diff options
| author | Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> | 2021-04-26 18:13:45 -0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> | 2021-05-20 19:48:30 -0400 |
| commit | 49219d9b8785ba712575c40e48ce0f7461254626 (patch) | |
| tree | 745008ece0fc7da7b66141a4358d4e19552dd7dc /security/integrity/evm | |
| parent | d07f6ca923ea0927a1024dfccafc5b53b61cfecc (diff) | |
evm: fix writing <securityfs>/evm overflow
EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE is defined as 0x80000000, which is larger than INT_MAX.
The "-fno-strict-overflow" compiler option properly prevents signaling
EVM that the EVM policy setup is complete. Define and read an unsigned
int.
Fixes: f00d79750712 ("EVM: Allow userspace to signal an RSA key has been loaded")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/integrity/evm')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c | 5 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c index bbc85637e18b..0007d3362754 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c @@ -66,12 +66,13 @@ static ssize_t evm_read_key(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, static ssize_t evm_write_key(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { - int i, ret; + unsigned int i; + int ret; if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || (evm_initialized & EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE)) return -EPERM; - ret = kstrtoint_from_user(buf, count, 0, &i); + ret = kstrtouint_from_user(buf, count, 0, &i); if (ret) return ret; |