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-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c2
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/domain.c4
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/file.c2
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/include/lib.h6
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/lsm.c30
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/policy_compat.c3
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c51
7 files changed, 50 insertions, 48 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
index 424b2c1e586d..db7a51acf9db 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -1793,7 +1793,7 @@ fail2:
return error;
}
-static int ns_mkdir_op(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *dir,
+static int ns_mkdir_op(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir,
struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
{
struct aa_ns *ns, *parent;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index 6dd3cc5309bf..f3715cda59c5 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ static int aa_xattrs_match(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
d = bprm->file->f_path.dentry;
for (i = 0; i < attach->xattr_count; i++) {
- size = vfs_getxattr_alloc(&init_user_ns, d, attach->xattrs[i],
+ size = vfs_getxattr_alloc(&nop_mnt_idmap, d, attach->xattrs[i],
&value, value_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (size >= 0) {
u32 index, perm;
@@ -862,7 +862,7 @@ int apparmor_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
const char *info = NULL;
int error = 0;
bool unsafe = false;
- vfsuid_t vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(file_mnt_user_ns(bprm->file),
+ vfsuid_t vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(file_mnt_idmap(bprm->file),
file_inode(bprm->file));
struct path_cond cond = {
vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid),
diff --git a/security/apparmor/file.c b/security/apparmor/file.c
index 56061c9ab018..698b124e649f 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/file.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/file.c
@@ -459,7 +459,7 @@ static int __file_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label,
{
struct aa_profile *profile;
struct aa_perms perms = {};
- vfsuid_t vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(file_mnt_user_ns(file),
+ vfsuid_t vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(file_mnt_idmap(file),
file_inode(file));
struct path_cond cond = {
.uid = vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid),
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/lib.h b/security/apparmor/include/lib.h
index f1a29ab7ea1b..73c8a32c6861 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/lib.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/lib.h
@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ void aa_policy_destroy(struct aa_policy *policy);
*/
#define fn_label_build(L, P, GFP, FN) \
({ \
- __label__ __cleanup, __done; \
+ __label__ __do_cleanup, __done; \
struct aa_label *__new_; \
\
if ((L)->size > 1) { \
@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ void aa_policy_destroy(struct aa_policy *policy);
__new_ = (FN); \
AA_BUG(!__new_); \
if (IS_ERR(__new_)) \
- goto __cleanup; \
+ goto __do_cleanup; \
__lvec[__j++] = __new_; \
} \
for (__j = __count = 0; __j < (L)->size; __j++) \
@@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ void aa_policy_destroy(struct aa_policy *policy);
vec_cleanup(profile, __pvec, __count); \
} else \
__new_ = NULL; \
-__cleanup: \
+__do_cleanup: \
vec_cleanup(label, __lvec, (L)->size); \
} else { \
(P) = labels_profile(L); \
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 8d2d31d0d506..c9463bd0307d 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -227,8 +227,7 @@ static int common_perm(const char *op, const struct path *path, u32 mask,
*/
static int common_perm_cond(const char *op, const struct path *path, u32 mask)
{
- struct user_namespace *mnt_userns = mnt_user_ns(path->mnt);
- vfsuid_t vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_userns,
+ vfsuid_t vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_idmap(path->mnt),
d_backing_inode(path->dentry));
struct path_cond cond = {
vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid),
@@ -273,14 +272,13 @@ static int common_perm_rm(const char *op, const struct path *dir,
struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask)
{
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
- struct user_namespace *mnt_userns = mnt_user_ns(dir->mnt);
struct path_cond cond = { };
vfsuid_t vfsuid;
if (!inode || !path_mediated_fs(dentry))
return 0;
- vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_userns, inode);
+ vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_idmap(dir->mnt), inode);
cond.uid = vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid);
cond.mode = inode->i_mode;
@@ -379,7 +377,7 @@ static int apparmor_path_rename(const struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_d
label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
if (!unconfined(label)) {
- struct user_namespace *mnt_userns = mnt_user_ns(old_dir->mnt);
+ struct mnt_idmap *idmap = mnt_idmap(old_dir->mnt);
vfsuid_t vfsuid;
struct path old_path = { .mnt = old_dir->mnt,
.dentry = old_dentry };
@@ -388,14 +386,14 @@ static int apparmor_path_rename(const struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_d
struct path_cond cond = {
.mode = d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_mode
};
- vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_userns, d_backing_inode(old_dentry));
+ vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, d_backing_inode(old_dentry));
cond.uid = vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid);
if (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) {
struct path_cond cond_exchange = {
.mode = d_backing_inode(new_dentry)->i_mode,
};
- vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_userns, d_backing_inode(old_dentry));
+ vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, d_backing_inode(old_dentry));
cond_exchange.uid = vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid);
error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, label, &new_path, 0,
@@ -460,13 +458,13 @@ static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file)
label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(file->f_cred);
if (!unconfined(label)) {
- struct user_namespace *mnt_userns = file_mnt_user_ns(file);
+ struct mnt_idmap *idmap = file_mnt_idmap(file);
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
vfsuid_t vfsuid;
struct path_cond cond = {
.mode = inode->i_mode,
};
- vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_userns, inode);
+ vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, inode);
cond.uid = vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid);
error = aa_path_perm(OP_OPEN, label, &file->f_path, 0,
@@ -1211,13 +1209,13 @@ static int apparmor_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb
/*
* The cred blob is a pointer to, not an instance of, an aa_label.
*/
-struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = {
.lbs_cred = sizeof(struct aa_label *),
.lbs_file = sizeof(struct aa_file_ctx),
.lbs_task = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx),
};
-static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, apparmor_capget),
@@ -1429,7 +1427,7 @@ static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aaintbool = {
.get = param_get_aaintbool
};
/* Boot time disable flag */
-static int apparmor_enabled __lsm_ro_after_init = 1;
+static int apparmor_enabled __ro_after_init = 1;
module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, aaintbool, 0444);
static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str)
@@ -1766,11 +1764,6 @@ static int apparmor_dointvec(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
return proc_dointvec(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
}
-static struct ctl_path apparmor_sysctl_path[] = {
- { .procname = "kernel", },
- { }
-};
-
static struct ctl_table apparmor_sysctl_table[] = {
{
.procname = "unprivileged_userns_apparmor_policy",
@@ -1792,8 +1785,7 @@ static struct ctl_table apparmor_sysctl_table[] = {
static int __init apparmor_init_sysctl(void)
{
- return register_sysctl_paths(apparmor_sysctl_path,
- apparmor_sysctl_table) ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
+ return register_sysctl("kernel", apparmor_sysctl_table) ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
}
#else
static inline int apparmor_init_sysctl(void)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_compat.c b/security/apparmor/policy_compat.c
index 7ff9184ace29..0cb02da8a319 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy_compat.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy_compat.c
@@ -162,8 +162,7 @@ static struct aa_perms *compute_fperms(struct aa_dfa *dfa,
return NULL;
*size = state_count * 2;
- /* zero init so skip the trap state (state == 0) */
- for (state = 1; state < state_count; state++) {
+ for (state = 0; state < state_count; state++) {
table[state * 2] = compute_fperms_user(dfa, state);
table[state * 2 + 1] = compute_fperms_other(dfa, state);
}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
index 35ec2d9b6064..694fb7a09962 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
@@ -161,15 +161,6 @@ VISIBLE_IF_KUNIT bool aa_inbounds(struct aa_ext *e, size_t size)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_IF_KUNIT(aa_inbounds);
-static void *kvmemdup(const void *src, size_t len)
-{
- void *p = kvmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
-
- if (p)
- memcpy(p, src, len);
- return p;
-}
-
/**
* aa_unpack_u16_chunk - test and do bounds checking for a u16 size based chunk
* @e: serialized data read head (NOT NULL)
@@ -313,6 +304,26 @@ fail:
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_IF_KUNIT(aa_unpack_u64);
+static bool aa_unpack_cap_low(struct aa_ext *e, kernel_cap_t *data, const char *name)
+{
+ u32 val;
+
+ if (!aa_unpack_u32(e, &val, name))
+ return false;
+ data->val = val;
+ return true;
+}
+
+static bool aa_unpack_cap_high(struct aa_ext *e, kernel_cap_t *data, const char *name)
+{
+ u32 val;
+
+ if (!aa_unpack_u32(e, &val, name))
+ return false;
+ data->val = (u32)data->val | ((u64)val << 32);
+ return true;
+}
+
VISIBLE_IF_KUNIT bool aa_unpack_array(struct aa_ext *e, const char *name, u16 *size)
{
void *pos = e->pos;
@@ -908,25 +919,25 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name)
profile->path_flags = PATH_MEDIATE_DELETED;
info = "failed to unpack profile capabilities";
- if (!aa_unpack_u32(e, &(rules->caps.allow.cap[0]), NULL))
+ if (!aa_unpack_cap_low(e, &rules->caps.allow, NULL))
goto fail;
- if (!aa_unpack_u32(e, &(rules->caps.audit.cap[0]), NULL))
+ if (!aa_unpack_cap_low(e, &rules->caps.audit, NULL))
goto fail;
- if (!aa_unpack_u32(e, &(rules->caps.quiet.cap[0]), NULL))
+ if (!aa_unpack_cap_low(e, &rules->caps.quiet, NULL))
goto fail;
- if (!aa_unpack_u32(e, &tmpcap.cap[0], NULL))
+ if (!aa_unpack_cap_low(e, &tmpcap, NULL))
goto fail;
info = "failed to unpack upper profile capabilities";
if (aa_unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "caps64")) {
/* optional upper half of 64 bit caps */
- if (!aa_unpack_u32(e, &(rules->caps.allow.cap[1]), NULL))
+ if (!aa_unpack_cap_high(e, &rules->caps.allow, NULL))
goto fail;
- if (!aa_unpack_u32(e, &(rules->caps.audit.cap[1]), NULL))
+ if (!aa_unpack_cap_high(e, &rules->caps.audit, NULL))
goto fail;
- if (!aa_unpack_u32(e, &(rules->caps.quiet.cap[1]), NULL))
+ if (!aa_unpack_cap_high(e, &rules->caps.quiet, NULL))
goto fail;
- if (!aa_unpack_u32(e, &(tmpcap.cap[1]), NULL))
+ if (!aa_unpack_cap_high(e, &tmpcap, NULL))
goto fail;
if (!aa_unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL))
goto fail;
@@ -935,9 +946,9 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name)
info = "failed to unpack extended profile capabilities";
if (aa_unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "capsx")) {
/* optional extended caps mediation mask */
- if (!aa_unpack_u32(e, &(rules->caps.extended.cap[0]), NULL))
+ if (!aa_unpack_cap_low(e, &rules->caps.extended, NULL))
goto fail;
- if (!aa_unpack_u32(e, &(rules->caps.extended.cap[1]), NULL))
+ if (!aa_unpack_cap_high(e, &rules->caps.extended, NULL))
goto fail;
if (!aa_unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL))
goto fail;
@@ -1052,7 +1063,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name)
data->key = key;
data->size = aa_unpack_blob(e, &data->data, NULL);
- data->data = kvmemdup(data->data, data->size);
+ data->data = kvmemdup(data->data, data->size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (data->size && !data->data) {
kfree_sensitive(data->key);
kfree_sensitive(data);
generated by cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2 (git 2.47.1) at 2025-02-02 12:03:46 +0000