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-rw-r--r--security/Makefile2
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c3
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/audit.c3
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/domain.c3
-rw-r--r--security/commoncap.c1
-rw-r--r--security/device_cgroup.c19
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c46
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c4
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c9
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c12
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c3
-rw-r--r--security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c18
-rw-r--r--security/keys/proc.c2
-rw-r--r--security/security.c16
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c70
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/classmap.h4
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/conditional.c2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/policydb.c8
-rw-r--r--security/tomoyo/common.c4
19 files changed, 135 insertions, 94 deletions
diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile
index 22e73a3482bd..3baf435de541 100644
--- a/security/Makefile
+++ b/security/Makefile
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) += yama/
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN) += loadpin/
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID) += safesetid/
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM) += lockdown/
-obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE) += device_cgroup.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUPS) += device_cgroup.o
obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) += bpf/
# Object integrity file lists
diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
index 280741fc0f5f..f6a3ecfadf80 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -454,7 +454,7 @@ static ssize_t policy_update(u32 mask, const char __user *buf, size_t size,
*/
error = aa_may_manage_policy(label, ns, mask);
if (error)
- return error;
+ goto end_section;
data = aa_simple_write_to_buffer(buf, size, size, pos);
error = PTR_ERR(data);
@@ -462,6 +462,7 @@ static ssize_t policy_update(u32 mask, const char __user *buf, size_t size,
error = aa_replace_profiles(ns, label, mask, data);
aa_put_loaddata(data);
}
+end_section:
end_current_label_crit_section(label);
return error;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c
index 5a98661a8b46..597732503815 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/audit.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c
@@ -197,8 +197,9 @@ int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
rule->label = aa_label_parse(&root_ns->unconfined->label, rulestr,
GFP_KERNEL, true, false);
if (IS_ERR(rule->label)) {
+ int err = PTR_ERR(rule->label);
aa_audit_rule_free(rule);
- return PTR_ERR(rule->label);
+ return err;
}
*vrule = rule;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index 6ceb74e0f789..a84ef030fbd7 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -1328,6 +1328,7 @@ int aa_change_profile(const char *fqname, int flags)
ctx->nnp = aa_get_label(label);
if (!fqname || !*fqname) {
+ aa_put_label(label);
AA_DEBUG("no profile name");
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -1346,8 +1347,6 @@ int aa_change_profile(const char *fqname, int flags)
op = OP_CHANGE_PROFILE;
}
- label = aa_get_current_label();
-
if (*fqname == '&') {
stack = true;
/* don't have label_parse() do stacking */
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index f4ee0ae106b2..0ca31c8bc0b1 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -812,6 +812,7 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
int ret;
kuid_t root_uid;
+ new->cap_ambient = old->cap_ambient;
if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(old)))
return -EPERM;
diff --git a/security/device_cgroup.c b/security/device_cgroup.c
index 7d0f8f7431ff..43ab0ad45c1b 100644
--- a/security/device_cgroup.c
+++ b/security/device_cgroup.c
@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@
#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#ifdef CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE
+
static DEFINE_MUTEX(devcgroup_mutex);
enum devcg_behavior {
@@ -792,7 +794,7 @@ struct cgroup_subsys devices_cgrp_subsys = {
};
/**
- * __devcgroup_check_permission - checks if an inode operation is permitted
+ * devcgroup_legacy_check_permission - checks if an inode operation is permitted
* @dev_cgroup: the dev cgroup to be tested against
* @type: device type
* @major: device major number
@@ -801,7 +803,7 @@ struct cgroup_subsys devices_cgrp_subsys = {
*
* returns 0 on success, -EPERM case the operation is not permitted
*/
-static int __devcgroup_check_permission(short type, u32 major, u32 minor,
+static int devcgroup_legacy_check_permission(short type, u32 major, u32 minor,
short access)
{
struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup;
@@ -825,6 +827,10 @@ static int __devcgroup_check_permission(short type, u32 major, u32 minor,
return 0;
}
+#endif /* CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE */
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE) || defined(CONFIG_CGROUP_BPF)
+
int devcgroup_check_permission(short type, u32 major, u32 minor, short access)
{
int rc = BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_DEVICE_CGROUP(type, major, minor, access);
@@ -832,6 +838,13 @@ int devcgroup_check_permission(short type, u32 major, u32 minor, short access)
if (rc)
return -EPERM;
- return __devcgroup_check_permission(type, major, minor, access);
+ #ifdef CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE
+ return devcgroup_legacy_check_permission(type, major, minor, access);
+
+ #else /* CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE */
+ return 0;
+
+ #endif /* CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE */
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(devcgroup_check_permission);
+#endif /* defined(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE) || defined(CONFIG_CGROUP_BPF) */
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
index 35682852ddea..764b896cd628 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type, uint8_t hash_algo)
{
long rc;
const char *algo;
- struct crypto_shash **tfm;
+ struct crypto_shash **tfm, *tmp_tfm;
struct shash_desc *desc;
if (type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC) {
@@ -91,31 +91,31 @@ static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type, uint8_t hash_algo)
algo = hash_algo_name[hash_algo];
}
- if (*tfm == NULL) {
- mutex_lock(&mutex);
- if (*tfm)
- goto out;
- *tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(algo, 0, CRYPTO_NOLOAD);
- if (IS_ERR(*tfm)) {
- rc = PTR_ERR(*tfm);
- pr_err("Can not allocate %s (reason: %ld)\n", algo, rc);
- *tfm = NULL;
+ if (*tfm)
+ goto alloc;
+ mutex_lock(&mutex);
+ if (*tfm)
+ goto unlock;
+
+ tmp_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(algo, 0, CRYPTO_NOLOAD);
+ if (IS_ERR(tmp_tfm)) {
+ pr_err("Can not allocate %s (reason: %ld)\n", algo,
+ PTR_ERR(tmp_tfm));
+ mutex_unlock(&mutex);
+ return ERR_CAST(tmp_tfm);
+ }
+ if (type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC) {
+ rc = crypto_shash_setkey(tmp_tfm, evmkey, evmkey_len);
+ if (rc) {
+ crypto_free_shash(tmp_tfm);
mutex_unlock(&mutex);
return ERR_PTR(rc);
}
- if (type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC) {
- rc = crypto_shash_setkey(*tfm, evmkey, evmkey_len);
- if (rc) {
- crypto_free_shash(*tfm);
- *tfm = NULL;
- mutex_unlock(&mutex);
- return ERR_PTR(rc);
- }
- }
-out:
- mutex_unlock(&mutex);
}
-
+ *tfm = tmp_tfm;
+unlock:
+ mutex_unlock(&mutex);
+alloc:
desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(*tfm),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!desc)
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry,
data->hdr.length = crypto_shash_digestsize(desc->tfm);
error = -ENODATA;
- list_for_each_entry_rcu(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
+ list_for_each_entry_lockless(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
bool is_ima = false;
if (strcmp(xattr->name, XATTR_NAME_IMA) == 0)
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index d361d7fdafc4..0d36259b690d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ static int evm_find_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry)
if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- list_for_each_entry_rcu(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
+ list_for_each_entry_lockless(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
error = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, xattr->name, NULL, 0);
if (error < 0) {
if (error == -ENODATA)
@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ static int evm_protected_xattr(const char *req_xattr_name)
struct xattr_list *xattr;
namelen = strlen(req_xattr_name);
- list_for_each_entry_rcu(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
+ list_for_each_entry_lockless(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
if ((strlen(xattr->name) == namelen)
&& (strncmp(req_xattr_name, xattr->name, namelen) == 0)) {
found = 1;
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
index 39ad1038d45d..cfc3075769bb 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
@@ -232,7 +232,14 @@ static ssize_t evm_write_xattrs(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
goto out;
}
- /* Guard against races in evm_read_xattrs */
+ /*
+ * xattr_list_mutex guards against races in evm_read_xattrs().
+ * Entries are only added to the evm_config_xattrnames list
+ * and never deleted. Therefore, the list is traversed
+ * using list_for_each_entry_lockless() without holding
+ * the mutex in evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(), evm_find_protected_xattrs()
+ * and evm_protected_xattr().
+ */
mutex_lock(&xattr_list_mutex);
list_for_each_entry(tmp, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
if (strcmp(xattr->name, tmp->name) == 0) {
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
index 423c84f95a14..88b5e288f241 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash)
loff_t i_size;
int rc;
struct file *f = file;
- bool new_file_instance = false, modified_flags = false;
+ bool new_file_instance = false, modified_mode = false;
/*
* For consistency, fail file's opened with the O_DIRECT flag on
@@ -431,13 +431,13 @@ int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash)
f = dentry_open(&file->f_path, flags, file->f_cred);
if (IS_ERR(f)) {
/*
- * Cannot open the file again, lets modify f_flags
+ * Cannot open the file again, lets modify f_mode
* of original and continue
*/
pr_info_ratelimited("Unable to reopen file for reading.\n");
f = file;
- f->f_flags |= FMODE_READ;
- modified_flags = true;
+ f->f_mode |= FMODE_READ;
+ modified_mode = true;
} else {
new_file_instance = true;
}
@@ -455,8 +455,8 @@ int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash)
out:
if (new_file_instance)
fput(f);
- else if (modified_flags)
- f->f_flags &= ~FMODE_READ;
+ else if (modified_mode)
+ f->f_mode &= ~FMODE_READ;
return rc;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index a71e822a6e92..3efc8308ad26 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -338,8 +338,7 @@ static ssize_t ima_write_policy(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, NULL,
"policy_update", "signed policy required",
1, 0);
- if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)
- result = -EACCES;
+ result = -EACCES;
} else {
result = ima_parse_add_rule(data);
}
diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
index f6797ba44bf7..14cf81d1a30b 100644
--- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
@@ -323,19 +323,6 @@ error:
return ukey;
}
-static int calc_hash(struct crypto_shash *tfm, u8 *digest,
- const u8 *buf, unsigned int buflen)
-{
- SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, tfm);
- int err;
-
- desc->tfm = tfm;
-
- err = crypto_shash_digest(desc, buf, buflen, digest);
- shash_desc_zero(desc);
- return err;
-}
-
static int calc_hmac(u8 *digest, const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen,
const u8 *buf, unsigned int buflen)
{
@@ -351,7 +338,7 @@ static int calc_hmac(u8 *digest, const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen,
err = crypto_shash_setkey(tfm, key, keylen);
if (!err)
- err = calc_hash(tfm, digest, buf, buflen);
+ err = crypto_shash_tfm_digest(tfm, buf, buflen, digest);
crypto_free_shash(tfm);
return err;
}
@@ -381,7 +368,8 @@ static int get_derived_key(u8 *derived_key, enum derived_key_type key_type,
memcpy(derived_buf + strlen(derived_buf) + 1, master_key,
master_keylen);
- ret = calc_hash(hash_tfm, derived_key, derived_buf, derived_buf_len);
+ ret = crypto_shash_tfm_digest(hash_tfm, derived_buf, derived_buf_len,
+ derived_key);
kzfree(derived_buf);
return ret;
}
diff --git a/security/keys/proc.c b/security/keys/proc.c
index 415f3f1c2da0..d0cde6685627 100644
--- a/security/keys/proc.c
+++ b/security/keys/proc.c
@@ -139,6 +139,8 @@ static void *proc_keys_next(struct seq_file *p, void *v, loff_t *_pos)
n = key_serial_next(p, v);
if (n)
*_pos = key_node_serial(n);
+ else
+ (*_pos)++;
return n;
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 7fed24b9d57e..51de970fbb1e 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1965,8 +1965,20 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
{
- return call_int_hook(secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, secid, secdata,
- seclen);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int rc;
+
+ /*
+ * Currently, only one LSM can implement secid_to_secctx (i.e this
+ * LSM hook is not "stackable").
+ */
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
+ rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(secid, secdata, seclen);
+ if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(secid_to_secctx))
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(secid_to_secctx);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 0b4e32161b77..4c037c2545c1 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -5842,40 +5842,60 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(void *priv,
static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- int err = 0;
- u32 perm;
+ int rc = 0;
+ unsigned int msg_len;
+ unsigned int data_len = skb->len;
+ unsigned char *data = skb->data;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ u16 sclass = sksec->sclass;
+ u32 perm;
- if (skb->len < NLMSG_HDRLEN) {
- err = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
- nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
+ while (data_len >= nlmsg_total_size(0)) {
+ nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)data;
+
+ /* NOTE: the nlmsg_len field isn't reliably set by some netlink
+ * users which means we can't reject skb's with bogus
+ * length fields; our solution is to follow what
+ * netlink_rcv_skb() does and simply skip processing at
+ * messages with length fields that are clearly junk
+ */
+ if (nlh->nlmsg_len < NLMSG_HDRLEN || nlh->nlmsg_len > data_len)
+ return 0;
- err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
- if (err) {
- if (err == -EINVAL) {
+ rc = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
+ if (rc == 0) {
+ rc = sock_has_perm(sk, perm);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ } else if (rc == -EINVAL) {
+ /* -EINVAL is a missing msg/perm mapping */
pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: unrecognized netlink"
- " message: protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s"
- " pid=%d comm=%s\n",
- sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type,
- secclass_map[sksec->sclass - 1].name,
- task_pid_nr(current), current->comm);
- if (!enforcing_enabled(&selinux_state) ||
- security_get_allow_unknown(&selinux_state))
- err = 0;
+ " message: protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s"
+ " pid=%d comm=%s\n",
+ sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type,
+ secclass_map[sclass - 1].name,
+ task_pid_nr(current), current->comm);
+ if (enforcing_enabled(&selinux_state) &&
+ !security_get_allow_unknown(&selinux_state))
+ return rc;
+ rc = 0;
+ } else if (rc == -ENOENT) {
+ /* -ENOENT is a missing socket/class mapping, ignore */
+ rc = 0;
+ } else {
+ return rc;
}
- /* Ignore */
- if (err == -ENOENT)
- err = 0;
- goto out;
+ /* move to the next message after applying netlink padding */
+ msg_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(nlh->nlmsg_len);
+ if (msg_len >= data_len)
+ return 0;
+ data_len -= msg_len;
+ data += msg_len;
}
- err = sock_has_perm(sk, perm);
-out:
- return err;
+ return rc;
}
static void ipc_init_security(struct ipc_security_struct *isec, u16 sclass)
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index 986f3ac14282..d233ab3f1533 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -27,9 +27,9 @@
"audit_control", "setfcap"
#define COMMON_CAP2_PERMS "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", \
- "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read"
+ "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read", "perfmon"
-#if CAP_LAST_CAP > CAP_AUDIT_READ
+#if CAP_LAST_CAP > CAP_PERFMON
#error New capability defined, please update COMMON_CAP2_PERMS.
#endif
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
index 939a74fd8fb4..da94a1b4bfda 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
@@ -429,7 +429,7 @@ int cond_read_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
p->cond_list = kcalloc(len, sizeof(*p->cond_list), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!p->cond_list)
- return rc;
+ return -ENOMEM;
rc = avtab_alloc(&(p->te_cond_avtab), p->te_avtab.nel);
if (rc)
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index a30cad18931b..98f343005d6b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -1054,14 +1054,14 @@ static int str_read(char **strp, gfp_t flags, void *fp, u32 len)
if (!str)
return -ENOMEM;
- /* it's expected the caller should free the str */
- *strp = str;
-
rc = next_entry(str, fp, len);
- if (rc)
+ if (rc) {
+ kfree(str);
return rc;
+ }
str[len] = '\0';
+ *strp = str;
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.c b/security/tomoyo/common.c
index 1b467381986f..c16b8c1b03e7 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/common.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/common.c
@@ -1025,7 +1025,7 @@ static bool tomoyo_select_domain(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head,
if (domain)
head->r.domain = &domain->list;
else
- head->r.eof = 1;
+ head->r.eof = true;
tomoyo_io_printf(head, "# select %s\n", data);
if (domain && domain->is_deleted)
tomoyo_io_printf(head, "# This is a deleted domain.\n");
@@ -2662,8 +2662,6 @@ ssize_t tomoyo_write_control(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head,
if (!head->write)
return -EINVAL;
- if (!access_ok(buffer, buffer_len))
- return -EFAULT;
if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&head->io_sem))
return -EINTR;
head->read_user_buf_avail = 0;
generated by cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2 (git 2.47.1) at 2024-12-27 00:41:07 +0000