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2024-11-23Merge tag 'mm-stable-2024-11-18-19-27' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm Pull MM updates from Andrew Morton: - The series "zram: optimal post-processing target selection" from Sergey Senozhatsky improves zram's post-processing selection algorithm. This leads to improved memory savings. - Wei Yang has gone to town on the mapletree code, contributing several series which clean up the implementation: - "refine mas_mab_cp()" - "Reduce the space to be cleared for maple_big_node" - "maple_tree: simplify mas_push_node()" - "Following cleanup after introduce mas_wr_store_type()" - "refine storing null" - The series "selftests/mm: hugetlb_fault_after_madv improvements" from David Hildenbrand fixes this selftest for s390. - The series "introduce pte_offset_map_{ro|rw}_nolock()" from Qi Zheng implements some rationaizations and cleanups in the page mapping code. - The series "mm: optimize shadow entries removal" from Shakeel Butt optimizes the file truncation code by speeding up the handling of shadow entries. - The series "Remove PageKsm()" from Matthew Wilcox completes the migration of this flag over to being a folio-based flag. - The series "Unify hugetlb into arch_get_unmapped_area functions" from Oscar Salvador implements a bunch of consolidations and cleanups in the hugetlb code. - The series "Do not shatter hugezeropage on wp-fault" from Dev Jain takes away the wp-fault time practice of turning a huge zero page into small pages. Instead we replace the whole thing with a THP. More consistent cleaner and potentiall saves a large number of pagefaults. - The series "percpu: Add a test case and fix for clang" from Andy Shevchenko enhances and fixes the kernel's built in percpu test code. - The series "mm/mremap: Remove extra vma tree walk" from Liam Howlett optimizes mremap() by avoiding doing things which we didn't need to do. - The series "Improve the tmpfs large folio read performance" from Baolin Wang teaches tmpfs to copy data into userspace at the folio size rather than as individual pages. A 20% speedup was observed. - The series "mm/damon/vaddr: Fix issue in damon_va_evenly_split_region()" fro Zheng Yejian fixes DAMON splitting. - The series "memcg-v1: fully deprecate charge moving" from Shakeel Butt removes the long-deprecated memcgv2 charge moving feature. - The series "fix error handling in mmap_region() and refactor" from Lorenzo Stoakes cleanup up some of the mmap() error handling and addresses some potential performance issues. - The series "x86/module: use large ROX pages for text allocations" from Mike Rapoport teaches x86 to use large pages for read-only-execute module text. - The series "page allocation tag compression" from Suren Baghdasaryan is followon maintenance work for the new page allocation profiling feature. - The series "page->index removals in mm" from Matthew Wilcox remove most references to page->index in mm/. A slow march towards shrinking struct page. - The series "damon/{self,kunit}tests: minor fixups for DAMON debugfs interface tests" from Andrew Paniakin performs maintenance work for DAMON's self testing code. - The series "mm: zswap swap-out of large folios" from Kanchana Sridhar improves zswap's batching of compression and decompression. It is a step along the way towards using Intel IAA hardware acceleration for this zswap operation. - The series "kasan: migrate the last module test to kunit" from Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov completes the migration of the KASAN built-in tests over to the KUnit framework. - The series "implement lightweight guard pages" from Lorenzo Stoakes permits userapace to place fault-generating guard pages within a single VMA, rather than requiring that multiple VMAs be created for this. Improved efficiencies for userspace memory allocators are expected. - The series "memcg: tracepoint for flushing stats" from JP Kobryn uses tracepoints to provide increased visibility into memcg stats flushing activity. - The series "zram: IDLE flag handling fixes" from Sergey Senozhatsky fixes a zram buglet which potentially affected performance. - The series "mm: add more kernel parameters to control mTHP" from Maíra Canal enhances our ability to control/configuremultisize THP from the kernel boot command line. - The series "kasan: few improvements on kunit tests" from Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov has a couple of fixups for the KASAN KUnit tests. - The series "mm/list_lru: Split list_lru lock into per-cgroup scope" from Kairui Song optimizes list_lru memory utilization when lockdep is enabled. * tag 'mm-stable-2024-11-18-19-27' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (215 commits) cma: enforce non-zero pageblock_order during cma_init_reserved_mem() mm/kfence: add a new kunit test test_use_after_free_read_nofault() zram: fix NULL pointer in comp_algorithm_show() memcg/hugetlb: add hugeTLB counters to memcg vmstat: call fold_vm_zone_numa_events() before show per zone NUMA event mm: mmap_lock: check trace_mmap_lock_$type_enabled() instead of regcount zram: ZRAM_DEF_COMP should depend on ZRAM MAINTAINERS/MEMORY MANAGEMENT: add document files for mm Docs/mm/damon: recommend academic papers to read and/or cite mm: define general function pXd_init() kmemleak: iommu/iova: fix transient kmemleak false positive mm/list_lru: simplify the list_lru walk callback function mm/list_lru: split the lock to per-cgroup scope mm/list_lru: simplify reparenting and initial allocation mm/list_lru: code clean up for reparenting mm/list_lru: don't export list_lru_add mm/list_lru: don't pass unnecessary key parameters kasan: add kunit tests for kmalloc_track_caller, kmalloc_node_track_caller kasan: change kasan_atomics kunit test as KUNIT_CASE_SLOW kasan: use EXPORT_SYMBOL_IF_KUNIT to export symbols ...
2024-11-19Merge tag 'timers-vdso-2024-11-18' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull vdso data page handling updates from Thomas Gleixner: "First steps of consolidating the VDSO data page handling. The VDSO data page handling is architecture specific for historical reasons, but there is no real technical reason to do so. Aside of that VDSO data has become a dump ground for various mechanisms and fail to provide a clear separation of the functionalities. Clean this up by: - consolidating the VDSO page data by getting rid of architecture specific warts especially in x86 and PowerPC. - removing the last includes of header files which are pulling in other headers outside of the VDSO namespace. - seperating timekeeping and other VDSO data accordingly. Further consolidation of the VDSO page handling is done in subsequent changes scheduled for the next merge window. This also lays the ground for expanding the VDSO time getters for independent PTP clocks in a generic way without making every architecture add support seperately" * tag 'timers-vdso-2024-11-18' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (42 commits) x86/vdso: Add missing brackets in switch case vdso: Rename struct arch_vdso_data to arch_vdso_time_data powerpc: Split systemcfg struct definitions out from vdso powerpc: Split systemcfg data out of vdso data page powerpc: Add kconfig option for the systemcfg page powerpc/pseries/lparcfg: Use num_possible_cpus() for potential processors powerpc/pseries/lparcfg: Fix printing of system_active_processors powerpc/procfs: Propagate error of remap_pfn_range() powerpc/vdso: Remove offset comment from 32bit vdso_arch_data x86/vdso: Split virtual clock pages into dedicated mapping x86/vdso: Delete vvar.h x86/vdso: Access vdso data without vvar.h x86/vdso: Move the rng offset to vsyscall.h x86/vdso: Access rng vdso data without vvar.h x86/vdso: Access timens vdso data without vvar.h x86/vdso: Allocate vvar page from C code x86/vdso: Access rng data from kernel without vvar x86/vdso: Place vdso_data at beginning of vvar page x86/vdso: Use __arch_get_vdso_data() to access vdso data x86/mm/mmap: Remove arch_vma_name() ...
2024-11-18Merge tag 'pull-xattr' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfsLinus Torvalds
Pull xattr updates from Al Viro: "Sanitize xattr and io_uring interactions with it, add *xattrat() syscalls, sanitize struct filename handling in there" * tag 'pull-xattr' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: xattr: remove redundant check on variable err fs/xattr: add *at family syscalls new helpers: file_removexattr(), filename_removexattr() new helpers: file_listxattr(), filename_listxattr() replace do_getxattr() with saner helpers. replace do_setxattr() with saner helpers. new helper: import_xattr_name() fs: rename struct xattr_ctx to kernel_xattr_ctx xattr: switch to CLASS(fd) io_[gs]etxattr_prep(): just use getname() io_uring: IORING_OP_F[GS]ETXATTR is fine with REQ_F_FIXED_FILE getname_maybe_null() - the third variant of pathname copy-in teach filename_lookup() to treat NULL filename as ""
2024-11-08x86/stackprotector: Work around strict Clang TLS symbol requirementsArd Biesheuvel
GCC and Clang both implement stack protector support based on Thread Local Storage (TLS) variables, and this is used in the kernel to implement per-task stack cookies, by copying a task's stack cookie into a per-CPU variable every time it is scheduled in. Both now also implement -mstack-protector-guard-symbol=, which permits the TLS variable to be specified directly. This is useful because it will allow to move away from using a fixed offset of 40 bytes into the per-CPU area on x86_64, which requires a lot of special handling in the per-CPU code and the runtime relocation code. However, while GCC is rather lax in its implementation of this command line option, Clang actually requires that the provided symbol name refers to a TLS variable (i.e., one declared with __thread), although it also permits the variable to be undeclared entirely, in which case it will use an implicit declaration of the right type. The upshot of this is that Clang will emit the correct references to the stack cookie variable in most cases, e.g., 10d: 64 a1 00 00 00 00 mov %fs:0x0,%eax 10f: R_386_32 __stack_chk_guard However, if a non-TLS definition of the symbol in question is visible in the same compilation unit (which amounts to the whole of vmlinux if LTO is enabled), it will drop the per-CPU prefix and emit a load from a bogus address. Work around this by using a symbol name that never occurs in C code, and emit it as an alias in the linker script. Fixes: 3fb0fdb3bbe7 ("x86/stackprotector/32: Make the canary into a regular percpu variable") Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1854 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241105155801.1779119-2-brgerst@gmail.com
2024-11-07x86/module: prepare module loading for ROX allocations of textMike Rapoport (Microsoft)
When module text memory will be allocated with ROX permissions, the memory at the actual address where the module will live will contain invalid instructions and there will be a writable copy that contains the actual module code. Update relocations and alternatives patching to deal with it. [rppt@kernel.org: fix writable address in cfi_rewrite_endbr()] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/ZysRwR29Ji8CcbXc@kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241023162711.2579610-7-rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt@kernel.org> Tested-by: kdevops <kdevops@lists.linux.dev> Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Cc: Andreas Larsson <andreas@gaisler.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Cain <bcain@quicinc.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dinh Nguyen <dinguyen@kernel.org> Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org> Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Cc: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@kernel.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Cc: John Paul Adrian Glaubitz <glaubitz@physik.fu-berlin.de> Cc: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev> Cc: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@Oracle.com> Cc: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com> Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Song Liu <song@kernel.org> Cc: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com> Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Uladzislau Rezki (Sony) <urezki@gmail.com> Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@kernel.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-11-06fs/xattr: add *at family syscallsChristian Göttsche
Add the four syscalls setxattrat(), getxattrat(), listxattrat() and removexattrat(). Those can be used to operate on extended attributes, especially security related ones, either relative to a pinned directory or on a file descriptor without read access, avoiding a /proc/<pid>/fd/<fd> detour, requiring a mounted procfs. One use case will be setfiles(8) setting SELinux file contexts ("security.selinux") without race conditions and without a file descriptor opened with read access requiring SELinux read permission. Use the do_{name}at() pattern from fs/open.c. Pass the value of the extended attribute, its length, and for setxattrat(2) the command (XATTR_CREATE or XATTR_REPLACE) via an added struct xattr_args to not exceed six syscall arguments and not merging the AT_* and XATTR_* flags. [AV: fixes by Christian Brauner folded in, the entire thing rebased on top of {filename,file}_...xattr() primitives, treatment of empty pathnames regularized. As the result, AT_EMPTY_PATH+NULL handling is cheap, so f...(2) can use it] Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240426162042.191916-1-cgoettsche@seltendoof.de Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> CC: x86@kernel.org CC: linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org CC: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org CC: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org CC: linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org CC: linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org CC: linux-mips@vger.kernel.org CC: linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org CC: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org CC: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org CC: linux-sh@vger.kernel.org CC: sparclinux@vger.kernel.org CC: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org CC: audit@vger.kernel.org CC: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org CC: linux-api@vger.kernel.org CC: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org CC: selinux@vger.kernel.org [brauner: slight tweaks] Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2024-11-02x86/vdso: Add missing brackets in switch caseThomas Gleixner
0-day reported: arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c:199:3: warning: label followed by a declaration is a C23 extension [-Wc23-extensions] Add the missing brackets. Fixes: e93d2521b27f ("x86/vdso: Split virtual clock pages into dedicated mapping") Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202411022359.fBPFTg2T-lkp@intel.com/
2024-11-02x86/vdso: Split virtual clock pages into dedicated mappingThomas Weißschuh
The generic vdso data storage cannot handle the special pvclock and hvclock pages. Split them into their own mapping, so the other vdso storage can be migrated to the generic code. Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <thomas.weissschuh@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241010-vdso-generic-base-v1-20-b64f0842d512@linutronix.de
2024-11-02x86/vdso: Access vdso data without vvar.hThomas Weißschuh
The vdso_data is at the start of the vvar page. Make use of this invariant to remove the usage of vvar.h. This also matches the logic for the timens data. Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <thomas.weissschuh@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241010-vdso-generic-base-v1-18-b64f0842d512@linutronix.de
2024-11-02x86/vdso: Move the rng offset to vsyscall.hThomas Weißschuh
vvar.h will go away, so move the last useful bit into vsyscall.h. Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <thomas.weissschuh@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241010-vdso-generic-base-v1-17-b64f0842d512@linutronix.de
2024-11-02x86/vdso: Access rng vdso data without vvar.hThomas Weißschuh
The vdso_rng_data is at a well-known offset in the vvar page. Make use of this invariant to remove the usage of vvar.h. Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <thomas.weissschuh@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241010-vdso-generic-base-v1-16-b64f0842d512@linutronix.de
2024-11-02x86/vdso: Access timens vdso data without vvar.hThomas Weißschuh
The vdso_data is at the start of the timens page. Make use of this invariant to remove the usage of vvar.h. This also matches the logic for the pvclock and hvclock pages. Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <thomas.weissschuh@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241010-vdso-generic-base-v1-15-b64f0842d512@linutronix.de
2024-11-02x86/vdso: Allocate vvar page from C codeThomas Weißschuh
Allocate the vvar page through the standard union vdso_data_store and remove the custom linker script logic. Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <thomas.weissschuh@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241010-vdso-generic-base-v1-14-b64f0842d512@linutronix.de
2024-11-02x86/vdso: Access rng data from kernel without vvarThomas Weißschuh
Remove the usage of the vvar _vdso_rng_data from the kernel-space code, as the x86 vvar machinery is about to be removed. The definition of the structure is unnecessary, as the data lives in a page pre-allocated by the linker anyways. The vdso user-space access to the rng data will be switched soon. DEFINE_VVAR_SINGLE() is now unused. It will be removed later togehter with the rest of vvar.h. Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <thomas.weissschuh@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241010-vdso-generic-base-v1-13-b64f0842d512@linutronix.de
2024-10-20Merge tag 'x86_urgent_for_v6.12_rc4' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 fixes from Borislav Petkov: - Explicitly disable the TSC deadline timer when going idle to address some CPU errata in that area - Do not apply the Zenbleed fix on anything else except AMD Zen2 on the late microcode loading path - Clear CPU buffers later in the NMI exit path on 32-bit to avoid register clearing while they still contain sensitive data, for the RDFS mitigation - Do not clobber EFLAGS.ZF with VERW on the opportunistic SYSRET exit path on 32-bit - Fix parsing issues of memory bandwidth specification in sysfs for resctrl's memory bandwidth allocation feature - Other small cleanups and improvements * tag 'x86_urgent_for_v6.12_rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/apic: Always explicitly disarm TSC-deadline timer x86/CPU/AMD: Only apply Zenbleed fix for Zen2 during late microcode load x86/bugs: Use code segment selector for VERW operand x86/entry_32: Clear CPU buffers after register restore in NMI return x86/entry_32: Do not clobber user EFLAGS.ZF x86/resctrl: Annotate get_mem_config() functions as __init x86/resctrl: Avoid overflow in MB settings in bw_validate() x86/amd_nb: Add new PCI ID for AMD family 1Ah model 20h
2024-10-10x86/entry: Have entry_ibpb() invalidate return predictionsJohannes Wikner
entry_ibpb() should invalidate all indirect predictions, including return target predictions. Not all IBPB implementations do this, in which case the fallback is RSB filling. Prevent SRSO-style hijacks of return predictions following IBPB, as the return target predictor can be corrupted before the IBPB completes. [ bp: Massage. ] Signed-off-by: Johannes Wikner <kwikner@ethz.ch> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
2024-10-08x86/entry_32: Clear CPU buffers after register restore in NMI returnPawan Gupta
CPU buffers are currently cleared after call to exc_nmi, but before register state is restored. This may be okay for MDS mitigation but not for RDFS. Because RDFS mitigation requires CPU buffers to be cleared when registers don't have any sensitive data. Move CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS after RESTORE_ALL_NMI. Fixes: a0e2dab44d22 ("x86/entry_32: Add VERW just before userspace transition") Suggested-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc:stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240925-fix-dosemu-vm86-v7-2-1de0daca2d42%40linux.intel.com
2024-10-08x86/entry_32: Do not clobber user EFLAGS.ZFPawan Gupta
Opportunistic SYSEXIT executes VERW to clear CPU buffers after user EFLAGS are restored. This can clobber user EFLAGS.ZF. Move CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS before the user EFLAGS are restored. This ensures that the user EFLAGS.ZF is not clobbered. Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/yVXwe8gvgmPADpRB6lXlicS2fcHoV5OHHxyuFbB_MEleRPD7-KhGe5VtORejtPe-KCkT8Uhcg5d7-IBw4Ojb4H7z5LQxoZylSmJ8KNL3A8o=@protonmail.com/ Fixes: a0e2dab44d22 ("x86/entry_32: Add VERW just before userspace transition") Reported-by: Jari Ruusu <jariruusu@protonmail.com> Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc:stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240925-fix-dosemu-vm86-v7-1-1de0daca2d42%40linux.intel.com
2024-09-18Merge tag 'random-6.12-rc1-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random Pull random number generator updates from Jason Donenfeld: "Originally I'd planned on sending each of the vDSO getrandom() architecture ports to their respective arch trees. But as we started to work on this, we found lots of interesting issues in the shared code and infrastructure, the fixes for which the various archs needed to base their work. So in the end, this turned into a nice collaborative effort fixing up issues and porting to 5 new architectures -- arm64, powerpc64, powerpc32, s390x, and loongarch64 -- with everybody pitching in and commenting on each other's code. It was a fun development cycle. This contains: - Numerous fixups to the vDSO selftest infrastructure, getting it running successfully on more platforms, and fixing bugs in it. - Additions to the vDSO getrandom & chacha selftests. Basically every time manual review unearthed a bug in a revision of an arch patch, or an ambiguity, the tests were augmented. By the time the last arch was submitted for review, s390x, v1 of the series was essentially fine right out of the gate. - Fixes to the the generic C implementation of vDSO getrandom, to build and run successfully on all archs, decoupling it from assumptions we had (unintentionally) made on x86_64 that didn't carry through to the other architectures. - Port of vDSO getrandom to LoongArch64, from Xi Ruoyao and acked by Huacai Chen. - Port of vDSO getrandom to ARM64, from Adhemerval Zanella and acked by Will Deacon. - Port of vDSO getrandom to PowerPC, in both 32-bit and 64-bit varieties, from Christophe Leroy and acked by Michael Ellerman. - Port of vDSO getrandom to S390X from Heiko Carstens, the arch maintainer. While it'd be natural for there to be things to fix up over the course of the development cycle, these patches got a decent amount of review from a fairly diverse crew of folks on the mailing lists, and, for the most part, they've been cooking in linux-next, which has been helpful for ironing out build issues. In terms of architectures, I think that mostly takes care of the important 64-bit archs with hardware still being produced and running production loads in settings where vDSO getrandom is likely to help. Arguably there's still RISC-V left, and we'll see for 6.13 whether they find it useful and submit a port" * tag 'random-6.12-rc1-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random: (47 commits) selftests: vDSO: check cpu caps before running chacha test s390/vdso: Wire up getrandom() vdso implementation s390/vdso: Move vdso symbol handling to separate header file s390/vdso: Allow alternatives in vdso code s390/module: Provide find_section() helper s390/facility: Let test_facility() generate static branch if possible s390/alternatives: Remove ALT_FACILITY_EARLY s390/facility: Disable compile time optimization for decompressor code selftests: vDSO: fix vdso_config for s390 selftests: vDSO: fix ELF hash table entry size for s390x powerpc/vdso: Wire up getrandom() vDSO implementation on VDSO64 powerpc/vdso: Wire up getrandom() vDSO implementation on VDSO32 powerpc/vdso: Refactor CFLAGS for CVDSO build powerpc/vdso32: Add crtsavres mm: Define VM_DROPPABLE for powerpc/32 powerpc/vdso: Fix VDSO data access when running in a non-root time namespace selftests: vDSO: don't include generated headers for chacha test arm64: vDSO: Wire up getrandom() vDSO implementation arm64: alternative: make alternative_has_cap_likely() VDSO compatible selftests: vDSO: also test counter in vdso_test_chacha ...
2024-09-18Merge tag 'rcu.release.v6.12' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rcu/linux Pull RCU updates from Neeraj Upadhyay: "Context tracking: - rename context tracking state related symbols and remove references to "dynticks" in various context tracking state variables and related helpers - force context_tracking_enabled_this_cpu() to be inlined to avoid leaving a noinstr section CSD lock: - enhance CSD-lock diagnostic reports - add an API to provide an indication of ongoing CSD-lock stall nocb: - update and simplify RCU nocb code to handle (de-)offloading of callbacks only for offline CPUs - fix RT throttling hrtimer being armed from offline CPU rcutorture: - remove redundant rcu_torture_ops get_gp_completed fields - add SRCU ->same_gp_state and ->get_comp_state functions - add generic test for NUM_ACTIVE_*RCU_POLL* for testing RCU and SRCU polled grace periods - add CFcommon.arch for arch-specific Kconfig options - print number of update types in rcu_torture_write_types() - add rcutree.nohz_full_patience_delay testing to the TREE07 scenario - add a stall_cpu_repeat module parameter to test repeated CPU stalls - add argument to limit number of CPUs a guest OS can use in torture.sh rcustall: - abbreviate RCU CPU stall warnings during CSD-lock stalls - Allow dump_cpu_task() to be called without disabling preemption - defer printing stall-warning backtrace when holding rcu_node lock srcu: - make SRCU gp seq wrap-around faster - add KCSAN checks for concurrent updates to ->srcu_n_exp_nodelay and ->reschedule_count which are used in heuristics governing auto-expediting of normal SRCU grace periods and grace-period-state-machine delays - mark idle SRCU-barrier callbacks to help identify stuck SRCU-barrier callback rcu tasks: - remove RCU Tasks Rude asynchronous APIs as they are no longer used - stop testing RCU Tasks Rude asynchronous APIs - fix access to non-existent percpu regions - check processor-ID assumptions during chosen CPU calculation for callback enqueuing - update description of rtp->tasks_gp_seq grace-period sequence number - add rcu_barrier_cb_is_done() to identify whether a given rcu_barrier callback is stuck - mark idle Tasks-RCU-barrier callbacks - add *torture_stats_print() functions to print detailed diagnostics for Tasks-RCU variants - capture start time of rcu_barrier_tasks*() operation to help distinguish a hung barrier operation from a long series of barrier operations refscale: - add a TINY scenario to support tests of Tiny RCU and Tiny SRCU - optimize process_durations() operation rcuscale: - dump stacks of stalled rcu_scale_writer() instances and grace-period statistics when rcu_scale_writer() stalls - mark idle RCU-barrier callbacks to identify stuck RCU-barrier callbacks - print detailed grace-period and barrier diagnostics on rcu_scale_writer() hangs for Tasks-RCU variants - warn if async module parameter is specified for RCU implementations that do not have async primitives such as RCU Tasks Rude - make all writer tasks report upon hang - tolerate repeated GFP_KERNEL failure in rcu_scale_writer() - use special allocator for rcu_scale_writer() - NULL out top-level pointers to heap memory to avoid double-free bugs on modprobe failures - maintain per-task instead of per-CPU callbacks count to avoid any issues with migration of either tasks or callbacks - constify struct ref_scale_ops Fixes: - use system_unbound_wq for kfree_rcu work to avoid disturbing isolated CPUs Misc: - warn on unexpected rcu_state.srs_done_tail state - better define "atomic" for list_replace_rcu() and hlist_replace_rcu() routines - annotate struct kvfree_rcu_bulk_data with __counted_by()" * tag 'rcu.release.v6.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rcu/linux: (90 commits) rcu: Defer printing stall-warning backtrace when holding rcu_node lock rcu/nocb: Remove superfluous memory barrier after bypass enqueue rcu/nocb: Conditionally wake up rcuo if not already waiting on GP rcu/nocb: Fix RT throttling hrtimer armed from offline CPU rcu/nocb: Simplify (de-)offloading state machine context_tracking: Tag context_tracking_enabled_this_cpu() __always_inline context_tracking, rcu: Rename rcu_dyntick trace event into rcu_watching rcu: Update stray documentation references to rcu_dynticks_eqs_{enter, exit}() rcu: Rename rcu_momentary_dyntick_idle() into rcu_momentary_eqs() rcu: Rename rcu_implicit_dynticks_qs() into rcu_watching_snap_recheck() rcu: Rename dyntick_save_progress_counter() into rcu_watching_snap_save() rcu: Rename struct rcu_data .exp_dynticks_snap into .exp_watching_snap rcu: Rename struct rcu_data .dynticks_snap into .watching_snap rcu: Rename rcu_dynticks_zero_in_eqs() into rcu_watching_zero_in_eqs() rcu: Rename rcu_dynticks_in_eqs_since() into rcu_watching_snap_stopped_since() rcu: Rename rcu_dynticks_in_eqs() into rcu_watching_snap_in_eqs() rcu: Rename rcu_dynticks_eqs_online() into rcu_watching_online() context_tracking, rcu: Rename rcu_dynticks_curr_cpu_in_eqs() into rcu_is_watching_curr_cpu() context_tracking, rcu: Rename rcu_dynticks_task*() into rcu_task*() refscale: Constify struct ref_scale_ops ...
2024-09-13random: vDSO: add a __vdso_getrandom prototype for all architecturesXi Ruoyao
Without a prototype, we'll have to add a prototype for each architecture implementing vDSO getrandom. As most architectures will likely have the vDSO getrandom implemented in a near future, and we'd like to keep the declarations compatible everywhere (to ease the libc implementor work), we should really just have one copy of the prototype. This also is what's already done inside of include/vdso/gettime.h for those vDSO functions, so this continues that convention. Suggested-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Xi Ruoyao <xry111@xry111.site> Acked-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@kernel.org> [Jason: rewrite docbook comment for prototype.] Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2024-09-13random: vDSO: add __arch_get_k_vdso_rng_data() helper for data page accessChristophe Leroy
_vdso_data is specific to x86 and __arch_get_k_vdso_data() is provided so that all architectures can provide the requested pointer. Do the same with _vdso_rng_data, provide __arch_get_k_vdso_rng_data() and don't use x86 _vdso_rng_data directly. Until now vdso/vsyscall.h was only included by time/vsyscall.c but now it will also be included in char/random.c, leading to a duplicate declaration of _vdso_data and _vdso_rng_data. To fix this issue, move the declaration in a C file. vma.c looks like the most appropriate candidate. We don't need to replace the definitions in vsyscall.h by declarations as declarations are already in asm/vvar.h. Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2024-08-02uretprobe: change syscall number, againArnd Bergmann
Despite multiple attempts to get the syscall number assignment right for the newly added uretprobe syscall, we ended up with a bit of a mess: - The number is defined as 467 based on the assumption that the xattrat family of syscalls would use 463 through 466, but those did not make it into 6.11. - The include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h file still lists the number 463, but the new scripts/syscall.tbl that was supposed to have the same data lists 467 instead as the number for arc, arm64, csky, hexagon, loongarch, nios2, openrisc and riscv. None of these architectures actually provide a uretprobe syscall. - All the other architectures (powerpc, arm, mips, ...) don't list this syscall at all. There are two ways to make it consistent again: either list it with the same syscall number on all architectures, or only list it on x86 but not in scripts/syscall.tbl and asm-generic/unistd.h. Based on the most recent discussion, it seems like we won't need it anywhere else, so just remove the inconsistent assignment and instead move the x86 number to the next available one in the architecture specific range, which is 335. Fixes: 5c28424e9a34 ("syscalls: Fix to add sys_uretprobe to syscall.tbl") Fixes: 190fec72df4a ("uprobe: Wire up uretprobe system call") Fixes: 63ded110979b ("uprobe: Change uretprobe syscall scope and number") Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
2024-07-29treewide: context_tracking: Rename CONTEXT_* into CT_STATE_*Valentin Schneider
Context tracking state related symbols currently use a mix of the CONTEXT_ (e.g. CONTEXT_KERNEL) and CT_SATE_ (e.g. CT_STATE_MASK) prefixes. Clean up the naming and make the ctx_state enum use the CT_STATE_ prefix. Suggested-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Valentin Schneider <vschneid@redhat.com> Acked-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Neeraj Upadhyay <neeraj.upadhyay@kernel.org>
2024-07-24Merge tag 'random-6.11-rc1-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random Pull random number generator updates from Jason Donenfeld: "This adds getrandom() support to the vDSO. First, it adds a new kind of mapping to mmap(2), MAP_DROPPABLE, which lets the kernel zero out pages anytime under memory pressure, which enables allocating memory that never gets swapped to disk but also doesn't count as being mlocked. Then, the vDSO implementation of getrandom() is introduced in a generic manner and hooked into random.c. Next, this is implemented on x86. (Also, though it's not ready for this pull, somebody has begun an arm64 implementation already) Finally, two vDSO selftests are added. There are also two housekeeping cleanup commits" * tag 'random-6.11-rc1-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random: MAINTAINERS: add random.h headers to RNG subsection random: note that RNDGETPOOL was removed in 2.6.9-rc2 selftests/vDSO: add tests for vgetrandom x86: vdso: Wire up getrandom() vDSO implementation random: introduce generic vDSO getrandom() implementation mm: add MAP_DROPPABLE for designating always lazily freeable mappings
2024-07-19x86: vdso: Wire up getrandom() vDSO implementationJason A. Donenfeld
Hook up the generic vDSO implementation to the x86 vDSO data page. Since the existing vDSO infrastructure is heavily based on the timekeeping functionality, which works over arrays of bases, a new macro is introduced for vvars that are not arrays. The vDSO function requires a ChaCha20 implementation that does not write to the stack, yet can still do an entire ChaCha20 permutation, so provide this using SSE2, since this is userland code that must work on all x86-64 processors. Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Samuel Neves <sneves@dei.uc.pt> # for vgetrandom-chacha.S Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2024-07-18Merge tag 'probes-v6.11' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/trace/linux-trace Pull probes updates from Masami Hiramatsu: "Uprobes: - x86/shstk: Make return uprobe work with shadow stack - Add uretprobe syscall which speeds up the uretprobe 10-30% faster. This syscall is automatically used from user-space trampolines which are generated by the uretprobe. If this syscall is used by normal user program, it will cause SIGILL. Note that this is currently only implemented on x86_64. (This also has two fixes for adjusting the syscall number to avoid conflict with new *attrat syscalls.) - uprobes/perf: fix user stack traces in the presence of pending uretprobe. This corrects the uretprobe's trampoline address in the stacktrace with correct return address - selftests/x86: Add a return uprobe with shadow stack test - selftests/bpf: Add uretprobe syscall related tests. - test case for register integrity check - test case with register changing case - test case for uretprobe syscall without uprobes (expected to fail) - test case for uretprobe with shadow stack - selftests/bpf: add test validating uprobe/uretprobe stack traces - MAINTAINERS: Add uprobes entry. This does not specify the tree but to clarify who maintains and reviews the uprobes Kprobes: - tracing/kprobes: Test case cleanups. Replace redundant WARN_ON_ONCE() + pr_warn() with WARN_ONCE() and remove unnecessary code from selftest - tracing/kprobes: Add symbol counting check when module loads. This checks the uniqueness of the probed symbol on modules. The same check has already done for kernel symbols (This also has a fix for build error with CONFIG_MODULES=n) Cleanup: - Add MODULE_DESCRIPTION() macros for fprobe and kprobe examples" * tag 'probes-v6.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/trace/linux-trace: MAINTAINERS: Add uprobes entry selftests/bpf: Change uretprobe syscall number in uprobe_syscall test uprobe: Change uretprobe syscall scope and number tracing/kprobes: Fix build error when find_module() is not available tracing/kprobes: Add symbol counting check when module loads selftests/bpf: add test validating uprobe/uretprobe stack traces perf,uprobes: fix user stack traces in the presence of pending uretprobes tracing/kprobe: Remove cleanup code unrelated to selftest tracing/kprobe: Integrate test warnings into WARN_ONCE selftests/bpf: Add uretprobe shadow stack test selftests/bpf: Add uretprobe syscall call from user space test selftests/bpf: Add uretprobe syscall test for regs changes selftests/bpf: Add uretprobe syscall test for regs integrity selftests/x86: Add return uprobe shadow stack test uprobe: Add uretprobe syscall to speed up return probe uprobe: Wire up uretprobe system call x86/shstk: Make return uprobe work with shadow stack samples: kprobes: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION() macros fprobe: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION() macro
2024-07-15Merge tag 'x86_bugs_for_v6.11_rc1' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 cpu mitigation updates from Borislav Petkov: - Add a spectre_bhi=vmexit mitigation option aimed at cloud environments - Remove duplicated Spectre cmdline option documentation - Add separate macro definitions for syscall handlers which do not return in order to address objtool warnings * tag 'x86_bugs_for_v6.11_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/bugs: Add 'spectre_bhi=vmexit' cmdline option x86/bugs: Remove duplicate Spectre cmdline option descriptions x86/syscall: Mark exit[_group] syscall handlers __noreturn
2024-07-15Merge tag 'x86_misc_for_v6.11_rc1' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull misc x86 updates from Borislav Petkov: - Make error checking of AMD SMN accesses more robust in the callers as they're the only ones who can interpret the results properly - The usual cleanups and fixes, left and right * tag 'x86_misc_for_v6.11_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/kmsan: Fix hook for unaligned accesses x86/platform/iosf_mbi: Convert PCIBIOS_* return codes to errnos x86/pci/xen: Fix PCIBIOS_* return code handling x86/pci/intel_mid_pci: Fix PCIBIOS_* return code handling x86/of: Return consistent error type from x86_of_pci_irq_enable() hwmon: (k10temp) Rename _data variable hwmon: (k10temp) Remove unused HAVE_TDIE() macro hwmon: (k10temp) Reduce k10temp_get_ccd_support() parameters hwmon: (k10temp) Define a helper function to read CCD temperature x86/amd_nb: Enhance SMN access error checking hwmon: (k10temp) Check return value of amd_smn_read() EDAC/amd64: Check return value of amd_smn_read() EDAC/amd64: Remove unused register accesses tools/x86/kcpuid: Add missing dir via Makefile x86, arm: Add missing license tag to syscall tables files
2024-07-15uprobe: Change uretprobe syscall scope and numberJiri Olsa
After discussing with Arnd [1] it's preferable to change uretprobe syscall number to 467 to omit the merge conflict with xattrat syscalls. Also changing the ABI to 'common' which will ease up the global scripts/syscall.tbl management. One consequence is we generate uretprobe syscall numbers for ABIs that do not support uretprobe syscall, but the syscall still returns -ENOSYS when called in that ABI. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/784a34e5-4654-44c9-9c07-f9f4ffd952a0@app.fastmail.com/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240712135228.1619332-2-jolsa@kernel.org/ Fixes: 190fec72df4a ("uprobe: Wire up uretprobe system call") Suggested-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
2024-07-03x86/bhi: Avoid warning in #DB handler due to BHI mitigationAlexandre Chartre
When BHI mitigation is enabled, if SYSENTER is invoked with the TF flag set then entry_SYSENTER_compat() uses CLEAR_BRANCH_HISTORY and calls the clear_bhb_loop() before the TF flag is cleared. This causes the #DB handler (exc_debug_kernel()) to issue a warning because single-step is used outside the entry_SYSENTER_compat() function. To address this issue, entry_SYSENTER_compat() should use CLEAR_BRANCH_HISTORY after making sure the TF flag is cleared. The problem can be reproduced with the following sequence: $ cat sysenter_step.c int main() { asm("pushf; pop %ax; bts $8,%ax; push %ax; popf; sysenter"); } $ gcc -o sysenter_step sysenter_step.c $ ./sysenter_step Segmentation fault (core dumped) The program is expected to crash, and the #DB handler will issue a warning. Kernel log: WARNING: CPU: 27 PID: 7000 at arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:1009 exc_debug_kernel+0xd2/0x160 ... RIP: 0010:exc_debug_kernel+0xd2/0x160 ... Call Trace: <#DB> ? show_regs+0x68/0x80 ? __warn+0x8c/0x140 ? exc_debug_kernel+0xd2/0x160 ? report_bug+0x175/0x1a0 ? handle_bug+0x44/0x90 ? exc_invalid_op+0x1c/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1f/0x30 ? exc_debug_kernel+0xd2/0x160 exc_debug+0x43/0x50 asm_exc_debug+0x1e/0x40 RIP: 0010:clear_bhb_loop+0x0/0xb0 ... </#DB> <TASK> ? entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x8d </TASK> [ bp: Massage commit message. ] Fixes: 7390db8aea0d ("x86/bhi: Add support for clearing branch history at syscall entry") Reported-by: Suman Maity <suman.m.maity@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240524070459.3674025-1-alexandre.chartre@oracle.com
2024-06-28x86/syscall: Mark exit[_group] syscall handlers __noreturnJosh Poimboeuf
The direct-call syscall dispatch function doesn't know that the exit() and exit_group() syscall handlers don't return, so the call sites aren't optimized accordingly. Fix that by marking the exit syscall declarations __noreturn. Fixes the following warnings: vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: x64_sys_call+0x2804: __x64_sys_exit() is missing a __noreturn annotation vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: ia32_sys_call+0x29b6: __ia32_sys_exit_group() is missing a __noreturn annotation Fixes: 1e3ad78334a6 ("x86/syscall: Don't force use of indirect calls for system calls") Closes: https://lkml.kernel.org/lkml/6dba9b32-db2c-4e6d-9500-7a08852f17a3@paulmck-laptop Reported-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Tested-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/5d8882bc077d8eadcc7fd1740b56dfb781f12288.1719381528.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
2024-06-25syscalls: fix compat_sys_io_pgetevents_time64 usageArnd Bergmann
Using sys_io_pgetevents() as the entry point for compat mode tasks works almost correctly, but misses the sign extension for the min_nr and nr arguments. This was addressed on parisc by switching to compat_sys_io_pgetevents_time64() in commit 6431e92fc827 ("parisc: io_pgetevents_time64() needs compat syscall in 32-bit compat mode"), as well as by using more sophisticated system call wrappers on x86 and s390. However, arm64, mips, powerpc, sparc and riscv still have the same bug. Change all of them over to use compat_sys_io_pgetevents_time64() like parisc already does. This was clearly the intention when the function was originally added, but it got hooked up incorrectly in the tables. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 48166e6ea47d ("y2038: add 64-bit time_t syscalls to all 32-bit architectures") Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> # s390 Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
2024-06-12x86, arm: Add missing license tag to syscall tables filesMarcin Juszkiewicz
syscall*.tbl files were added to make it easier to check which system calls are supported on each architecture and to check for their numbers. Arm and x86 files lack Linux-syscall-note license exception present in files for all other architectures. Signed-off-by: Marcin Juszkiewicz <marcin@juszkiewicz.com.pl> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240229145101.553998-1-marcin@juszkiewicz.com.pl
2024-06-12uprobe: Wire up uretprobe system callJiri Olsa
Wiring up uretprobe system call, which comes in following changes. We need to do the wiring before, because the uretprobe implementation needs the syscall number. Note at the moment uretprobe syscall is supported only for native 64-bit process. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240611112158.40795-3-jolsa@kernel.org/ Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
2024-05-23mseal: wire up mseal syscallJeff Xu
Patch series "Introduce mseal", v10. This patchset proposes a new mseal() syscall for the Linux kernel. In a nutshell, mseal() protects the VMAs of a given virtual memory range against modifications, such as changes to their permission bits. Modern CPUs support memory permissions, such as the read/write (RW) and no-execute (NX) bits. Linux has supported NX since the release of kernel version 2.6.8 in August 2004 [1]. The memory permission feature improves the security stance on memory corruption bugs, as an attacker cannot simply write to arbitrary memory and point the code to it. The memory must be marked with the X bit, or else an exception will occur. Internally, the kernel maintains the memory permissions in a data structure called VMA (vm_area_struct). mseal() additionally protects the VMA itself against modifications of the selected seal type. Memory sealing is useful to mitigate memory corruption issues where a corrupted pointer is passed to a memory management system. For example, such an attacker primitive can break control-flow integrity guarantees since read-only memory that is supposed to be trusted can become writable or .text pages can get remapped. Memory sealing can automatically be applied by the runtime loader to seal .text and .rodata pages and applications can additionally seal security critical data at runtime. A similar feature already exists in the XNU kernel with the VM_FLAGS_PERMANENT [3] flag and on OpenBSD with the mimmutable syscall [4]. Also, Chrome wants to adopt this feature for their CFI work [2] and this patchset has been designed to be compatible with the Chrome use case. Two system calls are involved in sealing the map: mmap() and mseal(). The new mseal() is an syscall on 64 bit CPU, and with following signature: int mseal(void addr, size_t len, unsigned long flags) addr/len: memory range. flags: reserved. mseal() blocks following operations for the given memory range. 1> Unmapping, moving to another location, and shrinking the size, via munmap() and mremap(), can leave an empty space, therefore can be replaced with a VMA with a new set of attributes. 2> Moving or expanding a different VMA into the current location, via mremap(). 3> Modifying a VMA via mmap(MAP_FIXED). 4> Size expansion, via mremap(), does not appear to pose any specific risks to sealed VMAs. It is included anyway because the use case is unclear. In any case, users can rely on merging to expand a sealed VMA. 5> mprotect() and pkey_mprotect(). 6> Some destructive madvice() behaviors (e.g. MADV_DONTNEED) for anonymous memory, when users don't have write permission to the memory. Those behaviors can alter region contents by discarding pages, effectively a memset(0) for anonymous memory. The idea that inspired this patch comes from Stephen Röttger’s work in V8 CFI [5]. Chrome browser in ChromeOS will be the first user of this API. Indeed, the Chrome browser has very specific requirements for sealing, which are distinct from those of most applications. For example, in the case of libc, sealing is only applied to read-only (RO) or read-execute (RX) memory segments (such as .text and .RELRO) to prevent them from becoming writable, the lifetime of those mappings are tied to the lifetime of the process. Chrome wants to seal two large address space reservations that are managed by different allocators. The memory is mapped RW- and RWX respectively but write access to it is restricted using pkeys (or in the future ARM permission overlay extensions). The lifetime of those mappings are not tied to the lifetime of the process, therefore, while the memory is sealed, the allocators still need to free or discard the unused memory. For example, with madvise(DONTNEED). However, always allowing madvise(DONTNEED) on this range poses a security risk. For example if a jump instruction crosses a page boundary and the second page gets discarded, it will overwrite the target bytes with zeros and change the control flow. Checking write-permission before the discard operation allows us to control when the operation is valid. In this case, the madvise will only succeed if the executing thread has PKEY write permissions and PKRU changes are protected in software by control-flow integrity. Although the initial version of this patch series is targeting the Chrome browser as its first user, it became evident during upstream discussions that we would also want to ensure that the patch set eventually is a complete solution for memory sealing and compatible with other use cases. The specific scenario currently in mind is glibc's use case of loading and sealing ELF executables. To this end, Stephen is working on a change to glibc to add sealing support to the dynamic linker, which will seal all non-writable segments at startup. Once this work is completed, all applications will be able to automatically benefit from these new protections. In closing, I would like to formally acknowledge the valuable contributions received during the RFC process, which were instrumental in shaping this patch: Jann Horn: raising awareness and providing valuable insights on the destructive madvise operations. Liam R. Howlett: perf optimization. Linus Torvalds: assisting in defining system call signature and scope. Theo de Raadt: sharing the experiences and insight gained from implementing mimmutable() in OpenBSD. MM perf benchmarks ================== This patch adds a loop in the mprotect/munmap/madvise(DONTNEED) to check the VMAs’ sealing flag, so that no partial update can be made, when any segment within the given memory range is sealed. To measure the performance impact of this loop, two tests are developed. [8] The first is measuring the time taken for a particular system call, by using clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC). The second is using PERF_COUNT_HW_REF_CPU_CYCLES (exclude user space). Both tests have similar results. The tests have roughly below sequence: for (i = 0; i < 1000, i++) create 1000 mappings (1 page per VMA) start the sampling for (j = 0; j < 1000, j++) mprotect one mapping stop and save the sample delete 1000 mappings calculates all samples. Below tests are performed on Intel(R) Pentium(R) Gold 7505 @ 2.00GHz, 4G memory, Chromebook. Based on the latest upstream code: The first test (measuring time) syscall__ vmas t t_mseal delta_ns per_vma % munmap__ 1 909 944 35 35 104% munmap__ 2 1398 1502 104 52 107% munmap__ 4 2444 2594 149 37 106% munmap__ 8 4029 4323 293 37 107% munmap__ 16 6647 6935 288 18 104% munmap__ 32 11811 12398 587 18 105% mprotect 1 439 465 26 26 106% mprotect 2 1659 1745 86 43 105% mprotect 4 3747 3889 142 36 104% mprotect 8 6755 6969 215 27 103% mprotect 16 13748 14144 396 25 103% mprotect 32 27827 28969 1142 36 104% madvise_ 1 240 262 22 22 109% madvise_ 2 366 442 76 38 121% madvise_ 4 623 751 128 32 121% madvise_ 8 1110 1324 215 27 119% madvise_ 16 2127 2451 324 20 115% madvise_ 32 4109 4642 534 17 113% The second test (measuring cpu cycle) syscall__ vmas cpu cmseal delta_cpu per_vma % munmap__ 1 1790 1890 100 100 106% munmap__ 2 2819 3033 214 107 108% munmap__ 4 4959 5271 312 78 106% munmap__ 8 8262 8745 483 60 106% munmap__ 16 13099 14116 1017 64 108% munmap__ 32 23221 24785 1565 49 107% mprotect 1 906 967 62 62 107% mprotect 2 3019 3203 184 92 106% mprotect 4 6149 6569 420 105 107% mprotect 8 9978 10524 545 68 105% mprotect 16 20448 21427 979 61 105% mprotect 32 40972 42935 1963 61 105% madvise_ 1 434 497 63 63 115% madvise_ 2 752 899 147 74 120% madvise_ 4 1313 1513 200 50 115% madvise_ 8 2271 2627 356 44 116% madvise_ 16 4312 4883 571 36 113% madvise_ 32 8376 9319 943 29 111% Based on the result, for 6.8 kernel, sealing check adds 20-40 nano seconds, or around 50-100 CPU cycles, per VMA. In addition, I applied the sealing to 5.10 kernel: The first test (measuring time) syscall__ vmas t tmseal delta_ns per_vma % munmap__ 1 357 390 33 33 109% munmap__ 2 442 463 21 11 105% munmap__ 4 614 634 20 5 103% munmap__ 8 1017 1137 120 15 112% munmap__ 16 1889 2153 263 16 114% munmap__ 32 4109 4088 -21 -1 99% mprotect 1 235 227 -7 -7 97% mprotect 2 495 464 -30 -15 94% mprotect 4 741 764 24 6 103% mprotect 8 1434 1437 2 0 100% mprotect 16 2958 2991 33 2 101% mprotect 32 6431 6608 177 6 103% madvise_ 1 191 208 16 16 109% madvise_ 2 300 324 24 12 108% madvise_ 4 450 473 23 6 105% madvise_ 8 753 806 53 7 107% madvise_ 16 1467 1592 125 8 108% madvise_ 32 2795 3405 610 19 122% The second test (measuring cpu cycle) syscall__ nbr_vma cpu cmseal delta_cpu per_vma % munmap__ 1 684 715 31 31 105% munmap__ 2 861 898 38 19 104% munmap__ 4 1183 1235 51 13 104% munmap__ 8 1999 2045 46 6 102% munmap__ 16 3839 3816 -23 -1 99% munmap__ 32 7672 7887 216 7 103% mprotect 1 397 443 46 46 112% mprotect 2 738 788 50 25 107% mprotect 4 1221 1256 35 9 103% mprotect 8 2356 2429 72 9 103% mprotect 16 4961 4935 -26 -2 99% mprotect 32 9882 10172 291 9 103% madvise_ 1 351 380 29 29 108% madvise_ 2 565 615 49 25 109% madvise_ 4 872 933 61 15 107% madvise_ 8 1508 1640 132 16 109% madvise_ 16 3078 3323 245 15 108% madvise_ 32 5893 6704 811 25 114% For 5.10 kernel, sealing check adds 0-15 ns in time, or 10-30 CPU cycles, there is even decrease in some cases. It might be interesting to compare 5.10 and 6.8 kernel The first test (measuring time) syscall__ vmas t_5_10 t_6_8 delta_ns per_vma % munmap__ 1 357 909 552 552 254% munmap__ 2 442 1398 956 478 316% munmap__ 4 614 2444 1830 458 398% munmap__ 8 1017 4029 3012 377 396% munmap__ 16 1889 6647 4758 297 352% munmap__ 32 4109 11811 7702 241 287% mprotect 1 235 439 204 204 187% mprotect 2 495 1659 1164 582 335% mprotect 4 741 3747 3006 752 506% mprotect 8 1434 6755 5320 665 471% mprotect 16 2958 13748 10790 674 465% mprotect 32 6431 27827 21397 669 433% madvise_ 1 191 240 49 49 125% madvise_ 2 300 366 67 33 122% madvise_ 4 450 623 173 43 138% madvise_ 8 753 1110 357 45 147% madvise_ 16 1467 2127 660 41 145% madvise_ 32 2795 4109 1314 41 147% The second test (measuring cpu cycle) syscall__ vmas cpu_5_10 c_6_8 delta_cpu per_vma % munmap__ 1 684 1790 1106 1106 262% munmap__ 2 861 2819 1958 979 327% munmap__ 4 1183 4959 3776 944 419% munmap__ 8 1999 8262 6263 783 413% munmap__ 16 3839 13099 9260 579 341% munmap__ 32 7672 23221 15549 486 303% mprotect 1 397 906 509 509 228% mprotect 2 738 3019 2281 1140 409% mprotect 4 1221 6149 4929 1232 504% mprotect 8 2356 9978 7622 953 423% mprotect 16 4961 20448 15487 968 412% mprotect 32 9882 40972 31091 972 415% madvise_ 1 351 434 82 82 123% madvise_ 2 565 752 186 93 133% madvise_ 4 872 1313 442 110 151% madvise_ 8 1508 2271 763 95 151% madvise_ 16 3078 4312 1234 77 140% madvise_ 32 5893 8376 2483 78 142% From 5.10 to 6.8 munmap: added 250-550 ns in time, or 500-1100 in cpu cycle, per vma. mprotect: added 200-750 ns in time, or 500-1200 in cpu cycle, per vma. madvise: added 33-50 ns in time, or 70-110 in cpu cycle, per vma. In comparison to mseal, which adds 20-40 ns or 50-100 CPU cycles, the increase from 5.10 to 6.8 is significantly larger, approximately ten times greater for munmap and mprotect. When I discuss the mm performance with Brian Makin, an engineer who worked on performance, it was brought to my attention that such performance benchmarks, which measuring millions of mm syscall in a tight loop, may not accurately reflect real-world scenarios, such as that of a database service. Also this is tested using a single HW and ChromeOS, the data from another HW or distribution might be different. It might be best to take this data with a grain of salt. This patch (of 5): Wire up mseal syscall for all architectures. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240415163527.626541-1-jeffxu@chromium.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240415163527.626541-2-jeffxu@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> [Bug #2] Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Jorge Lucangeli Obes <jorgelo@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Muhammad Usama Anjum <usama.anjum@collabora.com> Cc: Pedro Falcato <pedro.falcato@gmail.com> Cc: Stephen Röttger <sroettger@google.com> Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com> Cc: Amer Al Shanawany <amer.shanawany@gmail.com> Cc: Javier Carrasco <javier.carrasco.cruz@gmail.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-05-18Merge tag 'kbuild-v6.10' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild Pull Kbuild updates from Masahiro Yamada: - Avoid 'constexpr', which is a keyword in C23 - Allow 'dtbs_check' and 'dt_compatible_check' run independently of 'dt_binding_check' - Fix weak references to avoid GOT entries in position-independent code generation - Convert the last use of 'optional' property in arch/sh/Kconfig - Remove support for the 'optional' property in Kconfig - Remove support for Clang's ThinLTO caching, which does not work with the .incbin directive - Change the semantics of $(src) so it always points to the source directory, which fixes Makefile inconsistencies between upstream and downstream - Fix 'make tar-pkg' for RISC-V to produce a consistent package - Provide reasonable default coverage for objtool, sanitizers, and profilers - Remove redundant OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD, KASAN_SANITIZE, etc. - Remove the last use of tristate choice in drivers/rapidio/Kconfig - Various cleanups and fixes in Kconfig * tag 'kbuild-v6.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild: (46 commits) kconfig: use sym_get_choice_menu() in sym_check_prop() rapidio: remove choice for enumeration kconfig: lxdialog: remove initialization with A_NORMAL kconfig: m/nconf: merge two item_add_str() calls kconfig: m/nconf: remove dead code to display value of bool choice kconfig: m/nconf: remove dead code to display children of choice members kconfig: gconf: show checkbox for choice correctly kbuild: use GCOV_PROFILE and KCSAN_SANITIZE in scripts/Makefile.modfinal Makefile: remove redundant tool coverage variables kbuild: provide reasonable defaults for tool coverage modules: Drop the .export_symbol section from the final modules kconfig: use menu_list_for_each_sym() in sym_check_choice_deps() kconfig: use sym_get_choice_menu() in conf_write_defconfig() kconfig: add sym_get_choice_menu() helper kconfig: turn defaults and additional prompt for choice members into error kconfig: turn missing prompt for choice members into error kconfig: turn conf_choice() into void function kconfig: use linked list in sym_set_changed() kconfig: gconf: use MENU_CHANGED instead of SYMBOL_CHANGED kconfig: gconf: remove debug code ...
2024-05-14Merge tag 'x86-irq-2024-05-12' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 interrupt handling updates from Thomas Gleixner: "Add support for posted interrupts on bare metal. Posted interrupts is a virtualization feature which allows to inject interrupts directly into a guest without host interaction. The VT-d interrupt remapping hardware sets the bit which corresponds to the interrupt vector in a vector bitmap which is either used to inject the interrupt directly into the guest via a virtualized APIC or in case that the guest is scheduled out provides a host side notification interrupt which informs the host that an interrupt has been marked pending in the bitmap. This can be utilized on bare metal for scenarios where multiple devices, e.g. NVME storage, raise interrupts with a high frequency. In the default mode these interrupts are handles independently and therefore require a full roundtrip of interrupt entry/exit. Utilizing posted interrupts this roundtrip overhead can be avoided by coalescing these interrupt entries to a single entry for the posted interrupt notification. The notification interrupt then demultiplexes the pending bits in a memory based bitmap and invokes the corresponding device specific handlers. Depending on the usage scenario and device utilization throughput improvements between 10% and 130% have been measured. As this is only relevant for high end servers with multiple device queues per CPU attached and counterproductive for situations where interrupts are arriving at distinct times, the functionality is opt-in via a kernel command line parameter" * tag 'x86-irq-2024-05-12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/irq: Use existing helper for pending vector check iommu/vt-d: Enable posted mode for device MSIs iommu/vt-d: Make posted MSI an opt-in command line option x86/irq: Extend checks for pending vectors to posted interrupts x86/irq: Factor out common code for checking pending interrupts x86/irq: Install posted MSI notification handler x86/irq: Factor out handler invocation from common_interrupt() x86/irq: Set up per host CPU posted interrupt descriptors x86/irq: Reserve a per CPU IDT vector for posted MSIs x86/irq: Add a Kconfig option for posted MSI x86/irq: Remove bitfields in posted interrupt descriptor x86/irq: Unionize PID.PIR for 64bit access w/o casting KVM: VMX: Move posted interrupt descriptor out of VMX code
2024-05-14Makefile: remove redundant tool coverage variablesMasahiro Yamada
Now Kbuild provides reasonable defaults for objtool, sanitizers, and profilers. Remove redundant variables. Note: This commit changes the coverage for some objects: - include arch/mips/vdso/vdso-image.o into UBSAN, GCOV, KCOV - include arch/sparc/vdso/vdso-image-*.o into UBSAN - include arch/sparc/vdso/vma.o into UBSAN - include arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.o into KASAN, KCSAN, UBSAN, GCOV, KCOV - include arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso-image-*.o into KASAN, KCSAN, UBSAN, GCOV, KCOV - include arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso32-setup.o into KASAN, KCSAN, UBSAN, GCOV, KCOV - include arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.o into GCOV, KCOV - include arch/x86/um/vdso/vma.o into KASAN, GCOV, KCOV I believe these are positive effects because all of them are kernel space objects. Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Tested-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
2024-05-13Merge tag 'x86-shstk-2024-05-13' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 shadow stacks from Ingo Molnar: "Enable shadow stacks for x32. While we normally don't do such feature-enabling for 32-bit anymore, this change is small, straightforward & tested on upstream glibc" * tag 'x86-shstk-2024-05-13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/shstk: Enable shadow stacks for x32
2024-05-13Merge tag 'x86-entry-2024-05-13' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 entry cleanup from Ingo Molnar: - Merge thunk_64.S and thunk_32.S into thunk.S * tag 'x86-entry-2024-05-13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/entry: Merge thunk_64.S and thunk_32.S into thunk.S
2024-05-13Merge tag 'x86-cleanups-2024-05-13' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 cleanups from Ingo Molnar: - Fix function prototypes to address clang function type cast warnings in the math-emu code - Reorder definitions in <asm/msr-index.h> - Remove unused code - Fix typos - Simplify #include sections * tag 'x86-cleanups-2024-05-13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/pci/ce4100: Remove unused 'struct sim_reg_op' x86/msr: Move ARCH_CAP_XAPIC_DISABLE bit definition to its rightful place x86/math-emu: Fix function cast warnings x86/extable: Remove unused fixup type EX_TYPE_COPY x86/rtc: Remove unused intel-mid.h x86/32: Remove unused IA32_STACK_TOP and two externs x86/head: Simplify relative include path to xen-head.S x86/fred: Fix typo in Kconfig description x86/syscall/compat: Remove ia32_unistd.h x86/syscall/compat: Remove unused macro __SYSCALL_ia32_NR x86/virt/tdx: Remove duplicate include x86/xen: Remove duplicate #include
2024-05-10kbuild: use $(src) instead of $(srctree)/$(src) for source directoryMasahiro Yamada
Kbuild conventionally uses $(obj)/ for generated files, and $(src)/ for checked-in source files. It is merely a convention without any functional difference. In fact, $(obj) and $(src) are exactly the same, as defined in scripts/Makefile.build: src := $(obj) When the kernel is built in a separate output directory, $(src) does not accurately reflect the source directory location. While Kbuild resolves this discrepancy by specifying VPATH=$(srctree) to search for source files, it does not cover all cases. For example, when adding a header search path for local headers, -I$(srctree)/$(src) is typically passed to the compiler. This introduces inconsistency between upstream and downstream Makefiles because $(src) is used instead of $(srctree)/$(src) for the latter. To address this inconsistency, this commit changes the semantics of $(src) so that it always points to the directory in the source tree. Going forward, the variables used in Makefiles will have the following meanings: $(obj) - directory in the object tree $(src) - directory in the source tree (changed by this commit) $(objtree) - the top of the kernel object tree $(srctree) - the top of the kernel source tree Consequently, $(srctree)/$(src) in upstream Makefiles need to be replaced with $(src). Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Nicolas Schier <nicolas@fjasle.eu>
2024-05-01x86/mm: Remove broken vsyscall emulation code from the page fault codeLinus Torvalds
The syzbot-reported stack trace from hell in this discussion thread actually has three nested page faults: https://lore.kernel.org/r/000000000000d5f4fc0616e816d4@google.com ... and I think that's actually the important thing here: - the first page fault is from user space, and triggers the vsyscall emulation. - the second page fault is from __do_sys_gettimeofday(), and that should just have caused the exception that then sets the return value to -EFAULT - the third nested page fault is due to _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore() -> preempt_schedule() -> trace_sched_switch(), which then causes a BPF trace program to run, which does that bpf_probe_read_compat(), which causes that page fault under pagefault_disable(). It's quite the nasty backtrace, and there's a lot going on. The problem is literally the vsyscall emulation, which sets current->thread.sig_on_uaccess_err = 1; and that causes the fixup_exception() code to send the signal *despite* the exception being caught. And I think that is in fact completely bogus. It's completely bogus exactly because it sends that signal even when it *shouldn't* be sent - like for the BPF user mode trace gathering. In other words, I think the whole "sig_on_uaccess_err" thing is entirely broken, because it makes any nested page-faults do all the wrong things. Now, arguably, I don't think anybody should enable vsyscall emulation any more, but this test case clearly does. I think we should just make the "send SIGSEGV" be something that the vsyscall emulation does on its own, not this broken per-thread state for something that isn't actually per thread. The x86 page fault code actually tried to deal with the "incorrect nesting" by having that: if (in_interrupt()) return; which ignores the sig_on_uaccess_err case when it happens in interrupts, but as shown by this example, these nested page faults do not need to be about interrupts at all. IOW, I think the only right thing is to remove that horrendously broken code. The attached patch looks like the ObviouslyCorrect(tm) thing to do. NOTE! This broken code goes back to this commit in 2011: 4fc3490114bb ("x86-64: Set siginfo and context on vsyscall emulation faults") ... and back then the reason was to get all the siginfo details right. Honestly, I do not for a moment believe that it's worth getting the siginfo details right here, but part of the commit says: This fixes issues with UML when vsyscall=emulate. ... and so my patch to remove this garbage will probably break UML in this situation. I do not believe that anybody should be running with vsyscall=emulate in 2024 in the first place, much less if you are doing things like UML. But let's see if somebody screams. Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+83e7f982ca045ab4405c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Tested-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAHk-=wh9D6f7HUkDgZHKmDCHUQmp+Co89GP+b8+z+G56BKeyNg@mail.gmail.com
2024-04-30x86/irq: Install posted MSI notification handlerJacob Pan
All MSI vectors are multiplexed into a single notification vector when posted MSI is enabled. It is the responsibility of the notification vector handler to demultiplex MSI vectors. In the handler the MSI vector handlers are dispatched without IDT delivery for each pending MSI interrupt. For example, the interrupt flow will change as follows: (3 MSIs of different vectors arrive in a a high frequency burst) BEFORE: interrupt(MSI) irq_enter() handler() /* EOI */ irq_exit() process_softirq() interrupt(MSI) irq_enter() handler() /* EOI */ irq_exit() process_softirq() interrupt(MSI) irq_enter() handler() /* EOI */ irq_exit() process_softirq() AFTER: interrupt /* Posted MSI notification vector */ irq_enter() atomic_xchg(PIR) handler() handler() handler() pi_clear_on() apic_eoi() irq_exit() process_softirq() Except for the leading MSI, CPU notifications are skipped/coalesced. For MSIs which arrive at a low frequency, the demultiplexing loop does not wait for more interrupts to coalesce. Therefore, there's no additional latency other than the processing time. Signed-off-by: Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240423174114.526704-9-jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com
2024-04-18x86/fred: Fix incorrect error code printout in fred_bad_type()Hou Wenlong
regs->orig_ax has been set to -1 on entry so in the printout, fred_bad_type() should use the passed parameter error_code. Fixes: 14619d912b65 ("x86/fred: FRED entry/exit and dispatch code") Signed-off-by: Hou Wenlong <houwenlong.hwl@antgroup.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin (Intel) <hpa@zytor.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/b2a8f0a41449d25240e314a2ddfbf6549511fb04.1713353612.git.houwenlong.hwl@antgroup.com
2024-04-18x86/fred: Fix INT80 emulation for FREDXin Li (Intel)
Add a FRED-specific INT80 handler and document why it differs from the current one. Eventually, the common bits will be unified once FRED hw is available and it turns out that no further changes are needed but for now, keep the handlers separate for everyone's sanity's sake. [ bp: Zap duplicated commit message, massage. ] Fixes: 55617fb991df ("x86/entry: Do not allow external 0x80 interrupts") Suggested-by: H. Peter Anvin (Intel) <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Xin Li (Intel) <xin@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240417174731.4189592-1-xin@zytor.com
2024-04-09x86/entry: Merge thunk_64.S and thunk_32.S into thunk.SLai Jiangshan
The code in thunk_64.S and thunk_32.S are exactly the same except for the comments. Merge them in to thunk.S. And since thunk_32.S was originated from thunk_64.S, the new merged thunk.S is actually renamed from thunk_64.S. Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshan.ljs@antgroup.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240407090558.3395-9-jiangshanlai@gmail.com
2024-04-08x86/bhi: Add support for clearing branch history at syscall entryPawan Gupta
Branch History Injection (BHI) attacks may allow a malicious application to influence indirect branch prediction in kernel by poisoning the branch history. eIBRS isolates indirect branch targets in ring0. The BHB can still influence the choice of indirect branch predictor entry, and although branch predictor entries are isolated between modes when eIBRS is enabled, the BHB itself is not isolated between modes. Alder Lake and new processors supports a hardware control BHI_DIS_S to mitigate BHI. For older processors Intel has released a software sequence to clear the branch history on parts that don't support BHI_DIS_S. Add support to execute the software sequence at syscall entry and VMexit to overwrite the branch history. For now, branch history is not cleared at interrupt entry, as malicious applications are not believed to have sufficient control over the registers, since previous register state is cleared at interrupt entry. Researchers continue to poke at this area and it may become necessary to clear at interrupt entry as well in the future. This mitigation is only defined here. It is enabled later. Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Co-developed-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
2024-04-08x86/syscall: Don't force use of indirect calls for system callsLinus Torvalds
Make <asm/syscall.h> build a switch statement instead, and the compiler can either decide to generate an indirect jump, or - more likely these days due to mitigations - just a series of conditional branches. Yes, the conditional branches also have branch prediction, but the branch prediction is much more controlled, in that it just causes speculatively running the wrong system call (harmless), rather than speculatively running possibly wrong random less controlled code gadgets. This doesn't mitigate other indirect calls, but the system call indirection is the first and most easily triggered case. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>