From 9f5d7d23cc5ec61a92076b73665fcb9aaa5bb5a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tushar Sugandhi Date: Thu, 7 Jan 2021 20:07:06 -0800 Subject: IMA: extend critical data hook to limit the measurement based on a label The IMA hook ima_measure_critical_data() does not support a way to specify the source of the critical data provider. Thus, the data measurement cannot be constrained based on the data source label in the IMA policy. Extend the IMA hook ima_measure_critical_data() to support passing the data source label as an input parameter, so that the policy rule can be used to limit the measurements based on the label. Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar --- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 251e7b4006f4..6a429846f90a 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -945,6 +945,7 @@ void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) /** * ima_measure_critical_data - measure kernel integrity critical data + * @event_label: unique event label for grouping and limiting critical data * @event_name: event name for the record in the IMA measurement list * @buf: pointer to buffer data * @buf_len: length of buffer data (in bytes) @@ -955,15 +956,16 @@ void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) * structures, policies, and states stored in kernel memory that can * impact the integrity of the system. */ -void ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_name, +void ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_label, + const char *event_name, const void *buf, size_t buf_len, bool hash) { - if (!event_name || !buf || !buf_len) + if (!event_name || !event_label || !buf || !buf_len) return; process_buffer_measurement(NULL, buf, buf_len, event_name, - CRITICAL_DATA, 0, NULL, + CRITICAL_DATA, 0, event_label, hash); } -- cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2