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2024-07-24sysctl: treewide: constify the ctl_table argument of proc_handlersJoel Granados
const qualify the struct ctl_table argument in the proc_handler function signatures. This is a prerequisite to moving the static ctl_table structs into .rodata data which will ensure that proc_handler function pointers cannot be modified. This patch has been generated by the following coccinelle script: ``` virtual patch @r1@ identifier ctl, write, buffer, lenp, ppos; identifier func !~ "appldata_(timer|interval)_handler|sched_(rt|rr)_handler|rds_tcp_skbuf_handler|proc_sctp_do_(hmac_alg|rto_min|rto_max|udp_port|alpha_beta|auth|probe_interval)"; @@ int func( - struct ctl_table *ctl + const struct ctl_table *ctl ,int write, void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos); @r2@ identifier func, ctl, write, buffer, lenp, ppos; @@ int func( - struct ctl_table *ctl + const struct ctl_table *ctl ,int write, void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) { ... } @r3@ identifier func; @@ int func( - struct ctl_table * + const struct ctl_table * ,int , void *, size_t *, loff_t *); @r4@ identifier func, ctl; @@ int func( - struct ctl_table *ctl + const struct ctl_table *ctl ,int , void *, size_t *, loff_t *); @r5@ identifier func, write, buffer, lenp, ppos; @@ int func( - struct ctl_table * + const struct ctl_table * ,int write, void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos); ``` * Code formatting was adjusted in xfs_sysctl.c to comply with code conventions. The xfs_stats_clear_proc_handler, xfs_panic_mask_proc_handler and xfs_deprecated_dointvec_minmax where adjusted. * The ctl_table argument in proc_watchdog_common was const qualified. This is called from a proc_handler itself and is calling back into another proc_handler, making it necessary to change it as part of the proc_handler migration. Co-developed-by: Thomas Weißschuh <linux@weissschuh.net> Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <linux@weissschuh.net> Co-developed-by: Joel Granados <j.granados@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Joel Granados <j.granados@samsung.com>
2020-04-27sysctl: pass kernel pointers to ->proc_handlerChristoph Hellwig
Instead of having all the sysctl handlers deal with user pointers, which is rather hairy in terms of the BPF interaction, copy the input to and from userspace in common code. This also means that the strings are always NUL-terminated by the common code, making the API a little bit safer. As most handler just pass through the data to one of the common handlers a lot of the changes are mechnical. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Acked-by: Andrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2017-11-02License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no licenseGreg Kroah-Hartman
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2010-05-14mmap_min_addr check CAP_SYS_RAWIO only for writeKees Cook
Redirecting directly to lsm, here's the patch discussed on lkml: http://lkml.org/lkml/2010/4/22/219 The mmap_min_addr value is useful information for an admin to see without being root ("is my system vulnerable to kernel NULL pointer attacks?") and its setting is trivially easy for an attacker to determine by calling mmap() in PAGE_SIZE increments starting at 0, so trying to keep it private has no value. Only require CAP_SYS_RAWIO if changing the value, not reading it. Comment from Serge : Me, I like to write my passwords with light blue pen on dark blue paper, pasted on my window - if you're going to get my password, you're gonna get a headache. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> (cherry picked from commit 822cceec7248013821d655545ea45d1c6a9d15b3)
2009-12-17security/min_addr.c: make init_mmap_min_addr() staticH Hartley Sweeten
init_mmap_min_addr() is a pure_initcall and should be static. Signed-off-by: H Hartley Sweeten <hsweeten@visionengravers.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-11-09sysctl: require CAP_SYS_RAWIO to set mmap_min_addrKees Cook
Currently the mmap_min_addr value can only be bypassed during mmap when the task has CAP_SYS_RAWIO. However, the mmap_min_addr sysctl value itself can be adjusted to 0 if euid == 0, allowing a bypass without CAP_SYS_RAWIO. This patch adds a check for the capability before allowing mmap_min_addr to be changed. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-24sysctl: remove "struct file *" argument of ->proc_handlerAlexey Dobriyan
It's unused. It isn't needed -- read or write flag is already passed and sysctl shouldn't care about the rest. It _was_ used in two places at arch/frv for some reason. Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-08-17Security/SELinux: seperate lsm specific mmap_min_addrEric Paris
Currently SELinux enforcement of controls on the ability to map low memory is determined by the mmap_min_addr tunable. This patch causes SELinux to ignore the tunable and instead use a seperate Kconfig option specific to how much space the LSM should protect. The tunable will now only control the need for CAP_SYS_RAWIO and SELinux permissions will always protect the amount of low memory designated by CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR. This allows users who need to disable the mmap_min_addr controls (usual reason being they run WINE as a non-root user) to do so and still have SELinux controls preventing confined domains (like a web server) from being able to map some area of low memory. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>