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Drop the per-VM zapped_obsolete_pages list now that the usage from the
defunct mmu_shrinker is gone, and instead use a local list to track pages
in kvm_zap_obsolete_pages(), the sole remaining user of
zapped_obsolete_pages.
Opportunistically add an assertion to verify and document that slots_lock
must be held, i.e. that there can only be one active instance of
kvm_zap_obsolete_pages() at any given time, and by doing so also prove
that using a local list instead of a per-VM list doesn't change any
functionality (beyond trivialities like list initialization).
Signed-off-by: Vipin Sharma <vipinsh@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241101201437.1604321-2-vipinsh@google.com
[sean: split to separate patch, write changelog]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Recover TDP MMU huge page mappings in-place instead of zapping them when
dirty logging is disabled, and rename functions that recover huge page
mappings when dirty logging is disabled to move away from the "zap
collapsible spte" terminology.
Before KVM flushes TLBs, guest accesses may be translated through either
the (stale) small SPTE or the (new) huge SPTE. This is already possible
when KVM is doing eager page splitting (where TLB flushes are also
batched), and when vCPUs are faulting in huge mappings (where TLBs are
flushed after the new huge SPTE is installed).
Recovering huge pages reduces the number of page faults when dirty
logging is disabled:
$ perf stat -e kvm:kvm_page_fault -- ./dirty_log_perf_test -s anonymous_hugetlb_2mb -v 64 -e -b 4g
Before: 393,599 kvm:kvm_page_fault
After: 262,575 kvm:kvm_page_fault
vCPU throughput and the latency of disabling dirty-logging are about
equal compared to zapping, but avoiding faults can be beneficial to
remove vCPU jitter in extreme scenarios.
Signed-off-by: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240823235648.3236880-5-dmatlack@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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To avoid duplication of inline asm between C and Rust, we need to
import the inline asm from the relevant `jump_label.h` header into Rust.
To make that easier, this patch updates the header files to expose the
inline asm via a new ARCH_STATIC_BRANCH_ASM macro.
The header files are all updated to define a ARCH_STATIC_BRANCH_ASM that
takes the same arguments in a consistent order so that Rust can use the
same logic for every architecture.
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Cc: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: Alex Gaynor <alex.gaynor@gmail.com>
Cc: Wedson Almeida Filho <wedsonaf@gmail.com>
Cc: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>
Cc: Gary Guo <gary@garyguo.net>
Cc: " =?utf-8?q?Bj=C3=B6rn_Roy_Baron?= " <bjorn3_gh@protonmail.com>
Cc: Benno Lossin <benno.lossin@proton.me>
Cc: Andreas Hindborg <a.hindborg@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Uros Bizjak <ubizjak@gmail.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
Cc: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>
Cc: Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>
Cc: Anup Patel <apatel@ventanamicro.com>
Cc: Andrew Jones <ajones@ventanamicro.com>
Cc: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Cc: Conor Dooley <conor.dooley@microchip.com>
Cc: Samuel Holland <samuel.holland@sifive.com>
Cc: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@kernel.org>
Cc: WANG Xuerui <kernel@xen0n.name>
Cc: Bibo Mao <maobibo@loongson.cn>
Cc: Tiezhu Yang <yangtiezhu@loongson.cn>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Tianrui Zhao <zhaotianrui@loongson.cn>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20241030-tracepoint-v12-4-eec7f0f8ad22@google.com
Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Co-developed-by: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Acked-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com> # RISC-V
Signed-off-by: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
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The generic vdso data storage cannot handle the special pvclock and
hvclock pages. Split them into their own mapping, so the other vdso
storage can be migrated to the generic code.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <thomas.weissschuh@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241010-vdso-generic-base-v1-20-b64f0842d512@linutronix.de
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All users have been removed.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <thomas.weissschuh@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241010-vdso-generic-base-v1-19-b64f0842d512@linutronix.de
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The vdso_data is at the start of the vvar page.
Make use of this invariant to remove the usage of vvar.h.
This also matches the logic for the timens data.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <thomas.weissschuh@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241010-vdso-generic-base-v1-18-b64f0842d512@linutronix.de
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vvar.h will go away, so move the last useful bit into vsyscall.h.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <thomas.weissschuh@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241010-vdso-generic-base-v1-17-b64f0842d512@linutronix.de
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The vdso_rng_data is at a well-known offset in the vvar page.
Make use of this invariant to remove the usage of vvar.h.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <thomas.weissschuh@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241010-vdso-generic-base-v1-16-b64f0842d512@linutronix.de
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The vdso_data is at the start of the timens page.
Make use of this invariant to remove the usage of vvar.h.
This also matches the logic for the pvclock and hvclock pages.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <thomas.weissschuh@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241010-vdso-generic-base-v1-15-b64f0842d512@linutronix.de
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Allocate the vvar page through the standard union vdso_data_store
and remove the custom linker script logic.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <thomas.weissschuh@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241010-vdso-generic-base-v1-14-b64f0842d512@linutronix.de
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Remove the usage of the vvar _vdso_rng_data from the kernel-space code,
as the x86 vvar machinery is about to be removed.
The definition of the structure is unnecessary, as the data lives in a
page pre-allocated by the linker anyways.
The vdso user-space access to the rng data will be switched soon.
DEFINE_VVAR_SINGLE() is now unused. It will be removed later togehter
with the rest of vvar.h.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <thomas.weissschuh@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241010-vdso-generic-base-v1-13-b64f0842d512@linutronix.de
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The offset of the vdso_data only has historic reasons, as back then
other vvars also existed and offset 0 was already used.
(See commit 8c49d9a74bac ("x86-64: Clean up vdso/kernel shared variables"))
Over time most other vvars got removed and offset 0 is free again.
Moving vdso_data to the beginning of the vvar page aligns x86 with other
architectures and opens up the way for the removal of the custom x86
vvar machinery.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <thomas.weissschuh@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241010-vdso-generic-base-v1-12-b64f0842d512@linutronix.de
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The implementation details of the vdso_data access will change.
Prepare for that by using the existing helper function.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <thomas.weissschuh@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241010-vdso-generic-base-v1-11-b64f0842d512@linutronix.de
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Add a quirk to control KVM's misguided initialization of select feature
MSRs to KVM's max configuration, as enabling features by default violates
KVM's approach of letting userspace own the vCPU model, and is actively
problematic for MSRs that are conditionally supported, as the vCPU will
end up with an MSR value that userspace can't restore. E.g. if the vCPU
is configured with PDCM=0, userspace will save and attempt to restore a
non-zero PERF_CAPABILITIES, thanks to KVM's meddling.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240802185511.305849-4-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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When querying guest CPL to determine if a vCPU was preempted while in
kernel mode, bypass the register cache, i.e. always read SS.AR_BYTES from
the VMCS on Intel CPUs. If the kernel is running with full preemption
enabled, using the register cache in the preemption path can result in
stale and/or uninitialized data being cached in the segment cache.
In particular the following scenario is currently possible:
- vCPU is just created, and the vCPU thread is preempted before
SS.AR_BYTES is written in vmx_vcpu_reset().
- When scheduling out the vCPU task, kvm_arch_vcpu_in_kernel() =>
vmx_get_cpl() reads and caches '0' for SS.AR_BYTES.
- vmx_vcpu_reset() => seg_setup() configures SS.AR_BYTES, but doesn't
invoke vmx_segment_cache_clear() to invalidate the cache.
As a result, KVM retains a stale value in the cache, which can be read,
e.g. via KVM_GET_SREGS. Usually this is not a problem because the VMX
segment cache is reset on each VM-Exit, but if the userspace VMM (e.g KVM
selftests) reads and writes system registers just after the vCPU was
created, _without_ modifying SS.AR_BYTES, userspace will write back the
stale '0' value and ultimately will trigger a VM-Entry failure due to
incorrect SS segment type.
Note, the VM-Enter failure can also be avoided by moving the call to
vmx_segment_cache_clear() until after the vmx_vcpu_reset() initializes all
segments. However, while that change is correct and desirable (and will
come along shortly), it does not address the underlying problem that
accessing KVM's register caches from !task context is generally unsafe.
In addition to fixing the immediate bug, bypassing the cache for this
particular case will allow hardening KVM register caching log to assert
that the caches are accessed only when KVM _knows_ it is safe to do so.
Fixes: de63ad4cf497 ("KVM: X86: implement the logic for spinlock optimization")
Reported-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240716022014.240960-3-mlevitsk@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241009175002.1118178-2-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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This family 5 CPU escaped notice when cleaning up all the family 6
CPUs.
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241031185733.17327-1-tony.luck%40intel.com
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A new "FRU Text in MCA" feature is defined where the Field Replaceable
Unit (FRU) Text for a device is represented by a string in the new
MCA_SYND1 and MCA_SYND2 registers. This feature is supported per MCA
bank, and it is advertised by the McaFruTextInMca bit (MCA_CONFIG[9]).
The FRU Text is populated dynamically for each individual error state
(MCA_STATUS, MCA_ADDR, et al.). Handle the case where an MCA bank covers
multiple devices, for example, a Unified Memory Controller (UMC) bank
that manages two DIMMs.
[ Yazen: Add Avadhut as co-developer for wrapper changes. ]
[ bp: Do not expose MCA_CONFIG to userspace yet. ]
Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com>
Co-developed-by: Avadhut Naik <avadhut.naik@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Avadhut Naik <avadhut.naik@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241022194158.110073-6-avadhut.naik@amd.com
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Starting with Zen4, AMD's Scalable MCA systems incorporate two new registers:
MCA_SYND1 and MCA_SYND2.
These registers will include supplemental error information in addition to the
existing MCA_SYND register. The data within these registers is considered
valid if MCA_STATUS[SyndV] is set.
Userspace error decoding tools like rasdaemon gather related hardware error
information through the tracepoints.
Therefore, export these two registers through the mce_record tracepoint so
that tools like rasdaemon can parse them and output the supplemental error
information like FRU text contained in them.
[ bp: Massage. ]
Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Avadhut Naik <avadhut.naik@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241022194158.110073-4-avadhut.naik@amd.com
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Currently, exporting new additional machine check error information
involves adding new fields for the same at the end of the struct mce.
This additional information can then be consumed through mcelog or
tracepoint.
However, as new MSRs are being added (and will be added in the future)
by CPU vendors on their newer CPUs with additional machine check error
information to be exported, the size of struct mce will balloon on some
CPUs, unnecessarily, since those fields are vendor-specific. Moreover,
different CPU vendors may export the additional information in varying
sizes.
The problem particularly intensifies since struct mce is exposed to
userspace as part of UAPI. It's bloating through vendor-specific data
should be avoided to limit the information being sent out to userspace.
Add a new structure mce_hw_err to wrap the existing struct mce. The same
will prevent its ballooning since vendor-specifc data, if any, can now be
exported through a union within the wrapper structure and through
__dynamic_array in mce_record tracepoint.
Furthermore, new internal kernel fields can be added to the wrapper
struct without impacting the user space API.
[ bp: Restore reverse x-mas tree order of function vars declarations. ]
Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Avadhut Naik <avadhut.naik@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241022194158.110073-2-avadhut.naik@amd.com
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node_to_amd_nb() is defined to NULL in non-AMD configs:
drivers/platform/x86/amd/hsmp/plat.c: In function 'init_platform_device':
drivers/platform/x86/amd/hsmp/plat.c:165:68: error: dereferencing 'void *' pointer [-Werror]
165 | sock->root = node_to_amd_nb(i)->root;
| ^~
drivers/platform/x86/amd/hsmp/plat.c:165:68: error: request for member 'root' in something not a structure or union
Users of the interface who also allow COMPILE_TEST will cause the above build
error so provide an inline stub to fix that.
[ bp: Massage commit message. ]
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241029092329.3857004-1-arnd@kernel.org
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page_to_phys is duplicated by all architectures, and from some strange
reason placed in <asm/io.h> where it doesn't fit at all.
phys_to_page is only provided by a few architectures despite having a lot
of open coded users.
Provide generic versions in <asm-generic/memory_model.h> to make these
helpers more easily usable.
Note with this patch powerpc loses the CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL pfn_valid
check. It will be added back in a generic version later.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
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SNP guests allocate shared buffers to perform I/O. It is done by
allocating pages normally from the buddy allocator and converting them
to shared with set_memory_decrypted().
The second, kexec-ed, kernel has no idea what memory is converted this
way. It only sees E820_TYPE_RAM.
Accessing shared memory via private mapping will cause unrecoverable RMP
page-faults.
On kexec, walk direct mapping and convert all shared memory back to
private. It makes all RAM private again and second kernel may use it
normally. Additionally, for SNP guests, convert all bss decrypted
section pages back to private.
The conversion occurs in two steps: stopping new conversions and
unsharing all memory. In the case of normal kexec, the stopping of
conversions takes place while scheduling is still functioning. This
allows for waiting until any ongoing conversions are finished. The
second step is carried out when all CPUs except one are inactive and
interrupts are disabled. This prevents any conflicts with code that may
access shared memory.
Co-developed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/05a8c15fb665dbb062b04a8cb3d592a63f235937.1722520012.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com
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Refactor __set_clr_pte_enc() and add two new helper functions to
set/clear PTE C-bit from early SEV/SNP initialization code and later
during shutdown/kexec especially when all CPUs are stopped and
interrupts are disabled and set_memory_xx() interfaces can't be used.
Co-developed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/5df4aa450447f28294d1c5a890e27b63ed4ded36.1722520012.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com
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Add a new feature bit that indicates support for workload-based heuristic
feedback to OS for scheduling decisions.
When the bit set, threads are classified during runtime into enumerated
classes. The classes represent thread performance/power characteristics
that may benefit from special scheduling behaviors.
Signed-off-by: Perry Yuan <perry.yuan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Gautham R. Shenoy <gautham.shenoy@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241028020251.8085-4-mario.limonciello@amd.com
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Sometimes it is required to take actions based on if a CPU is a performance or
efficiency core. As an example, intel_pstate driver uses the Intel core-type
to determine CPU scaling. Also, some CPU vulnerabilities only affect
a specific CPU type, like RFDS only affects Intel Atom. Hybrid systems that
have variants P+E, P-only(Core) and E-only(Atom), it is not straightforward to
identify which variant is affected by a type specific vulnerability.
Such processors do have CPUID field that can uniquely identify them. Like,
P+E, P-only and E-only enumerates CPUID.1A.CORE_TYPE identification, while P+E
additionally enumerates CPUID.7.HYBRID. Based on this information, it is
possible for boot CPU to identify if a system has mixed CPU types.
Add a new field hw_cpu_type to struct cpuinfo_topology that stores the
hardware specific CPU type. This saves the overhead of IPIs to get the CPU
type of a different CPU. CPU type is populated early in the boot process,
before vulnerabilities are enumerated.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241025171459.1093-5-mario.limonciello@amd.com
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CPUID leaf 0x80000026 advertises core types with different efficiency
rankings.
Bit 30 indicates the heterogeneous core topology feature, if the bit
set, it means not all instances at the current hierarchical level have
the same core topology.
This is described in the AMD64 Architecture Programmers Manual Volume
2 and 3, doc ID #25493 and #25494.
Signed-off-by: Perry Yuan <perry.yuan@amd.com>
Co-developed-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241025171459.1093-3-mario.limonciello@amd.com
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This feature is an AMD unique feature of some processors, so put
AMD into the name.
Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241025171459.1093-2-mario.limonciello@amd.com
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The x86 user pointer validation changes made me look at compiler output
a lot, and the wrong indentation for the ".popsection" in the generated
assembler triggered me.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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It turns out that AMD has a "Meltdown Lite(tm)" issue with non-canonical
accesses in kernel space. And so using just the high bit to decide
whether an access is in user space or kernel space ends up with the good
old "leak speculative data" if you have the right gadget using the
result:
CVE-2020-12965 “Transient Execution of Non-Canonical Accesses“
Now, the kernel surrounds the access with a STAC/CLAC pair, and those
instructions end up serializing execution on older Zen architectures,
which closes the speculation window.
But that was true only up until Zen 5, which renames the AC bit [1].
That improves performance of STAC/CLAC a lot, but also means that the
speculation window is now open.
Note that this affects not just the new address masking, but also the
regular valid_user_address() check used by access_ok(), and the asm
version of the sign bit check in the get_user() helpers.
It does not affect put_user() or clear_user() variants, since there's no
speculative result to be used in a gadget for those operations.
Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/80d94591-1297-4afb-b510-c665efd37f10@citrix.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241023094448.GAZxjFkEOOF_DM83TQ@fat_crate.local/ [1]
Link: https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-1010.html
Link: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2108.10771
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Tested-by: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman@intel.com> # LAM case
Fixes: 2865baf54077 ("x86: support user address masking instead of non-speculative conditional")
Fixes: 6014bc27561f ("x86-64: make access_ok() independent of LAM")
Fixes: b19b74bc99b1 ("x86/mm: Rework address range check in get_user() and put_user()")
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 fixes from Borislav Petkov:
- Explicitly disable the TSC deadline timer when going idle to address
some CPU errata in that area
- Do not apply the Zenbleed fix on anything else except AMD Zen2 on the
late microcode loading path
- Clear CPU buffers later in the NMI exit path on 32-bit to avoid
register clearing while they still contain sensitive data, for the
RDFS mitigation
- Do not clobber EFLAGS.ZF with VERW on the opportunistic SYSRET exit
path on 32-bit
- Fix parsing issues of memory bandwidth specification in sysfs for
resctrl's memory bandwidth allocation feature
- Other small cleanups and improvements
* tag 'x86_urgent_for_v6.12_rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/apic: Always explicitly disarm TSC-deadline timer
x86/CPU/AMD: Only apply Zenbleed fix for Zen2 during late microcode load
x86/bugs: Use code segment selector for VERW operand
x86/entry_32: Clear CPU buffers after register restore in NMI return
x86/entry_32: Do not clobber user EFLAGS.ZF
x86/resctrl: Annotate get_mem_config() functions as __init
x86/resctrl: Avoid overflow in MB settings in bw_validate()
x86/amd_nb: Add new PCI ID for AMD family 1Ah model 20h
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Currently, the sev-guest driver is the only user of SNP guest messaging.
The snp_guest_dev structure holds all the allocated buffers, secrets page
and VMPCK details. In preparation for adding messaging allocation and
initialization APIs, decouple snp_guest_dev from messaging-related
information by carving out the guest message context
structure(snp_msg_desc).
Incorporate this newly added context into snp_send_guest_request() and all
related functions, replacing the use of the snp_guest_dev.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241009092850.197575-7-nikunj@amd.com
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Add a snp_guest_req structure to eliminate the need to pass a long list of
parameters. This structure will be used to call the SNP Guest message
request API, simplifying the function arguments.
Update the snp_issue_guest_request() prototype to include the new guest
request structure.
Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241009092850.197575-5-nikunj@amd.com
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The sev-guest driver encryption code uses the crypto API for SNP guest
messaging with the AMD Security processor. In order to enable secure TSC,
SEV-SNP guests need to send such a TSC_INFO message before the APs are
booted. Details from the TSC_INFO response will then be used to program the
VMSA before the APs are brought up.
However, the crypto API is not available this early in the boot process.
In preparation for moving the encryption code out of sev-guest to support
secure TSC and to ease review, switch to using the AES GCM library
implementation instead.
Drop __enc_payload() and dec_payload() helpers as both are small and can be
moved to the respective callers.
Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Tested-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241009092850.197575-2-nikunj@amd.com
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The VDSO implementation includes headers from outside of the
vdso/ namespace.
Introduce vdso/page.h to make sure that the generic library
uses only the allowed namespace.
Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> # m68k
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241014151340.1639555-3-vincenzo.frascino@arm.com
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Move SEV-specific kernel command line option parsing support from
arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c to arch/x86/virt/svm/cmdline.c so that both
host and guest related SEV command line options can be supported.
No functional changes intended.
Signed-off-by: Pavan Kumar Paluri <papaluri@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241014130948.1476946-2-papaluri@amd.com
|
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Since the generic VDSO clock mode storage is used, this header file is
unused and can be removed.
This avoids including a non-VDSO header while building the VDSO,
which can lead to compilation errors.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <thomas.weissschuh@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241010-vdso-generic-arch_update_vsyscall-v1-7-7fe5a3ea4382@linutronix.de
|
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Most architectures use pt_regs within ftrace_regs making a lot of the
accessor functions just calls to the pt_regs internally. Instead of
duplication this effort, use a HAVE_ARCH_FTRACE_REGS for architectures
that have their own ftrace_regs that is not based on pt_regs and will
define all the accessor functions, and for the architectures that just use
pt_regs, it will leave it undefined, and the default accessor functions
will be used.
Note, this will also make it easier to add new accessor functions to
ftrace_regs as it will mean having to touch less architectures.
Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: "x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@kernel.org>
Cc: WANG Xuerui <kernel@xen0n.name>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: Naveen N Rao <naveen@kernel.org>
Cc: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>
Cc: Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20241010202114.2289f6fd@gandalf.local.home
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> # s390
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> # powerpc
Suggested-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
|
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ftrace_regs was created to hold registers that store information to save
function parameters, return value and stack. Since it is a subset of
pt_regs, it should only be used by its accessor functions. But because
pt_regs can easily be taken from ftrace_regs (on most archs), it is
tempting to use it directly. But when running on other architectures, it
may fail to build or worse, build but crash the kernel!
Instead, make struct ftrace_regs an empty structure and have the
architectures define __arch_ftrace_regs and all the accessor functions
will typecast to it to get to the actual fields. This will help avoid
usage of ftrace_regs directly.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241007171027.629bdafd@gandalf.local.home/
Cc: "linux-arch@vger.kernel.org" <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: "x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@kernel.org>
Cc: WANG Xuerui <kernel@xen0n.name>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: Naveen N Rao <naveen@kernel.org>
Cc: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>
Cc: Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20241008230628.958778821@goodmis.org
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> # s390
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
|
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Set this flag if the CPU has an IBPB implementation that does not
invalidate return target predictions. Zen generations < 4 do not flush
the RSB when executing an IBPB and this bug flag denotes that.
[ bp: Massage. ]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Wikner <kwikner@ethz.ch>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
|
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AMD's initial implementation of IBPB did not clear the return address
predictor. Beginning with Zen4, AMD's IBPB *does* clear the return address
predictor. This behavior is enumerated by CPUID.80000008H:EBX.IBPB_RET[30].
Define X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET for use in KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID,
when determining cross-vendor capabilities.
Suggested-by: Venkatesh Srinivas <venkateshs@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
|
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Robert Gill reported below #GP in 32-bit mode when dosemu software was
executing vm86() system call:
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
CPU: 4 PID: 4610 Comm: dosemu.bin Not tainted 6.6.21-gentoo-x86 #1
Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge 1950/0H723K, BIOS 2.7.0 10/30/2010
EIP: restore_all_switch_stack+0xbe/0xcf
EAX: 00000000 EBX: 00000000 ECX: 00000000 EDX: 00000000
ESI: 00000000 EDI: 00000000 EBP: 00000000 ESP: ff8affdc
DS: 0000 ES: 0000 FS: 0000 GS: 0033 SS: 0068 EFLAGS: 00010046
CR0: 80050033 CR2: 00c2101c CR3: 04b6d000 CR4: 000406d0
Call Trace:
show_regs+0x70/0x78
die_addr+0x29/0x70
exc_general_protection+0x13c/0x348
exc_bounds+0x98/0x98
handle_exception+0x14d/0x14d
exc_bounds+0x98/0x98
restore_all_switch_stack+0xbe/0xcf
exc_bounds+0x98/0x98
restore_all_switch_stack+0xbe/0xcf
This only happens in 32-bit mode when VERW based mitigations like MDS/RFDS
are enabled. This is because segment registers with an arbitrary user value
can result in #GP when executing VERW. Intel SDM vol. 2C documents the
following behavior for VERW instruction:
#GP(0) - If a memory operand effective address is outside the CS, DS, ES,
FS, or GS segment limit.
CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS macro executes VERW instruction before returning to user
space. Use %cs selector to reference VERW operand. This ensures VERW will
not #GP for an arbitrary user %ds.
[ mingo: Fixed the SOB chain. ]
Fixes: a0e2dab44d22 ("x86/entry_32: Add VERW just before userspace transition")
Reported-by: Robert Gill <rtgill82@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10+
Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218707
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/8c77ccfd-d561-45a1-8ed5-6b75212c7a58@leemhuis.info/
Suggested-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Suggested-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
|
Define helper get_this_hybrid_cpu_native_id() to return the CPU core
native ID. This core native ID combining with core type can be used to
figure out the CPU core uarch uniquely.
Signed-off-by: Dapeng Mi <dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Yongwei Ma <yongwei.ma@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240820073853.1974746-3-dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com
|
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Pull kvm fixes from Paolo Bonzini:
"ARM64:
- Fix pKVM error path on init, making sure we do not change critical
system registers as we're about to fail
- Make sure that the host's vector length is at capped by a value
common to all CPUs
- Fix kvm_has_feat*() handling of "negative" features, as the current
code is pretty broken
- Promote Joey to the status of official reviewer, while James steps
down -- hopefully only temporarly
x86:
- Fix compilation with KVM_INTEL=KVM_AMD=n
- Fix disabling KVM_X86_QUIRK_SLOT_ZAP_ALL when shadow MMU is in use
Selftests:
- Fix compilation on non-x86 architectures"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm:
x86/reboot: emergency callbacks are now registered by common KVM code
KVM: x86: leave kvm.ko out of the build if no vendor module is requested
KVM: x86/mmu: fix KVM_X86_QUIRK_SLOT_ZAP_ALL for shadow MMU
KVM: arm64: Fix kvm_has_feat*() handling of negative features
KVM: selftests: Fix build on architectures other than x86_64
KVM: arm64: Another reviewer reshuffle
KVM: arm64: Constrain the host to the maximum shared SVE VL with pKVM
KVM: arm64: Fix __pkvm_init_vcpu cptr_el2 error path
|
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD
KVM/arm64 fixes for 6.12, take #1
- Fix pKVM error path on init, making sure we do not change critical
system registers as we're about to fail
- Make sure that the host's vector length is at capped by a value
common to all CPUs
- Fix kvm_has_feat*() handling of "negative" features, as the current
code is pretty broken
- Promote Joey to the status of official reviewer, while James steps
down -- hopefully only temporarly
|
|
Guard them with CONFIG_KVM_X86_COMMON rather than the two vendor modules.
In practice this has no functional change, because CONFIG_KVM_X86_COMMON
is set if and only if at least one vendor-specific module is being built.
However, it is cleaner to specify CONFIG_KVM_X86_COMMON for functions that
are used in kvm.ko.
Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Fixes: 590b09b1d88e ("KVM: x86: Register "emergency disable" callbacks when virt is enabled")
Fixes: 6d55a94222db ("x86/reboot: Unconditionally define cpu_emergency_virt_cb typedef")
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
In preparation for adding arm64 GCS support make the map_shadow_stack()
SHADOW_STACK_SET_TOKEN flag generic and add _SET_MARKER. The existing
flag indicates that a token usable for stack switch should be added to
the top of the newly mapped GCS region while the new flag indicates that
a top of stack marker suitable for use by unwinders should be added
above that.
For arm64 the top of stack marker is all bits 0.
Reviewed-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <thiago.bauermann@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Acked-by: Yury Khrustalev <yury.khrustalev@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241001-arm64-gcs-v13-5-222b78d87eee@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
|
|
<asm/ftrace.h> uses struct pt_regs in several places. Include
<asm/ptrace.h> to ensure it's visible. This is needed to make sure
object files that only include <asm/asm-prototypes.h> compile.
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20240916221557.846853-2-samitolvanen@google.com
Suggested-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
|
|
tick_nsec is only updated in the NTP core, but there are no users.
Remove it.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Anna-Maria Behnsen <anna-maria@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: John Stultz <jstultz@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240911-devel-anna-maria-b4-timers-ptp-ntp-v1-1-2d52f4e13476@linutronix.de
|
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The cpu_emergency_register_virt_callback() function is used
unconditionally by the x86 kvm code, but it is declared (and defined)
conditionally:
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_AMD)
void cpu_emergency_register_virt_callback(cpu_emergency_virt_cb *callback);
...
leading to a build error when neither KVM_INTEL nor KVM_AMD support is
enabled:
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c: In function ‘kvm_arch_enable_virtualization’:
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:12517:9: error: implicit declaration of function ‘cpu_emergency_register_virt_callback’ [-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
12517 | cpu_emergency_register_virt_callback(kvm_x86_ops.emergency_disable_virtualization_cpu);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c: In function ‘kvm_arch_disable_virtualization’:
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:12522:9: error: implicit declaration of function ‘cpu_emergency_unregister_virt_callback’ [-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
12522 | cpu_emergency_unregister_virt_callback(kvm_x86_ops.emergency_disable_virtualization_cpu);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Fix the build by defining empty helper functions the same way the old
cpu_emergency_disable_virtualization() function was dealt with for the
same situation.
Maybe we could instead have made the call sites conditional, since the
callers (kvm_arch_{en,dis}able_virtualization()) have an empty weak
fallback. I'll leave that to the kvm people to argue about, this at
least gets the build going for that particular config.
Fixes: 590b09b1d88e ("KVM: x86: Register "emergency disable" callbacks when virt is enabled")
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Cc: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Cc: Farrah Chen <farrah.chen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 fixes from Ingo Molnar:
"Fix TDX MMIO #VE fault handling, and add two new Intel model numbers
for 'Pantherlake' and 'Diamond Rapids'"
* tag 'x86-urgent-2024-09-29' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/cpu: Add two Intel CPU model numbers
x86/tdx: Fix "in-kernel MMIO" check
|
