry
  net: Mellanox: Delete unnecessary checks before the function call "vunmap"
  cxgb4: Add support in cxgb4 to get expansion rom version via ethtool
  ethtool: rename reserved1 memeber in ethtool_drvinfo for expansion ROM version
  net: dsa: Remove redundant phy_attach()
  IB/mlx4: Reset flow support for IB kernel ULPs
  IB/mlx4: Always use the correct port for mirrored multicast attachments
  net/bonding: Fix potential bad memory access during bonding events
  tipc: remove tipc_snprintf
  tipc: nl compat add noop and remove legacy nl framework
  tipc: convert legacy nl stats show to nl compat
  tipc: convert legacy nl net id get to nl compat
  tipc: convert legacy nl net id set to nl compat
  ...

1 files changed, 454 insertions, 14 deletions

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index b67749bb55bf..c09a821f381d 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
    SOFTWARE IS DISCLAIMED.
 */
 
+#include <linux/debugfs.h>
 #include <linux/crypto.h>
 #include <linux/scatterlist.h>
 #include <crypto/b128ops.h>
@@ -223,8 +224,9 @@ static int smp_f4(struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac, const u8 u[32], const u8 v[32],
 	return err;
 }
 
-static int smp_f5(struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac, u8 w[32], u8 n1[16], u8 n2[16],
-		  u8 a1[7], u8 a2[7], u8 mackey[16], u8 ltk[16])
+static int smp_f5(struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[32],
+		  const u8 n1[16], const u8 n2[16], const u8 a1[7],
+		  const u8 a2[7], u8 mackey[16], u8 ltk[16])
 {
 	/* The btle, salt and length "magic" values are as defined in
 	 * the SMP section of the Bluetooth core specification. In ASCII
@@ -276,7 +278,7 @@ static int smp_f5(struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac, u8 w[32], u8 n1[16], u8 n2[16],
 }
 
 static int smp_f6(struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16],
-		  const u8 n1[16], u8 n2[16], const u8 r[16],
+		  const u8 n1[16], const u8 n2[16], const u8 r[16],
 		  const u8 io_cap[3], const u8 a1[7], const u8 a2[7],
 		  u8 res[16])
 {
@@ -298,7 +300,7 @@ static int smp_f6(struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16],
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
-	BT_DBG("res %16phN", res);
+	SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res);
 
 	return err;
 }
@@ -618,7 +620,7 @@ static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
 
 		oob_data = hci_find_remote_oob_data(hdev, &hcon->dst,
 						    bdaddr_type);
-		if (oob_data) {
+		if (oob_data && oob_data->present) {
 			set_bit(SMP_FLAG_OOB, &smp->flags);
 			oob_flag = SMP_OOB_PRESENT;
 			memcpy(smp->rr, oob_data->rand256, 16);
@@ -1674,7 +1676,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (conn->hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
 		/* We must have a BR/EDR SC link */
 		if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &conn->hcon->flags) &&
-		    !test_bit(HCI_FORCE_LESC, &hdev->dbg_flags))
+		    !test_bit(HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP, &hdev->dbg_flags))
 			return SMP_CROSS_TRANSP_NOT_ALLOWED;
 
 		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
@@ -2303,8 +2305,12 @@ static int smp_cmd_ident_addr_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
 	 * implementations are not known of and in order to not over
 	 * complicate our implementation, simply pretend that we never
 	 * received an IRK for such a device.
+	 *
+	 * The Identity Address must also be a Static Random or Public
+	 * Address, which hci_is_identity_address() checks for.
 	 */
-	if (!bacmp(&info->bdaddr, BDADDR_ANY)) {
+	if (!bacmp(&info->bdaddr, BDADDR_ANY) ||
+	    !hci_is_identity_address(&info->bdaddr, info->addr_type)) {
 		BT_ERR("Ignoring IRK with no identity address");
 		goto distribute;
 	}
@@ -2737,7 +2743,7 @@ static void bredr_pairing(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
 
 	/* BR/EDR must use Secure Connections for SMP */
 	if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &hcon->flags) &&
-	    !test_bit(HCI_FORCE_LESC, &hdev->dbg_flags))
+	    !test_bit(HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP, &hdev->dbg_flags))
 		return;
 
 	/* If our LE support is not enabled don't do anything */
@@ -2944,11 +2950,30 @@ create_chan:
 
 	l2cap_chan_set_defaults(chan);
 
-	bacpy(&chan->src, &hdev->bdaddr);
-	if (cid == L2CAP_CID_SMP)
-		chan->src_type = BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC;
-	else
+	if (cid == L2CAP_CID_SMP) {
+		/* If usage of static address is forced or if the devices
+		 * does not have a public address, then listen on the static
+		 * address.
+		 *
+		 * In case BR/EDR has been disabled on a dual-mode controller
+		 * and a static address has been configued, then listen on
+		 * the static address instead.
+		 */
+		if (test_bit(HCI_FORCE_STATIC_ADDR, &hdev->dbg_flags) ||
+		    !bacmp(&hdev->bdaddr, BDADDR_ANY) ||
+		    (!test_bit(HCI_BREDR_ENABLED, &hdev->dev_flags) &&
+		     bacmp(&hdev->static_addr, BDADDR_ANY))) {
+			bacpy(&chan->src, &hdev->static_addr);
+			chan->src_type = BDADDR_LE_RANDOM;
+		} else {
+			bacpy(&chan->src, &hdev->bdaddr);
+			chan->src_type = BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC;
+		}
+	} else {
+		bacpy(&chan->src, &hdev->bdaddr);
 		chan->src_type = BDADDR_BREDR;
+	}
+
 	chan->state = BT_LISTEN;
 	chan->mode = L2CAP_MODE_BASIC;
 	chan->imtu = L2CAP_DEFAULT_MTU;
@@ -2975,21 +3000,108 @@ static void smp_del_chan(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
 	l2cap_chan_put(chan);
 }
 
+static ssize_t force_bredr_smp_read(struct file *file,
+				    char __user *user_buf,
+				    size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data;
+	char buf[3];
+
+	buf[0] = test_bit(HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP, &hdev->dbg_flags) ? 'Y': 'N';
+	buf[1] = '\n';
+	buf[2] = '\0';
+	return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, buf, 2);
+}
+
+static ssize_t force_bredr_smp_write(struct file *file,
+				     const char __user *user_buf,
+				     size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data;
+	char buf[32];
+	size_t buf_size = min(count, (sizeof(buf)-1));
+	bool enable;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(buf, user_buf, buf_size))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	buf[buf_size] = '\0';
+	if (strtobool(buf, &enable))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (enable == test_bit(HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP, &hdev->dbg_flags))
+		return -EALREADY;
+
+	if (enable) {
+		struct l2cap_chan *chan;
+
+		chan = smp_add_cid(hdev, L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR);
+		if (IS_ERR(chan))
+			return PTR_ERR(chan);
+
+		hdev->smp_bredr_data = chan;
+	} else {
+		struct l2cap_chan *chan;
+
+		chan = hdev->smp_bredr_data;
+		hdev->smp_bredr_data = NULL;
+		smp_del_chan(chan);
+	}
+
+	change_bit(HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP, &hdev->dbg_flags);
+
+	return count;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations force_bredr_smp_fops = {
+	.open		= simple_open,
+	.read		= force_bredr_smp_read,
+	.write		= force_bredr_smp_write,
+	.llseek		= default_llseek,
+};
+
 int smp_register(struct hci_dev *hdev)
 {
 	struct l2cap_chan *chan;
 
 	BT_DBG("%s", hdev->name);
 
+	/* If the controller does not support Low Energy operation, then
+	 * there is also no need to register any SMP channel.
+	 */
+	if (!lmp_le_capable(hdev))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (WARN_ON(hdev->smp_data)) {
+		chan = hdev->smp_data;
+		hdev->smp_data = NULL;
+		smp_del_chan(chan);
+	}
+
 	chan = smp_add_cid(hdev, L2CAP_CID_SMP);
 	if (IS_ERR(chan))
 		return PTR_ERR(chan);
 
 	hdev->smp_data = chan;
 
-	if (!lmp_sc_capable(hdev) &&
-	    !test_bit(HCI_FORCE_LESC, &hdev->dbg_flags))
+	/* If the controller does not support BR/EDR Secure Connections
+	 * feature, then the BR/EDR SMP channel shall not be present.
+	 *
+	 * To test this with Bluetooth 4.0 controllers, create a debugfs
+	 * switch that allows forcing BR/EDR SMP support and accepting
+	 * cross-transport pairing on non-AES encrypted connections.
+	 */
+	if (!lmp_sc_capable(hdev)) {
+		debugfs_create_file("force_bredr_smp", 0644, hdev->debugfs,
+				    hdev, &force_bredr_smp_fops);
 		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (WARN_ON(hdev->smp_bredr_data)) {
+		chan = hdev->smp_bredr_data;
+		hdev->smp_bredr_data = NULL;
+		smp_del_chan(chan);
+	}
 
 	chan = smp_add_cid(hdev, L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR);
 	if (IS_ERR(chan)) {
@@ -3021,3 +3133,331 @@ void smp_unregister(struct hci_dev *hdev)
 		smp_del_chan(chan);
 	}
 }
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BT_SELFTEST_SMP)
+
+static int __init test_ah(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes)
+{
+	const u8 irk[16] = {
+			0x9b, 0x7d, 0x39, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0x10, 0x10, 0x34,
+			0x05, 0xad, 0xc8, 0x57, 0xa3, 0x34, 0x02, 0xec };
+	const u8 r[3] = { 0x94, 0x81, 0x70 };
+	const u8 exp[3] = { 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x0d };
+	u8 res[3];
+	int err;
+
+	err = smp_ah(tfm_aes, irk, r, res);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	if (memcmp(res, exp, 3))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int __init test_c1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes)
+{
+	const u8 k[16] = {
+			0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+			0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 };
+	const u8 r[16] = {
+			0xe0, 0x2e, 0x70, 0xc6, 0x4e, 0x27, 0x88, 0x63,
+			0x0e, 0x6f, 0xad, 0x56, 0x21, 0xd5, 0x83, 0x57 };
+	const u8 preq[7] = { 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10, 0x07, 0x07 };
+	const u8 pres[7] = { 0x02, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08, 0x00, 0x05 };
+	const u8 _iat = 0x01;
+	const u8 _rat = 0x00;
+	const bdaddr_t ra = { { 0xb6, 0xb5, 0xb4, 0xb3, 0xb2, 0xb1 } };
+	const bdaddr_t ia = { { 0xa6, 0xa5, 0xa4, 0xa3, 0xa2, 0xa1 } };
+	const u8 exp[16] = {
+			0x86, 0x3b, 0xf1, 0xbe, 0xc5, 0x4d, 0xa7, 0xd2,
+			0xea, 0x88, 0x89, 0x87, 0xef, 0x3f, 0x1e, 0x1e };
+	u8 res[16];
+	int err;
+
+	err = smp_c1(tfm_aes, k, r, preq, pres, _iat, &ia, _rat, &ra, res);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	if (memcmp(res, exp, 16))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int __init test_s1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes)
+{
+	const u8 k[16] = {
+			0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+			0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 };
+	const u8 r1[16] = {
+			0x88, 0x77, 0x66, 0x55, 0x44, 0x33, 0x22, 0x11 };
+	const u8 r2[16] = {
+			0x00, 0xff, 0xee, 0xdd, 0xcc, 0xbb, 0xaa, 0x99 };
+	const u8 exp[16] = {
+			0x62, 0xa0, 0x6d, 0x79, 0xae, 0x16, 0x42, 0x5b,
+			0x9b, 0xf4, 0xb0, 0xe8, 0xf0, 0xe1, 0x1f, 0x9a };
+	u8 res[16];
+	int err;
+
+	err = smp_s1(tfm_aes, k, r1, r2, res);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	if (memcmp(res, exp, 16))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int __init test_f4(struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac)
+{
+	const u8 u[32] = {
+			0xe6, 0x9d, 0x35, 0x0e, 0x48, 0x01, 0x03, 0xcc,
+			0xdb, 0xfd, 0xf4, 0xac, 0x11, 0x91, 0xf4, 0xef,
+			0xb9, 0xa5, 0xf9, 0xe9, 0xa7, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x5e,
+			0x2c, 0xbe, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xd2, 0x03, 0xb0, 0x20 };
+	const u8 v[32] = {
+			0xfd, 0xc5, 0x7f, 0xf4, 0x49, 0xdd, 0x4f, 0x6b,
+			0xfb, 0x7c, 0x9d, 0xf1, 0xc2, 0x9a, 0xcb, 0x59,
+			0x2a, 0xe7, 0xd4, 0xee, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0x0a, 0x90,
+			0x9a, 0xbb, 0xf6, 0x32, 0x3d, 0x8b, 0x18, 0x55 };
+	const u8 x[16] = {
+			0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff,
+			0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 };
+	const u8 z = 0x00;
+	const u8 exp[16] = {
+			0x2d, 0x87, 0x74, 0xa9, 0xbe, 0xa1, 0xed, 0xf1,
+			0x1c, 0xbd, 0xa9, 0x07, 0xf1, 0x16, 0xc9, 0xf2 };
+	u8 res[16];
+	int err;
+
+	err = smp_f4(tfm_cmac, u, v, x, z, res);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	if (memcmp(res, exp, 16))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int __init test_f5(struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac)
+{
+	const u8 w[32] = {
+			0x98, 0xa6, 0xbf, 0x73, 0xf3, 0x34, 0x8d, 0x86,
+			0xf1, 0x66, 0xf8, 0xb4, 0x13, 0x6b, 0x79, 0x99,
+			0x9b, 0x7d, 0x39, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0x10, 0x10, 0x34,
+			0x05, 0xad, 0xc8, 0x57, 0xa3, 0x34, 0x02, 0xec };
+	const u8 n1[16] = {
+			0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff,
+			0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 };
+	const u8 n2[16] = {
+			0xcf, 0xc4, 0x3d, 0xff, 0xf7, 0x83, 0x65, 0x21,
+			0x6e, 0x5f, 0xa7, 0x25, 0xcc, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0xa6 };
+	const u8 a1[7] = { 0xce, 0xbf, 0x37, 0x37, 0x12, 0x56, 0x00 };
+	const u8 a2[7] = { 0xc1, 0xcf, 0x2d, 0x70, 0x13, 0xa7, 0x00 };
+	const u8 exp_ltk[16] = {
+			0x38, 0x0a, 0x75, 0x94, 0xb5, 0x22, 0x05, 0x98,
+			0x23, 0xcd, 0xd7, 0x69, 0x11, 0x79, 0x86, 0x69 };
+	const u8 exp_mackey[16] = {
+			0x20, 0x6e, 0x63, 0xce, 0x20, 0x6a, 0x3f, 0xfd,
+			0x02, 0x4a, 0x08, 0xa1, 0x76, 0xf1, 0x65, 0x29 };
+	u8 mackey[16], ltk[16];
+	int err;
+
+	err = smp_f5(tfm_cmac, w, n1, n2, a1, a2, mackey, ltk);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	if (memcmp(mackey, exp_mackey, 16))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (memcmp(ltk, exp_ltk, 16))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int __init test_f6(struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac)
+{
+	const u8 w[16] = {
+			0x20, 0x6e, 0x63, 0xce, 0x20, 0x6a, 0x3f, 0xfd,
+			0x02, 0x4a, 0x08, 0xa1, 0x76, 0xf1, 0x65, 0x29 };
+	const u8 n1[16] = {
+			0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff,
+			0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 };
+	const u8 n2[16] = {
+			0xcf, 0xc4, 0x3d, 0xff, 0xf7, 0x83, 0x65, 0x21,
+			0x6e, 0x5f, 0xa7, 0x25, 0xcc, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0xa6 };
+	const u8 r[16] = {
+			0xc8, 0x0f, 0x2d, 0x0c, 0xd2, 0x42, 0xda, 0x08,
+			0x54, 0xbb, 0x53, 0xb4, 0x3b, 0x34, 0xa3, 0x12 };
+	const u8 io_cap[3] = { 0x02, 0x01, 0x01 };
+	const u8 a1[7] = { 0xce, 0xbf, 0x37, 0x37, 0x12, 0x56, 0x00 };
+	const u8 a2[7] = { 0xc1, 0xcf, 0x2d, 0x70, 0x13, 0xa7, 0x00 };
+	const u8 exp[16] = {
+			0x61, 0x8f, 0x95, 0xda, 0x09, 0x0b, 0x6c, 0xd2,
+			0xc5, 0xe8, 0xd0, 0x9c, 0x98, 0x73, 0xc4, 0xe3 };
+	u8 res[16];
+	int err;
+
+	err = smp_f6(tfm_cmac, w, n1, n2, r, io_cap, a1, a2, res);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	if (memcmp(res, exp, 16))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int __init test_g2(struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac)
+{
+	const u8 u[32] = {
+			0xe6, 0x9d, 0x35, 0x0e, 0x48, 0x01, 0x03, 0xcc,
+			0xdb, 0xfd, 0xf4, 0xac, 0x11, 0x91, 0xf4, 0xef,
+			0xb9, 0xa5, 0xf9, 0xe9, 0xa7, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x5e,
+			0x2c, 0xbe, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xd2, 0x03, 0xb0, 0x20 };
+	const u8 v[32] = {
+			0xfd, 0xc5, 0x7f, 0xf4, 0x49, 0xdd, 0x4f, 0x6b,
+			0xfb, 0x7c, 0x9d, 0xf1, 0xc2, 0x9a, 0xcb, 0x59,
+			0x2a, 0xe7, 0xd4, 0xee, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0x0a, 0x90,
+			0x9a, 0xbb, 0xf6, 0x32, 0x3d, 0x8b, 0x18, 0x55 };
+	const u8 x[16] = {
+			0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff,
+			0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 };
+	const u8 y[16] = {
+			0xcf, 0xc4, 0x3d, 0xff, 0xf7, 0x83, 0x65, 0x21,
+			0x6e, 0x5f, 0xa7, 0x25, 0xcc, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0xa6 };
+	const u32 exp_val = 0x2f9ed5ba % 1000000;
+	u32 val;
+	int err;
+
+	err = smp_g2(tfm_cmac, u, v, x, y, &val);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	if (val != exp_val)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int __init test_h6(struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac)
+{
+	const u8 w[16] = {
+			0x9b, 0x7d, 0x39, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0x10, 0x10, 0x34,
+			0x05, 0xad, 0xc8, 0x57, 0xa3, 0x34, 0x02, 0xec };
+	const u8 key_id[4] = { 0x72, 0x62, 0x65, 0x6c };
+	const u8 exp[16] = {
+			0x99, 0x63, 0xb1, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xa9, 0xd3, 0xe8,
+			0x1c, 0xc9, 0x6d, 0xe7, 0x02, 0xe1, 0x9a, 0x2d };
+	u8 res[16];
+	int err;
+
+	err = smp_h6(tfm_cmac, w, key_id, res);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	if (memcmp(res, exp, 16))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int __init run_selftests(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes,
+				struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac)
+{
+	ktime_t calltime, delta, rettime;
+	unsigned long long duration;
+	int err;
+
+	calltime = ktime_get();
+
+	err = test_ah(tfm_aes);
+	if (err) {
+		BT_ERR("smp_ah test failed");
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	err = test_c1(tfm_aes);
+	if (err) {
+		BT_ERR("smp_c1 test failed");
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	err = test_s1(tfm_aes);
+	if (err) {
+		BT_ERR("smp_s1 test failed");
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	err = test_f4(tfm_cmac);
+	if (err) {
+		BT_ERR("smp_f4 test failed");
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	err = test_f5(tfm_cmac);
+	if (err) {
+		BT_ERR("smp_f5 test failed");
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	err = test_f6(tfm_cmac);
+	if (err) {
+		BT_ERR("smp_f6 test failed");
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	err = test_g2(tfm_cmac);
+	if (err) {
+		BT_ERR("smp_g2 test failed");
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	err = test_h6(tfm_cmac);
+	if (err) {
+		BT_ERR("smp_h6 test failed");
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	rettime = ktime_get();
+	delta = ktime_sub(rettime, calltime);
+	duration = (unsigned long long) ktime_to_ns(delta) >> 10;
+
+	BT_INFO("SMP test passed in %llu usecs", duration);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int __init bt_selftest_smp(void)
+{
+	struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes;
+	struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac;
+	int err;
+
+	tfm_aes = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm_aes)) {
+		BT_ERR("Unable to create ECB crypto context");
+		return PTR_ERR(tfm_aes);
+	}
+
+	tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_hash("cmac(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm_cmac)) {
+		BT_ERR("Unable to create CMAC crypto context");
+		crypto_free_blkcipher(tfm_aes);
+		return PTR_ERR(tfm_cmac);
+	}
+
+	err = run_selftests(tfm_aes, tfm_cmac);
+
+	crypto_free_hash(tfm_cmac);
+	crypto_free_blkcipher(tfm_aes);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+#endif