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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull fourth vfs update from Al Viro:
"d_inode() annotations from David Howells (sat in for-next since before
the beginning of merge window) + four assorted fixes"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
RCU pathwalk breakage when running into a symlink overmounting something
fix I_DIO_WAKEUP definition
direct-io: only inc/dec inode->i_dio_count for file systems
fs/9p: fix readdir()
VFS: assorted d_backing_inode() annotations
VFS: fs/inode.c helpers: d_inode() annotations
VFS: fs/cachefiles: d_backing_inode() annotations
VFS: fs library helpers: d_inode() annotations
VFS: assorted weird filesystems: d_inode() annotations
VFS: normal filesystems (and lustre): d_inode() annotations
VFS: security/: d_inode() annotations
VFS: security/: d_backing_inode() annotations
VFS: net/: d_inode() annotations
VFS: net/unix: d_backing_inode() annotations
VFS: kernel/: d_inode() annotations
VFS: audit: d_backing_inode() annotations
VFS: Fix up some ->d_inode accesses in the chelsio driver
VFS: Cachefiles should perform fs modifications on the top layer only
VFS: AF_UNIX sockets should call mknod on the top layer only
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... except where that code acts as a filesystem driver, rather than
working with dentries given to it.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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most of the ->d_inode uses there refer to the same inode IO would
go to, i.e. d_backing_inode()
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"Highlights for this window:
- improved AVC hashing for SELinux by John Brooks and Stephen Smalley
- addition of an unconfined label to Smack
- Smack documentation update
- TPM driver updates"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (28 commits)
lsm: copy comm before calling audit_log to avoid race in string printing
tomoyo: Do not generate empty policy files
tomoyo: Use if_changed when generating builtin-policy.h
tomoyo: Use bin2c to generate builtin-policy.h
selinux: increase avtab max buckets
selinux: Use a better hash function for avtab
selinux: convert avtab hash table to flex_array
selinux: reconcile security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid() and mls_import_netlbl_cat()
selinux: remove unnecessary pointer reassignment
Smack: Updates for Smack documentation
tpm/st33zp24/spi: Add missing device table for spi phy.
tpm/st33zp24: Add proper wait for ordinal duration in case of irq mode
smack: Fix gcc warning from unused smack_syslog_lock mutex in smackfs.c
Smack: Allow an unconfined label in bringup mode
Smack: getting the Smack security context of keys
Smack: Assign smack_known_web as default smk_in label for kernel thread's socket
tpm/tpm_infineon: Use struct dev_pm_ops for power management
MAINTAINERS: Add Jason as designated reviewer for TPM
tpm: Update KConfig text to include TPM2.0 FIFO chips
tpm/st33zp24/dts/st33zp24-spi: Add dts documentation for st33zp24 spi phy
...
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Pull networking updates from David Miller:
1) Add BQL support to via-rhine, from Tino Reichardt.
2) Integrate SWITCHDEV layer support into the DSA layer, so DSA drivers
can support hw switch offloading. From Floria Fainelli.
3) Allow 'ip address' commands to initiate multicast group join/leave,
from Madhu Challa.
4) Many ipv4 FIB lookup optimizations from Alexander Duyck.
5) Support EBPF in cls_bpf classifier and act_bpf action, from Daniel
Borkmann.
6) Remove the ugly compat support in ARP for ugly layers like ax25,
rose, etc. And use this to clean up the neigh layer, then use it to
implement MPLS support. All from Eric Biederman.
7) Support L3 forwarding offloading in switches, from Scott Feldman.
8) Collapse the LOCAL and MAIN ipv4 FIB tables when possible, to speed
up route lookups even further. From Alexander Duyck.
9) Many improvements and bug fixes to the rhashtable implementation,
from Herbert Xu and Thomas Graf. In particular, in the case where
an rhashtable user bulk adds a large number of items into an empty
table, we expand the table much more sanely.
10) Don't make the tcp_metrics hash table per-namespace, from Eric
Biederman.
11) Extend EBPF to access SKB fields, from Alexei Starovoitov.
12) Split out new connection request sockets so that they can be
established in the main hash table. Much less false sharing since
hash lookups go direct to the request sockets instead of having to
go first to the listener then to the request socks hashed
underneath. From Eric Dumazet.
13) Add async I/O support for crytpo AF_ALG sockets, from Tadeusz Struk.
14) Support stable privacy address generation for RFC7217 in IPV6. From
Hannes Frederic Sowa.
15) Hash network namespace into IP frag IDs, also from Hannes Frederic
Sowa.
16) Convert PTP get/set methods to use 64-bit time, from Richard
Cochran.
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1816 commits)
fm10k: Bump driver version to 0.15.2
fm10k: corrected VF multicast update
fm10k: mbx_update_max_size does not drop all oversized messages
fm10k: reset head instead of calling update_max_size
fm10k: renamed mbx_tx_dropped to mbx_tx_oversized
fm10k: update xcast mode before synchronizing multicast addresses
fm10k: start service timer on probe
fm10k: fix function header comment
fm10k: comment next_vf_mbx flow
fm10k: don't handle mailbox events in iov_event path and always process mailbox
fm10k: use separate workqueue for fm10k driver
fm10k: Set PF queues to unlimited bandwidth during virtualization
fm10k: expose tx_timeout_count as an ethtool stat
fm10k: only increment tx_timeout_count in Tx hang path
fm10k: remove extraneous "Reset interface" message
fm10k: separate PF only stats so that VF does not display them
fm10k: use hw->mac.max_queues for stats
fm10k: only show actual queues, not the maximum in hardware
fm10k: allow creation of VLAN on default vid
fm10k: fix unused warnings
...
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Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Pass the nf_hook_state all the way down into the hook
functions themselves.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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In commit 00f84f3f2e9d088f06722f4351d67f5f577abe22 ("Smack: Make the
syslog control configurable") this mutex was added, but the rest of
the final commit never actually made use of it, resulting in:
In file included from include/linux/mutex.h:29:0,
from include/linux/notifier.h:13,
from include/linux/memory_hotplug.h:6,
from include/linux/mmzone.h:821,
from include/linux/gfp.h:5,
from include/linux/slab.h:14,
from include/linux/security.h:27,
from security/smack/smackfs.c:21:
security/smack/smackfs.c:63:21: warning: ‘smack_syslog_lock’ defined but not used [-Wunused-variable]
static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_syslog_lock);
^
A git grep shows no other instances/references to smack_syslog_lock.
Delete it, assuming that the mutex addition was just a leftover from
an earlier work in progress version of the change.
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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I have vehemently opposed adding a "permissive" mode to Smack
for the simple reasons that it would be subject to massive abuse
and that developers refuse to turn it off come product release.
I still believe that this is true, and still refuse to add a
general "permissive mode". So don't ask again.
Bumjin Im suggested an approach that addresses most of the concerns,
and I have implemented it here. I still believe that we'd be better
off without this sort of thing, but it looks like this minimizes the
abuse potential.
Firstly, you have to configure Smack Bringup Mode. That allows
for "release" software to be ammune from abuse. Second, only one
label gets to be "permissive" at a time. You can use it for
debugging, but that's about it.
A label written to smackfs/unconfined is treated specially.
If either the subject or object label of an access check
matches the "unconfined" label, and the access would not
have been allowed otherwise an audit record and a console
message are generated. The audit record "request" string is
marked with either "(US)" or "(UO)", to indicate that the
request was granted because of an unconfined label. The
fact that an inode was accessed by an unconfined label is
remembered, and subsequent accesses to that "impure"
object are noted in the log. The impurity is not stored in
the filesystem, so a file mislabled as a side effect of
using an unconfined label may still cause concern after
a reboot.
So, it's there, it's dangerous, but so many application
developers seem incapable of living without it I have
given in. I've tried to make it as safe as I can, but
in the end it's still a chain saw.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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With this commit, the LSM Smack implements the LSM
side part of the system call keyctl with the action
code KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY.
It is now possible to get the context of, for example,
the user session key using the command "keyctl security @s".
The original patch has been modified for merge.
Signed-off-by: José Bollo <jose.bollo@open.eurogiciel.org>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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This change fixes the bug associated with sockets owned by kernel threads. These
sockets, created usually by network devices' drivers tasks, received smk_in
label from the task that created them - the "floor" label in the most cases. The
result was that they were not able to receive data packets because of missing
smack rules. The main reason of the access deny is that the socket smk_in label
is placed as the object during smk check, kernel thread's capabilities are
omitted.
Signed-off-by: Marcin Lis <m.lis@samsung.com>
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Use d_is_positive() rather than testing dentry->d_inode in Smack to get rid of
direct references to d_inode outside of the VFS.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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If the secmark is available us it on connection as
well as packet delivery.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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On 1/23/2015 8:20 AM, Jim Davis wrote:
> Building with the attached random configuration file,
>
> security/smack/smack_netfilter.c: In function ‘smack_ipv4_output’:
> security/smack/smack_netfilter.c:55:6: error: ‘struct sk_buff’ has no
> member named ‘secmark’
> skb->secmark = skp->smk_secid;
> ^
> make[2]: *** [security/smack/smack_netfilter.o] Error 1
The existing Makefile used the wrong configuration option to
determine if smack_netfilter should be built. This sets it right.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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We hit use after free on dereferncing pointer to task_smack struct in
smk_of_task() called from smack_task_to_inode().
task_security() macro uses task_cred_xxx() to get pointer to the task_smack.
task_cred_xxx() could be used only for non-pointer members of task's
credentials. It cannot be used for pointer members since what they point
to may disapper after dropping RCU read lock.
Mainly task_security() used this way:
smk_of_task(task_security(p))
Intead of this introduce function smk_of_task_struct() which
takes task_struct as argument and returns pointer to smk_known struct
and do this under RCU read lock.
Bogus task_security() macro is not used anymore, so remove it.
KASan's report for this:
AddressSanitizer: use after free in smack_task_to_inode+0x50/0x70 at addr c4635600
=============================================================================
BUG kmalloc-64 (Tainted: PO): kasan error
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
INFO: Allocated in new_task_smack+0x44/0xd8 age=39 cpu=0 pid=1866
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x88/0x1bc
new_task_smack+0x44/0xd8
smack_cred_prepare+0x48/0x21c
security_prepare_creds+0x44/0x4c
prepare_creds+0xdc/0x110
smack_setprocattr+0x104/0x150
security_setprocattr+0x4c/0x54
proc_pid_attr_write+0x12c/0x194
vfs_write+0x1b0/0x370
SyS_write+0x5c/0x94
ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x48
INFO: Freed in smack_cred_free+0xc4/0xd0 age=27 cpu=0 pid=1564
kfree+0x270/0x290
smack_cred_free+0xc4/0xd0
security_cred_free+0x34/0x3c
put_cred_rcu+0x58/0xcc
rcu_process_callbacks+0x738/0x998
__do_softirq+0x264/0x4cc
do_softirq+0x94/0xf4
irq_exit+0xbc/0x120
handle_IRQ+0x104/0x134
gic_handle_irq+0x70/0xac
__irq_svc+0x44/0x78
_raw_spin_unlock+0x18/0x48
sync_inodes_sb+0x17c/0x1d8
sync_filesystem+0xac/0xfc
vdfs_file_fsync+0x90/0xc0
vfs_fsync_range+0x74/0x7c
INFO: Slab 0xd3b23f50 objects=32 used=31 fp=0xc4635600 flags=0x4080
INFO: Object 0xc4635600 @offset=5632 fp=0x (null)
Bytes b4 c46355f0: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ
Object c4635600: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
Object c4635610: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
Object c4635620: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
Object c4635630: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b a5 kkkkkkkkkkkkkkk.
Redzone c4635640: bb bb bb bb ....
Padding c46356e8: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ
Padding c46356f8: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ZZZZZZZZ
CPU: 5 PID: 834 Comm: launchpad_prelo Tainted: PBO 3.10.30 #1
Backtrace:
[<c00233a4>] (dump_backtrace+0x0/0x158) from [<c0023dec>] (show_stack+0x20/0x24)
r7:c4634010 r6:d3b23f50 r5:c4635600 r4:d1002140
[<c0023dcc>] (show_stack+0x0/0x24) from [<c06d6d7c>] (dump_stack+0x20/0x28)
[<c06d6d5c>] (dump_stack+0x0/0x28) from [<c01c1d50>] (print_trailer+0x124/0x144)
[<c01c1c2c>] (print_trailer+0x0/0x144) from [<c01c1e88>] (object_err+0x3c/0x44)
r7:c4635600 r6:d1002140 r5:d3b23f50 r4:c4635600
[<c01c1e4c>] (object_err+0x0/0x44) from [<c01cac18>] (kasan_report_error+0x2b8/0x538)
r6:d1002140 r5:d3b23f50 r4:c6429cf8 r3:c09e1aa7
[<c01ca960>] (kasan_report_error+0x0/0x538) from [<c01c9430>] (__asan_load4+0xd4/0xf8)
[<c01c935c>] (__asan_load4+0x0/0xf8) from [<c031e168>] (smack_task_to_inode+0x50/0x70)
r5:c4635600 r4:ca9da000
[<c031e118>] (smack_task_to_inode+0x0/0x70) from [<c031af64>] (security_task_to_inode+0x3c/0x44)
r5:cca25e80 r4:c0ba9780
[<c031af28>] (security_task_to_inode+0x0/0x44) from [<c023d614>] (pid_revalidate+0x124/0x178)
r6:00000000 r5:cca25e80 r4:cbabe3c0 r3:00008124
[<c023d4f0>] (pid_revalidate+0x0/0x178) from [<c01db98c>] (lookup_fast+0x35c/0x43y4)
r9:c6429efc r8:00000101 r7:c079d940 r6:c6429e90 r5:c6429ed8 r4:c83c4148
[<c01db630>] (lookup_fast+0x0/0x434) from [<c01deec8>] (do_last.isra.24+0x1c0/0x1108)
[<c01ded08>] (do_last.isra.24+0x0/0x1108) from [<c01dff04>] (path_openat.isra.25+0xf4/0x648)
[<c01dfe10>] (path_openat.isra.25+0x0/0x648) from [<c01e1458>] (do_filp_open+0x3c/0x88)
[<c01e141c>] (do_filp_open+0x0/0x88) from [<c01ccb28>] (do_sys_open+0xf0/0x198)
r7:00000001 r6:c0ea2180 r5:0000000b r4:00000000
[<c01cca38>] (do_sys_open+0x0/0x198) from [<c01ccc00>] (SyS_open+0x30/0x34)
[<c01ccbd0>] (SyS_open+0x0/0x34) from [<c001db80>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x48)
Read of size 4 by thread T834:
Memory state around the buggy address:
c4635380: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
c4635400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
c4635480: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
c4635500: 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
c4635580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>c4635600: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
c4635680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
c4635700: 00 00 00 00 04 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
c4635780: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
c4635800: 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
c4635880: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
==================================================================
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
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During UDS connection check, both sides are checked for write access to
the other side. But only the first check is performed with audit support.
The second one didn't produce any audit logs. This simple patch fixes that.
Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
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Smack uses CIPSO to label internet packets and thus provide
for access control on delivery of packets. The netfilter facility
was not used to allow for Smack to work properly without netfilter
configuration. Smack does not need netfilter, however there are
cases where it would be handy.
As a side effect, the labeling of local IPv4 packets can be optimized
and the handling of local IPv6 packets is just all out better.
The best part is that the netfilter tools use "contexts" that
are just strings, and they work just as well for Smack as they
do for SELinux.
All of the conditional compilation for IPv6 was implemented
by Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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This is one of those cases where you look at code you did
years ago and wonder what you might have been thinking.
There are a number of LSM hooks that work off of file pointers,
and most of them really want the security data from the inode.
Some, however, really want the security context that the process
had when the file was opened. The difference went undetected in
Smack until it started getting used in a real system with real
testing. At that point it was clear that something was amiss.
This patch corrects the misuse of the f_security value in several
of the hooks. The behavior will not usually be any different, as
the process had to be able to open the file in the first place, and
the old check almost always succeeded, as will the new, but for
different reasons.
Thanks to the Samsung Tizen development team that identified this.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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The 54e70ec5eb090193b03e69d551fa6771a5a217c4 commit introduced a
bidirectional check that should have checked for mutual WRITE access
between two labels. Due to a typo subject's OUT label is checked with
object's OUT. Should be OUT to IN.
Signed-off-by: Zbigniew Jasinski <z.jasinski@samsung.com>
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Files created with __shmem_file_stup() appear to have somewhat fake
dentries which make them look like root directories and not get
the label the current process or ("*") star meant for tmpfs files.
Signed-off-by: Łukasz Stelmach <l.stelmach@samsung.com>
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In principle if this function was called with "value" == NULL and "len"
not NULL it could return different results for the "len" compared to a
case where "name" was not NULL. This is a hypothetical case that does
not exist in the kernel, but it's a logic bug nonetheless.
Signed-off-by: Lukasz Pawelczyk <l.pawelczyk@samsung.com>
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Signed-off-by: Lukasz Pawelczyk <l.pawelczyk@samsung.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security layer updates from James Morris:
"In terms of changes, there's general maintenance to the Smack,
SELinux, and integrity code.
The IMA code adds a new kconfig option, IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT,
which allows IMA appraisal to require signatures. Support for reading
keys from rootfs before init is call is also added"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (23 commits)
selinux: Remove security_ops extern
security: smack: fix out-of-bounds access in smk_parse_smack()
VFS: refactor vfs_read()
ima: require signature based appraisal
integrity: provide a hook to load keys when rootfs is ready
ima: load x509 certificate from the kernel
integrity: provide a function to load x509 certificate from the kernel
integrity: define a new function integrity_read_file()
Security: smack: replace kzalloc with kmem_cache for inode_smack
Smack: Lock mode for the floor and hat labels
ima: added support for new kernel cmdline parameter ima_template_fmt
ima: allocate field pointers array on demand in template_desc_init_fields()
ima: don't allocate a copy of template_fmt in template_desc_init_fields()
ima: display template format in meas. list if template name length is zero
ima: added error messages to template-related functions
ima: use atomic bit operations to protect policy update interface
ima: ignore empty and with whitespaces policy lines
ima: no need to allocate entry for comment
ima: report policy load status
ima: use path names cache
...
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Setting smack label on file (e.g. 'attr -S -s SMACK64 -V "test" test')
triggered following spew on the kernel with KASan applied:
==================================================================
BUG: AddressSanitizer: out of bounds access in strncpy+0x28/0x60 at addr ffff8800059ad064
=============================================================================
BUG kmalloc-8 (Not tainted): kasan error
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
INFO: Slab 0xffffea0000166b40 objects=128 used=7 fp=0xffff8800059ad080 flags=0x4000000000000080
INFO: Object 0xffff8800059ad060 @offset=96 fp=0xffff8800059ad080
Bytes b4 ffff8800059ad050: a0 df 9a 05 00 88 ff ff 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ........ZZZZZZZZ
Object ffff8800059ad060: 74 65 73 74 6b 6b 6b a5 testkkk.
Redzone ffff8800059ad068: cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc ........
Padding ffff8800059ad078: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ZZZZZZZZ
CPU: 0 PID: 528 Comm: attr Tainted: G B 3.18.0-rc1-mm1+ #5
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
0000000000000000 ffff8800059ad064 ffffffff81534cf2 ffff880005a5bc40
ffffffff8112fe1a 0000000100800006 0000000f059ad060 ffff880006000f90
0000000000000296 ffffea0000166b40 ffffffff8107ca97 ffff880005891060
Call Trace:
? dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:52)
? kasan_report_error (mm/kasan/report.c:102 mm/kasan/report.c:178)
? preempt_count_sub (kernel/sched/core.c:2651)
? __asan_load1 (mm/kasan/kasan.h:50 mm/kasan/kasan.c:248 mm/kasan/kasan.c:358)
? strncpy (lib/string.c:121)
? strncpy (lib/string.c:121)
? smk_parse_smack (security/smack/smack_access.c:457)
? setxattr (fs/xattr.c:343)
? smk_import_entry (security/smack/smack_access.c:514)
? smack_inode_setxattr (security/smack/smack_lsm.c:1093 (discriminator 1))
? security_inode_setxattr (security/security.c:602)
? vfs_setxattr (fs/xattr.c:134)
? setxattr (fs/xattr.c:343)
? setxattr (fs/xattr.c:360)
? get_parent_ip (kernel/sched/core.c:2606)
? preempt_count_sub (kernel/sched/core.c:2651)
? __percpu_counter_add (arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:98 lib/percpu_counter.c:90)
? get_parent_ip (kernel/sched/core.c:2606)
? preempt_count_sub (kernel/sched/core.c:2651)
? __mnt_want_write (arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:98 fs/namespace.c:359)
? path_setxattr (fs/xattr.c:380)
? SyS_lsetxattr (fs/xattr.c:397)
? system_call_fastpath (arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S:423)
Read of size 1 by task attr:
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8800059ace80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
ffff8800059acf00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
ffff8800059acf80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>ffff8800059ad000: 00 fc fc fc 00 fc fc fc 05 fc fc fc 04 fc fc fc
^
ffff8800059ad080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8800059ad100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8800059ad180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================
strncpy() copies one byte more than the source string has.
Fix this by passing the correct length to strncpy().
Now we can remove initialization of the last byte in 'smack' string
because kzalloc() already did this for us.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
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Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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The patch use kmem_cache to allocate/free inode_smack since they are
alloced in high volumes making it a perfect case for kmem_cache.
As per analysis, 24 bytes of memory is wasted per allocation due
to internal fragmentation. With kmem_cache, this can be avoided.
Accounting of memory allocation is below :
total slack net count-alloc/free caller
Before (with kzalloc)
1919872 719952 1919872 29998/0 new_inode_smack+0x14
After (with kmem_cache)
1201680 0 1201680 30042/0 new_inode_smack+0x18
>From above data, we found that 719952 bytes(~700 KB) of memory is
saved on allocation of 29998 smack inodes.
Signed-off-by: Rohit <rohit.kr@samsung.com>
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The lock access mode allows setting a read lock on a file
for with the process has only read access. The floor label is
defined to make it easy to have the basic system installed such
that everyone can read it. Once there's a desire to read lock
(rationally or otherwise) a floor file a rule needs to get set.
This happens all the time, so make the floor label a little bit
more special and allow everyone lock access, too. By implication,
give processes with the hat label (hat can read everything)
lock access as well. This reduces clutter in the Smack rule set.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris.
Mostly ima, selinux, smack and key handling updates.
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (65 commits)
integrity: do zero padding of the key id
KEYS: output last portion of fingerprint in /proc/keys
KEYS: strip 'id:' from ca_keyid
KEYS: use swapped SKID for performing partial matching
KEYS: Restore partial ID matching functionality for asymmetric keys
X.509: If available, use the raw subjKeyId to form the key description
KEYS: handle error code encoded in pointer
selinux: normalize audit log formatting
selinux: cleanup error reporting in selinux_nlmsg_perm()
KEYS: Check hex2bin()'s return when generating an asymmetric key ID
ima: detect violations for mmaped files
ima: fix race condition on ima_rdwr_violation_check and process_measurement
ima: added ima_policy_flag variable
ima: return an error code from ima_add_boot_aggregate()
ima: provide 'ima_appraise=log' kernel option
ima: move keyring initialization to ima_init()
PKCS#7: Handle PKCS#7 messages that contain no X.509 certs
PKCS#7: Better handling of unsupported crypto
KEYS: Overhaul key identification when searching for asymmetric keys
KEYS: Implement binary asymmetric key ID handling
...
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security_file_set_fowner always returns 0, so make it f_setown and
__f_setown void return functions and fix up the error handling in the
callers.
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
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Smack used to use a mix of smack_known struct and char* throughout its
APIs and implementation. This patch unifies the behaviour and makes it
store and operate exclusively on smack_known struct pointers when managing
labels.
Signed-off-by: Lukasz Pawelczyk <l.pawelczyk@samsung.com>
Conflicts:
security/smack/smack_access.c
security/smack/smack_lsm.c
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The 54e70ec5eb090193b03e69d551fa6771a5a217c4 commit introduced a
bidirectional check that should have checked for mutual WRITE access
between two labels. Due to a typo the second check was incorrect.
Signed-off-by: Lukasz Pawelczyk <l.pawelczyk@samsung.com>
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Signed-off-by: Lukasz Pawelczyk <l.pawelczyk@samsung.com>
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People keep asking me for permissive mode, and I keep saying "no".
Permissive mode is wrong for more reasons than I can enumerate,
but the compelling one is that it's once on, never off.
Nonetheless, there is an argument to be made for running a
process with lots of permissions, logging which are required,
and then locking the process down. There wasn't a way to do
that with Smack, but this provides it.
The notion is that you start out by giving the process an
appropriate Smack label, such as "ATBirds". You create rules
with a wide range of access and the "b" mode. On Tizen it
might be:
ATBirds System rwxalb
ATBirds User rwxalb
ATBirds _ rwxalb
User ATBirds wb
System ATBirds wb
Accesses that fail will generate audit records. Accesses
that succeed because of rules marked with a "b" generate
log messages identifying the rule, the program and as much
object information as is convenient.
When the system is properly configured and the programs
brought in line with the labeling scheme the "b" mode can
be removed from the rules. When the system is ready for
production the facility can be configured out.
This provides the developer the convenience of permissive
mode without creating a system that looks like it is
enforcing a policy while it is not.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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While opening with CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE file label is not set.
Other calls may access it after CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE is dropped from process.
Signed-off-by: Marcin Niesluchowski <m.niesluchow@samsung.com>
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Values of extended attributes are stored as binary blobs. NULL-termination
of them isn't required. It just wastes disk space and confuses command-line
tools like getfattr because they have to print that zero byte at the end.
This patch removes terminating zero byte from initial security label in
smack_inode_init_security and cuts it out in function smack_inode_getsecurity
which is used by syscall getxattr. This change seems completely safe, because
function smk_parse_smack ignores everything after first zero byte.
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <k.khlebnikov@samsung.com>
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Zero-length security labels are invalid but kernel should handle them.
This patch fixes kernel panic after setting zero-length security labels:
# attr -S -s "SMACK64" -V "" file
And after writing zero-length string into smackfs files syslog and onlycp:
# python -c 'import os; os.write(1, "")' > /smack/syslog
The problem is caused by brain-damaged logic in function smk_parse_smack()
which takes pointer to buffer and its length but if length below or equal zero
it thinks that the buffer is zero-terminated. Unfortunately callers of this
function are widely used and proper fix requires serious refactoring.
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <k.khlebnikov@samsung.com>
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Security operation ->inode_listsecurity is used for generating list of
available extended attributes for syscall listxattr. Currently it's used
only in nfs4 or if filesystem doesn't provide i_op->listxattr.
The list is the set of NULL-terminated names, one after the other.
This method must include zero byte at the and into result.
Also this function must return length even if string does not fit into
output buffer or it is NULL, see similar method in selinux and man listxattr.
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <k.khlebnikov@samsung.com>
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Historically the NetLabel LSM secattr catmap functions and data
structures have had very long names which makes a mess of the NetLabel
code and anyone who uses NetLabel. This patch renames the catmap
functions and structures from "*_secattr_catmap_*" to just "*_catmap_*"
which improves things greatly.
There are no substantial code or logic changes in this patch.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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The NetLabel secattr catmap functions, and the SELinux import/export
glue routines, were broken in many horrible ways and the SELinux glue
code fiddled with the NetLabel catmap structures in ways that we
probably shouldn't allow. At some point this "worked", but that was
likely due to a bit of dumb luck and sub-par testing (both inflicted
by yours truly). This patch corrects these problems by basically
gutting the code in favor of something less obtuse and restoring the
NetLabel abstractions in the SELinux catmap glue code.
Everything is working now, and if it decides to break itself in the
future this code will be much easier to debug than the code it
replaces.
One noteworthy side effect of the changes is that it is no longer
necessary to allocate a NetLabel catmap before calling one of the
NetLabel APIs to set a bit in the catmap. NetLabel will automatically
allocate the catmap nodes when needed, resulting in less allocations
when the lowest bit is greater than 255 and less code in the LSMs.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Christian Evans <frodox@zoho.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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The NetLabel category (catmap) functions have a problem in that they
assume categories will be set in an increasing manner, e.g. the next
category set will always be larger than the last. Unfortunately, this
is not a valid assumption and could result in problems when attempting
to set categories less than the startbit in the lowest catmap node.
In some cases kernel panics and other nasties can result.
This patch corrects the problem by checking for this and allocating a
new catmap node instance and placing it at the front of the list.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Christian Evans <frodox@zoho.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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into next
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This fixes a warning about the mismatch of types between
the declared unsigned and integer.
Signed-off-by: Toralf Förster <toralf.foerster@gmx.de>
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The cgroup filesystem isn't ready for an LSM to
properly use extented attributes. This patch makes
files created in the cgroup filesystem usable by
a system running Smack and systemd.
Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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Smack believes that many of the operatons that can
be performed on an open file descriptor are read operations.
The fstat and lseek system calls are examples.
An implication of this is that files shouldn't be open
if the task doesn't have read access even if it has
write access and the file is being opened write only.
Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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Smack IPC policy requires that the sender have write access
to the receiver. UDS streams don't do per-packet checks. The
only check is done at connect time. The existing code checks
if the connecting process can write to the other, but not the
other way around. This change adds a check that the other end
can write to the connecting process.
Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
Signed-off-by: Casey Schuafler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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Sam Henderson points out that removing the SMACK64TRANSMUTE
attribute from a directory does not result in the directory
transmuting. This is because the inode flag indicating that
the directory is transmuting isn't cleared. The fix is a tad
less than trivial because smk_task and smk_mmap should have
been broken out, too.
Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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The function `smack_inode_post_setxattr` is called each
time that a setxattr is done, for any value of name.
The kernel allow to put value==NULL when size==0
to set an empty attribute value. The systematic
call to smk_import_entry was causing the dereference
of a NULL pointer hence a KERNEL PANIC!
The problem can be produced easily by issuing the
command `setfattr -n user.data file` under bash prompt
when SMACK is active.
Moving the call to smk_import_entry as proposed by this
patch is correcting the behaviour because the function
smack_inode_post_setxattr is called for the SMACK's
attributes only if the function smack_inode_setxattr validated
the value and its size (what will not be the case when size==0).
It also has a benefical effect to not fill the smack hash
with garbage values coming from any extended attribute
write.
Change-Id: Iaf0039c2be9bccb6cee11c24a3b44d209101fe47
Signed-off-by: José Bollo <jose.bollo@open.eurogiciel.org>
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1. In order to remove any SMACK extended attribute from a file, a user
should have CAP_MAC_ADMIN capability. But user without having this
capability is able to remove SMACK64MMAP security attribute.
2. While validating size and value of smack extended attribute in
smack_inode_setsecurity hook, wrong error code is returned.
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Kumar <pamkaj.k2@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com>
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