From dfa73c17d55b921e1d4e154976de35317e43a93a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lin Ma Date: Tue, 27 Jun 2023 11:31:38 +0800 Subject: net: xfrm: Fix xfrm_address_filter OOB read We found below OOB crash: [ 44.211730] ================================================================== [ 44.212045] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in memcmp+0x8b/0xb0 [ 44.212045] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800870f320 by task poc.xfrm/97 [ 44.212045] [ 44.212045] CPU: 0 PID: 97 Comm: poc.xfrm Not tainted 6.4.0-rc7-00072-gdad9774deaf1-dirty #4 [ 44.212045] Call Trace: [ 44.212045] [ 44.212045] dump_stack_lvl+0x37/0x50 [ 44.212045] print_report+0xcc/0x620 [ 44.212045] ? __virt_addr_valid+0xf3/0x170 [ 44.212045] ? memcmp+0x8b/0xb0 [ 44.212045] kasan_report+0xb2/0xe0 [ 44.212045] ? memcmp+0x8b/0xb0 [ 44.212045] kasan_check_range+0x39/0x1c0 [ 44.212045] memcmp+0x8b/0xb0 [ 44.212045] xfrm_state_walk+0x21c/0x420 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_dump_one_state+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] xfrm_dump_sa+0x1e2/0x290 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_xfrm_dump_sa+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? __kernel_text_address+0xd/0x40 [ 44.212045] ? kasan_unpoison+0x27/0x60 [ 44.212045] ? mutex_lock+0x60/0xe0 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_mutex_lock+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50 [ 44.212045] netlink_dump+0x322/0x6c0 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_netlink_dump+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? mutex_unlock+0x7f/0xd0 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_mutex_unlock+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] __netlink_dump_start+0x353/0x430 [ 44.212045] xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x3a4/0x410 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_xfrm_dump_sa+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_xfrm_dump_sa_done+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? __stack_depot_save+0x382/0x4e0 [ 44.212045] ? filter_irq_stacks+0x1c/0x70 [ 44.212045] ? kasan_save_stack+0x32/0x50 [ 44.212045] ? kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50 [ 44.212045] ? kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 [ 44.212045] ? __kasan_slab_alloc+0x59/0x70 [ 44.212045] ? kmem_cache_alloc_node+0xf7/0x260 [ 44.212045] ? kmalloc_reserve+0xab/0x120 [ 44.212045] ? __alloc_skb+0xcf/0x210 [ 44.212045] ? netlink_sendmsg+0x509/0x700 [ 44.212045] ? sock_sendmsg+0xde/0xe0 [ 44.212045] ? __sys_sendto+0x18d/0x230 [ 44.212045] ? __x64_sys_sendto+0x71/0x90 [ 44.212045] ? do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 [ 44.212045] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc [ 44.212045] ? netlink_sendmsg+0x509/0x700 [ 44.212045] ? sock_sendmsg+0xde/0xe0 [ 44.212045] ? __sys_sendto+0x18d/0x230 [ 44.212045] ? __x64_sys_sendto+0x71/0x90 [ 44.212045] ? do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 [ 44.212045] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc [ 44.212045] ? kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50 [ 44.212045] ? kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 [ 44.212045] ? kasan_save_free_info+0x2e/0x50 [ 44.212045] ? __kasan_slab_free+0x10a/0x190 [ 44.212045] ? kmem_cache_free+0x9c/0x340 [ 44.212045] ? netlink_recvmsg+0x23c/0x660 [ 44.212045] ? sock_recvmsg+0xeb/0xf0 [ 44.212045] ? __sys_recvfrom+0x13c/0x1f0 [ 44.212045] ? __x64_sys_recvfrom+0x71/0x90 [ 44.212045] ? do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 [ 44.212045] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc [ 44.212045] ? copyout+0x3e/0x50 [ 44.212045] netlink_rcv_skb+0xd6/0x210 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_netlink_rcv_skb+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_sock_has_perm+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? mutex_lock+0x8d/0xe0 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_mutex_lock+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x44/0x50 [ 44.212045] netlink_unicast+0x36f/0x4c0 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_netlink_unicast+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? netlink_recvmsg+0x500/0x660 [ 44.212045] netlink_sendmsg+0x3b7/0x700 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_netlink_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_netlink_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] sock_sendmsg+0xde/0xe0 [ 44.212045] __sys_sendto+0x18d/0x230 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx___sys_sendto+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? rcu_core+0x44a/0xe10 [ 44.212045] ? __rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x45b/0x740 [ 44.212045] ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x81/0xe0 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx___rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_restore_fpregs_from_fpstate+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_blkcg_maybe_throttle_current+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_task_work_run+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] __x64_sys_sendto+0x71/0x90 [ 44.212045] do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 [ 44.212045] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc [ 44.212045] RIP: 0033:0x44b7da [ 44.212045] RSP: 002b:00007ffdc8838548 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c [ 44.212045] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffdc8839978 RCX: 000000000044b7da [ 44.212045] RDX: 0000000000000038 RSI: 00007ffdc8838770 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 44.212045] RBP: 00007ffdc88385b0 R08: 00007ffdc883858c R09: 000000000000000c [ 44.212045] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001 [ 44.212045] R13: 00007ffdc8839968 R14: 00000000004c37d0 R15: 0000000000000001 [ 44.212045] [ 44.212045] [ 44.212045] Allocated by task 97: [ 44.212045] kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50 [ 44.212045] kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 [ 44.212045] __kasan_kmalloc+0x7f/0x90 [ 44.212045] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x5b/0x140 [ 44.212045] kmemdup+0x21/0x50 [ 44.212045] xfrm_dump_sa+0x17d/0x290 [ 44.212045] netlink_dump+0x322/0x6c0 [ 44.212045] __netlink_dump_start+0x353/0x430 [ 44.212045] xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x3a4/0x410 [ 44.212045] netlink_rcv_skb+0xd6/0x210 [ 44.212045] xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x44/0x50 [ 44.212045] netlink_unicast+0x36f/0x4c0 [ 44.212045] netlink_sendmsg+0x3b7/0x700 [ 44.212045] sock_sendmsg+0xde/0xe0 [ 44.212045] __sys_sendto+0x18d/0x230 [ 44.212045] __x64_sys_sendto+0x71/0x90 [ 44.212045] do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 [ 44.212045] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc [ 44.212045] [ 44.212045] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800870f300 [ 44.212045] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-64 of size 64 [ 44.212045] The buggy address is located 32 bytes inside of [ 44.212045] allocated 36-byte region [ffff88800870f300, ffff88800870f324) [ 44.212045] [ 44.212045] The buggy address belongs to the physical page: [ 44.212045] page:00000000e4de16ee refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:000000000 ... [ 44.212045] flags: 0x100000000000200(slab|node=0|zone=1) [ 44.212045] page_type: 0xffffffff() [ 44.212045] raw: 0100000000000200 ffff888004c41640 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 [ 44.212045] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080200020 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 44.212045] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 44.212045] [ 44.212045] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 44.212045] ffff88800870f200: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 44.212045] ffff88800870f280: 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 44.212045] >ffff88800870f300: 00 00 00 00 04 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 44.212045] ^ [ 44.212045] ffff88800870f380: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 44.212045] ffff88800870f400: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 44.212045] ================================================================== By investigating the code, we find the root cause of this OOB is the lack of checks in xfrm_dump_sa(). The buggy code allows a malicious user to pass arbitrary value of filter->splen/dplen. Hence, with crafted xfrm states, the attacker can achieve 8 bytes heap OOB read, which causes info leak. if (attrs[XFRMA_ADDRESS_FILTER]) { filter = kmemdup(nla_data(attrs[XFRMA_ADDRESS_FILTER]), sizeof(*filter), GFP_KERNEL); if (filter == NULL) return -ENOMEM; // NO MORE CHECKS HERE !!! } This patch fixes the OOB by adding necessary boundary checks, just like the code in pfkey_dump() function. Fixes: d3623099d350 ("ipsec: add support of limited SA dump") Signed-off-by: Lin Ma Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert --- net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) (limited to 'net/xfrm') diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c index c34a2a06ca94..7c91deadc36e 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c @@ -1267,6 +1267,15 @@ static int xfrm_dump_sa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb) sizeof(*filter), GFP_KERNEL); if (filter == NULL) return -ENOMEM; + + /* see addr_match(), (prefix length >> 5) << 2 + * will be used to compare xfrm_address_t + */ + if (filter->splen > (sizeof(xfrm_address_t) << 3) || + filter->dplen > (sizeof(xfrm_address_t) << 3)) { + kfree(filter); + return -EINVAL; + } } if (attrs[XFRMA_PROTO]) -- cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2 From d1e0e61d617ba17aa516db707aa871387566bbf7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lin Ma Date: Fri, 30 Jun 2023 16:19:11 +0800 Subject: net: xfrm: Amend XFRMA_SEC_CTX nla_policy structure According to all consumers code of attrs[XFRMA_SEC_CTX], like * verify_sec_ctx_len(), convert to xfrm_user_sec_ctx* * xfrm_state_construct(), call security_xfrm_state_alloc whose prototype is int security_xfrm_state_alloc(.., struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx); * copy_from_user_sec_ctx(), convert to xfrm_user_sec_ctx * ... It seems that the expected parsing result for XFRMA_SEC_CTX should be structure xfrm_user_sec_ctx, and the current xfrm_sec_ctx is confusing and misleading (Luckily, they happen to have same size 8 bytes). This commit amend the policy structure to xfrm_user_sec_ctx to avoid ambiguity. Fixes: cf5cb79f6946 ("[XFRM] netlink: Establish an attribute policy") Signed-off-by: Lin Ma Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert --- net/xfrm/xfrm_compat.c | 2 +- net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net/xfrm') diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_compat.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_compat.c index 8cbf45a8bcdc..655fe4ff8621 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_compat.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_compat.c @@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ static const struct nla_policy compat_policy[XFRMA_MAX+1] = { [XFRMA_ALG_COMP] = { .len = sizeof(struct xfrm_algo) }, [XFRMA_ENCAP] = { .len = sizeof(struct xfrm_encap_tmpl) }, [XFRMA_TMPL] = { .len = sizeof(struct xfrm_user_tmpl) }, - [XFRMA_SEC_CTX] = { .len = sizeof(struct xfrm_sec_ctx) }, + [XFRMA_SEC_CTX] = { .len = sizeof(struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx) }, [XFRMA_LTIME_VAL] = { .len = sizeof(struct xfrm_lifetime_cur) }, [XFRMA_REPLAY_VAL] = { .len = sizeof(struct xfrm_replay_state) }, [XFRMA_REPLAY_THRESH] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c index 7c91deadc36e..fdc0c17122b6 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c @@ -3024,7 +3024,7 @@ const struct nla_policy xfrma_policy[XFRMA_MAX+1] = { [XFRMA_ALG_COMP] = { .len = sizeof(struct xfrm_algo) }, [XFRMA_ENCAP] = { .len = sizeof(struct xfrm_encap_tmpl) }, [XFRMA_TMPL] = { .len = sizeof(struct xfrm_user_tmpl) }, - [XFRMA_SEC_CTX] = { .len = sizeof(struct xfrm_sec_ctx) }, + [XFRMA_SEC_CTX] = { .len = sizeof(struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx) }, [XFRMA_LTIME_VAL] = { .len = sizeof(struct xfrm_lifetime_cur) }, [XFRMA_REPLAY_VAL] = { .len = sizeof(struct xfrm_replay_state) }, [XFRMA_REPLAY_THRESH] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, -- cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2 From 57010b8ece2821a1fdfdba2197d14a022f3769db Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Herbert Xu Date: Tue, 4 Jul 2023 08:53:49 +0800 Subject: xfrm: Silence warnings triggerable by bad packets MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit After the elimination of inner modes, a couple of warnings that were previously unreachable can now be triggered by malformed inbound packets. Fix this by: 1. Moving the setting of skb->protocol into the decap functions. 2. Returning -EINVAL when unexpected protocol is seen. Reported-by: Maciej Żenczykowski Fixes: 5f24f41e8ea6 ("xfrm: Remove inner/outer modes from input path") Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Reviewed-by: Maciej Żenczykowski Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert --- net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c | 22 +++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) (limited to 'net/xfrm') diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c index 815b38080401..d5ee96789d4b 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c @@ -180,6 +180,8 @@ static int xfrm4_remove_beet_encap(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb) int optlen = 0; int err = -EINVAL; + skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IP); + if (unlikely(XFRM_MODE_SKB_CB(skb)->protocol == IPPROTO_BEETPH)) { struct ip_beet_phdr *ph; int phlen; @@ -232,6 +234,8 @@ static int xfrm4_remove_tunnel_encap(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb) { int err = -EINVAL; + skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IP); + if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct iphdr))) goto out; @@ -267,6 +271,8 @@ static int xfrm6_remove_tunnel_encap(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb) { int err = -EINVAL; + skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IPV6); + if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct ipv6hdr))) goto out; @@ -296,6 +302,8 @@ static int xfrm6_remove_beet_encap(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb) int size = sizeof(struct ipv6hdr); int err; + skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IPV6); + err = skb_cow_head(skb, size + skb->mac_len); if (err) goto out; @@ -346,6 +354,7 @@ xfrm_inner_mode_encap_remove(struct xfrm_state *x, return xfrm6_remove_tunnel_encap(x, skb); break; } + return -EINVAL; } WARN_ON_ONCE(1); @@ -366,19 +375,6 @@ static int xfrm_prepare_input(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb) return -EAFNOSUPPORT; } - switch (XFRM_MODE_SKB_CB(skb)->protocol) { - case IPPROTO_IPIP: - case IPPROTO_BEETPH: - skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IP); - break; - case IPPROTO_IPV6: - skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IPV6); - break; - default: - WARN_ON_ONCE(1); - break; - } - return xfrm_inner_mode_encap_remove(x, skb); } -- cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2 From 53223f2ed1ef5c90dad814daaaefea4e68a933c8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zhengchao Shao Date: Mon, 10 Jul 2023 17:40:51 +0800 Subject: xfrm: fix slab-use-after-free in decode_session6 When the xfrm device is set to the qdisc of the sfb type, the cb field of the sent skb may be modified during enqueuing. Then, slab-use-after-free may occur when the xfrm device sends IPv6 packets. The stack information is as follows: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in decode_session6+0x103f/0x1890 Read of size 1 at addr ffff8881111458ef by task swapper/3/0 CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Not tainted 6.4.0-next-20230707 #409 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-1.fc33 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x150 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x3c0 kasan_report+0x11d/0x130 decode_session6+0x103f/0x1890 __xfrm_decode_session+0x54/0xb0 xfrmi_xmit+0x173/0x1ca0 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x187/0x700 sch_direct_xmit+0x1a3/0xc30 __qdisc_run+0x510/0x17a0 __dev_queue_xmit+0x2215/0x3b10 neigh_connected_output+0x3c2/0x550 ip6_finish_output2+0x55a/0x1550 ip6_finish_output+0x6b9/0x1270 ip6_output+0x1f1/0x540 ndisc_send_skb+0xa63/0x1890 ndisc_send_rs+0x132/0x6f0 addrconf_rs_timer+0x3f1/0x870 call_timer_fn+0x1a0/0x580 expire_timers+0x29b/0x4b0 run_timer_softirq+0x326/0x910 __do_softirq+0x1d4/0x905 irq_exit_rcu+0xb7/0x120 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x97/0xc0 asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 RIP: 0010:intel_idle_hlt+0x23/0x30 Code: 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 41 54 41 89 d4 0f 1f 44 00 00 66 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 0f 00 2d c4 9f ab 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 fb f4 44 89 e0 41 5c c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 41 54 41 89 d4 RSP: 0018:ffffc90000197d78 EFLAGS: 00000246 RAX: 00000000000a83c3 RBX: ffffe8ffffd09c50 RCX: ffffffff8a22d8e5 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffff8d3f8080 RDI: ffffe8ffffd09c50 RBP: ffffffff8d3f8080 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed1026ba6d9d R10: ffff888135d36ceb R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: ffffffff8d3f8100 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000000 cpuidle_enter_state+0xd3/0x6f0 cpuidle_enter+0x4e/0xa0 do_idle+0x2fe/0x3c0 cpu_startup_entry+0x18/0x20 start_secondary+0x200/0x290 secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0x167/0x16b Allocated by task 939: kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x40 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x7f/0x90 kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x1cd/0x410 kmalloc_reserve+0x165/0x270 __alloc_skb+0x129/0x330 inet6_ifa_notify+0x118/0x230 __ipv6_ifa_notify+0x177/0xbe0 addrconf_dad_completed+0x133/0xe00 addrconf_dad_work+0x764/0x1390 process_one_work+0xa32/0x16f0 worker_thread+0x67d/0x10c0 kthread+0x344/0x440 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888111145800 which belongs to the cache skbuff_small_head of size 640 The buggy address is located 239 bytes inside of freed 640-byte region [ffff888111145800, ffff888111145a80) As commit f855691975bb ("xfrm6: Fix the nexthdr offset in _decode_session6.") showed, xfrm_decode_session was originally intended only for the receive path. IP6CB(skb)->nhoff is not set during transmission. Therefore, set the cb field in the skb to 0 before sending packets. Fixes: f855691975bb ("xfrm6: Fix the nexthdr offset in _decode_session6.") Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert --- net/xfrm/xfrm_interface_core.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net/xfrm') diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_interface_core.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_interface_core.c index a3319965470a..b86474084690 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_interface_core.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_interface_core.c @@ -537,8 +537,8 @@ static netdev_tx_t xfrmi_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev) switch (skb->protocol) { case htons(ETH_P_IPV6): - xfrm_decode_session(skb, &fl, AF_INET6); memset(IP6CB(skb), 0, sizeof(*IP6CB(skb))); + xfrm_decode_session(skb, &fl, AF_INET6); if (!dst) { fl.u.ip6.flowi6_oif = dev->ifindex; fl.u.ip6.flowi6_flags |= FLOWI_FLAG_ANYSRC; @@ -552,8 +552,8 @@ static netdev_tx_t xfrmi_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev) } break; case htons(ETH_P_IP): - xfrm_decode_session(skb, &fl, AF_INET); memset(IPCB(skb), 0, sizeof(*IPCB(skb))); + xfrm_decode_session(skb, &fl, AF_INET); if (!dst) { struct rtable *rt; -- cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2 From 00374d9b6d9f932802b55181be9831aa948e5b7c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lin Ma Date: Fri, 21 Jul 2023 22:51:03 +0800 Subject: xfrm: add NULL check in xfrm_update_ae_params Normally, x->replay_esn and x->preplay_esn should be allocated at xfrm_alloc_replay_state_esn(...) in xfrm_state_construct(...), hence the xfrm_update_ae_params(...) is okay to update them. However, the current implementation of xfrm_new_ae(...) allows a malicious user to directly dereference a NULL pointer and crash the kernel like below. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 PGD 8253067 P4D 8253067 PUD 8e0e067 PMD 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 0 PID: 98 Comm: poc.npd Not tainted 6.4.0-rc7-00072-gdad9774deaf1 #8 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.o4 RIP: 0010:memcpy_orig+0xad/0x140 Code: e8 4c 89 5f e0 48 8d 7f e0 73 d2 83 c2 20 48 29 d6 48 29 d7 83 fa 10 72 34 4c 8b 06 4c 8b 4e 08 c RSP: 0018:ffff888008f57658 EFLAGS: 00000202 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888008bd0000 RCX: ffffffff8238e571 RDX: 0000000000000018 RSI: ffff888007f64844 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff888008f57818 R13: ffff888007f64aa4 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00000000014013c0(0000) GS:ffff88806d600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000000054d8000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: ? __die+0x1f/0x70 ? page_fault_oops+0x1e8/0x500 ? __pfx_is_prefetch.constprop.0+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_page_fault_oops+0x10/0x10 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x11/0x40 ? fixup_exception+0x36/0x460 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x11/0x40 ? exc_page_fault+0x5e/0xc0 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 ? xfrm_update_ae_params+0xd1/0x260 ? memcpy_orig+0xad/0x140 ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_bh+0x10/0x10 xfrm_update_ae_params+0xe7/0x260 xfrm_new_ae+0x298/0x4e0 ? __pfx_xfrm_new_ae+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_xfrm_new_ae+0x10/0x10 xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x25a/0x410 ? __pfx_xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 ? __alloc_skb+0xcf/0x210 ? stack_trace_save+0x90/0xd0 ? filter_irq_stacks+0x1c/0x70 ? __stack_depot_save+0x39/0x4e0 ? __kasan_slab_free+0x10a/0x190 ? kmem_cache_free+0x9c/0x340 ? netlink_recvmsg+0x23c/0x660 ? sock_recvmsg+0xeb/0xf0 ? __sys_recvfrom+0x13c/0x1f0 ? __x64_sys_recvfrom+0x71/0x90 ? do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc ? copyout+0x3e/0x50 netlink_rcv_skb+0xd6/0x210 ? __pfx_xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_netlink_rcv_skb+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_sock_has_perm+0x10/0x10 ? mutex_lock+0x8d/0xe0 ? __pfx_mutex_lock+0x10/0x10 xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x44/0x50 netlink_unicast+0x36f/0x4c0 ? __pfx_netlink_unicast+0x10/0x10 ? netlink_recvmsg+0x500/0x660 netlink_sendmsg+0x3b7/0x700 This Null-ptr-deref bug is assigned CVE-2023-3772. And this commit adds additional NULL check in xfrm_update_ae_params to fix the NPD. Fixes: d8647b79c3b7 ("xfrm: Add user interface for esn and big anti-replay windows") Signed-off-by: Lin Ma Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert --- net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net/xfrm') diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c index fdc0c17122b6..8f74dde4a55f 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c @@ -628,7 +628,7 @@ static void xfrm_update_ae_params(struct xfrm_state *x, struct nlattr **attrs, struct nlattr *rt = attrs[XFRMA_REPLAY_THRESH]; struct nlattr *mt = attrs[XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH]; - if (re) { + if (re && x->replay_esn && x->preplay_esn) { struct xfrm_replay_state_esn *replay_esn; replay_esn = nla_data(re); memcpy(x->replay_esn, replay_esn, -- cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2 From 5e2424708da7207087934c5c75211e8584d553a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lin Ma Date: Sun, 23 Jul 2023 15:41:10 +0800 Subject: xfrm: add forgotten nla_policy for XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH The previous commit 4e484b3e969b ("xfrm: rate limit SA mapping change message to user space") added one additional attribute named XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH and described its type at compat_policy (net/xfrm/xfrm_compat.c). However, the author forgot to also describe the nla_policy at xfrma_policy (net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c). Hence, this suppose NLA_U32 (4 bytes) value can be faked as empty (0 bytes) by a malicious user, which leads to 4 bytes overflow read and heap information leak when parsing nlattrs. To exploit this, one malicious user can spray the SLUB objects and then leverage this 4 bytes OOB read to leak the heap data into x->mapping_maxage (see xfrm_update_ae_params(...)), and leak it to userspace via copy_to_user_state_extra(...). The above bug is assigned CVE-2023-3773. To fix it, this commit just completes the nla_policy description for XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH, which enforces the length check and avoids such OOB read. Fixes: 4e484b3e969b ("xfrm: rate limit SA mapping change message to user space") Signed-off-by: Lin Ma Reviewed-by: Simon Horman Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert --- net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'net/xfrm') diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c index 8f74dde4a55f..f06d6deb58dd 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c @@ -3044,6 +3044,7 @@ const struct nla_policy xfrma_policy[XFRMA_MAX+1] = { [XFRMA_SET_MARK] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, [XFRMA_SET_MARK_MASK] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, [XFRMA_IF_ID] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, + [XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, }; EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xfrma_policy); -- cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2 From 982c3aca8bac8ae38acdc940e4f1ecec3bffc623 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Leon Romanovsky Date: Mon, 31 Jul 2023 14:38:26 +0300 Subject: xfrm: delete offloaded policy The policy memory was released but not HW driver data. Add call to xfrm_dev_policy_delete(), so drivers will have a chance to release their resources. Fixes: 919e43fad516 ("xfrm: add an interface to offload policy") Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert --- net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'net/xfrm') diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c index f06d6deb58dd..ad01997c3aa9 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c @@ -2345,6 +2345,7 @@ static int xfrm_get_policy(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh, NETLINK_CB(skb).portid); } } else { + xfrm_dev_policy_delete(xp); xfrm_audit_policy_delete(xp, err ? 0 : 1, true); if (err != 0) -- cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2 From f3ec2b5d879ef5bbcb24678914641343cb6399a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Leon Romanovsky Date: Mon, 31 Jul 2023 14:38:27 +0300 Subject: xfrm: don't skip free of empty state in acquire policy In destruction flow, the assignment of NULL to xso->dev caused to skip of xfrm_dev_state_free() call, which was called in xfrm_state_put(to_put) routine. Instead of open-coded variant of xfrm_dev_state_delete() and xfrm_dev_state_free(), let's use them directly. Fixes: f8a70afafc17 ("xfrm: add TX datapath support for IPsec packet offload mode") Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert --- include/net/xfrm.h | 1 + net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 8 ++------ 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) (limited to 'net/xfrm') diff --git a/include/net/xfrm.h b/include/net/xfrm.h index 151ca95dd08d..363c7d510554 100644 --- a/include/net/xfrm.h +++ b/include/net/xfrm.h @@ -1984,6 +1984,7 @@ static inline void xfrm_dev_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x) if (dev->xfrmdev_ops->xdo_dev_state_free) dev->xfrmdev_ops->xdo_dev_state_free(x); xso->dev = NULL; + xso->type = XFRM_DEV_OFFLOAD_UNSPECIFIED; netdev_put(dev, &xso->dev_tracker); } } diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c index 49e63eea841d..bda5327bf34d 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c @@ -1324,12 +1324,8 @@ found: struct xfrm_dev_offload *xso = &x->xso; if (xso->type == XFRM_DEV_OFFLOAD_PACKET) { - xso->dev->xfrmdev_ops->xdo_dev_state_delete(x); - xso->dir = 0; - netdev_put(xso->dev, &xso->dev_tracker); - xso->dev = NULL; - xso->real_dev = NULL; - xso->type = XFRM_DEV_OFFLOAD_UNSPECIFIED; + xfrm_dev_state_delete(x); + xfrm_dev_state_free(x); } #endif x->km.state = XFRM_STATE_DEAD; -- cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2