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In old days, the "host-progs" syntax was used for specifying host
programs. It was renamed to the current "hostprogs-y" in 2004.
It is typically useful in scripts/Makefile because it allows Kbuild to
selectively compile host programs based on the kernel configuration.
This commit renames like follows:
always -> always-y
hostprogs-y -> hostprogs
So, scripts/Makefile will look like this:
always-$(CONFIG_BUILD_BIN2C) += ...
always-$(CONFIG_KALLSYMS) += ...
...
hostprogs := $(always-y) $(always-m)
I think this makes more sense because a host program is always a host
program, irrespective of the kernel configuration. We want to specify
which ones to compile by CONFIG options, so always-y will be handier.
The "always", "hostprogs-y", "hostprogs-m" will be kept for backward
compatibility for a while.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
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I noticed that randconfig builds with gcc no longer produce a lot of
ccache hits, unlike with clang, and traced this back to plugins
now being enabled unconditionally if they are supported.
I am now working around this by adding
export CCACHE_COMPILERCHECK=/usr/bin/size -A %compiler%
to my top-level Makefile. This changes the heuristic that ccache uses
to determine whether the plugins are the same after a 'make clean'.
However, it also seems that being able to just turn off the plugins is
generally useful, at least for build testing it adds noticeable overhead
but does not find a lot of bugs additional bugs, and may be easier for
ccache users than my workaround.
Fixes: 9f671e58159a ("security: Create "kernel hardening" config area")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191211133951.401933-1-arnd@arndb.de
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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While no uses in the kernel triggered this case, it was possible to have
a false negative where a struct contains other structs which contain only
function pointers because of unreachable code in is_pure_ops_struct().
Signed-off-by: Joonwon Kang <kjw1627@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190727155841.GA13586@host
Fixes: 313dd1b62921 ("gcc-plugins: Add the randstruct plugin")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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The gcc_plugins.txt file is already a ReST file. Move it
to the core-api book while renaming it.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull gcc-plugins fix from Kees Cook:
"Handle unusual header environment, fixing a redefined macro error
under a Darwin build host"
* tag 'gcc-plugins-v5.2-rc3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
gcc-plugins: Fix build failures under Darwin host
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Add SPDX license identifiers to all Make/Kconfig files which:
- Have no license information of any form
These files fall under the project license, GPL v2 only. The resulting SPDX
license identifier is:
GPL-2.0-only
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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The gcc-common.h file did not take into account certain macros that
might have already been defined in the build environment. This updates
the header to avoid redefining the macros, as seen on a Darwin host
using gcc 4.9.2:
HOSTCXX -fPIC scripts/gcc-plugins/arm_ssp_per_task_plugin.o - due to: scripts/gcc-plugins/gcc-common.h
In file included from scripts/gcc-plugins/arm_ssp_per_task_plugin.c:3:0:
scripts/gcc-plugins/gcc-common.h:153:0: warning: "__unused" redefined
^
In file included from /usr/include/stdio.h:64:0,
from /Users/hns/Documents/Projects/QuantumSTEP/System/Library/Frameworks/System.framework/Versions-jessie/x86_64-apple-darwin15.0.0/gcc/arm-linux-gnueabi/bin/../lib/gcc/arm-linux-gnueabi/4.9.2/plugin/include/system.h:40,
from /Users/hns/Documents/Projects/QuantumSTEP/System/Library/Frameworks/System.framework/Versions-jessie/x86_64-apple-darwin15.0.0/gcc/arm-linux-gnueabi/bin/../lib/gcc/arm-linux-gnueabi/4.9.2/plugin/include/gcc-plugin.h:28,
from /Users/hns/Documents/Projects/QuantumSTEP/System/Library/Frameworks/System.framework/Versions-jessie/x86_64-apple-darwin15.0.0/gcc/arm-linux-gnueabi/bin/../lib/gcc/arm-linux-gnueabi/4.9.2/plugin/include/plugin.h:23,
from scripts/gcc-plugins/gcc-common.h:9,
from scripts/gcc-plugins/arm_ssp_per_task_plugin.c:3:
/usr/include/sys/cdefs.h:161:0: note: this is the location of the previous definition
^
Reported-and-tested-by: "H. Nikolaus Schaller" <hns@goldelico.com>
Fixes: 189af4657186 ("ARM: smp: add support for per-task stack canaries")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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ssh://gitolite.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull gcc plugin fix from Kees Cook:
"Fix ARM stack-protector-per-task plugin build for older GCC < 6 (Chris
Packham)"
* tag 'gcc-plugins-v5.2-rc1' of ssh://gitolite.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
gcc-plugins: arm_ssp_per_task_plugin: Fix for older GCC < 6
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Use gen_rtx_set instead of gen_rtx_SET. The former is a wrapper macro
that handles the difference between GCC versions implementing
the latter.
This fixes the following error on my system with g++ 5.4.0 as the host
compiler
HOSTCXX -fPIC scripts/gcc-plugins/arm_ssp_per_task_plugin.o
scripts/gcc-plugins/arm_ssp_per_task_plugin.c:42:14: error: macro "gen_rtx_SET" requires 3 arguments, but only 2 given
mask)),
^
scripts/gcc-plugins/arm_ssp_per_task_plugin.c: In function ‘unsigned int arm_pertask_ssp_rtl_execute()’:
scripts/gcc-plugins/arm_ssp_per_task_plugin.c:39:20: error: ‘gen_rtx_SET’ was not declared in this scope
emit_insn_before(gen_rtx_SET
Signed-off-by: Chris Packham <chris.packham@alliedtelesis.co.nz>
Fixes: 189af4657186 ("ARM: smp: add support for per-task stack canaries")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Tested-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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This moves the stackleak plugin options to Kconfig.hardening's memory
initialization menu.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Acked-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
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Right now kernel hardening options are scattered around various Kconfig
files. This can be a central place to collect these kinds of options
going forward. This is initially populated with the memory initialization
options from the gcc-plugins.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull gcc-plugins updates from Kees Cook:
"This adds additional type coverage to the existing structleak plugin
and adds a large set of selftests to help evaluate stack variable
zero-initialization coverage.
That can be used to test whatever instrumentation might be performing
zero-initialization: either with the structleak plugin or with Clang's
coming "-ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero" option.
Summary:
- Add scalar and array initialization coverage
- Refactor Kconfig to make options more clear
- Add self-test module for testing automatic initialization"
* tag 'gcc-plugins-v5.1-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
lib: Introduce test_stackinit module
gcc-plugins: structleak: Generalize to all variable types
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Use after scope bugs detector seems to be almost entirely useless for
the linux kernel. It exists over two years, but I've seen only one
valid bug so far [1]. And the bug was fixed before it has been
reported. There were some other use-after-scope reports, but they were
false-positives due to different reasons like incompatibility with
structleak plugin.
This feature significantly increases stack usage, especially with GCC <
9 version, and causes a 32K stack overflow. It probably adds
performance penalty too.
Given all that, let's remove use-after-scope detector entirely.
While preparing this patch I've noticed that we mistakenly enable
use-after-scope detection for clang compiler regardless of
CONFIG_KASAN_EXTRA setting. This is also fixed now.
[1] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<20171129052106.rhgbjhhis53hkgfn@wfg-t540p.sh.intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190111185842.13978-1-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> [arm64]
Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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This adjusts structleak to also work with non-struct types when they
are passed by reference, since those variables may leak just like
anything else. This is exposed via an improved set of Kconfig options.
(This does mean structleak is slightly misnamed now.)
Building with CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL should give the
kernel complete initialization coverage of all stack variables passed
by reference, including padding (see lib/test_stackinit.c).
Using CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_VERBOSE to count added initializations
under defconfig:
..._BYREF: 5945 added initializations
..._BYREF_ALL: 16606 added initializations
There is virtually no change to text+data size (both have less than 0.05%
growth):
text data bss dec hex filename
19502103 5051456 1917000 26470559 193e89f vmlinux.stock
19513412 5051456 1908808 26473676 193f4cc vmlinux.byref
19516974 5047360 1900616 26464950 193d2b6 vmlinux.byref_all
The measured performance difference is in the noise for hackbench and
kernel build benchmarks:
Stock:
5x hackbench -g 20 -l 1000
Mean: 10.649s
Std Dev: 0.339
5x kernel build (4-way parallel)
Mean: 261.98s
Std Dev: 1.53
CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF:
5x hackbench -g 20 -l 1000
Mean: 10.540s
Std Dev: 0.233
5x kernel build (4-way parallel)
Mean: 260.52s
Std Dev: 1.31
CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL:
5x hackbench -g 20 -l 1000
Mean: 10.320
Std Dev: 0.413
5x kernel build (4-way parallel)
Mean: 260.10
Std Dev: 0.86
This does not yet solve missing padding initialization for structures
on the stack that are never passed by reference (which should be a tiny
minority). Hopefully this will be more easily addressed by upstream
compiler fixes after clarifying the C11 padding initialization
specification.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
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GCC 9 reworks the way the references to the stack canary are
emitted, to prevent the value from being spilled to the stack
before the final comparison in the epilogue, defeating the
purpose, given that the spill slot is under control of the
attacker that we are protecting ourselves from.
Since our canary value address is obtained without accessing
memory (as opposed to pre-v7 code that will obtain it from a
literal pool), it is unlikely (although not guaranteed) that
the compiler will spill the canary value in the same way, so
let's just disable this improvement when building with GCC9+.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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The ARM per-task stack protector GCC plugin hits an assert in
the compiler in some case, due to the fact the the SP mask
expression is not sign-extended as it should be. So fix that.
Suggested-by: Kugan Vivekanandarajah <kugan.vivekanandarajah@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull gcc-plugins update from Kees Cook:
"Both arm and arm64 are gaining per-task stack canaries (to match x86),
but arm is being done with a gcc plugin, hence it going through the
gcc-plugins tree.
New gcc-plugin:
- Enable per-task stack protector for ARM (Ard Biesheuvel)"
* tag 'gcc-plugins-v4.21-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
ARM: smp: add support for per-task stack canaries
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On ARM, we currently only change the value of the stack canary when
switching tasks if the kernel was built for UP. On SMP kernels, this
is impossible since the stack canary value is obtained via a global
symbol reference, which means
a) all running tasks on all CPUs must use the same value
b) we can only modify the value when no kernel stack frames are live
on any CPU, which is effectively never.
So instead, use a GCC plugin to add a RTL pass that replaces each
reference to the address of the __stack_chk_guard symbol with an
expression that produces the address of the 'stack_canary' field
that is added to struct thread_info. This way, each task will use
its own randomized value.
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Acked-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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Currently the 'stackleak_cleanup' pass deleting a CALL insn is executed
after the 'reload' pass. That allows gcc to do some weird optimization in
function prologues and epilogues, which are generated later [1].
Let's avoid that by registering the 'stackleak_cleanup' pass before
the '*free_cfg' pass. It's the moment when the stack frame size is
already final, function prologues and epilogues are generated, and the
machine-dependent code transformations are not done.
[1] https://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2018/11/23/2
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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Introduce CONFIG_STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE option, which provides
'stack_erasing' sysctl. It can be used in runtime to control kernel
stack erasing for kernels built with CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK.
Suggested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Tested-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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Introduce CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS providing STACKLEAK information about
tasks via the /proc file system. In particular, /proc/<pid>/stack_depth
shows the maximum kernel stack consumption for the current and previous
syscalls. Although this information is not precise, it can be useful for
estimating the STACKLEAK performance impact for your workloads.
Suggested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Tested-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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The STACKLEAK feature erases the kernel stack before returning from
syscalls. That reduces the information which kernel stack leak bugs can
reveal and blocks some uninitialized stack variable attacks.
This commit introduces the STACKLEAK gcc plugin. It is needed for
tracking the lowest border of the kernel stack, which is important
for the code erasing the used part of the kernel stack at the end
of syscalls (comes in a separate commit).
The STACKLEAK feature is ported from grsecurity/PaX. More information at:
https://grsecurity.net/
https://pax.grsecurity.net/
This code is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's code in the last
public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on our understanding of the code.
Changes or omissions from the original code are ours and don't reflect
the original grsecurity/PaX code.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Tested-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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The STACKLEAK feature (initially developed by PaX Team) has the following
benefits:
1. Reduces the information that can be revealed through kernel stack leak
bugs. The idea of erasing the thread stack at the end of syscalls is
similar to CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING and memzero_explicit() in kernel
crypto, which all comply with FDP_RIP.2 (Full Residual Information
Protection) of the Common Criteria standard.
2. Blocks some uninitialized stack variable attacks (e.g. CVE-2017-17712,
CVE-2010-2963). That kind of bugs should be killed by improving C
compilers in future, which might take a long time.
This commit introduces the code filling the used part of the kernel
stack with a poison value before returning to userspace. Full
STACKLEAK feature also contains the gcc plugin which comes in a
separate commit.
The STACKLEAK feature is ported from grsecurity/PaX. More information at:
https://grsecurity.net/
https://pax.grsecurity.net/
This code is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's code in the last
public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on our understanding of the code.
Changes or omissions from the original code are ours and don't reflect
the original grsecurity/PaX code.
Performance impact:
Hardware: Intel Core i7-4770, 16 GB RAM
Test #1: building the Linux kernel on a single core
0.91% slowdown
Test #2: hackbench -s 4096 -l 2000 -g 15 -f 25 -P
4.2% slowdown
So the STACKLEAK description in Kconfig includes: "The tradeoff is the
performance impact: on a single CPU system kernel compilation sees a 1%
slowdown, other systems and workloads may vary and you are advised to
test this feature on your expected workload before deploying it".
Signed-off-by: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull gcc plugin fix from Kees Cook:
"Lift gcc test into Kconfig. This is for better behavior when the
kernel is built with Clang, reported by Stefan Agner"
* tag 'gcc-plugins-v4.19-rc1-fix' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
gcc-plugins: Disable when building under Clang
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Prior to doing compiler feature detection in Kconfig, attempts to build
GCC plugins with Clang would fail the build, much in the same way missing
GCC plugin headers would fail the build. However, now that this logic
has been lifted into Kconfig, add an explicit test for GCC (instead of
duplicating it in the feature-test script).
Reported-by: Stefan Agner <stefan@agner.ch>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
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Drop useless redefinitions of cgraph_create_edge* macros. Drop the unused
nest argument. Also support gcc-8, which doesn't have freq argument.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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Collect relevant code into the scripts/gcc-plugins directory.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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GCC_PLUGIN_SUBDIR has never been used. If you really need this in
the future, please re-add it then.
For now, the code is unused. Remove.
'export HOSTLIBS' is not necessary either.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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Run scripts/gcc-plugin.sh from Kconfig so that users can enable
GCC_PLUGINS only when the compiler supports building plugins.
Kconfig defines a new symbol, PLUGIN_HOSTCC. This will contain
the compiler (g++ or gcc) used for building plugins, or empty
if the plugin can not be supported at all.
This allows us to remove all ugly testing in Makefile.gcc-plugins.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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As Documentation/kbuild/kconfig-language.txt notes, 'select' should be
be used with care - it forces a lower limit of another symbol, ignoring
the dependency. Currently, KCOV can select GCC_PLUGINS even if arch
does not select HAVE_GCC_PLUGINS. This could cause the unmet direct
dependency.
Now that Kconfig can test compiler capability, let's handle this in a
more sophisticated way.
There are two ways to enable KCOV; use the compiler that natively
supports -fsanitize-coverage=trace-pc, or build the SANCOV plugin if
the compiler has ability to build GCC plugins. Hence, the correct
dependency for KCOV is:
depends on CC_HAS_SANCOV_TRACE_PC || GCC_PLUGINS
You do not need to build the SANCOV plugin if the compiler already
supports -fsanitize-coverage=trace-pc. Hence, the select should be:
select GCC_PLUGIN_SANCOV if !CC_HAS_SANCOV_TRACE_PC
With this, GCC_PLUGIN_SANCOV is selected only when necessary, so
scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins can be cleaner.
I also cleaned up Kconfig and scripts/Makefile.kcov as well.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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This changes security_hook_heads to use hlist_heads instead of
the circular doubly-linked list heads. This should cut down
the size of the struct by about half.
In addition, it allows mutation of the hooks at the tail of the
callback list without having to modify the head. The longer-term
purpose of this is to enable making the heads read only.
Signed-off-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reviewed-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
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GCC 8 changed the order of some fields and is very picky about ordering
in static initializers, so instead just move to dynamic initializers,
and drop the redundant already-zero field assignments.
Suggested-by: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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GCC requires another #include to get the gcc-plugins to build cleanly.
Signed-off-by: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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In the Linux kernel, struct type variables are rarely passed by-value,
and so functions that initialize such variables typically take an input
reference to the variable rather than returning a value that can
subsequently be used in an assignment.
If the initalization function is not part of the same compilation unit,
the lack of an assignment operation defeats any analysis the compiler
can perform as to whether the variable may be used before having been
initialized. This means we may end up passing on such variables
uninitialized, resulting in potential information leaks.
So extend the existing structleak GCC plugin so it will [optionally]
apply to all struct type variables that have their address taken at any
point, rather than only to variables of struct types that have a __user
annotation.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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This enables the automatic structure selection logic in the randstruct
GCC plugin. The selection logic randomizes all structures that contain
only function pointers, unless marked with __no_randomize_layout.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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The NIU ethernet driver intentionally stores a page struct pointer on
top of the "mapping" field. Whitelist this case:
drivers/net/ethernet/sun/niu.c: In function ‘niu_rx_pkt_ignore’:
drivers/net/ethernet/sun/niu.c:3402:10: note: found mismatched ssa struct pointer types: ‘struct page’ and ‘struct address_space’
*link = (struct page *) page->mapping;
~~~~~~^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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The big_key payload structure intentionally stores a struct path in
two void pointers to avoid header soup. Whitelist this case:
security/keys/big_key.c: In function ‘big_key_read’:
security/keys/big_key.c:293:16: note: found mismatched rhs struct pointer types: ‘struct path’ and ‘void *’
struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data[big_key_path];
^~~~
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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This is another false positive in bad cast detection:
net/unix/af_unix.c: In function ‘unix_skb_scm_eq’:
net/unix/af_unix.c:1621:31: note: found mismatched rhs struct pointer types: ‘struct unix_skb_parms’ and ‘char’
const struct unix_skb_parms *u = &UNIXCB(skb);
^
UNIXCB is:
#define UNIXCB(skb) (*(struct unix_skb_parms *)&((skb)->cb))
And ->cb is:
char cb[48] __aligned(8);
This is a rather crazy cast, but appears to be safe in the face of
randomization, so whitelist it in the plugin.
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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The LSM initialization routines walk security_hook_heads as an array
of struct list_head instead of via names to avoid a ton of needless
source. Whitelist this to avoid the false positive warning from the
plugin:
security/security.c: In function ‘security_init’:
security/security.c:59:20: note: found mismatched op0 struct pointer types: ‘struct list_head’ and ‘struct security_hook_heads’
struct list_head *list = (struct list_head *) &security_hook_heads;
^
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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This randstruct plugin is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's code
in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding
of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and
don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.
The randstruct GCC plugin randomizes the layout of selected structures
at compile time, as a probabilistic defense against attacks that need to
know the layout of structures within the kernel. This is most useful for
"in-house" kernel builds where neither the randomization seed nor other
build artifacts are made available to an attacker. While less useful for
distribution kernels (where the randomization seed must be exposed for
third party kernel module builds), it still has some value there since now
all kernel builds would need to be tracked by an attacker.
In more performance sensitive scenarios, GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE
can be selected to make a best effort to restrict randomization to
cacheline-sized groups of elements, and will not randomize bitfields. This
comes at the cost of reduced randomization.
Two annotations are defined,__randomize_layout and __no_randomize_layout,
which respectively tell the plugin to either randomize or not to
randomize instances of the struct in question. Follow-on patches enable
the auto-detection logic for selecting structures for randomization
that contain only function pointers. It is disabled here to assist with
bisection.
Since any randomized structs must be initialized using designated
initializers, __randomize_layout includes the __designated_init annotation
even when the plugin is disabled so that all builds will require
the needed initialization. (With the plugin enabled, annotations for
automatically chosen structures are marked as well.)
The main differences between this implemenation and grsecurity are:
- disable automatic struct selection (to be enabled in follow-up patch)
- add designated_init attribute at runtime and for manual marking
- clarify debugging output to differentiate bad cast warnings
- add whitelisting infrastructure
- support gcc 7's DECL_ALIGN and DECL_MODE changes (Laura Abbott)
- raise minimum required GCC version to 4.7
Earlier versions of this patch series were ported by Michael Leibowitz.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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The c-common.h file moved in stock gcc 4.7, not gcc 4.6. However, most
people building plugins with gcc 4.6 are using the Debian or Ubuntu
version, which includes a patch to move the headers to the 4.7 location.
In case anyone trips over this with a stock gcc 4.6, add a pointer to the
patch used by Debian/Ubuntu.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull gcc-plugins fix from Kees Cook:
"Fixes a typo in sancov plugin, exposed in earlier compiler versions"
* tag 'gcc-plugins-v4.11-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
gcc-plugins: fix sancov_plugin for gcc-5
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The name of the local variable was inadvertantly changed from
sancov_plugin_pass_info to sancov_pass_info:
scripts/gcc-plugins/sancov_plugin.c: In function ‘int plugin_init(plugin_name_args*, plugin_gcc_version*)’:
scripts/gcc-plugins/sancov_plugin.c:136:67: error: ‘sancov_plugin_pass_info’ was not declared in this scope
This changes the conditional reference to this variable as well.
Fixes: 5a45a4c5c3f5 ("gcc-plugins: consolidate on PASS_INFO macro")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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This plugin detects any structures that contain __user attributes and
makes sure it is being fully initialized so that a specific class of
information exposure is eliminated. (This plugin was originally designed
to block the exposure of siginfo in CVE-2013-2141.)
Ported from grsecurity/PaX. This version adds a verbose option to the
plugin and the Kconfig.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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Now that PASS_INFO() exists, use it in the other existing gcc plugins,
instead of always open coding the same thing.
Based on updates to the grsecurity/PaX gcc plugins.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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This updates the GCC plugins gcc-common.h from PaX Team to include
more helpers and header files, specifically adds the PASS_INFO()
macro to make plugin declarations nicer and a helper for proper
const string building.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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This updates gcc-common.h from Emese Revfy for gcc 7. This fixes issues seen
by Kugan and Arnd. Build tested with gcc 5.4 and 7 snapshot.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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