summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorRodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>2021-05-26 09:40:54 -0400
committerRodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>2021-05-26 09:40:54 -0400
commitabfe041de01f16d74df522d92cf5e3f6523971dd (patch)
tree1cd997085149cf09e110baa4f98725ed18ffa05a /arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
parent7bc188cc2c8c7b21bfa0782f0d22bbf245ce1f63 (diff)
parent9a91e5e0af5e03940d0eec72c36364a1701de240 (diff)
Merge drm/drm-next into drm-intel-next
Getting in sync with -rc2 Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c')
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c6
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
index 04aba7e80a36..a9639f663d25 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
@@ -529,7 +529,7 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
/*
* No SME if Hypervisor bit is set. This check is here to
* prevent a guest from trying to enable SME. For running as a
- * KVM guest the MSR_K8_SYSCFG will be sufficient, but there
+ * KVM guest the MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG will be sufficient, but there
* might be other hypervisors which emulate that MSR as non-zero
* or even pass it through to the guest.
* A malicious hypervisor can still trick a guest into this
@@ -542,8 +542,8 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
return;
/* For SME, check the SYSCFG MSR */
- msr = __rdmsr(MSR_K8_SYSCFG);
- if (!(msr & MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT))
+ msr = __rdmsr(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG);
+ if (!(msr & MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT))
return;
} else {
/* SEV state cannot be controlled by a command line option */