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| author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2021-05-16 09:31:06 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2021-05-16 09:31:06 -0700 |
| commit | ccb013c29d2d16e37c9114b1cea19fac5643b173 (patch) | |
| tree | d937462704d7737e0319516835998b702dba1e23 /arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c | |
| parent | 63d1cb53e26a9a4168b84a8981b225c0a9cfa235 (diff) | |
| parent | a554e740b66a83c7560b30e6b50bece37555ced3 (diff) | |
Merge tag 'x86_urgent_for_v5.13_rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 fixes from Borislav Petkov:
"The three SEV commits are not really urgent material. But we figured
since getting them in now will avoid a huge amount of conflicts
between future SEV changes touching tip, the kvm and probably other
trees, sending them to you now would be best.
The idea is that the tip, kvm etc branches for 5.14 will all base
ontop of -rc2 and thus everything will be peachy. What is more, those
changes are purely mechanical and defines movement so they should be
fine to go now (famous last words).
Summary:
- Enable -Wundef for the compressed kernel build stage
- Reorganize SEV code to streamline and simplify future development"
* tag 'x86_urgent_for_v5.13_rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/boot/compressed: Enable -Wundef
x86/msr: Rename MSR_K8_SYSCFG to MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG
x86/sev: Move GHCB MSR protocol and NAE definitions in a common header
x86/sev-es: Rename sev-es.{ch} to sev.{ch}
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c | 6 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c index 04aba7e80a36..a9639f663d25 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c @@ -529,7 +529,7 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) /* * No SME if Hypervisor bit is set. This check is here to * prevent a guest from trying to enable SME. For running as a - * KVM guest the MSR_K8_SYSCFG will be sufficient, but there + * KVM guest the MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG will be sufficient, but there * might be other hypervisors which emulate that MSR as non-zero * or even pass it through to the guest. * A malicious hypervisor can still trick a guest into this @@ -542,8 +542,8 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) return; /* For SME, check the SYSCFG MSR */ - msr = __rdmsr(MSR_K8_SYSCFG); - if (!(msr & MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT)) + msr = __rdmsr(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG); + if (!(msr & MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT)) return; } else { /* SEV state cannot be controlled by a command line option */ |