diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/userspace-api')
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/userspace-api/check_exec.rst | 144 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/userspace-api/netlink/c-code-gen.rst | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/userspace-api/netlink/intro-specs.rst | 8 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/userspace-api/ntsync.rst | 385 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/userspace-api/sysfs-platform_profile.rst | 38 |
7 files changed, 578 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/check_exec.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/check_exec.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..05dfe3b56f71 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/check_exec.rst @@ -0,0 +1,144 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +.. Copyright © 2024 Microsoft Corporation + +=================== +Executability check +=================== + +The ``AT_EXECVE_CHECK`` :manpage:`execveat(2)` flag, and the +``SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE`` and ``SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE`` securebits +are intended for script interpreters and dynamic linkers to enforce a +consistent execution security policy handled by the kernel. See the +`samples/check-exec/inc.c`_ example. + +Whether an interpreter should check these securebits or not depends on the +security risk of running malicious scripts with respect to the execution +environment, and whether the kernel can check if a script is trustworthy or +not. For instance, Python scripts running on a server can use arbitrary +syscalls and access arbitrary files. Such interpreters should then be +enlighten to use these securebits and let users define their security policy. +However, a JavaScript engine running in a web browser should already be +sandboxed and then should not be able to harm the user's environment. + +Script interpreters or dynamic linkers built for tailored execution environments +(e.g. hardened Linux distributions or hermetic container images) could use +``AT_EXECVE_CHECK`` without checking the related securebits if backward +compatibility is handled by something else (e.g. atomic update ensuring that +all legitimate libraries are allowed to be executed). It is then recommended +for script interpreters and dynamic linkers to check the securebits at run time +by default, but also to provide the ability for custom builds to behave like if +``SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE`` or ``SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE`` were always +set to 1 (i.e. always enforce restrictions). + +AT_EXECVE_CHECK +=============== + +Passing the ``AT_EXECVE_CHECK`` flag to :manpage:`execveat(2)` only performs a +check on a regular file and returns 0 if execution of this file would be +allowed, ignoring the file format and then the related interpreter dependencies +(e.g. ELF libraries, script's shebang). + +Programs should always perform this check to apply kernel-level checks against +files that are not directly executed by the kernel but passed to a user space +interpreter instead. All files that contain executable code, from the point of +view of the interpreter, should be checked. However the result of this check +should only be enforced according to ``SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE`` or +``SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE.``. + +The main purpose of this flag is to improve the security and consistency of an +execution environment to ensure that direct file execution (e.g. +``./script.sh``) and indirect file execution (e.g. ``sh script.sh``) lead to +the same result. For instance, this can be used to check if a file is +trustworthy according to the caller's environment. + +In a secure environment, libraries and any executable dependencies should also +be checked. For instance, dynamic linking should make sure that all libraries +are allowed for execution to avoid trivial bypass (e.g. using ``LD_PRELOAD``). +For such secure execution environment to make sense, only trusted code should +be executable, which also requires integrity guarantees. + +To avoid race conditions leading to time-of-check to time-of-use issues, +``AT_EXECVE_CHECK`` should be used with ``AT_EMPTY_PATH`` to check against a +file descriptor instead of a path. + +SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE and SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE +========================================================== + +When ``SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE`` is set, a process should only interpret or +execute a file if a call to :manpage:`execveat(2)` with the related file +descriptor and the ``AT_EXECVE_CHECK`` flag succeed. + +This secure bit may be set by user session managers, service managers, +container runtimes, sandboxer tools... Except for test environments, the +related ``SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE_LOCKED`` bit should also be set. + +Programs should only enforce consistent restrictions according to the +securebits but without relying on any other user-controlled configuration. +Indeed, the use case for these securebits is to only trust executable code +vetted by the system configuration (through the kernel), so we should be +careful to not let untrusted users control this configuration. + +However, script interpreters may still use user configuration such as +environment variables as long as it is not a way to disable the securebits +checks. For instance, the ``PATH`` and ``LD_PRELOAD`` variables can be set by +a script's caller. Changing these variables may lead to unintended code +executions, but only from vetted executable programs, which is OK. For this to +make sense, the system should provide a consistent security policy to avoid +arbitrary code execution e.g., by enforcing a write xor execute policy. + +When ``SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE`` is set, a process should never interpret +interactive user commands (e.g. scripts). However, if such commands are passed +through a file descriptor (e.g. stdin), its content should be interpreted if a +call to :manpage:`execveat(2)` with the related file descriptor and the +``AT_EXECVE_CHECK`` flag succeed. + +For instance, script interpreters called with a script snippet as argument +should always deny such execution if ``SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE`` is set. + +This secure bit may be set by user session managers, service managers, +container runtimes, sandboxer tools... Except for test environments, the +related ``SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE_LOCKED`` bit should also be set. + +Here is the expected behavior for a script interpreter according to combination +of any exec securebits: + +1. ``SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE=0`` and ``SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE=0`` + + Always interpret scripts, and allow arbitrary user commands (default). + + No threat, everyone and everything is trusted, but we can get ahead of + potential issues thanks to the call to :manpage:`execveat(2)` with + ``AT_EXECVE_CHECK`` which should always be performed but ignored by the + script interpreter. Indeed, this check is still important to enable systems + administrators to verify requests (e.g. with audit) and prepare for + migration to a secure mode. + +2. ``SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE=1`` and ``SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE=0`` + + Deny script interpretation if they are not executable, but allow + arbitrary user commands. + + The threat is (potential) malicious scripts run by trusted (and not fooled) + users. That can protect against unintended script executions (e.g. ``sh + /tmp/*.sh``). This makes sense for (semi-restricted) user sessions. + +3. ``SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE=0`` and ``SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE=1`` + + Always interpret scripts, but deny arbitrary user commands. + + This use case may be useful for secure services (i.e. without interactive + user session) where scripts' integrity is verified (e.g. with IMA/EVM or + dm-verity/IPE) but where access rights might not be ready yet. Indeed, + arbitrary interactive commands would be much more difficult to check. + +4. ``SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE=1`` and ``SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE=1`` + + Deny script interpretation if they are not executable, and also deny + any arbitrary user commands. + + The threat is malicious scripts run by untrusted users (but trusted code). + This makes sense for system services that may only execute trusted scripts. + +.. Links +.. _samples/check-exec/inc.c: + https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/samples/check-exec/inc.c diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst index 274cc7546efc..b1395d94b3fd 100644 --- a/Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ Security-related interfaces mfd_noexec spec_ctrl tee + check_exec Devices and I/O =============== @@ -63,6 +64,7 @@ Everything else vduse futex2 perf_ring_buffer + ntsync .. only:: subproject and html diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst index 243f1f1b554a..6d1465315df3 100644 --- a/Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst @@ -283,6 +283,7 @@ Code Seq# Include File Comments 'p' 80-9F linux/ppdev.h user-space parport <mailto:tim@cyberelk.net> 'p' A1-A5 linux/pps.h LinuxPPS +'p' B1-B3 linux/pps_gen.h LinuxPPS <mailto:giometti@linux.it> 'q' 00-1F linux/serio.h 'q' 80-FF linux/telephony.h Internet PhoneJACK, Internet LineJACK @@ -311,6 +312,7 @@ Code Seq# Include File Comments <mailto:oe@port.de> 'z' 10-4F drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_api.h conflict! '|' 00-7F linux/media.h +'|' 80-9F samples/ Any sample and example drivers 0x80 00-1F linux/fb.h 0x81 00-1F linux/vduse.h 0x89 00-06 arch/x86/include/asm/sockios.h diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/netlink/c-code-gen.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/netlink/c-code-gen.rst index 89de42c13350..46415e6d646d 100644 --- a/Documentation/userspace-api/netlink/c-code-gen.rst +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/netlink/c-code-gen.rst @@ -56,7 +56,9 @@ If ``name-prefix`` is specified it replaces the ``$family-$enum`` portion of the entry name. Boolean ``render-max`` controls creation of the max values -(which are enabled by default for attribute enums). +(which are enabled by default for attribute enums). These max +values are named ``__$pfx-MAX`` and ``$pfx-MAX``. The name +of the first value can be overridden via ``enum-cnt-name`` property. Attributes ========== diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/netlink/intro-specs.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/netlink/intro-specs.rst index bada89699455..a4435ae4628d 100644 --- a/Documentation/userspace-api/netlink/intro-specs.rst +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/netlink/intro-specs.rst @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ developing Netlink related code. The tool is implemented in Python and can use a YAML specification to issue Netlink requests to the kernel. Only Generic Netlink is supported. -The tool is located at ``tools/net/ynl/cli.py``. It accepts +The tool is located at ``tools/net/ynl/pyynl/cli.py``. It accepts a handul of arguments, the most important ones are: - ``--spec`` - point to the spec file @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ YAML specs can be found under ``Documentation/netlink/specs/``. Example use:: - $ ./tools/net/ynl/cli.py --spec Documentation/netlink/specs/ethtool.yaml \ + $ ./tools/net/ynl/pyynl/cli.py --spec Documentation/netlink/specs/ethtool.yaml \ --do rings-get \ --json '{"header":{"dev-index": 18}}' {'header': {'dev-index': 18, 'dev-name': 'eni1np1'}, @@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ the two marker lines like above to a file, add that file to git, and run the regeneration tool. Grep the tree for ``YNL-GEN`` to see other examples. -The code generation itself is performed by ``tools/net/ynl/ynl-gen-c.py`` +The code generation itself is performed by ``tools/net/ynl/pyynl/ynl_gen_c.py`` but it takes a few arguments so calling it directly for each file quickly becomes tedious. @@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ YNL lib ``tools/net/ynl/lib/`` contains an implementation of a C library (based on libmnl) which integrates with code generated by -``tools/net/ynl/ynl-gen-c.py`` to create easy to use netlink wrappers. +``tools/net/ynl/pyynl/ynl_gen_c.py`` to create easy to use netlink wrappers. YNL basics ---------- diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/ntsync.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/ntsync.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..25e7c4aef968 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/ntsync.rst @@ -0,0 +1,385 @@ +=================================== +NT synchronization primitive driver +=================================== + +This page documents the user-space API for the ntsync driver. + +ntsync is a support driver for emulation of NT synchronization +primitives by user-space NT emulators. It exists because implementation +in user-space, using existing tools, cannot match Windows performance +while offering accurate semantics. It is implemented entirely in +software, and does not drive any hardware device. + +This interface is meant as a compatibility tool only, and should not +be used for general synchronization. Instead use generic, versatile +interfaces such as futex(2) and poll(2). + +Synchronization primitives +========================== + +The ntsync driver exposes three types of synchronization primitives: +semaphores, mutexes, and events. + +A semaphore holds a single volatile 32-bit counter, and a static 32-bit +integer denoting the maximum value. It is considered signaled (that is, +can be acquired without contention, or will wake up a waiting thread) +when the counter is nonzero. The counter is decremented by one when a +wait is satisfied. Both the initial and maximum count are established +when the semaphore is created. + +A mutex holds a volatile 32-bit recursion count, and a volatile 32-bit +identifier denoting its owner. A mutex is considered signaled when its +owner is zero (indicating that it is not owned). The recursion count is +incremented when a wait is satisfied, and ownership is set to the given +identifier. + +A mutex also holds an internal flag denoting whether its previous owner +has died; such a mutex is said to be abandoned. Owner death is not +tracked automatically based on thread death, but rather must be +communicated using ``NTSYNC_IOC_MUTEX_KILL``. An abandoned mutex is +inherently considered unowned. + +Except for the "unowned" semantics of zero, the actual value of the +owner identifier is not interpreted by the ntsync driver at all. The +intended use is to store a thread identifier; however, the ntsync +driver does not actually validate that a calling thread provides +consistent or unique identifiers. + +An event is similar to a semaphore with a maximum count of one. It holds +a volatile boolean state denoting whether it is signaled or not. There +are two types of events, auto-reset and manual-reset. An auto-reset +event is designaled when a wait is satisfied; a manual-reset event is +not. The event type is specified when the event is created. + +Unless specified otherwise, all operations on an object are atomic and +totally ordered with respect to other operations on the same object. + +Objects are represented by files. When all file descriptors to an +object are closed, that object is deleted. + +Char device +=========== + +The ntsync driver creates a single char device /dev/ntsync. Each file +description opened on the device represents a unique instance intended +to back an individual NT virtual machine. Objects created by one ntsync +instance may only be used with other objects created by the same +instance. + +ioctl reference +=============== + +All operations on the device are done through ioctls. There are four +structures used in ioctl calls:: + + struct ntsync_sem_args { + __u32 count; + __u32 max; + }; + + struct ntsync_mutex_args { + __u32 owner; + __u32 count; + }; + + struct ntsync_event_args { + __u32 signaled; + __u32 manual; + }; + + struct ntsync_wait_args { + __u64 timeout; + __u64 objs; + __u32 count; + __u32 owner; + __u32 index; + __u32 alert; + __u32 flags; + __u32 pad; + }; + +Depending on the ioctl, members of the structure may be used as input, +output, or not at all. + +The ioctls on the device file are as follows: + +.. c:macro:: NTSYNC_IOC_CREATE_SEM + + Create a semaphore object. Takes a pointer to struct + :c:type:`ntsync_sem_args`, which is used as follows: + + .. list-table:: + + * - ``count`` + - Initial count of the semaphore. + * - ``max`` + - Maximum count of the semaphore. + + Fails with ``EINVAL`` if ``count`` is greater than ``max``. + On success, returns a file descriptor the created semaphore. + +.. c:macro:: NTSYNC_IOC_CREATE_MUTEX + + Create a mutex object. Takes a pointer to struct + :c:type:`ntsync_mutex_args`, which is used as follows: + + .. list-table:: + + * - ``count`` + - Initial recursion count of the mutex. + * - ``owner`` + - Initial owner of the mutex. + + If ``owner`` is nonzero and ``count`` is zero, or if ``owner`` is + zero and ``count`` is nonzero, the function fails with ``EINVAL``. + On success, returns a file descriptor the created mutex. + +.. c:macro:: NTSYNC_IOC_CREATE_EVENT + + Create an event object. Takes a pointer to struct + :c:type:`ntsync_event_args`, which is used as follows: + + .. list-table:: + + * - ``signaled`` + - If nonzero, the event is initially signaled, otherwise + nonsignaled. + * - ``manual`` + - If nonzero, the event is a manual-reset event, otherwise + auto-reset. + + On success, returns a file descriptor the created event. + +The ioctls on the individual objects are as follows: + +.. c:macro:: NTSYNC_IOC_SEM_POST + + Post to a semaphore object. Takes a pointer to a 32-bit integer, + which on input holds the count to be added to the semaphore, and on + output contains its previous count. + + If adding to the semaphore's current count would raise the latter + past the semaphore's maximum count, the ioctl fails with + ``EOVERFLOW`` and the semaphore is not affected. If raising the + semaphore's count causes it to become signaled, eligible threads + waiting on this semaphore will be woken and the semaphore's count + decremented appropriately. + +.. c:macro:: NTSYNC_IOC_MUTEX_UNLOCK + + Release a mutex object. Takes a pointer to struct + :c:type:`ntsync_mutex_args`, which is used as follows: + + .. list-table:: + + * - ``owner`` + - Specifies the owner trying to release this mutex. + * - ``count`` + - On output, contains the previous recursion count. + + If ``owner`` is zero, the ioctl fails with ``EINVAL``. If ``owner`` + is not the current owner of the mutex, the ioctl fails with + ``EPERM``. + + The mutex's count will be decremented by one. If decrementing the + mutex's count causes it to become zero, the mutex is marked as + unowned and signaled, and eligible threads waiting on it will be + woken as appropriate. + +.. c:macro:: NTSYNC_IOC_SET_EVENT + + Signal an event object. Takes a pointer to a 32-bit integer, which on + output contains the previous state of the event. + + Eligible threads will be woken, and auto-reset events will be + designaled appropriately. + +.. c:macro:: NTSYNC_IOC_RESET_EVENT + + Designal an event object. Takes a pointer to a 32-bit integer, which + on output contains the previous state of the event. + +.. c:macro:: NTSYNC_IOC_PULSE_EVENT + + Wake threads waiting on an event object while leaving it in an + unsignaled state. Takes a pointer to a 32-bit integer, which on + output contains the previous state of the event. + + A pulse operation can be thought of as a set followed by a reset, + performed as a single atomic operation. If two threads are waiting on + an auto-reset event which is pulsed, only one will be woken. If two + threads are waiting a manual-reset event which is pulsed, both will + be woken. However, in both cases, the event will be unsignaled + afterwards, and a simultaneous read operation will always report the + event as unsignaled. + +.. c:macro:: NTSYNC_IOC_READ_SEM + + Read the current state of a semaphore object. Takes a pointer to + struct :c:type:`ntsync_sem_args`, which is used as follows: + + .. list-table:: + + * - ``count`` + - On output, contains the current count of the semaphore. + * - ``max`` + - On output, contains the maximum count of the semaphore. + +.. c:macro:: NTSYNC_IOC_READ_MUTEX + + Read the current state of a mutex object. Takes a pointer to struct + :c:type:`ntsync_mutex_args`, which is used as follows: + + .. list-table:: + + * - ``owner`` + - On output, contains the current owner of the mutex, or zero + if the mutex is not currently owned. + * - ``count`` + - On output, contains the current recursion count of the mutex. + + If the mutex is marked as abandoned, the function fails with + ``EOWNERDEAD``. In this case, ``count`` and ``owner`` are set to + zero. + +.. c:macro:: NTSYNC_IOC_READ_EVENT + + Read the current state of an event object. Takes a pointer to struct + :c:type:`ntsync_event_args`, which is used as follows: + + .. list-table:: + + * - ``signaled`` + - On output, contains the current state of the event. + * - ``manual`` + - On output, contains 1 if the event is a manual-reset event, + and 0 otherwise. + +.. c:macro:: NTSYNC_IOC_KILL_OWNER + + Mark a mutex as unowned and abandoned if it is owned by the given + owner. Takes an input-only pointer to a 32-bit integer denoting the + owner. If the owner is zero, the ioctl fails with ``EINVAL``. If the + owner does not own the mutex, the function fails with ``EPERM``. + + Eligible threads waiting on the mutex will be woken as appropriate + (and such waits will fail with ``EOWNERDEAD``, as described below). + +.. c:macro:: NTSYNC_IOC_WAIT_ANY + + Poll on any of a list of objects, atomically acquiring at most one. + Takes a pointer to struct :c:type:`ntsync_wait_args`, which is + used as follows: + + .. list-table:: + + * - ``timeout`` + - Absolute timeout in nanoseconds. If ``NTSYNC_WAIT_REALTIME`` + is set, the timeout is measured against the REALTIME clock; + otherwise it is measured against the MONOTONIC clock. If the + timeout is equal to or earlier than the current time, the + function returns immediately without sleeping. If ``timeout`` + is U64_MAX, the function will sleep until an object is + signaled, and will not fail with ``ETIMEDOUT``. + * - ``objs`` + - Pointer to an array of ``count`` file descriptors + (specified as an integer so that the structure has the same + size regardless of architecture). If any object is + invalid, the function fails with ``EINVAL``. + * - ``count`` + - Number of objects specified in the ``objs`` array. + If greater than ``NTSYNC_MAX_WAIT_COUNT``, the function fails + with ``EINVAL``. + * - ``owner`` + - Mutex owner identifier. If any object in ``objs`` is a mutex, + the ioctl will attempt to acquire that mutex on behalf of + ``owner``. If ``owner`` is zero, the ioctl fails with + ``EINVAL``. + * - ``index`` + - On success, contains the index (into ``objs``) of the object + which was signaled. If ``alert`` was signaled instead, + this contains ``count``. + * - ``alert`` + - Optional event object file descriptor. If nonzero, this + specifies an "alert" event object which, if signaled, will + terminate the wait. If nonzero, the identifier must point to a + valid event. + * - ``flags`` + - Zero or more flags. Currently the only flag is + ``NTSYNC_WAIT_REALTIME``, which causes the timeout to be + measured against the REALTIME clock instead of MONOTONIC. + * - ``pad`` + - Unused, must be set to zero. + + This function attempts to acquire one of the given objects. If unable + to do so, it sleeps until an object becomes signaled, subsequently + acquiring it, or the timeout expires. In the latter case the ioctl + fails with ``ETIMEDOUT``. The function only acquires one object, even + if multiple objects are signaled. + + A semaphore is considered to be signaled if its count is nonzero, and + is acquired by decrementing its count by one. A mutex is considered + to be signaled if it is unowned or if its owner matches the ``owner`` + argument, and is acquired by incrementing its recursion count by one + and setting its owner to the ``owner`` argument. An auto-reset event + is acquired by designaling it; a manual-reset event is not affected + by acquisition. + + Acquisition is atomic and totally ordered with respect to other + operations on the same object. If two wait operations (with different + ``owner`` identifiers) are queued on the same mutex, only one is + signaled. If two wait operations are queued on the same semaphore, + and a value of one is posted to it, only one is signaled. + + If an abandoned mutex is acquired, the ioctl fails with + ``EOWNERDEAD``. Although this is a failure return, the function may + otherwise be considered successful. The mutex is marked as owned by + the given owner (with a recursion count of 1) and as no longer + abandoned, and ``index`` is still set to the index of the mutex. + + The ``alert`` argument is an "extra" event which can terminate the + wait, independently of all other objects. + + It is valid to pass the same object more than once, including by + passing the same event in the ``objs`` array and in ``alert``. If a + wakeup occurs due to that object being signaled, ``index`` is set to + the lowest index corresponding to that object. + + The function may fail with ``EINTR`` if a signal is received. + +.. c:macro:: NTSYNC_IOC_WAIT_ALL + + Poll on a list of objects, atomically acquiring all of them. Takes a + pointer to struct :c:type:`ntsync_wait_args`, which is used + identically to ``NTSYNC_IOC_WAIT_ANY``, except that ``index`` is + always filled with zero on success if not woken via alert. + + This function attempts to simultaneously acquire all of the given + objects. If unable to do so, it sleeps until all objects become + simultaneously signaled, subsequently acquiring them, or the timeout + expires. In the latter case the ioctl fails with ``ETIMEDOUT`` and no + objects are modified. + + Objects may become signaled and subsequently designaled (through + acquisition by other threads) while this thread is sleeping. Only + once all objects are simultaneously signaled does the ioctl acquire + them and return. The entire acquisition is atomic and totally ordered + with respect to other operations on any of the given objects. + + If an abandoned mutex is acquired, the ioctl fails with + ``EOWNERDEAD``. Similarly to ``NTSYNC_IOC_WAIT_ANY``, all objects are + nevertheless marked as acquired. Note that if multiple mutex objects + are specified, there is no way to know which were marked as + abandoned. + + As with "any" waits, the ``alert`` argument is an "extra" event which + can terminate the wait. Critically, however, an "all" wait will + succeed if all members in ``objs`` are signaled, *or* if ``alert`` is + signaled. In the latter case ``index`` will be set to ``count``. As + with "any" waits, if both conditions are filled, the former takes + priority, and objects in ``objs`` will be acquired. + + Unlike ``NTSYNC_IOC_WAIT_ANY``, it is not valid to pass the same + object more than once, nor is it valid to pass the same object in + ``objs`` and in ``alert``. If this is attempted, the function fails + with ``EINVAL``. diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/sysfs-platform_profile.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/sysfs-platform_profile.rst index 4fccde2e4563..7f013356118a 100644 --- a/Documentation/userspace-api/sysfs-platform_profile.rst +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/sysfs-platform_profile.rst @@ -40,3 +40,41 @@ added. Drivers which wish to introduce new profile names must: 1. Explain why the existing profile names cannot be used. 2. Add the new profile name, along with a clear description of the expected behaviour, to the sysfs-platform_profile ABI documentation. + +"Custom" profile support +======================== +The platform_profile class also supports profiles advertising a "custom" +profile. This is intended to be set by drivers when the setttings in the +driver have been modified in a way that a standard profile doesn't represent +the current state. + +Multiple driver support +======================= +When multiple drivers on a system advertise a platform profile handler, the +platform profile handler core will only advertise the profiles that are +common between all drivers to the ``/sys/firmware/acpi`` interfaces. + +This is to ensure there is no ambiguity on what the profile names mean when +all handlers don't support a profile. + +Individual drivers will register a 'platform_profile' class device that has +similar semantics as the ``/sys/firmware/acpi/platform_profile`` interface. + +To discover which driver is associated with a platform profile handler the +user can read the ``name`` attribute of the class device. + +To discover available profiles from the class interface the user can read the +``choices`` attribute. + +If a user wants to select a profile for a specific driver, they can do so +by writing to the ``profile`` attribute of the driver's class device. + +This will allow users to set different profiles for different drivers on the +same system. If the selected profile by individual drivers differs the +platform profile handler core will display the profile 'custom' to indicate +that the profiles are not the same. + +While the ``platform_profile`` attribute has the value ``custom``, writing a +common profile from ``platform_profile_choices`` to the platform_profile +attribute of the platform profile handler core will set the profile for all +drivers. |