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nested vmexit
Fixing nested_vmcb_check_save to avoid all TOC/TOU races
is a bit harder in released kernels, so do the bare minimum
by avoiding that EFER.SVME is cleared. This is problematic
because svm_set_efer frees the data structures for nested
virtualization if EFER.SVME is cleared.
Also check that EFER.SVME remains set after a nested vmexit;
clearing it could happen if the bit is zero in the save area
that is passed to KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE (the save area of the
nested state corresponds to the nested hypervisor's state
and is restored on the next nested vmexit).
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 2fcf4876ada ("KVM: nSVM: implement on demand allocation of the nested state")
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Avoid races between check and use of the nested VMCB controls. This
for example ensures that the VMRUN intercept is always reflected to the
nested hypervisor, instead of being processed by the host. Without this
patch, it is possible to end up with svm->nested.hsave pointing to
the MSR permission bitmap for nested guests.
This bug is CVE-2021-29657.
Reported-by: Felix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 2fcf4876ada ("KVM: nSVM: implement on demand allocation of the nested state")
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Use the vmcb12 control clean field to determine which vmcb12.save
registers were marked dirty in order to minimize register copies
when switching from L1 to L2. Those vmcb12 registers marked as dirty need
to be copied to L0's vmcb02 as they will be used to update the vmcb
state cache for the L2 VMRUN. In the case where we have a different
vmcb12 from the last L2 VMRUN all vmcb12.save registers must be
copied over to L2.save.
Tested:
kvm-unit-tests
kvm selftests
Fedora L1 L2
Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Cathy Avery <cavery@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210301200844.2000-1-cavery@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Newer AMD processors have a feature to virtualize the use of the
SPEC_CTRL MSR. Presence of this feature is indicated via CPUID
function 0x8000000A_EDX[20]: GuestSpecCtrl. Hypervisors are not
required to enable this feature since it is automatically enabled on
processors that support it.
A hypervisor may wish to impose speculation controls on guest
execution or a guest may want to impose its own speculation controls.
Therefore, the processor implements both host and guest
versions of SPEC_CTRL.
When in host mode, the host SPEC_CTRL value is in effect and writes
update only the host version of SPEC_CTRL. On a VMRUN, the processor
loads the guest version of SPEC_CTRL from the VMCB. When the guest
writes SPEC_CTRL, only the guest version is updated. On a VMEXIT,
the guest version is saved into the VMCB and the processor returns
to only using the host SPEC_CTRL for speculation control. The guest
SPEC_CTRL is located at offset 0x2E0 in the VMCB.
The effective SPEC_CTRL setting is the guest SPEC_CTRL setting or'ed
with the hypervisor SPEC_CTRL setting. This allows the hypervisor to
ensure a minimum SPEC_CTRL if desired.
This support also fixes an issue where a guest may sometimes see an
inconsistent value for the SPEC_CTRL MSR on processors that support
this feature. With the current SPEC_CTRL support, the first write to
SPEC_CTRL is intercepted and the virtualized version of the SPEC_CTRL
MSR is not updated. When the guest reads back the SPEC_CTRL MSR, it
will be 0x0, instead of the actual expected value. There isn’t a
security concern here, because the host SPEC_CTRL value is or’ed with
the Guest SPEC_CTRL value to generate the effective SPEC_CTRL value.
KVM writes with the guest's virtualized SPEC_CTRL value to SPEC_CTRL
MSR just before the VMRUN, so it will always have the actual value
even though it doesn’t appear that way in the guest. The guest will
only see the proper value for the SPEC_CTRL register if the guest was
to write to the SPEC_CTRL register again. With Virtual SPEC_CTRL
support, the save area spec_ctrl is properly saved and restored.
So, the guest will always see the proper value when it is read back.
Signed-off-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
Message-Id: <161188100955.28787.11816849358413330720.stgit@bmoger-ubuntu>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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This allows to avoid copying of these fields between vmcb01
and vmcb02 on nested guest entry/exit.
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Add a helper to consolidate boilerplate for nested VM-Exits that don't
provide any data in exit_info_*.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210302174515.2812275-3-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Synthesize a nested VM-Exit if L2 triggers an emulated triple fault
instead of exiting to userspace, which likely will kill L1. Any flow
that does KVM_REQ_TRIPLE_FAULT is suspect, but the most common scenario
for L2 killing L1 is if L0 (KVM) intercepts a contributory exception that
is _not_intercepted by L1. E.g. if KVM is intercepting #GPs for the
VMware backdoor, a #GP that occurs in L2 while vectoring an injected #DF
will cause KVM to emulate triple fault.
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210302174515.2812275-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Refactor the svm_exit_handlers API to pass @vcpu instead of @svm to
allow directly invoking common x86 exit handlers (in a future patch).
Opportunistically convert an absurd number of instances of 'svm->vcpu'
to direct uses of 'vcpu' to avoid pointless casting.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210205005750.3841462-4-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Use trace_kvm_nested_vmenter_failed() and its macro magic to trace
consistency check failures on nested VMRUN. Tracing such failures by
running the buggy VMM as a KVM guest is often the only way to get a
precise explanation of why VMRUN failed.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210204000117.3303214-13-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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The path for SVM_SET_NESTED_STATE needs to have the same checks for the CPU
registers, as we have in the VMRUN path for a nested guest. This patch adds
those missing checks to svm_set_nested_state().
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com>
Message-Id: <20201006190654.32305-3-krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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The VMLOAD/VMSAVE data is not taken from userspace, since it will
not be restored on VMEXIT (it will be copied from VMCB02 to VMCB01).
For clarity, replace the wholesale copy of the VMCB save area
with a copy of that state only.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Since L1 and L2 now use different VMCBs, most of the fields remain the
same in VMCB02 from one L2 run to the next. Since KVM itself is not
looking at VMCB12's clean field, for now not much can be optimized.
However, in the future we could avoid more copies if the VMCB12's SEG
and DT sections are clean.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Since L1 and L2 now use different VMCBs, most of the fields remain
the same from one L1 run to the next. svm_set_cr0 and other functions
called by nested_svm_vmexit already take care of clearing the
corresponding clean bits; only the TSC offset is special.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Most fields were going to be overwritten by vmcb12 control fields, or
do not matter at all because they are filled by the processor on vmexit.
Therefore, we need not copy them from vmcb01 to vmcb02 on vmentry.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Now that SVM is using a separate vmcb01 and vmcb02 (and also uses the vmcb12
naming) we can give clearer names to functions that write to and read
from those VMCBs. Likewise, variables and parameters can be renamed
from nested_vmcb to vmcb12.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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svm->vmcb will now point to a separate vmcb for L1 (not nested) or L2
(nested).
The main advantages are removing get_host_vmcb and hsave, in favor of
concepts that are shared with VMX.
We don't need anymore to stash the L1 registers in hsave while L2
runs, but we need to copy the VMLOAD/VMSAVE registers from VMCB01 to
VMCB02 and back. This more or less has the same cost, but code-wise
nested_svm_vmloadsave can be reused.
This patch omits several optimizations that are possible:
- for simplicity there is some wholesale copying of vmcb.control areas
which can go away.
- we should be able to better use the VMCB01 and VMCB02 clean bits.
- another possibility is to always use VMCB01 for VMLOAD and VMSAVE,
thus avoiding the copy of VMLOAD/VMSAVE registers from VMCB01 to
VMCB02 and back.
Tested:
kvm-unit-tests
kvm self tests
Loaded fedora nested guest on fedora
Signed-off-by: Cathy Avery <cavery@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20201011184818.3609-3-cavery@redhat.com>
[Fix conflicts; keep VMCB02 G_PAT up to date whenever guest writes the
PAT MSR; do not copy CR4 over from VMCB01 as it is not needed anymore; add
a few more comments. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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The new per-cpu stat 'nested_run' is introduced in order to track if L1 VM
is running or used to run L2 VM.
An example of the usage of 'nested_run' is to help the host administrator
to easily track if any L1 VM is used to run L2 VM. Suppose there is issue
that may happen with nested virtualization, the administrator will be able
to easily narrow down and confirm if the issue is due to nested
virtualization via 'nested_run'. For example, whether the fix like
commit 88dddc11a8d6 ("KVM: nVMX: do not use dangling shadow VMCS after
guest reset") is required.
Cc: Joe Jin <joe.jin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Dongli Zhang <dongli.zhang@oracle.com>
Message-Id: <20210305225747.7682-1-dongli.zhang@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Right now, enter_svm_guest_mode is calling nested_prepare_vmcb_save and
nested_prepare_vmcb_control. This results in is_guest_mode being false
until the end of nested_prepare_vmcb_control.
This is a problem because nested_prepare_vmcb_save can in turn cause
changes to the intercepts and these have to be applied to the "host VMCB"
(stored in svm->nested.hsave) and then merged with the VMCB12 intercepts
into svm->vmcb.
In particular, without this change we forget to set the CR0 read and CR0
write intercepts when running a real mode L2 guest with NPT disabled.
The guest is therefore able to see the CR0.PG bit that KVM sets to
enable "paged real mode". This patch fixes the svm.flat mode_switch
test case with npt=0. There are no other problematic calls in
nested_prepare_vmcb_save.
Moving is_guest_mode to the end is done since commit 06fc7772690d
("KVM: SVM: Activate nested state only when guest state is complete",
2010-04-25). However, back then KVM didn't grab a different VMCB
when updating the intercepts, it had already copied/merged L1's stuff
to L0's VMCB, and then updated L0's VMCB regardless of is_nested().
Later recalc_intercepts was introduced in commit 384c63684397
("KVM: SVM: Add function to recalculate intercept masks", 2011-01-12).
This introduced the bug, because recalc_intercepts now throws away
the intercept manipulations that svm_set_cr0 had done in the meanwhile
to svm->vmcb.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/1266493115-28386-1-git-send-email-joerg.roedel@amd.com/
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Tested-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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In case of npt=0 on host, nSVM needs the same .inject_page_fault tweak
as VMX has, to make sure that shadow mmu faults are injected as vmexits.
It is not clear why this is needed at all, but for now keep the same
code as VMX and we'll fix it for both.
Based on a patch by Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>.
Fixes: 7c86663b68ba ("KVM: nSVM: inject exceptions via svm_check_nested_events")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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This way trace will capture all the nested mode entries
(including entries after migration, and from smm)
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210217145718.1217358-3-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Rename cr3_lm_rsvd_bits to reserved_gpa_bits, and use it for all GPA
legality checks. AMD's APM states:
If the C-bit is an address bit, this bit is masked from the guest
physical address when it is translated through the nested page tables.
Thus, any access that can conceivably be run through NPT should ignore
the C-bit when checking for validity.
For features that KVM emulates in software, e.g. MTRRs, there is no
clear direction in the APM for how the C-bit should be handled. For
such cases, follow the SME behavior inasmuch as possible, since SEV is
is essentially a VM-specific variant of SME. For SME, the APM states:
In this case the upper physical address bits are treated as reserved
when the feature is enabled except where otherwise indicated.
Collecting the various relavant SME snippets in the APM and cross-
referencing the omissions with Linux kernel code, this leaves MTTRs and
APIC_BASE as the only flows that KVM emulates that should _not_ ignore
the C-bit.
Note, this means the reserved bit checks in the page tables are
technically broken. This will be remedied in a future patch.
Although the page table checks are technically broken, in practice, it's
all but guaranteed to be irrelevant. NPT is required for SEV, i.e.
shadowing page tables isn't needed in the common case. Theoretically,
the checks could be in play for nested NPT, but it's extremely unlikely
that anyone is running nested VMs on SEV, as doing so would require L1
to expose sensitive data to L0, e.g. the entire VMCB. And if anyone is
running nested VMs, L0 can't read the guest's encrypted memory, i.e. L1
would need to put its NPT in shared memory, in which case the C-bit will
never be set. Or, L1 could use shadow paging, but again, if L0 needs to
read page tables, e.g. to load PDPTRs, the memory can't be encrypted if
L1 has any expectation of L0 doing the right thing.
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210204000117.3303214-8-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Replace an open coded check for an invalid CR3 with its equivalent
helper.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210204000117.3303214-7-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Don't clear the SME C-bit when reading a guest PDPTR, as the GPA (CR3) is
in the guest domain.
Barring a bizarre paravirtual use case, this is likely a benign bug. SME
is not emulated by KVM, loading SEV guest PDPTRs is doomed as KVM can't
use the correct key to read guest memory, and setting guest MAXPHYADDR
higher than the host, i.e. overlapping the C-bit, would cause faults in
the guest.
Note, for SEV guests, stripping the C-bit is technically aligned with CPU
behavior, but for KVM it's the greater of two evils. Because KVM doesn't
have access to the guest's encryption key, ignoring the C-bit would at
best result in KVM reading garbage. By keeping the C-bit, KVM will
fail its read (unless userspace creates a memslot with the C-bit set).
The guest will still undoubtedly die, as KVM will use '0' for the PDPTR
value, but that's preferable to interpreting encrypted data as a PDPTR.
Fixes: d0ec49d4de90 ("kvm/x86/svm: Support Secure Memory Encryption within KVM")
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210204000117.3303214-3-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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DR6_INIT contains the 1-reserved bits as well as the bit that is cleared
to 0 when the condition (e.g. RTM) happens. The value can be used to
initialize dr6 and also be the XOR mask between the #DB exit
qualification (or payload) and DR6.
Concerning that DR6_INIT is used as initial value only once, rename it
to DR6_ACTIVE_LOW and apply it in other places, which would make the
incoming changes for bus lock debug exception more simple.
Signed-off-by: Chenyi Qiang <chenyi.qiang@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20210202090433.13441-2-chenyi.qiang@intel.com>
[Define DR6_FIXED_1 from DR6_ACTIVE_LOW and DR6_VOLATILE. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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If not in long mode, the low bits of CR3 are reserved but not enforced to
be zero, so remove those checks. If in long mode, however, the MBZ bits
extend down to the highest physical address bit of the guest, excluding
the encryption bit.
Make the checks consistent with the above, and match them between
nested_vmcb_checks and KVM_SET_SREGS.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 761e41693465 ("KVM: nSVM: Check that MBZ bits in CR3 and CR4 are not set on vmrun of nested guests")
Fixes: a780a3ea6282 ("KVM: X86: Fix reserved bits check for MOV to CR3")
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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VMX also uses KVM_REQ_GET_NESTED_STATE_PAGES for the Hyper-V eVMCS,
which may need to be loaded outside guest mode. Therefore we cannot
WARN in that case.
However, that part of nested_get_vmcs12_pages is _not_ needed at
vmentry time. Split it out of KVM_REQ_GET_NESTED_STATE_PAGES handling,
so that both vmentry and migration (and in the latter case, independent
of is_guest_mode) do the parts that are needed.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.10.x: f2c7ef3ba: KVM: nSVM: cancel KVM_REQ_GET_NESTED_STATE_PAGES
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.10.x
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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It is possible to exit the nested guest mode, entered by
svm_set_nested_state prior to first vm entry to it (e.g due to pending event)
if the nested run was not pending during the migration.
In this case we must not switch to the nested msr permission bitmap.
Also add a warning to catch similar cases in the future.
Fixes: a7d5c7ce41ac1 ("KVM: nSVM: delay MSR permission processing to first nested VM run")
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210107093854.882483-2-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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We overwrite most of vmcb fields while doing so, so we must
mark it as dirty.
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210107093854.882483-5-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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The code to store it on the migration exists, but no code was restoring it.
One of the side effects of fixing this is that L1->L2 injected events
are no longer lost when migration happens with nested run pending.
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210107093854.882483-3-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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SVM generally ignores fixed-1 bits. Set them manually so that we
do not end up by mistake without those bits set in struct kvm_vcpu;
it is part of userspace API that KVM always returns value with the
bits set.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Rework the common CR4 and SREGS checks to return a bool instead of an
int, i.e. true/false instead of 0/-EINVAL, and add "is" to the name to
clarify the polarity of the return value (which is effectively inverted
by this change).
No functional changed intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20201007014417.29276-6-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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This way we don't waste memory on VMs which don't use nesting
virtualization even when the host enabled it for them.
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20201001112954.6258-5-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Allow userspace to set up the memory map after KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE;
to do so, move the call to nested_svm_vmrun_msrpm inside the
KVM_REQ_GET_NESTED_STATE_PAGES handler (which is currently
not used by nSVM). This is similar to what VMX does already.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Commit 761e4169346553c180bbd4a383aedd72f905bc9a created a wrong mask for the
CR3 MBZ bits. According to APM vol 2, only the upper 12 bits are MBZ.
Fixes: 761e41693465 ("KVM: nSVM: Check that MBZ bits in CR3 and CR4 are not set on vmrun of nested guests", 2020-07-08)
Signed-off-by: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com>
Message-Id: <20200829004824.4577-2-krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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The new intercept bits have been added in vmcb control area to support
few more interceptions. Here are the some of them.
- INTERCEPT_INVLPGB,
- INTERCEPT_INVLPGB_ILLEGAL,
- INTERCEPT_INVPCID,
- INTERCEPT_MCOMMIT,
- INTERCEPT_TLBSYNC,
Add a new intercept word in vmcb_control_area to support these instructions.
Also update kvm_nested_vmrun trace function to support the new addition.
AMD documentation for these instructions is available at "AMD64
Architecture Programmer’s Manual Volume 2: System Programming, Pub. 24593
Rev. 3.34(or later)"
The documentation can be obtained at the links below:
Link: https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/24593.pdf
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206537
Signed-off-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Message-Id: <159985251547.11252.16994139329949066945.stgit@bmoger-ubuntu>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Convert all the intercepts to one array of 32 bit vectors in
vmcb_control_area. This makes it easy for future intercept vector
additions. Also update trace functions.
Signed-off-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Message-Id: <159985250813.11252.5736581193881040525.stgit@bmoger-ubuntu>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Modify intercept_exceptions to generic intercepts in vmcb_control_area. Use
the generic vmcb_set_intercept, vmcb_clr_intercept and vmcb_is_intercept to
set/clear/test the intercept_exceptions bits.
Signed-off-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Message-Id: <159985250037.11252.1361972528657052410.stgit@bmoger-ubuntu>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Modify intercept_dr to generic intercepts in vmcb_control_area. Use
the generic vmcb_set_intercept, vmcb_clr_intercept and vmcb_is_intercept
to set/clear/test the intercept_dr bits.
Signed-off-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Message-Id: <159985249255.11252.10000868032136333355.stgit@bmoger-ubuntu>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Change intercept_cr to generic intercepts in vmcb_control_area.
Use the new vmcb_set_intercept, vmcb_clr_intercept and vmcb_is_intercept
where applicable.
Signed-off-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Message-Id: <159985248506.11252.9081085950784508671.stgit@bmoger-ubuntu>
[Change constant names. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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This is in preparation for the future intercept vector additions.
Add new functions vmcb_set_intercept, vmcb_clr_intercept and vmcb_is_intercept
using kernel APIs __set_bit, __clear_bit and test_bit espectively.
Signed-off-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Message-Id: <159985247876.11252.16039238014239824460.stgit@bmoger-ubuntu>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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host_intercept_exceptions is not used anywhere. Clean it up.
Signed-off-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Message-Id: <159985252277.11252.8819848322175521354.stgit@bmoger-ubuntu>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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This is to be more consistient with VMX, and to support
upcoming addition of vmcb02
Hopefully no functional changes.
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200827171145.374620-3-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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The save and ctl pointers are passed uninitialized to kfree() when
svm_set_nested_state() follows the 'goto out_set_gif' path. While the
issue could've been fixed by initializing these on-stack varialbles to
NULL, it seems preferable to eliminate 'out_set_gif' label completely as
it is not actually a failure path and duplicating a single svm_set_gif()
call doesn't look too bad.
[ bp: Drop obscure Addresses-Coverity: tag. ]
Fixes: 6ccbd29ade0d ("KVM: SVM: nested: Don't allocate VMCB structures on stack")
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reported-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Reported-by: Colin King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Acked-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200914133725.650221-1-vkuznets@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip into HEAD
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This code was missing and was forcing the L2 run with L1's msr
permission bitmap
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200827162720.278690-3-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Currently code in svm_set_nested_state copies the current vmcb control
area to L1 control area (hsave->control), under assumption that
it mostly reflects the defaults that kvm choose, and later qemu
overrides these defaults with L2 state using standard KVM interfaces,
like KVM_SET_REGS.
However nested GIF (which is AMD specific thing) is by default is true,
and it is copied to hsave area as such.
This alone is not a big deal since on VMexit, GIF is always set to false,
regardless of what it was on VM entry. However in nested_svm_vmexit we
were first were setting GIF to false, but then we overwrite the control
fields with value from the hsave area. (including the nested GIF field
itself if GIF virtualization is enabled).
Now on normal vm entry this is not a problem, since GIF is usually false
prior to normal vm entry, and this is the value that copied to hsave,
and then restored, but this is not always the case when the nested state
is loaded as explained above.
To fix this issue, move svm_set_gif after we restore the L1 control
state in nested_svm_vmexit, so that even with wrong GIF in the
saved L1 control area, we still clear GIF as the spec says.
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200827162720.278690-2-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Do not allocate a vmcb_control_area and a vmcb_save_area on the stack,
as these structures will become larger with future extenstions of
SVM and thus the svm_set_nested_state() function will become a too large
stack frame.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200907131613.12703-2-joro@8bytes.org
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Move the initialization of shadow NPT MMU's shadow_root_level into
kvm_init_shadow_npt_mmu() and explicitly set the level in the shadow NPT
MMU's role to be the TDP level. This ensures the role and MMU levels
are synchronized and also initialized before __kvm_mmu_new_pgd(), which
consumes the level when attempting a fast PGD switch.
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Fixes: 9fa72119b24db ("kvm: x86: Introduce kvm_mmu_calc_root_page_role()")
Fixes: a506fdd223426 ("KVM: nSVM: implement nested_svm_load_cr3() and use it for host->guest switch")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20200716034122.5998-2-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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