diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/char')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/agp/amd64-agp.c | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/agp/intel-agp.c | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/agp/intel-gtt.c | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/agp/sis-agp.c | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/agp/via-agp.c | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/hpet.c | 34 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/ipmi/ipmb_dev_int.c | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_ipmb.c | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_ssif.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/ipmi/ssif_bmc.c | 10 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/tpm/Makefile | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/tpm/eventlog/common.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 419 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_spi_main.c | 1 |
14 files changed, 291 insertions, 196 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/char/agp/amd64-agp.c b/drivers/char/agp/amd64-agp.c index ce8651436609..8e41731d3642 100644 --- a/drivers/char/agp/amd64-agp.c +++ b/drivers/char/agp/amd64-agp.c @@ -802,4 +802,5 @@ module_exit(agp_amd64_cleanup); MODULE_AUTHOR("Dave Jones, Andi Kleen"); module_param(agp_try_unsupported, bool, 0); +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("GART driver for the AMD Opteron/Athlon64 on-CPU northbridge"); MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); diff --git a/drivers/char/agp/intel-agp.c b/drivers/char/agp/intel-agp.c index c518b3a9db04..3111e320b2c5 100644 --- a/drivers/char/agp/intel-agp.c +++ b/drivers/char/agp/intel-agp.c @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ #include <asm/smp.h> #include "agp.h" #include "intel-agp.h" -#include <drm/intel-gtt.h> +#include <drm/intel/intel-gtt.h> static int intel_fetch_size(void) { @@ -920,4 +920,5 @@ module_init(agp_intel_init); module_exit(agp_intel_cleanup); MODULE_AUTHOR("Dave Jones, Various @Intel"); +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Intel AGPGART routines"); MODULE_LICENSE("GPL and additional rights"); diff --git a/drivers/char/agp/intel-gtt.c b/drivers/char/agp/intel-gtt.c index bf6716ff863b..ef30445527a2 100644 --- a/drivers/char/agp/intel-gtt.c +++ b/drivers/char/agp/intel-gtt.c @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ #include <asm/smp.h> #include "agp.h" #include "intel-agp.h" -#include <drm/intel-gtt.h> +#include <drm/intel/intel-gtt.h> #include <asm/set_memory.h> /* @@ -1461,4 +1461,5 @@ void intel_gmch_remove(void) EXPORT_SYMBOL(intel_gmch_remove); MODULE_AUTHOR("Dave Jones, Various @Intel"); +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Intel GTT (Graphics Translation Table) routines"); MODULE_LICENSE("GPL and additional rights"); diff --git a/drivers/char/agp/sis-agp.c b/drivers/char/agp/sis-agp.c index 484bb101c53b..a0deb97cedb0 100644 --- a/drivers/char/agp/sis-agp.c +++ b/drivers/char/agp/sis-agp.c @@ -433,4 +433,5 @@ module_param(agp_sis_force_delay, bool, 0); MODULE_PARM_DESC(agp_sis_force_delay,"forces sis delay hack"); module_param(agp_sis_agp_spec, int, 0); MODULE_PARM_DESC(agp_sis_agp_spec,"0=force sis init, 1=force generic agp3 init, default: autodetect"); +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("SiS AGPGART routines"); MODULE_LICENSE("GPL and additional rights"); diff --git a/drivers/char/agp/via-agp.c b/drivers/char/agp/via-agp.c index bc5140af2dcb..8b19a5d1a09b 100644 --- a/drivers/char/agp/via-agp.c +++ b/drivers/char/agp/via-agp.c @@ -575,5 +575,6 @@ static void __exit agp_via_cleanup(void) module_init(agp_via_init); module_exit(agp_via_cleanup); +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("VIA AGPGART routines"); MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); MODULE_AUTHOR("Dave Jones"); diff --git a/drivers/char/hpet.c b/drivers/char/hpet.c index d51fc8321d41..da32e8ed0830 100644 --- a/drivers/char/hpet.c +++ b/drivers/char/hpet.c @@ -269,8 +269,13 @@ hpet_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t * ppos) if (!devp->hd_ireqfreq) return -EIO; - if (count < sizeof(unsigned long)) - return -EINVAL; + if (in_compat_syscall()) { + if (count < sizeof(compat_ulong_t)) + return -EINVAL; + } else { + if (count < sizeof(unsigned long)) + return -EINVAL; + } add_wait_queue(&devp->hd_waitqueue, &wait); @@ -294,9 +299,16 @@ hpet_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t * ppos) schedule(); } - retval = put_user(data, (unsigned long __user *)buf); - if (!retval) - retval = sizeof(unsigned long); + if (in_compat_syscall()) { + retval = put_user(data, (compat_ulong_t __user *)buf); + if (!retval) + retval = sizeof(compat_ulong_t); + } else { + retval = put_user(data, (unsigned long __user *)buf); + if (!retval) + retval = sizeof(unsigned long); + } + out: __set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING); remove_wait_queue(&devp->hd_waitqueue, &wait); @@ -651,12 +663,24 @@ struct compat_hpet_info { unsigned short hi_timer; }; +/* 32-bit types would lead to different command codes which should be + * translated into 64-bit ones before passed to hpet_ioctl_common + */ +#define COMPAT_HPET_INFO _IOR('h', 0x03, struct compat_hpet_info) +#define COMPAT_HPET_IRQFREQ _IOW('h', 0x6, compat_ulong_t) + static long hpet_compat_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) { struct hpet_info info; int err; + if (cmd == COMPAT_HPET_INFO) + cmd = HPET_INFO; + + if (cmd == COMPAT_HPET_IRQFREQ) + cmd = HPET_IRQFREQ; + mutex_lock(&hpet_mutex); err = hpet_ioctl_common(file->private_data, cmd, arg, &info); mutex_unlock(&hpet_mutex); diff --git a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmb_dev_int.c b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmb_dev_int.c index 49100845fcb7..7296127181ec 100644 --- a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmb_dev_int.c +++ b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmb_dev_int.c @@ -350,8 +350,8 @@ static void ipmb_remove(struct i2c_client *client) } static const struct i2c_device_id ipmb_id[] = { - { "ipmb-dev", 0 }, - {}, + { "ipmb-dev" }, + {} }; MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(i2c, ipmb_id); diff --git a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_ipmb.c b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_ipmb.c index 4e335832fc26..6a4f279c7c1f 100644 --- a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_ipmb.c +++ b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_ipmb.c @@ -561,8 +561,8 @@ MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(of, of_ipmi_ipmb_match); #endif static const struct i2c_device_id ipmi_ipmb_id[] = { - { DEVICE_NAME, 0 }, - {}, + { DEVICE_NAME }, + {} }; MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(i2c, ipmi_ipmb_id); diff --git a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_ssif.c b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_ssif.c index 3f509a22217b..96ad571d041a 100644 --- a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_ssif.c +++ b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_ssif.c @@ -2049,7 +2049,7 @@ static int dmi_ipmi_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) #endif static const struct i2c_device_id ssif_id[] = { - { DEVICE_NAME, 0 }, + { DEVICE_NAME }, { } }; MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(i2c, ssif_id); diff --git a/drivers/char/ipmi/ssif_bmc.c b/drivers/char/ipmi/ssif_bmc.c index 56346fb32872..a14fafc583d4 100644 --- a/drivers/char/ipmi/ssif_bmc.c +++ b/drivers/char/ipmi/ssif_bmc.c @@ -177,13 +177,15 @@ static ssize_t ssif_bmc_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t unsigned long flags; ssize_t ret; - if (count > sizeof(struct ipmi_ssif_msg)) + if (count < sizeof(msg.len) || + count > sizeof(struct ipmi_ssif_msg)) return -EINVAL; if (copy_from_user(&msg, buf, count)) return -EFAULT; - if (!msg.len || count < sizeof_field(struct ipmi_ssif_msg, len) + msg.len) + if (!msg.len || msg.len > IPMI_SSIF_PAYLOAD_MAX || + count < sizeof_field(struct ipmi_ssif_msg, len) + msg.len) return -EINVAL; spin_lock_irqsave(&ssif_bmc->lock, flags); @@ -850,8 +852,8 @@ static const struct of_device_id ssif_bmc_match[] = { MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(of, ssif_bmc_match); static const struct i2c_device_id ssif_bmc_id[] = { - { DEVICE_NAME, 0 }, - { }, + { DEVICE_NAME }, + { } }; MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(i2c, ssif_bmc_id); diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile b/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile index 4c695b0388f3..9bb142c75243 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile @@ -16,8 +16,8 @@ tpm-y += eventlog/common.o tpm-y += eventlog/tpm1.o tpm-y += eventlog/tpm2.o tpm-y += tpm-buf.o +tpm-y += tpm2-sessions.o -tpm-$(CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC) += tpm2-sessions.o tpm-$(CONFIG_ACPI) += tpm_ppi.o eventlog/acpi.o tpm-$(CONFIG_EFI) += eventlog/efi.o tpm-$(CONFIG_OF) += eventlog/of.o diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/eventlog/common.c b/drivers/char/tpm/eventlog/common.c index 639c3f395a5a..4c0bbba64ee5 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/eventlog/common.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/eventlog/common.c @@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ static int tpm_bios_measurements_open(struct inode *inode, if (!err) { seq = file->private_data; seq->private = chip; + } else { + put_device(&chip->dev); } return err; diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c index 907ac9956a78..2281d55df545 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c @@ -83,9 +83,6 @@ #define AES_KEY_BYTES AES_KEYSIZE_128 #define AES_KEY_BITS (AES_KEY_BYTES*8) -static int tpm2_create_primary(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 hierarchy, - u32 *handle, u8 *name); - /* * This is the structure that carries all the auth information (like * session handle, nonces, session key and auth) from use to use it is @@ -148,6 +145,7 @@ struct tpm2_auth { u8 name[AUTH_MAX_NAMES][2 + SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE]; }; +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC /* * Name Size based on TPM algorithm (assumes no hash bigger than 255) */ @@ -163,6 +161,226 @@ static u8 name_size(const u8 *name) return size_map[alg] + 2; } +static int tpm2_parse_read_public(char *name, struct tpm_buf *buf) +{ + struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; + off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE; + u32 tot_len = be32_to_cpu(head->length); + u32 val; + + /* we're starting after the header so adjust the length */ + tot_len -= TPM_HEADER_SIZE; + + /* skip public */ + val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset); + if (val > tot_len) + return -EINVAL; + offset += val; + /* name */ + val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset); + if (val != name_size(&buf->data[offset])) + return -EINVAL; + memcpy(name, &buf->data[offset], val); + /* forget the rest */ + return 0; +} + +static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, char *name) +{ + struct tpm_buf buf; + int rc; + + rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_READ_PUBLIC); + if (rc) + return rc; + + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, handle); + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "read public"); + if (rc == TPM2_RC_SUCCESS) + rc = tpm2_parse_read_public(name, &buf); + + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + + return rc; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC */ + +/** + * tpm_buf_append_name() - add a handle area to the buffer + * @chip: the TPM chip structure + * @buf: The buffer to be appended + * @handle: The handle to be appended + * @name: The name of the handle (may be NULL) + * + * In order to compute session HMACs, we need to know the names of the + * objects pointed to by the handles. For most objects, this is simply + * the actual 4 byte handle or an empty buf (in these cases @name + * should be NULL) but for volatile objects, permanent objects and NV + * areas, the name is defined as the hash (according to the name + * algorithm which should be set to sha256) of the public area to + * which the two byte algorithm id has been appended. For these + * objects, the @name pointer should point to this. If a name is + * required but @name is NULL, then TPM2_ReadPublic() will be called + * on the handle to obtain the name. + * + * As with most tpm_buf operations, success is assumed because failure + * will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a + * kernel message. + */ +void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, + u32 handle, u8 *name) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC + enum tpm2_mso_type mso = tpm2_handle_mso(handle); + struct tpm2_auth *auth; + int slot; +#endif + + if (!tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) { + tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle); + /* count the number of handles in the upper bits of flags */ + buf->handles++; + return; + } + +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC + slot = (tpm_buf_length(buf) - TPM_HEADER_SIZE) / 4; + if (slot >= AUTH_MAX_NAMES) { + dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: too many handles\n"); + return; + } + auth = chip->auth; + WARN(auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf), + "name added in wrong place\n"); + tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle); + auth->session += 4; + + if (mso == TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT || + mso == TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE || + mso == TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) { + if (!name) + tpm2_read_public(chip, handle, auth->name[slot]); + } else { + if (name) + dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: Handle does not require name but one is specified\n"); + } + + auth->name_h[slot] = handle; + if (name) + memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, name_size(name)); +#endif +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_name); + +/** + * tpm_buf_append_hmac_session() - Append a TPM session element + * @chip: the TPM chip structure + * @buf: The buffer to be appended + * @attributes: The session attributes + * @passphrase: The session authority (NULL if none) + * @passphrase_len: The length of the session authority (0 if none) + * + * This fills in a session structure in the TPM command buffer, except + * for the HMAC which cannot be computed until the command buffer is + * complete. The type of session is controlled by the @attributes, + * the main ones of which are TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION which means the + * session won't terminate after tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(), + * TPM2_SA_DECRYPT which means this buffers first parameter should be + * encrypted with a session key and TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, which means the + * response buffer's first parameter needs to be decrypted (confusing, + * but the defines are written from the point of view of the TPM). + * + * Any session appended by this command must be finalized by calling + * tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session() otherwise the HMAC will be incorrect + * and the TPM will reject the command. + * + * As with most tpm_buf operations, success is assumed because failure + * will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a + * kernel message. + */ +void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, + u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase, + int passphrase_len) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC + u8 nonce[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; + struct tpm2_auth *auth; + u32 len; +#endif + + if (!tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) { + /* offset tells us where the sessions area begins */ + int offset = buf->handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE; + u32 len = 9 + passphrase_len; + + if (tpm_buf_length(buf) != offset) { + /* not the first session so update the existing length */ + len += get_unaligned_be32(&buf->data[offset]); + put_unaligned_be32(len, &buf->data[offset]); + } else { + tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, len); + } + /* auth handle */ + tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, TPM2_RS_PW); + /* nonce */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, 0); + /* attributes */ + tpm_buf_append_u8(buf, 0); + /* passphrase */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, passphrase_len); + tpm_buf_append(buf, passphrase, passphrase_len); + return; + } + +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC + /* + * The Architecture Guide requires us to strip trailing zeros + * before computing the HMAC + */ + while (passphrase && passphrase_len > 0 && passphrase[passphrase_len - 1] == '\0') + passphrase_len--; + + auth = chip->auth; + auth->attrs = attributes; + auth->passphrase_len = passphrase_len; + if (passphrase_len) + memcpy(auth->passphrase, passphrase, passphrase_len); + + if (auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf)) { + /* we're not the first session */ + len = get_unaligned_be32(&buf->data[auth->session]); + if (4 + len + auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf)) { + WARN(1, "session length mismatch, cannot append"); + return; + } + + /* add our new session */ + len += 9 + 2 * SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE; + put_unaligned_be32(len, &buf->data[auth->session]); + } else { + tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, 9 + 2 * SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); + } + + /* random number for our nonce */ + get_random_bytes(nonce, sizeof(nonce)); + memcpy(auth->our_nonce, nonce, sizeof(nonce)); + tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, auth->handle); + /* our new nonce */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); + tpm_buf_append(buf, nonce, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); + tpm_buf_append_u8(buf, auth->attrs); + /* and put a placeholder for the hmac */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); + tpm_buf_append(buf, nonce, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); +#endif +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_hmac_session); + +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC + +static int tpm2_create_primary(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 hierarchy, + u32 *handle, u8 *name); + /* * It turns out the crypto hmac(sha256) is hard for us to consume * because it assumes a fixed key and the TPM seems to change the key @@ -344,82 +562,6 @@ static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip) } /** - * tpm_buf_append_hmac_session() - Append a TPM session element - * @chip: the TPM chip structure - * @buf: The buffer to be appended - * @attributes: The session attributes - * @passphrase: The session authority (NULL if none) - * @passphrase_len: The length of the session authority (0 if none) - * - * This fills in a session structure in the TPM command buffer, except - * for the HMAC which cannot be computed until the command buffer is - * complete. The type of session is controlled by the @attributes, - * the main ones of which are TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION which means the - * session won't terminate after tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(), - * TPM2_SA_DECRYPT which means this buffers first parameter should be - * encrypted with a session key and TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, which means the - * response buffer's first parameter needs to be decrypted (confusing, - * but the defines are written from the point of view of the TPM). - * - * Any session appended by this command must be finalized by calling - * tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session() otherwise the HMAC will be incorrect - * and the TPM will reject the command. - * - * As with most tpm_buf operations, success is assumed because failure - * will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a - * kernel message. - */ -void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, - u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase, - int passphrase_len) -{ - u8 nonce[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; - u32 len; - struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth; - - /* - * The Architecture Guide requires us to strip trailing zeros - * before computing the HMAC - */ - while (passphrase && passphrase_len > 0 - && passphrase[passphrase_len - 1] == '\0') - passphrase_len--; - - auth->attrs = attributes; - auth->passphrase_len = passphrase_len; - if (passphrase_len) - memcpy(auth->passphrase, passphrase, passphrase_len); - - if (auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf)) { - /* we're not the first session */ - len = get_unaligned_be32(&buf->data[auth->session]); - if (4 + len + auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf)) { - WARN(1, "session length mismatch, cannot append"); - return; - } - - /* add our new session */ - len += 9 + 2 * SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE; - put_unaligned_be32(len, &buf->data[auth->session]); - } else { - tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, 9 + 2 * SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); - } - - /* random number for our nonce */ - get_random_bytes(nonce, sizeof(nonce)); - memcpy(auth->our_nonce, nonce, sizeof(nonce)); - tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, auth->handle); - /* our new nonce */ - tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); - tpm_buf_append(buf, nonce, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); - tpm_buf_append_u8(buf, auth->attrs); - /* and put a placeholder for the hmac */ - tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); - tpm_buf_append(buf, nonce, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm_buf_append_hmac_session); - -/** * tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session() - finalize the session HMAC * @chip: the TPM chip structure * @buf: The buffer to be appended @@ -449,6 +591,9 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) u8 cphash[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; struct sha256_state sctx; + if (!auth) + return; + /* save the command code in BE format */ auth->ordinal = head->ordinal; @@ -567,104 +712,6 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session); -static int tpm2_parse_read_public(char *name, struct tpm_buf *buf) -{ - struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; - off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE; - u32 tot_len = be32_to_cpu(head->length); - u32 val; - - /* we're starting after the header so adjust the length */ - tot_len -= TPM_HEADER_SIZE; - - /* skip public */ - val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset); - if (val > tot_len) - return -EINVAL; - offset += val; - /* name */ - val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset); - if (val != name_size(&buf->data[offset])) - return -EINVAL; - memcpy(name, &buf->data[offset], val); - /* forget the rest */ - return 0; -} - -static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, char *name) -{ - struct tpm_buf buf; - int rc; - - rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_READ_PUBLIC); - if (rc) - return rc; - - tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, handle); - rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "read public"); - if (rc == TPM2_RC_SUCCESS) - rc = tpm2_parse_read_public(name, &buf); - - tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); - - return rc; -} - -/** - * tpm_buf_append_name() - add a handle area to the buffer - * @chip: the TPM chip structure - * @buf: The buffer to be appended - * @handle: The handle to be appended - * @name: The name of the handle (may be NULL) - * - * In order to compute session HMACs, we need to know the names of the - * objects pointed to by the handles. For most objects, this is simply - * the actual 4 byte handle or an empty buf (in these cases @name - * should be NULL) but for volatile objects, permanent objects and NV - * areas, the name is defined as the hash (according to the name - * algorithm which should be set to sha256) of the public area to - * which the two byte algorithm id has been appended. For these - * objects, the @name pointer should point to this. If a name is - * required but @name is NULL, then TPM2_ReadPublic() will be called - * on the handle to obtain the name. - * - * As with most tpm_buf operations, success is assumed because failure - * will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a - * kernel message. - */ -void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, - u32 handle, u8 *name) -{ - enum tpm2_mso_type mso = tpm2_handle_mso(handle); - struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth; - int slot; - - slot = (tpm_buf_length(buf) - TPM_HEADER_SIZE)/4; - if (slot >= AUTH_MAX_NAMES) { - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: too many handles\n"); - return; - } - WARN(auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf), - "name added in wrong place\n"); - tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle); - auth->session += 4; - - if (mso == TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT || - mso == TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE || - mso == TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) { - if (!name) - tpm2_read_public(chip, handle, auth->name[slot]); - } else { - if (name) - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: Handle does not require name but one is specified\n"); - } - - auth->name_h[slot] = handle; - if (name) - memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, name_size(name)); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm_buf_append_name); - /** * tpm_buf_check_hmac_response() - check the TPM return HMAC for correctness * @chip: the TPM chip structure @@ -705,6 +752,9 @@ int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 cc = be32_to_cpu(auth->ordinal); int parm_len, len, i, handles; + if (!auth) + return rc; + if (auth->session >= TPM_HEADER_SIZE) { WARN(1, "tpm session not filled correctly\n"); goto out; @@ -824,8 +874,13 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm_buf_check_hmac_response); */ void tpm2_end_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) { - tpm2_flush_context(chip, chip->auth->handle); - memzero_explicit(chip->auth, sizeof(*chip->auth)); + struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth; + + if (!auth) + return; + + tpm2_flush_context(chip, auth->handle); + memzero_explicit(auth, sizeof(*auth)); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm2_end_auth_session); @@ -907,6 +962,11 @@ int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) int rc; u32 null_key; + if (!auth) { + dev_warn_once(&chip->dev, "auth session is not active\n"); + return 0; + } + rc = tpm2_load_null(chip, &null_key); if (rc) goto out; @@ -1301,3 +1361,4 @@ int tpm2_sessions_init(struct tpm_chip *chip) return rc; } +#endif /* CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC */ diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_spi_main.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_spi_main.c index c9eca24bbad4..61b42c83ced8 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_spi_main.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_spi_main.c @@ -318,6 +318,7 @@ static void tpm_tis_spi_remove(struct spi_device *dev) } static const struct spi_device_id tpm_tis_spi_id[] = { + { "attpm20p", (unsigned long)tpm_tis_spi_probe }, { "st33htpm-spi", (unsigned long)tpm_tis_spi_probe }, { "slb9670", (unsigned long)tpm_tis_spi_probe }, { "tpm_tis_spi", (unsigned long)tpm_tis_spi_probe }, |