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SourceForge.JP was renamed to OSDN in May 2015.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
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Now that the SRCU Kconfig option is unconditionally selected, there is
no longer any point in selecting it. Therefore, remove the "select SRCU"
Kconfig statements.
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
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bin2c was, as its name implies, introduced to convert a binary file to
C code.
However, I did not see any good reason ever for using this tool because
using the .incbin directive is much faster, and often results in simpler
code.
Most of the uses of bin2c have been killed, for example:
- 13610aa908dc ("kernel/configs: use .incbin directive to embed config_data.gz")
- 4c0f032d4963 ("s390/purgatory: Omit use of bin2c")
security/tomoyo/Makefile has even less reason for using bin2c because
the policy files are text data. So, sed is enough for converting them
to C string literals, and what is nicer, generates human-readable
builtin-policy.h.
This is the last user of bin2c. After this commit lands, bin2c will be
removed.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
[penguin-kernel: Update sed script to also escape backslash and quote ]
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
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When CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO_INSECURE_BUILTIN_SETTING=y,
builtin-policy.h is unneeded.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
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If *.conf.default is updated, builtin-policy.h should be rebuilt,
but this does not work when compiled with O= option.
[Without this commit]
$ touch security/tomoyo/policy/exception_policy.conf.default
$ make O=/tmp security/tomoyo/
make[1]: Entering directory '/tmp'
GEN Makefile
CALL /home/masahiro/ref/linux/scripts/checksyscalls.sh
DESCEND objtool
make[1]: Leaving directory '/tmp'
[With this commit]
$ touch security/tomoyo/policy/exception_policy.conf.default
$ make O=/tmp security/tomoyo/
make[1]: Entering directory '/tmp'
GEN Makefile
CALL /home/masahiro/ref/linux/scripts/checksyscalls.sh
DESCEND objtool
POLICY security/tomoyo/builtin-policy.h
CC security/tomoyo/common.o
AR security/tomoyo/built-in.a
make[1]: Leaving directory '/tmp'
$(srctree)/ is essential because $(wildcard ) does not follow VPATH.
Fixes: f02dee2d148b ("tomoyo: Do not generate empty policy files")
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull kernel hardening fixes from Kees Cook:
- Fix CFI failure with KASAN (Sami Tolvanen)
- Fix LKDTM + CFI under GCC 7 and 8 (Kristina Martsenko)
- Limit CONFIG_ZERO_CALL_USED_REGS to Clang > 15.0.6 (Nathan
Chancellor)
- Ignore "contents" argument in LoadPin's LSM hook handling
- Fix paste-o in /sys/kernel/warn_count API docs
- Use READ_ONCE() consistently for oops/warn limit reading
* tag 'hardening-v6.2-rc1-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
cfi: Fix CFI failure with KASAN
exit: Use READ_ONCE() for all oops/warn limit reads
security: Restrict CONFIG_ZERO_CALL_USED_REGS to gcc or clang > 15.0.6
lkdtm: cfi: Make PAC test work with GCC 7 and 8
docs: Fix path paste-o for /sys/kernel/warn_count
LoadPin: Ignore the "contents" argument of the LSM hooks
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/idmapping
Pull vfsuid cleanup from Christian Brauner:
"This moves the ima specific vfs{g,u}id_t comparison helpers out of the
header and into the one file in ima where they are used.
We shouldn't incentivize people to use them by placing them into the
header. As discussed and suggested by Linus in [1] let's just define
them locally in the one file in ima where they are used"
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wj4BpEwUd=OkTv1F9uykvSrsBNZJVHMp+p_+e2kiV71_A@mail.gmail.com [1]
* tag 'fs.vfsuid.ima.v6.2-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/idmapping:
mnt_idmapping: move ima-only helpers to ima
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A bad bug in clang's implementation of -fzero-call-used-regs can result
in NULL pointer dereferences (see the links above the check for more
information). Restrict CONFIG_CC_HAS_ZERO_CALL_USED_REGS to either a
supported GCC version or a clang newer than 15.0.6, which will catch
both a theoretical 15.0.7 and the upcoming 16.0.0, which will both have
the bug fixed.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.15+
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221214232602.4118147-1-nathan@kernel.org
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LoadPin only enforces the read-only origin of kernel file reads. Whether
or not it was a partial read isn't important. Remove the overly
conservative checks so that things like partial firmware reads will
succeed (i.e. reading a firmware header).
Fixes: 2039bda1fa8d ("LSM: Add "contents" flag to kernel_read_file hook")
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Tested-by: Ping-Ke Shih <pkshih@realtek.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221209195453.never.494-kees@kernel.org
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor
Pull apparmor updates from John Johansen:
"Features:
- switch to zstd compression for profile raw data
Cleanups:
- simplify obtaining the newest label on a cred
- remove useless static inline functions
- compute permission conversion on policy unpack
- refactor code to share common permissins
- refactor unpack to group policy backwards compatiblity code
- add __init annotation to aa_{setup/teardown}_dfa_engine()
Bug Fixes:
- fix a memleak in
- multi_transaction_new()
- free_ruleset()
- unpack_profile()
- alloc_ns()
- fix lockdep warning when removing a namespace
- fix regression in stacking due to label flags
- fix loading of child before parent
- fix kernel-doc comments that differ from fns
- fix spelling errors in comments
- store return value of unpack_perms_table() to signed variable"
* tag 'apparmor-pr-2022-12-14' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor: (64 commits)
apparmor: Fix uninitialized symbol 'array_size' in policy_unpack_test.c
apparmor: Add __init annotation to aa_{setup/teardown}_dfa_engine()
apparmor: Fix memleak in alloc_ns()
apparmor: Fix memleak issue in unpack_profile()
apparmor: fix a memleak in free_ruleset()
apparmor: Fix spelling of function name in comment block
apparmor: Use pointer to struct aa_label for lbs_cred
AppArmor: Fix kernel-doc
LSM: Fix kernel-doc
AppArmor: Fix kernel-doc
apparmor: Fix loading of child before parent
apparmor: refactor code that alloc null profiles
apparmor: fix obsoleted comments for aa_getprocattr() and audit_resource()
apparmor: remove useless static inline functions
apparmor: Fix unpack_profile() warn: passing zero to 'ERR_PTR'
apparmor: fix uninitialize table variable in error in unpack_trans_table
apparmor: store return value of unpack_perms_table() to signed variable
apparmor: Fix kunit test for out of bounds array
apparmor: Fix decompression of rawdata for read back to userspace
apparmor: Fix undefined references to zstd_ symbols
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
"Aside from the one cleanup, the other changes are bug fixes:
Cleanup:
- Include missing iMac Pro 2017 in list of Macs with T2 security chip
Bug fixes:
- Improper instantiation of "encrypted" keys with user provided data
- Not handling delay in updating LSM label based IMA policy rules
(-ESTALE)
- IMA and integrity memory leaks on error paths
- CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SM3 hash algorithm renamed"
* tag 'integrity-v6.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
ima: Fix hash dependency to correct algorithm
ima: Fix misuse of dereference of pointer in template_desc_init_fields()
integrity: Fix memory leakage in keyring allocation error path
ima: Fix memory leak in __ima_inode_hash()
ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by ima_filter_rule_match()
ima: Simplify ima_lsm_copy_rule
ima: Fix a potential NULL pointer access in ima_restore_measurement_list
efi: Add iMac Pro 2017 to uefi skip cert quirk
KEYS: encrypted: fix key instantiation with user-provided data
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm
Pull lsm updates from Paul Moore:
- Improve the error handling in the device cgroup such that memory
allocation failures when updating the access policy do not
potentially alter the policy.
- Some minor fixes to reiserfs to ensure that it properly releases
LSM-related xattr values.
- Update the security_socket_getpeersec_stream() LSM hook to take
sockptr_t values.
Previously the net/BPF folks updated the getsockopt code in the
network stack to leverage the sockptr_t type to make it easier to
pass both kernel and __user pointers, but unfortunately when they did
so they didn't convert the LSM hook.
While there was/is no immediate risk by not converting the LSM hook,
it seems like this is a mistake waiting to happen so this patch
proactively does the LSM hook conversion.
- Convert vfs_getxattr_alloc() to return an int instead of a ssize_t
and cleanup the callers. Internally the function was never going to
return anything larger than an int and the callers were doing some
very odd things casting the return value; this patch fixes all that
and helps bring a bit of sanity to vfs_getxattr_alloc() and its
callers.
- More verbose, and helpful, LSM debug output when the system is booted
with "lsm.debug" on the command line. There are examples in the
commit description, but the quick summary is that this patch provides
better information about which LSMs are enabled and the ordering in
which they are processed.
- General comment and kernel-doc fixes and cleanups.
* tag 'lsm-pr-20221212' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm:
lsm: Fix description of fs_context_parse_param
lsm: Add/fix return values in lsm_hooks.h and fix formatting
lsm: Clarify documentation of vm_enough_memory hook
reiserfs: Add missing calls to reiserfs_security_free()
lsm,fs: fix vfs_getxattr_alloc() return type and caller error paths
device_cgroup: Roll back to original exceptions after copy failure
LSM: Better reporting of actual LSMs at boot
lsm: make security_socket_getpeersec_stream() sockptr_t safe
audit: Fix some kernel-doc warnings
lsm: remove obsoleted comments for security hooks
fs: edit a comment made in bad taste
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
"Two SELinux patches: one increases the sleep time on deprecated
functionality, and one removes the indirect calls in the sidtab
context conversion code"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20221212' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: remove the sidtab context conversion indirect calls
selinux: increase the deprecation sleep for checkreqprot and runtime disable
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux
Pull landlock updates from Mickaël Salaün:
"This adds file truncation support to Landlock, contributed by Günther
Noack. As described by Günther [1], the goal of these patches is to
work towards a more complete coverage of file system operations that
are restrictable with Landlock.
The known set of currently unsupported file system operations in
Landlock is described at [2]. Out of the operations listed there,
truncate is the only one that modifies file contents, so these patches
should make it possible to prevent the direct modification of file
contents with Landlock.
The new LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE access right covers both the
truncate(2) and ftruncate(2) families of syscalls, as well as open(2)
with the O_TRUNC flag. This includes usages of creat() in the case
where existing regular files are overwritten.
Additionally, this introduces a new Landlock security blob associated
with opened files, to track the available Landlock access rights at
the time of opening the file. This is in line with Unix's general
approach of checking the read and write permissions during open(), and
associating this previously checked authorization with the opened
file. An ongoing patch documents this use case [3].
In order to treat truncate(2) and ftruncate(2) calls differently in an
LSM hook, we split apart the existing security_path_truncate hook into
security_path_truncate (for truncation by path) and
security_file_truncate (for truncation of previously opened files)"
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221018182216.301684-1-gnoack3000@gmail.com [1]
Link: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v6.1/userspace-api/landlock.html#filesystem-flags [2]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221209193813.972012-1-mic@digikod.net [3]
* tag 'landlock-6.2-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux:
samples/landlock: Document best-effort approach for LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER
landlock: Document Landlock's file truncation support
samples/landlock: Extend sample tool to support LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE
selftests/landlock: Test ftruncate on FDs created by memfd_create(2)
selftests/landlock: Test FD passing from restricted to unrestricted processes
selftests/landlock: Locally define __maybe_unused
selftests/landlock: Test open() and ftruncate() in multiple scenarios
selftests/landlock: Test file truncation support
landlock: Support file truncation
landlock: Document init_layer_masks() helper
landlock: Refactor check_access_path_dual() into is_access_to_paths_allowed()
security: Create file_truncate hook from path_truncate hook
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The vfs{g,u}id_{gt,lt}_* helpers are currently not needed outside of
ima and we shouldn't incentivize people to use them by placing them into
the header. Let's just define them locally in the one file in ima where
they are used.
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/idmapping
Pull vfsuid updates from Christian Brauner:
"Last cycle we introduced the vfs{g,u}id_t types and associated helpers
to gain type safety when dealing with idmapped mounts. That initial
work already converted a lot of places over but there were still some
left,
This converts all remaining places that still make use of non-type
safe idmapping helpers to rely on the new type safe vfs{g,u}id based
helpers.
Afterwards it removes all the old non-type safe helpers"
* tag 'fs.vfsuid.conversion.v6.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/idmapping:
fs: remove unused idmapping helpers
ovl: port to vfs{g,u}id_t and associated helpers
fuse: port to vfs{g,u}id_t and associated helpers
ima: use type safe idmapping helpers
apparmor: use type safe idmapping helpers
caps: use type safe idmapping helpers
fs: use type safe idmapping helpers
mnt_idmapping: add missing helpers
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/idmapping
Pull VFS acl updates from Christian Brauner:
"This contains the work that builds a dedicated vfs posix acl api.
The origins of this work trace back to v5.19 but it took quite a while
to understand the various filesystem specific implementations in
sufficient detail and also come up with an acceptable solution.
As we discussed and seen multiple times the current state of how posix
acls are handled isn't nice and comes with a lot of problems: The
current way of handling posix acls via the generic xattr api is error
prone, hard to maintain, and type unsafe for the vfs until we call
into the filesystem's dedicated get and set inode operations.
It is already the case that posix acls are special-cased to death all
the way through the vfs. There are an uncounted number of hacks that
operate on the uapi posix acl struct instead of the dedicated vfs
struct posix_acl. And the vfs must be involved in order to interpret
and fixup posix acls before storing them to the backing store, caching
them, reporting them to userspace, or for permission checking.
Currently a range of hacks and duct tape exist to make this work. As
with most things this is really no ones fault it's just something that
happened over time. But the code is hard to understand and difficult
to maintain and one is constantly at risk of introducing bugs and
regressions when having to touch it.
Instead of continuing to hack posix acls through the xattr handlers
this series builds a dedicated posix acl api solely around the get and
set inode operations.
Going forward, the vfs_get_acl(), vfs_remove_acl(), and vfs_set_acl()
helpers must be used in order to interact with posix acls. They
operate directly on the vfs internal struct posix_acl instead of
abusing the uapi posix acl struct as we currently do. In the end this
removes all of the hackiness, makes the codepaths easier to maintain,
and gets us type safety.
This series passes the LTP and xfstests suites without any
regressions. For xfstests the following combinations were tested:
- xfs
- ext4
- btrfs
- overlayfs
- overlayfs on top of idmapped mounts
- orangefs
- (limited) cifs
There's more simplifications for posix acls that we can make in the
future if the basic api has made it.
A few implementation details:
- The series makes sure to retain exactly the same security and
integrity module permission checks. Especially for the integrity
modules this api is a win because right now they convert the uapi
posix acl struct passed to them via a void pointer into the vfs
struct posix_acl format to perform permission checking on the mode.
There's a new dedicated security hook for setting posix acls which
passes the vfs struct posix_acl not a void pointer. Basing checking
on the posix acl stored in the uapi format is really unreliable.
The vfs currently hacks around directly in the uapi struct storing
values that frankly the security and integrity modules can't
correctly interpret as evidenced by bugs we reported and fixed in
this area. It's not necessarily even their fault it's just that the
format we provide to them is sub optimal.
- Some filesystems like 9p and cifs need access to the dentry in
order to get and set posix acls which is why they either only
partially or not even at all implement get and set inode
operations. For example, cifs allows setxattr() and getxattr()
operations but doesn't allow permission checking based on posix
acls because it can't implement a get acl inode operation.
Thus, this patch series updates the set acl inode operation to take
a dentry instead of an inode argument. However, for the get acl
inode operation we can't do this as the old get acl method is
called in e.g., generic_permission() and inode_permission(). These
helpers in turn are called in various filesystem's permission inode
operation. So passing a dentry argument to the old get acl inode
operation would amount to passing a dentry to the permission inode
operation which we shouldn't and probably can't do.
So instead of extending the existing inode operation Christoph
suggested to add a new one. He also requested to ensure that the
get and set acl inode operation taking a dentry are consistently
named. So for this version the old get acl operation is renamed to
->get_inode_acl() and a new ->get_acl() inode operation taking a
dentry is added. With this we can give both 9p and cifs get and set
acl inode operations and in turn remove their complex custom posix
xattr handlers.
In the future I hope to get rid of the inode method duplication but
it isn't like we have never had this situation. Readdir is just one
example. And frankly, the overall gain in type safety and the more
pleasant api wise are simply too big of a benefit to not accept
this duplication for a while.
- We've done a full audit of every codepaths using variant of the
current generic xattr api to get and set posix acls and
surprisingly it isn't that many places. There's of course always a
chance that we might have missed some and if so I'm sure we'll find
them soon enough.
The crucial codepaths to be converted are obviously stacking
filesystems such as ecryptfs and overlayfs.
For a list of all callers currently using generic xattr api helpers
see [2] including comments whether they support posix acls or not.
- The old vfs generic posix acl infrastructure doesn't obey the
create and replace semantics promised on the setxattr(2) manpage.
This patch series doesn't address this. It really is something we
should revisit later though.
The patches are roughly organized as follows:
(1) Change existing set acl inode operation to take a dentry
argument (Intended to be a non-functional change)
(2) Rename existing get acl method (Intended to be a non-functional
change)
(3) Implement get and set acl inode operations for filesystems that
couldn't implement one before because of the missing dentry.
That's mostly 9p and cifs (Intended to be a non-functional
change)
(4) Build posix acl api, i.e., add vfs_get_acl(), vfs_remove_acl(),
and vfs_set_acl() including security and integrity hooks
(Intended to be a non-functional change)
(5) Implement get and set acl inode operations for stacking
filesystems (Intended to be a non-functional change)
(6) Switch posix acl handling in stacking filesystems to new posix
acl api now that all filesystems it can stack upon support it.
(7) Switch vfs to new posix acl api (semantical change)
(8) Remove all now unused helpers
(9) Additional regression fixes reported after we merged this into
linux-next
Thanks to Seth for a lot of good discussion around this and
encouragement and input from Christoph"
* tag 'fs.acl.rework.v6.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/idmapping: (36 commits)
posix_acl: Fix the type of sentinel in get_acl
orangefs: fix mode handling
ovl: call posix_acl_release() after error checking
evm: remove dead code in evm_inode_set_acl()
cifs: check whether acl is valid early
acl: make vfs_posix_acl_to_xattr() static
acl: remove a slew of now unused helpers
9p: use stub posix acl handlers
cifs: use stub posix acl handlers
ovl: use stub posix acl handlers
ecryptfs: use stub posix acl handlers
evm: remove evm_xattr_acl_change()
xattr: use posix acl api
ovl: use posix acl api
ovl: implement set acl method
ovl: implement get acl method
ecryptfs: implement set acl method
ecryptfs: implement get acl method
ksmbd: use vfs_remove_acl()
acl: add vfs_remove_acl()
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull iov_iter updates from Al Viro:
"iov_iter work; most of that is about getting rid of direction
misannotations and (hopefully) preventing more of the same for the
future"
* tag 'pull-iov_iter' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
use less confusing names for iov_iter direction initializers
iov_iter: saner checks for attempt to copy to/from iterator
[xen] fix "direction" argument of iov_iter_kvec()
[vhost] fix 'direction' argument of iov_iter_{init,bvec}()
[target] fix iov_iter_bvec() "direction" argument
[s390] memcpy_real(): WRITE is "data source", not destination...
[s390] zcore: WRITE is "data source", not destination...
[infiniband] READ is "data destination", not source...
[fsi] WRITE is "data source", not destination...
[s390] copy_oldmem_kernel() - WRITE is "data source", not destination
csum_and_copy_to_iter(): handle ITER_DISCARD
get rid of unlikely() on page_copy_sane() calls
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/shuah/linux-kselftest
Pull KUnit updates from Shuah Khan:
"Several enhancements, fixes, clean-ups, documentation updates,
improvements to logging and KTAP compliance of KUnit test output:
- log numbers in decimal and hex
- parse KTAP compliant test output
- allow conditionally exposing static symbols to tests when KUNIT is
enabled
- make static symbols visible during kunit testing
- clean-ups to remove unused structure definition"
* tag 'linux-kselftest-kunit-next-6.2-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/shuah/linux-kselftest: (29 commits)
Documentation: dev-tools: Clarify requirements for result description
apparmor: test: make static symbols visible during kunit testing
kunit: add macro to allow conditionally exposing static symbols to tests
kunit: tool: make parser preserve whitespace when printing test log
Documentation: kunit: Fix "How Do I Use This" / "Next Steps" sections
kunit: tool: don't include KTAP headers and the like in the test log
kunit: improve KTAP compliance of KUnit test output
kunit: tool: parse KTAP compliant test output
mm: slub: test: Use the kunit_get_current_test() function
kunit: Use the static key when retrieving the current test
kunit: Provide a static key to check if KUnit is actively running tests
kunit: tool: make --json do nothing if --raw_ouput is set
kunit: tool: tweak error message when no KTAP found
kunit: remove KUNIT_INIT_MEM_ASSERTION macro
Documentation: kunit: Remove redundant 'tips.rst' page
Documentation: KUnit: reword description of assertions
Documentation: KUnit: make usage.rst a superset of tips.rst, remove duplication
kunit: eliminate KUNIT_INIT_*_ASSERT_STRUCT macros
kunit: tool: remove redundant file.close() call in unit test
kunit: tool: unit tests all check parser errors, standardize formatting a bit
...
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Use macros, VISIBLE_IF_KUNIT and EXPORT_SYMBOL_IF_KUNIT, to allow
static symbols to be conditionally set to be visible during
apparmor_policy_unpack_test, which removes the need to include the testing
file in the implementation file.
Change the namespace of the symbols that are now conditionally visible (by
adding the prefix aa_) to avoid confusion with symbols of the same name.
Allow the test to be built as a module and namespace the module name from
policy_unpack_test to apparmor_policy_unpack_test to improve clarity of
the module name.
Provide an example of how static symbols can be dealt with in testing.
Signed-off-by: Rae Moar <rmoar@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Gow <davidgow@google.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
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TEE trusted keys support depends on registered shared memory support
since the key buffers are needed to be registered with OP-TEE. So make
that dependency explicit to not register trusted keys support if
underlying implementation doesn't support registered shared memory.
Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Jerome Forissier <jerome.forissier@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Commit d2825fa9365d ("crypto: sm3,sm4 - move into crypto directory") moves
the SM3 and SM4 stand-alone library and the algorithm implementation for
the Crypto API into the same directory, and the corresponding relationship
of Kconfig is modified, CONFIG_CRYPTO_SM3/4 corresponds to the stand-alone
library of SM3/4, and CONFIG_CRYPTO_SM3/4_GENERIC corresponds to the
algorithm implementation for the Crypto API. Therefore, it is necessary
for this module to depend on the correct algorithm.
Fixes: d2825fa9365d ("crypto: sm3,sm4 - move into crypto directory")
Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.19+
Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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READ/WRITE proved to be actively confusing - the meanings are
"data destination, as used with read(2)" and "data source, as
used with write(2)", but people keep interpreting those as
"we read data from it" and "we write data to it", i.e. exactly
the wrong way.
Call them ITER_DEST and ITER_SOURCE - at least that is harder
to misinterpret...
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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The vfs_getxattr_alloc() function currently returns a ssize_t value
despite the fact that it only uses int values internally for return
values. Fix this by converting vfs_getxattr_alloc() to return an
int type and adjust the callers as necessary. As part of these
caller modifications, some of the callers are fixed to properly free
the xattr value buffer on both success and failure to ensure that
memory is not leaked in the failure case.
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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When add the 'a *:* rwm' entry to devcgroup A's whitelist, at first A's
exceptions will be cleaned and A's behavior is changed to
DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW. Then parent's exceptions will be copyed to A's
whitelist. If copy failure occurs, just return leaving A to grant
permissions to all devices. And A may grant more permissions than
parent.
Backup A's whitelist and recover original exceptions after copy
failure.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 4cef7299b478 ("device_cgroup: add proper checking when changing default behavior")
Signed-off-by: Wang Weiyang <wangweiyang2@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Aristeu Rozanski <aris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Enhance the details reported by "lsm.debug" in several ways:
- report contents of "security="
- report contents of "CONFIG_LSM"
- report contents of "lsm="
- report any early LSM details
- whitespace-align the output of similar phases for easier visual parsing
- change "disabled" to more accurate "skipped"
- explain what "skipped" and "ignored" mean in a parenthetical
Upgrade the "security= is ignored" warning from pr_info to pr_warn,
and include full arguments list to make the cause even more clear.
Replace static "Security Framework initializing" pr_info with specific
list of the resulting order of enabled LSMs.
For example, if the kernel is built with:
CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX=y
CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR=y
CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN=y
CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA=y
CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID=y
CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM=y
CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK=y
CONFIG_INTEGRITY=y
CONFIG_BPF_LSM=y
CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR=y
CONFIG_LSM="landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,selinux,
smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf"
Booting without options will show:
LSM: initializing lsm=lockdown,capability,landlock,yama,loadpin,
safesetid,integrity,selinux,bpf
landlock: Up and running.
Yama: becoming mindful.
LoadPin: ready to pin (currently not enforcing)
SELinux: Initializing.
LSM support for eBPF active
Boot with "lsm.debug" will show:
LSM: legacy security= *unspecified*
LSM: CONFIG_LSM=landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,
selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf
LSM: boot arg lsm= *unspecified*
LSM: early started: lockdown (enabled)
LSM: first ordered: capability (enabled)
LSM: builtin ordered: landlock (enabled)
LSM: builtin ignored: lockdown (not built into kernel)
LSM: builtin ordered: yama (enabled)
LSM: builtin ordered: loadpin (enabled)
LSM: builtin ordered: safesetid (enabled)
LSM: builtin ordered: integrity (enabled)
LSM: builtin ordered: selinux (enabled)
LSM: builtin ignored: smack (not built into kernel)
LSM: builtin ignored: tomoyo (not built into kernel)
LSM: builtin ordered: apparmor (enabled)
LSM: builtin ordered: bpf (enabled)
LSM: exclusive chosen: selinux
LSM: exclusive disabled: apparmor
LSM: initializing lsm=lockdown,capability,landlock,yama,loadpin,
safesetid,integrity,selinux,bpf
LSM: cred blob size = 32
LSM: file blob size = 16
LSM: inode blob size = 72
LSM: ipc blob size = 8
LSM: msg_msg blob size = 4
LSM: superblock blob size = 80
LSM: task blob size = 8
LSM: initializing capability
LSM: initializing landlock
landlock: Up and running.
LSM: initializing yama
Yama: becoming mindful.
LSM: initializing loadpin
LoadPin: ready to pin (currently not enforcing)
LSM: initializing safesetid
LSM: initializing integrity
LSM: initializing selinux
SELinux: Initializing.
LSM: initializing bpf
LSM support for eBPF active
And some examples of how the lsm.debug ordering report changes...
With "lsm.debug security=selinux":
LSM: legacy security=selinux
LSM: CONFIG_LSM=landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,
selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf
LSM: boot arg lsm= *unspecified*
LSM: early started: lockdown (enabled)
LSM: first ordered: capability (enabled)
LSM: security=selinux disabled: apparmor (only one legacy major LSM)
LSM: builtin ordered: landlock (enabled)
LSM: builtin ignored: lockdown (not built into kernel)
LSM: builtin ordered: yama (enabled)
LSM: builtin ordered: loadpin (enabled)
LSM: builtin ordered: safesetid (enabled)
LSM: builtin ordered: integrity (enabled)
LSM: builtin ordered: selinux (enabled)
LSM: builtin ignored: smack (not built into kernel)
LSM: builtin ignored: tomoyo (not built into kernel)
LSM: builtin ordered: apparmor (disabled)
LSM: builtin ordered: bpf (enabled)
LSM: exclusive chosen: selinux
LSM: initializing lsm=lockdown,capability,landlock,yama,loadpin,
safesetid,integrity,selinux,bpf
With "lsm.debug lsm=integrity,selinux,loadpin,crabability,bpf,
loadpin,loadpin":
LSM: legacy security= *unspecified*
LSM: CONFIG_LSM=landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,
selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf
LSM: boot arg lsm=integrity,selinux,loadpin,capability,bpf,loadpin,
loadpin
LSM: early started: lockdown (enabled)
LSM: first ordered: capability (enabled)
LSM: cmdline ordered: integrity (enabled)
LSM: cmdline ordered: selinux (enabled)
LSM: cmdline ordered: loadpin (enabled)
LSM: cmdline ignored: crabability (not built into kernel)
LSM: cmdline ordered: bpf (enabled)
LSM: cmdline skipped: apparmor (not in requested order)
LSM: cmdline skipped: yama (not in requested order)
LSM: cmdline skipped: safesetid (not in requested order)
LSM: cmdline skipped: landlock (not in requested order)
LSM: exclusive chosen: selinux
LSM: initializing lsm=lockdown,capability,integrity,selinux,loadpin,bpf
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
[PM: line wrapped commit description]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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The input parameter @fields is type of struct ima_template_field ***, so
when allocates array memory for @fields, the size of element should be
sizeof(**field) instead of sizeof(*field).
Actually the original code would not cause any runtime error, but it's
better to make it logically right.
Fixes: adf53a778a0a ("ima: new templates management mechanism")
Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Key restriction is allocated in integrity_init_keyring(). However, if
keyring allocation failed, it is not freed, causing memory leaks.
Fixes: 2b6aa412ff23 ("KEYS: Use structure to capture key restriction function and data")
Signed-off-by: GUO Zihua <guozihua@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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The sidtab conversion code has support for multiple context
conversion routines through the use of function pointers and
indirect calls. However, the reality is that all current users rely
on the same conversion routine: convert_context(). This patch does
away with this extra complexity and replaces the indirect calls
with direct function calls; allowing us to remove a layer of
obfuscation and create cleaner, more maintainable code.
Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Commit 4ff09db1b79b ("bpf: net: Change sk_getsockopt() to take the
sockptr_t argument") made it possible to call sk_getsockopt()
with both user and kernel address space buffers through the use of
the sockptr_t type. Unfortunately at the time of conversion the
security_socket_getpeersec_stream() LSM hook was written to only
accept userspace buffers, and in a desire to avoid having to change
the LSM hook the commit author simply passed the sockptr_t's
userspace buffer pointer. Since the only sk_getsockopt() callers
at the time of conversion which used kernel sockptr_t buffers did
not allow SO_PEERSEC, and hence the
security_socket_getpeersec_stream() hook, this was acceptable but
also very fragile as future changes presented the possibility of
silently passing kernel space pointers to the LSM hook.
There are several ways to protect against this, including careful
code review of future commits, but since relying on code review to
catch bugs is a recipe for disaster and the upstream eBPF maintainer
is "strongly against defensive programming", this patch updates the
LSM hook, and all of the implementations to support sockptr_t and
safely handle both user and kernel space buffers.
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Commit f3cc6b25dcc5 ("ima: always measure and audit files in policy") lets
measurement or audit happen even if the file digest cannot be calculated.
As a result, iint->ima_hash could have been allocated despite
ima_collect_measurement() returning an error.
Since ima_hash belongs to a temporary inode metadata structure, declared
at the beginning of __ima_inode_hash(), just add a kfree() call if
ima_collect_measurement() returns an error different from -ENOMEM (in that
case, ima_hash should not have been allocated).
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 280fe8367b0d ("ima: Always return a file measurement in ima_file_hash()")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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IMA relies on the blocking LSM policy notifier callback to update the
LSM based IMA policy rules.
When SELinux update its policies, IMA would be notified and starts
updating all its lsm rules one-by-one. During this time, -ESTALE would
be returned by ima_filter_rule_match() if it is called with a LSM rule
that has not yet been updated. In ima_match_rules(), -ESTALE is not
handled, and the LSM rule is considered a match, causing extra files
to be measured by IMA.
Fix it by re-initializing a temporary rule if -ESTALE is returned by
ima_filter_rule_match(). The origin rule in the rule list would be
updated by the LSM policy notifier callback.
Fixes: b16942455193 ("ima: use the lsm policy update notifier")
Signed-off-by: GUO Zihua <guozihua@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Currently ima_lsm_copy_rule() set the arg_p field of the source rule to
NULL, so that the source rule could be freed afterward. It does not make
sense for this behavior to be inside a "copy" function. So move it
outside and let the caller handle this field.
ima_lsm_copy_rule() now produce a shallow copy of the original entry
including args_p field. Meaning only the lsm.rule and the rule itself
should be freed for the original rule. Thus, instead of calling
ima_lsm_free_rule() which frees lsm.rule as well as args_p field, free
the lsm.rule directly.
Signed-off-by: GUO Zihua <guozihua@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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In restore_template_fmt, when kstrdup fails, a non-NULL value will still be
returned, which causes a NULL pointer access in template_desc_init_fields.
Fixes: c7d09367702e ("ima: support restoring multiple template formats")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Co-developed-by: Jiaming Li <lijiaming30@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiaming Li <lijiaming30@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Huaxin Lu <luhuaxin1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
|
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Make sure array_size is initialized in the kunit test to get rid of
compiler warnings. This will also make sure the following tests fail
consistently if the first test fails.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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The aa_setup_dfa_engine() and aa_teardown_dfa_engine() is only called in
apparmor_init(), so let us add __init annotation to them.
Fixes: 11c236b89d7c ("apparmor: add a default null dfa")
Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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The iMac Pro 2017 is also a T2 Mac. Thus add it to the list of uefi skip
cert.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 155ca952c7ca ("efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/9D46D92F-1381-4F10-989C-1A12CD2FFDD8@live.com/
Signed-off-by: Aditya Garg <gargaditya08@live.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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After changes in commit a1bd627b46d1 ("apparmor: share profile name on
replacement"), the hname member of struct aa_policy is not valid slab
object, but a subset of that, it can not be freed by kfree_sensitive(),
use aa_policy_destroy() to fix it.
Fixes: a1bd627b46d1 ("apparmor: share profile name on replacement")
Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm
Pull LSM fix from Paul Moore:
"A single patch to the capabilities code to fix a potential memory leak
in the xattr allocation error handling"
* tag 'lsm-pr-20221031' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm:
capabilities: fix potential memleak on error path from vfs_getxattr_alloc()
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When evm_status is INTEGRITY_PASS then this function returns early and so
later codepaths that check for evm_status != INTEGRITY_PASS can be removed
as they are dead code.
Fixes: e61b135f7bfe ("integrity: implement get and set acl hook")
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
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In cap_inode_getsecurity(), we will use vfs_getxattr_alloc() to
complete the memory allocation of tmpbuf, if we have completed
the memory allocation of tmpbuf, but failed to call handler->get(...),
there will be a memleak in below logic:
|-- ret = (int)vfs_getxattr_alloc(mnt_userns, ...)
| /* ^^^ alloc for tmpbuf */
|-- value = krealloc(*xattr_value, error + 1, flags)
| /* ^^^ alloc memory */
|-- error = handler->get(handler, ...)
| /* error! */
|-- *xattr_value = value
| /* xattr_value is &tmpbuf (memory leak!) */
So we will try to free(tmpbuf) after vfs_getxattr_alloc() fails to fix it.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 8db6c34f1dbc ("Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities")
Signed-off-by: Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
[PM: subject line and backtrace tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
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The current code provokes some kernel-doc warnings:
security/lsm_audit.c:198: warning: Function parameter or member
'ab' not described in 'dump_common_audit_data'
Signed-off-by: Bo Liu <liubo03@inspur.com>
[PM: description line wrap]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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We already ported most parts and filesystems over for v6.0 to the new
vfs{g,u}id_t type and associated helpers for v6.0. Convert the remaining
places so we can remove all the old helpers.
This is a non-functional change.
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee (DigitalOcean) <sforshee@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
|
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We already ported most parts and filesystems over for v6.0 to the new
vfs{g,u}id_t type and associated helpers for v6.0. Convert the remaining
places so we can remove all the old helpers.
This is a non-functional change.
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee (DigitalOcean) <sforshee@kernel.org>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
|
|
We already ported most parts and filesystems over for v6.0 to the new
vfs{g,u}id_t type and associated helpers for v6.0. Convert the remaining
places so we can remove all the old helpers.
This is a non-functional change.
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee (DigitalOcean) <sforshee@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
|
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Before aa_alloc_profile(), it has allocated string for @*ns_name if @tmpns
is not NULL, so directly return -ENOMEM if aa_alloc_profile() failed will
cause a memleak issue, and even if aa_alloc_profile() succeed, in the
@fail_profile tag of aa_unpack(), it need to free @ns_name as well, this
patch fixes them.
Fixes: 736ec752d95e ("AppArmor: policy routines for loading and unpacking policy")
Fixes: 04dc715e24d0 ("apparmor: audit policy ns specified in policy load")
Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
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When the aa_profile is released, we will call free_ruleset to
release aa_ruleset, but we don't free the memory of aa_ruleset,
so there will be memleak, fix it.
unreferenced object 0xffff8881475df800 (size 1024):
comm "apparmor_parser", pid 883, jiffies 4294899650 (age 9114.088s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 f8 5d 47 81 88 ff ff 00 f8 5d 47 81 88 ff ff ..]G......]G....
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 dc 65 47 81 88 ff ff ..........eG....
backtrace:
[<00000000370e658e>] __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x182/0x700
[<00000000f2f5a6d2>] kmalloc_trace+0x2c/0x130
[<00000000c5c905b3>] aa_alloc_profile+0x1bc/0x5c0
[<00000000bc4fa72b>] unpack_profile+0x319/0x30c0
[<00000000eab791e9>] aa_unpack+0x307/0x1450
[<000000002c3a6ee1>] aa_replace_profiles+0x1b8/0x3790
[<00000000d0c3fd54>] policy_update+0x35a/0x890
[<00000000d04fed90>] profile_replace+0x1d1/0x260
[<00000000cba0c0a7>] vfs_write+0x283/0xd10
[<000000006bae64a5>] ksys_write+0x134/0x260
[<00000000b2fd8f31>] __x64_sys_write+0x78/0xb0
[<00000000f3c8a015>] do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x90
[<00000000a242b1db>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
Fixes: 217af7e2f4de ("apparmor: refactor profile rules and attachments")
Signed-off-by: Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
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'resouce' -> 'resource'
Link: https://bugzilla.openanolis.cn/show_bug.cgi?id=2396
Reported-by: Abaci Robot <abaci@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Li <yang.lee@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
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According to the implementations of cred_label() and set_cred_label(),
we should use pointer to struct aa_label for lbs_cred instead of struct
aa_task_ctx, this patch fixes it.
Fixes: bbd3662a8348 ("Infrastructure management of the cred security blob")
Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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security/apparmor/ipc.c:53: warning: expecting prototype for audit_cb(). Prototype was for audit_signal_cb() instead.
Link: https://bugzilla.openanolis.cn/show_bug.cgi?id=2337
Reported-by: Abaci Robot <abaci@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiapeng Chong <jiapeng.chong@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
