diff options
| author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2022-09-22 10:27:38 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2022-09-22 10:27:38 -0700 |
| commit | 129e7152184b0224f9ca3f91b870acc14c64e1fa (patch) | |
| tree | c31c06b85d961d8ac8da3cc9f5f66c66b40356ca | |
| parent | 5e0a93e42756fa93b69fe8848cf8dda7cee5d13a (diff) | |
| parent | 5f56a74cc0a6d9b9f8ba89cea29cd7c4774cb2b1 (diff) | |
Merge tag 'efi-urgent-for-v6.0-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi
Pull EFI fixes from Ard Biesheuvel:
- Use the right variable to check for shim insecure mode
- Wipe setup_data field when booting via EFI
- Add missing error check to efibc driver
* tag 'efi-urgent-for-v6.0-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi:
efi: libstub: check Shim mode using MokSBStateRT
efi: x86: Wipe setup_data on pure EFI boot
efi: efibc: Guard against allocation failure
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/firmware/efi/efibc.c | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c | 8 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c | 7 |
3 files changed, 14 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/efibc.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/efibc.c index 8ced7af8e56d..4f9fb086eab7 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/efibc.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/efibc.c @@ -48,6 +48,9 @@ static int efibc_reboot_notifier_call(struct notifier_block *notifier, return NOTIFY_DONE; wdata = kmalloc(MAX_DATA_LEN * sizeof(efi_char16_t), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!wdata) + return NOTIFY_DONE; + for (l = 0; l < MAX_DATA_LEN - 1 && str[l] != '\0'; l++) wdata[l] = str[l]; wdata[l] = L'\0'; diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c index 8a18930f3eb6..516f4f0069bd 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ /* SHIM variables */ static const efi_guid_t shim_guid = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID; -static const efi_char16_t shim_MokSBState_name[] = L"MokSBState"; +static const efi_char16_t shim_MokSBState_name[] = L"MokSBStateRT"; static efi_status_t get_var(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *vendor, u32 *attr, unsigned long *data_size, void *data) @@ -43,8 +43,8 @@ enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot(void) /* * See if a user has put the shim into insecure mode. If so, and if the - * variable doesn't have the runtime attribute set, we might as well - * honor that. + * variable doesn't have the non-volatile attribute set, we might as + * well honor that. */ size = sizeof(moksbstate); status = get_efi_var(shim_MokSBState_name, &shim_guid, @@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot(void) /* If it fails, we don't care why. Default to secure */ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) goto secure_boot_enabled; - if (!(attr & EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS) && moksbstate == 1) + if (!(attr & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) && moksbstate == 1) return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled; secure_boot_enabled: diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c index 43ca665af610..7a7abc8959d2 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c @@ -516,6 +516,13 @@ efi_status_t __efiapi efi_pe_entry(efi_handle_t handle, hdr->ramdisk_image = 0; hdr->ramdisk_size = 0; + /* + * Disregard any setup data that was provided by the bootloader: + * setup_data could be pointing anywhere, and we have no way of + * authenticating or validating the payload. + */ + hdr->setup_data = 0; + efi_stub_entry(handle, sys_table_arg, boot_params); /* not reached */ |