diff options
author | Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> | 2023-05-21 20:46:30 -0500 |
---|---|---|
committer | Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> | 2023-05-24 16:29:21 -0500 |
commit | 38c8a9a52082579090e34c033d439ed2cd1a462d (patch) | |
tree | ca6c3bf5b2b912f32735c1aa0a045cd21a47a205 /fs/smb/client/sess.c | |
parent | cb8b02fd6343228966324528adf920bfb8b8e681 (diff) |
smb: move client and server files to common directory fs/smb
Move CIFS/SMB3 related client and server files (cifs.ko and ksmbd.ko
and helper modules) to new fs/smb subdirectory:
fs/cifs --> fs/smb/client
fs/ksmbd --> fs/smb/server
fs/smbfs_common --> fs/smb/common
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/smb/client/sess.c')
-rw-r--r-- | fs/smb/client/sess.c | 1857 |
1 files changed, 1857 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/smb/client/sess.c b/fs/smb/client/sess.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..335c078c42fb --- /dev/null +++ b/fs/smb/client/sess.c @@ -0,0 +1,1857 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1 +/* + * + * SMB/CIFS session setup handling routines + * + * Copyright (c) International Business Machines Corp., 2006, 2009 + * Author(s): Steve French (sfrench@us.ibm.com) + * + */ + +#include "cifspdu.h" +#include "cifsglob.h" +#include "cifsproto.h" +#include "cifs_unicode.h" +#include "cifs_debug.h" +#include "ntlmssp.h" +#include "nterr.h" +#include <linux/utsname.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/version.h> +#include "cifsfs.h" +#include "cifs_spnego.h" +#include "smb2proto.h" +#include "fs_context.h" + +static int +cifs_ses_add_channel(struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb, struct cifs_ses *ses, + struct cifs_server_iface *iface); + +bool +is_server_using_iface(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, + struct cifs_server_iface *iface) +{ + struct sockaddr_in *i4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)&iface->sockaddr; + struct sockaddr_in6 *i6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&iface->sockaddr; + struct sockaddr_in *s4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)&server->dstaddr; + struct sockaddr_in6 *s6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&server->dstaddr; + + if (server->dstaddr.ss_family != iface->sockaddr.ss_family) + return false; + if (server->dstaddr.ss_family == AF_INET) { + if (s4->sin_addr.s_addr != i4->sin_addr.s_addr) + return false; + } else if (server->dstaddr.ss_family == AF_INET6) { + if (memcmp(&s6->sin6_addr, &i6->sin6_addr, + sizeof(i6->sin6_addr)) != 0) + return false; + } else { + /* unknown family.. */ + return false; + } + return true; +} + +bool is_ses_using_iface(struct cifs_ses *ses, struct cifs_server_iface *iface) +{ + int i; + + spin_lock(&ses->chan_lock); + for (i = 0; i < ses->chan_count; i++) { + if (ses->chans[i].iface == iface) { + spin_unlock(&ses->chan_lock); + return true; + } + } + spin_unlock(&ses->chan_lock); + return false; +} + +/* channel helper functions. assumed that chan_lock is held by caller. */ + +unsigned int +cifs_ses_get_chan_index(struct cifs_ses *ses, + struct TCP_Server_Info *server) +{ + unsigned int i; + + for (i = 0; i < ses->chan_count; i++) { + if (ses->chans[i].server == server) + return i; + } + + /* If we didn't find the channel, it is likely a bug */ + if (server) + cifs_dbg(VFS, "unable to get chan index for server: 0x%llx", + server->conn_id); + WARN_ON(1); + return 0; +} + +void +cifs_chan_set_in_reconnect(struct cifs_ses *ses, + struct TCP_Server_Info *server) +{ + unsigned int chan_index = cifs_ses_get_chan_index(ses, server); + + ses->chans[chan_index].in_reconnect = true; +} + +void +cifs_chan_clear_in_reconnect(struct cifs_ses *ses, + struct TCP_Server_Info *server) +{ + unsigned int chan_index = cifs_ses_get_chan_index(ses, server); + + ses->chans[chan_index].in_reconnect = false; +} + +bool +cifs_chan_in_reconnect(struct cifs_ses *ses, + struct TCP_Server_Info *server) +{ + unsigned int chan_index = cifs_ses_get_chan_index(ses, server); + + return CIFS_CHAN_IN_RECONNECT(ses, chan_index); +} + +void +cifs_chan_set_need_reconnect(struct cifs_ses *ses, + struct TCP_Server_Info *server) +{ + unsigned int chan_index = cifs_ses_get_chan_index(ses, server); + + set_bit(chan_index, &ses->chans_need_reconnect); + cifs_dbg(FYI, "Set reconnect bitmask for chan %u; now 0x%lx\n", + chan_index, ses->chans_need_reconnect); +} + +void +cifs_chan_clear_need_reconnect(struct cifs_ses *ses, + struct TCP_Server_Info *server) +{ + unsigned int chan_index = cifs_ses_get_chan_index(ses, server); + + clear_bit(chan_index, &ses->chans_need_reconnect); + cifs_dbg(FYI, "Cleared reconnect bitmask for chan %u; now 0x%lx\n", + chan_index, ses->chans_need_reconnect); +} + +bool +cifs_chan_needs_reconnect(struct cifs_ses *ses, + struct TCP_Server_Info *server) +{ + unsigned int chan_index = cifs_ses_get_chan_index(ses, server); + + return CIFS_CHAN_NEEDS_RECONNECT(ses, chan_index); +} + +bool +cifs_chan_is_iface_active(struct cifs_ses *ses, + struct TCP_Server_Info *server) +{ + unsigned int chan_index = cifs_ses_get_chan_index(ses, server); + + return ses->chans[chan_index].iface && + ses->chans[chan_index].iface->is_active; +} + +/* returns number of channels added */ +int cifs_try_adding_channels(struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb, struct cifs_ses *ses) +{ + struct TCP_Server_Info *server = ses->server; + int old_chan_count, new_chan_count; + int left; + int rc = 0; + int tries = 0; + struct cifs_server_iface *iface = NULL, *niface = NULL; + + spin_lock(&ses->chan_lock); + + new_chan_count = old_chan_count = ses->chan_count; + left = ses->chan_max - ses->chan_count; + + if (left <= 0) { + spin_unlock(&ses->chan_lock); + cifs_dbg(FYI, + "ses already at max_channels (%zu), nothing to open\n", + ses->chan_max); + return 0; + } + + if (server->dialect < SMB30_PROT_ID) { + spin_unlock(&ses->chan_lock); + cifs_dbg(VFS, "multichannel is not supported on this protocol version, use 3.0 or above\n"); + return 0; + } + + if (!(server->capabilities & SMB2_GLOBAL_CAP_MULTI_CHANNEL)) { + ses->chan_max = 1; + spin_unlock(&ses->chan_lock); + cifs_server_dbg(VFS, "no multichannel support\n"); + return 0; + } + spin_unlock(&ses->chan_lock); + + /* + * Keep connecting to same, fastest, iface for all channels as + * long as its RSS. Try next fastest one if not RSS or channel + * creation fails. + */ + spin_lock(&ses->iface_lock); + iface = list_first_entry(&ses->iface_list, struct cifs_server_iface, + iface_head); + spin_unlock(&ses->iface_lock); + + while (left > 0) { + + tries++; + if (tries > 3*ses->chan_max) { + cifs_dbg(FYI, "too many channel open attempts (%d channels left to open)\n", + left); + break; + } + + spin_lock(&ses->iface_lock); + if (!ses->iface_count) { + spin_unlock(&ses->iface_lock); + break; + } + + list_for_each_entry_safe_from(iface, niface, &ses->iface_list, + iface_head) { + /* skip ifaces that are unusable */ + if (!iface->is_active || + (is_ses_using_iface(ses, iface) && + !iface->rss_capable)) { + continue; + } + + /* take ref before unlock */ + kref_get(&iface->refcount); + + spin_unlock(&ses->iface_lock); + rc = cifs_ses_add_channel(cifs_sb, ses, iface); + spin_lock(&ses->iface_lock); + + if (rc) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "failed to open extra channel on iface:%pIS rc=%d\n", + &iface->sockaddr, + rc); + kref_put(&iface->refcount, release_iface); + continue; + } + + cifs_dbg(FYI, "successfully opened new channel on iface:%pIS\n", + &iface->sockaddr); + break; + } + spin_unlock(&ses->iface_lock); + + left--; + new_chan_count++; + } + + return new_chan_count - old_chan_count; +} + +/* + * update the iface for the channel if necessary. + * will return 0 when iface is updated, 1 if removed, 2 otherwise + * Must be called with chan_lock held. + */ +int +cifs_chan_update_iface(struct cifs_ses *ses, struct TCP_Server_Info *server) +{ + unsigned int chan_index; + struct cifs_server_iface *iface = NULL; + struct cifs_server_iface *old_iface = NULL; + int rc = 0; + + spin_lock(&ses->chan_lock); + chan_index = cifs_ses_get_chan_index(ses, server); + if (!chan_index) { + spin_unlock(&ses->chan_lock); + return 0; + } + + if (ses->chans[chan_index].iface) { + old_iface = ses->chans[chan_index].iface; + if (old_iface->is_active) { + spin_unlock(&ses->chan_lock); + return 1; + } + } + spin_unlock(&ses->chan_lock); + + spin_lock(&ses->iface_lock); + /* then look for a new one */ + list_for_each_entry(iface, &ses->iface_list, iface_head) { + if (!iface->is_active || + (is_ses_using_iface(ses, iface) && + !iface->rss_capable)) { + continue; + } + kref_get(&iface->refcount); + break; + } + + if (list_entry_is_head(iface, &ses->iface_list, iface_head)) { + rc = 1; + iface = NULL; + cifs_dbg(FYI, "unable to find a suitable iface\n"); + } + + /* now drop the ref to the current iface */ + if (old_iface && iface) { + cifs_dbg(FYI, "replacing iface: %pIS with %pIS\n", + &old_iface->sockaddr, + &iface->sockaddr); + kref_put(&old_iface->refcount, release_iface); + } else if (old_iface) { + cifs_dbg(FYI, "releasing ref to iface: %pIS\n", + &old_iface->sockaddr); + kref_put(&old_iface->refcount, release_iface); + } else { + WARN_ON(!iface); + cifs_dbg(FYI, "adding new iface: %pIS\n", &iface->sockaddr); + } + spin_unlock(&ses->iface_lock); + + spin_lock(&ses->chan_lock); + chan_index = cifs_ses_get_chan_index(ses, server); + ses->chans[chan_index].iface = iface; + + /* No iface is found. if secondary chan, drop connection */ + if (!iface && CIFS_SERVER_IS_CHAN(server)) + ses->chans[chan_index].server = NULL; + + spin_unlock(&ses->chan_lock); + + if (!iface && CIFS_SERVER_IS_CHAN(server)) + cifs_put_tcp_session(server, false); + + return rc; +} + +/* + * If server is a channel of ses, return the corresponding enclosing + * cifs_chan otherwise return NULL. + */ +struct cifs_chan * +cifs_ses_find_chan(struct cifs_ses *ses, struct TCP_Server_Info *server) +{ + int i; + + spin_lock(&ses->chan_lock); + for (i = 0; i < ses->chan_count; i++) { + if (ses->chans[i].server == server) { + spin_unlock(&ses->chan_lock); + return &ses->chans[i]; + } + } + spin_unlock(&ses->chan_lock); + return NULL; +} + +static int +cifs_ses_add_channel(struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb, struct cifs_ses *ses, + struct cifs_server_iface *iface) +{ + struct TCP_Server_Info *chan_server; + struct cifs_chan *chan; + struct smb3_fs_context ctx = {NULL}; + static const char unc_fmt[] = "\\%s\\foo"; + char unc[sizeof(unc_fmt)+SERVER_NAME_LEN_WITH_NULL] = {0}; + struct sockaddr_in *ipv4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)&iface->sockaddr; + struct sockaddr_in6 *ipv6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&iface->sockaddr; + int rc; + unsigned int xid = get_xid(); + + if (iface->sockaddr.ss_family == AF_INET) + cifs_dbg(FYI, "adding channel to ses %p (speed:%zu bps rdma:%s ip:%pI4)\n", + ses, iface->speed, iface->rdma_capable ? "yes" : "no", + &ipv4->sin_addr); + else + cifs_dbg(FYI, "adding channel to ses %p (speed:%zu bps rdma:%s ip:%pI6)\n", + ses, iface->speed, iface->rdma_capable ? "yes" : "no", + &ipv6->sin6_addr); + + /* + * Setup a ctx with mostly the same info as the existing + * session and overwrite it with the requested iface data. + * + * We need to setup at least the fields used for negprot and + * sesssetup. + * + * We only need the ctx here, so we can reuse memory from + * the session and server without caring about memory + * management. + */ + + /* Always make new connection for now (TODO?) */ + ctx.nosharesock = true; + + /* Auth */ + ctx.domainauto = ses->domainAuto; + ctx.domainname = ses->domainName; + + /* no hostname for extra channels */ + ctx.server_hostname = ""; + + ctx.username = ses->user_name; + ctx.password = ses->password; + ctx.sectype = ses->sectype; + ctx.sign = ses->sign; + + /* UNC and paths */ + /* XXX: Use ses->server->hostname? */ + sprintf(unc, unc_fmt, ses->ip_addr); + ctx.UNC = unc; + ctx.prepath = ""; + + /* Reuse same version as master connection */ + ctx.vals = ses->server->vals; + ctx.ops = ses->server->ops; + + ctx.noblocksnd = ses->server->noblocksnd; + ctx.noautotune = ses->server->noautotune; + ctx.sockopt_tcp_nodelay = ses->server->tcp_nodelay; + ctx.echo_interval = ses->server->echo_interval / HZ; + ctx.max_credits = ses->server->max_credits; + + /* + * This will be used for encoding/decoding user/domain/pw + * during sess setup auth. + */ + ctx.local_nls = cifs_sb->local_nls; + + /* Use RDMA if possible */ + ctx.rdma = iface->rdma_capable; + memcpy(&ctx.dstaddr, &iface->sockaddr, sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)); + + /* reuse master con client guid */ + memcpy(&ctx.client_guid, ses->server->client_guid, + SMB2_CLIENT_GUID_SIZE); + ctx.use_client_guid = true; + + chan_server = cifs_get_tcp_session(&ctx, ses->server); + + spin_lock(&ses->chan_lock); + chan = &ses->chans[ses->chan_count]; + chan->server = chan_server; + if (IS_ERR(chan->server)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(chan->server); + chan->server = NULL; + spin_unlock(&ses->chan_lock); + goto out; + } + chan->iface = iface; + ses->chan_count++; + atomic_set(&ses->chan_seq, 0); + + /* Mark this channel as needing connect/setup */ + cifs_chan_set_need_reconnect(ses, chan->server); + + spin_unlock(&ses->chan_lock); + + mutex_lock(&ses->session_mutex); + /* + * We need to allocate the server crypto now as we will need + * to sign packets before we generate the channel signing key + * (we sign with the session key) + */ + rc = smb311_crypto_shash_allocate(chan->server); + if (rc) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: crypto alloc failed\n", __func__); + mutex_unlock(&ses->session_mutex); + goto out; + } + + rc = cifs_negotiate_protocol(xid, ses, chan->server); + if (!rc) + rc = cifs_setup_session(xid, ses, chan->server, cifs_sb->local_nls); + + mutex_unlock(&ses->session_mutex); + +out: + if (rc && chan->server) { + /* + * we should avoid race with these delayed works before we + * remove this channel + */ + cancel_delayed_work_sync(&chan->server->echo); + cancel_delayed_work_sync(&chan->server->reconnect); + + spin_lock(&ses->chan_lock); + /* we rely on all bits beyond chan_count to be clear */ + cifs_chan_clear_need_reconnect(ses, chan->server); + ses->chan_count--; + /* + * chan_count should never reach 0 as at least the primary + * channel is always allocated + */ + WARN_ON(ses->chan_count < 1); + spin_unlock(&ses->chan_lock); + + cifs_put_tcp_session(chan->server, 0); + } + + free_xid(xid); + return rc; +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_ALLOW_INSECURE_LEGACY +static __u32 cifs_ssetup_hdr(struct cifs_ses *ses, + struct TCP_Server_Info *server, + SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *pSMB) +{ + __u32 capabilities = 0; + + /* init fields common to all four types of SessSetup */ + /* Note that offsets for first seven fields in req struct are same */ + /* in CIFS Specs so does not matter which of 3 forms of struct */ + /* that we use in next few lines */ + /* Note that header is initialized to zero in header_assemble */ + pSMB->req.AndXCommand = 0xFF; + pSMB->req.MaxBufferSize = cpu_to_le16(min_t(u32, + CIFSMaxBufSize + MAX_CIFS_HDR_SIZE - 4, + USHRT_MAX)); + pSMB->req.MaxMpxCount = cpu_to_le16(server->maxReq); + pSMB->req.VcNumber = cpu_to_le16(1); + + /* Now no need to set SMBFLG_CASELESS or obsolete CANONICAL PATH */ + + /* BB verify whether signing required on neg or just on auth frame + (and NTLM case) */ + + capabilities = CAP_LARGE_FILES | CAP_NT_SMBS | CAP_LEVEL_II_OPLOCKS | + CAP_LARGE_WRITE_X | CAP_LARGE_READ_X; + + if (server->sign) + pSMB->req.hdr.Flags2 |= SMBFLG2_SECURITY_SIGNATURE; + + if (ses->capabilities & CAP_UNICODE) { + pSMB->req.hdr.Flags2 |= SMBFLG2_UNICODE; + capabilities |= CAP_UNICODE; + } + if (ses->capabilities & CAP_STATUS32) { + pSMB->req.hdr.Flags2 |= SMBFLG2_ERR_STATUS; + capabilities |= CAP_STATUS32; + } + if (ses->capabilities & CAP_DFS) { + pSMB->req.hdr.Flags2 |= SMBFLG2_DFS; + capabilities |= CAP_DFS; + } + if (ses->capabilities & CAP_UNIX) + capabilities |= CAP_UNIX; + + return capabilities; +} + +static void +unicode_oslm_strings(char **pbcc_area, const struct nls_table *nls_cp) +{ + char *bcc_ptr = *pbcc_area; + int bytes_ret = 0; + + /* Copy OS version */ + bytes_ret = cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *)bcc_ptr, "Linux version ", 32, + nls_cp); + bcc_ptr += 2 * bytes_ret; + bytes_ret = cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *) bcc_ptr, init_utsname()->release, + 32, nls_cp); + bcc_ptr += 2 * bytes_ret; + bcc_ptr += 2; /* trailing null */ + + bytes_ret = cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *) bcc_ptr, CIFS_NETWORK_OPSYS, + 32, nls_cp); + bcc_ptr += 2 * bytes_ret; + bcc_ptr += 2; /* trailing null */ + + *pbcc_area = bcc_ptr; +} + +static void unicode_domain_string(char **pbcc_area, struct cifs_ses *ses, + const struct nls_table *nls_cp) +{ + char *bcc_ptr = *pbcc_area; + int bytes_ret = 0; + + /* copy domain */ + if (ses->domainName == NULL) { + /* Sending null domain better than using a bogus domain name (as + we did briefly in 2.6.18) since server will use its default */ + *bcc_ptr = 0; + *(bcc_ptr+1) = 0; + bytes_ret = 0; + } else + bytes_ret = cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *) bcc_ptr, ses->domainName, + CIFS_MAX_DOMAINNAME_LEN, nls_cp); + bcc_ptr += 2 * bytes_ret; + bcc_ptr += 2; /* account for null terminator */ + + *pbcc_area = bcc_ptr; +} + +static void unicode_ssetup_strings(char **pbcc_area, struct cifs_ses *ses, + const struct nls_table *nls_cp) +{ + char *bcc_ptr = *pbcc_area; + int bytes_ret = 0; + + /* BB FIXME add check that strings total less + than 335 or will need to send them as arrays */ + + /* copy user */ + if (ses->user_name == NULL) { + /* null user mount */ + *bcc_ptr = 0; + *(bcc_ptr+1) = 0; + } else { + bytes_ret = cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *) bcc_ptr, ses->user_name, + CIFS_MAX_USERNAME_LEN, nls_cp); + } + bcc_ptr += 2 * bytes_ret; + bcc_ptr += 2; /* account for null termination */ + + unicode_domain_string(&bcc_ptr, ses, nls_cp); + unicode_oslm_strings(&bcc_ptr, nls_cp); + + *pbcc_area = bcc_ptr; +} + +static void ascii_ssetup_strings(char **pbcc_area, struct cifs_ses *ses, + const struct nls_table *nls_cp) +{ + char *bcc_ptr = *pbcc_area; + int len; + + /* copy user */ + /* BB what about null user mounts - check that we do this BB */ + /* copy user */ + if (ses->user_name != NULL) { + len = strscpy(bcc_ptr, ses->user_name, CIFS_MAX_USERNAME_LEN); + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(len < 0)) + len = CIFS_MAX_USERNAME_LEN - 1; + bcc_ptr += len; + } + /* else null user mount */ + *bcc_ptr = 0; + bcc_ptr++; /* account for null termination */ + + /* copy domain */ + if (ses->domainName != NULL) { + len = strscpy(bcc_ptr, ses->domainName, CIFS_MAX_DOMAINNAME_LEN); + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(len < 0)) + len = CIFS_MAX_DOMAINNAME_LEN - 1; + bcc_ptr += len; + } /* else we will send a null domain name + so the server will default to its own domain */ + *bcc_ptr = 0; + bcc_ptr++; + + /* BB check for overflow here */ + + strcpy(bcc_ptr, "Linux version "); + bcc_ptr += strlen("Linux version "); + strcpy(bcc_ptr, init_utsname()->release); + bcc_ptr += strlen(init_utsname()->release) + 1; + + strcpy(bcc_ptr, CIFS_NETWORK_OPSYS); + bcc_ptr += strlen(CIFS_NETWORK_OPSYS) + 1; + + *pbcc_area = bcc_ptr; +} + +static void +decode_unicode_ssetup(char **pbcc_area, int bleft, struct cifs_ses *ses, + const struct nls_table *nls_cp) +{ + int len; + char *data = *pbcc_area; + + cifs_dbg(FYI, "bleft %d\n", bleft); + + kfree(ses->serverOS); + ses->serverOS = cifs_strndup_from_utf16(data, bleft, true, nls_cp); + cifs_dbg(FYI, "serverOS=%s\n", ses->serverOS); + len = (UniStrnlen((wchar_t *) data, bleft / 2) * 2) + 2; + data += len; + bleft -= len; + if (bleft <= 0) + return; + + kfree(ses->serverNOS); + ses->serverNOS = cifs_strndup_from_utf16(data, bleft, true, nls_cp); + cifs_dbg(FYI, "serverNOS=%s\n", ses->serverNOS); + len = (UniStrnlen((wchar_t *) data, bleft / 2) * 2) + 2; + data += len; + bleft -= len; + if (bleft <= 0) + return; + + kfree(ses->serverDomain); + ses->serverDomain = cifs_strndup_from_utf16(data, bleft, true, nls_cp); + cifs_dbg(FYI, "serverDomain=%s\n", ses->serverDomain); + + return; +} + +static void decode_ascii_ssetup(char **pbcc_area, __u16 bleft, + struct cifs_ses *ses, + const struct nls_table *nls_cp) +{ + int len; + char *bcc_ptr = *pbcc_area; + + cifs_dbg(FYI, "decode sessetup ascii. bleft %d\n", bleft); + + len = strnlen(bcc_ptr, bleft); + if (len >= bleft) + return; + + kfree(ses->serverOS); + + ses->serverOS = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + if (ses->serverOS) { + memcpy(ses->serverOS, bcc_ptr, len); + ses->serverOS[len] = 0; + if (strncmp(ses->serverOS, "OS/2", 4) == 0) + cifs_dbg(FYI, "OS/2 server\n"); + } + + bcc_ptr += len + 1; + bleft -= len + 1; + + len = strnlen(bcc_ptr, bleft); + if (len >= bleft) + return; + + kfree(ses->serverNOS); + + ses->serverNOS = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + if (ses->serverNOS) { + memcpy(ses->serverNOS, bcc_ptr, len); + ses->serverNOS[len] = 0; + } + + bcc_ptr += len + 1; + bleft -= len + 1; + + len = strnlen(bcc_ptr, bleft); + if (len > bleft) + return; + + /* No domain field in LANMAN case. Domain is + returned by old servers in the SMB negprot response */ + /* BB For newer servers which do not support Unicode, + but thus do return domain here we could add parsing + for it later, but it is not very important */ + cifs_dbg(FYI, "ascii: bytes left %d\n", bleft); +} +#endif /* CONFIG_CIFS_ALLOW_INSECURE_LEGACY */ + +int decode_ntlmssp_challenge(char *bcc_ptr, int blob_len, + struct cifs_ses *ses) +{ + unsigned int tioffset; /* challenge message target info area */ + unsigned int tilen; /* challenge message target info area length */ + CHALLENGE_MESSAGE *pblob = (CHALLENGE_MESSAGE *)bcc_ptr; + __u32 server_flags; + + if (blob_len < sizeof(CHALLENGE_MESSAGE)) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "challenge blob len %d too small\n", blob_len); + return -EINVAL; + } + + if (memcmp(pblob->Signature, "NTLMSSP", 8)) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "blob signature incorrect %s\n", + pblob->Signature); + return -EINVAL; + } + if (pblob->MessageType != NtLmChallenge) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "Incorrect message type %d\n", + pblob->MessageType); + return -EINVAL; + } + + server_flags = le32_to_cpu(pblob->NegotiateFlags); + cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: negotiate=0x%08x challenge=0x%08x\n", __func__, + ses->ntlmssp->client_flags, server_flags); + + if ((ses->ntlmssp->client_flags & (NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN)) && + (!(server_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56) && !(server_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128))) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: requested signing/encryption but server did not return either 56-bit or 128-bit session key size\n", + __func__); + return -EINVAL; + } + if (!(server_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM) && !(server_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SEC)) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: server does not seem to support either NTLMv1 or NTLMv2\n", __func__); + return -EINVAL; + } + if (ses->server->sign && !(server_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN)) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: forced packet signing but server does not seem to support it\n", + __func__); + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + } + if ((ses->ntlmssp->client_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_XCH) && + !(server_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_XCH)) + pr_warn_once("%s: authentication has been weakened as server does not support key exchange\n", + __func__); + + ses->ntlmssp->server_flags = server_flags; + + memcpy(ses->ntlmssp->cryptkey, pblob->Challenge, CIFS_CRYPTO_KEY_SIZE); + /* In particular we can examine sign flags */ + /* BB spec says that if AvId field of MsvAvTimestamp is populated then + we must set the MIC field of the AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE */ + + tioffset = le32_to_cpu(pblob->TargetInfoArray.BufferOffset); + tilen = le16_to_cpu(pblob->TargetInfoArray.Length); + if (tioffset > blob_len || tioffset + tilen > blob_len) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "tioffset + tilen too high %u + %u\n", + tioffset, tilen); + return -EINVAL; + } + if (tilen) { + kfree_sensitive(ses->auth_key.response); + ses->auth_key.response = kmemdup(bcc_ptr + tioffset, tilen, + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ses->auth_key.response) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "Challenge target info alloc failure\n"); + return -ENOMEM; + } + ses->auth_key.len = tilen; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int size_of_ntlmssp_blob(struct cifs_ses *ses, int base_size) +{ + int sz = base_size + ses->auth_key.len + - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE + CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE + 2; + + if (ses->domainName) + sz += sizeof(__le16) * strnlen(ses->domainName, CIFS_MAX_DOMAINNAME_LEN); + else + sz += sizeof(__le16); + + if (ses->user_name) + sz += sizeof(__le16) * strnlen(ses->user_name, CIFS_MAX_USERNAME_LEN); + else + sz += sizeof(__le16); + + if (ses->workstation_name[0]) + sz += sizeof(__le16) * strnlen(ses->workstation_name, + ntlmssp_workstation_name_size(ses)); + else + sz += sizeof(__le16); + + return sz; +} + +static inline void cifs_security_buffer_from_str(SECURITY_BUFFER *pbuf, + char *str_value, + int str_length, + unsigned char *pstart, + unsigned char **pcur, + const struct nls_table *nls_cp) +{ + unsigned char *tmp = pstart; + int len; + + if (!pbuf) + return; + + if (!pcur) + pcur = &tmp; + + if (!str_value) { + pbuf->BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(*pcur - pstart); + pbuf->Length = 0; + pbuf->MaximumLength = 0; + *pcur += sizeof(__le16); + } else { + len = cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *)*pcur, + str_value, + str_length, + nls_cp); + len *= sizeof(__le16); + pbuf->BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(*pcur - pstart); + pbuf->Length = cpu_to_le16(len); + pbuf->MaximumLength = cpu_to_le16(len); + *pcur += len; + } +} + +/* BB Move to ntlmssp.c eventually */ + +int build_ntlmssp_negotiate_blob(unsigned char **pbuffer, + u16 *buflen, + struct cifs_ses *ses, + struct TCP_Server_Info *server, + const struct nls_table *nls_cp) +{ + int rc = 0; + NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE *sec_blob; + __u32 flags; + unsigned char *tmp; + int len; + + len = size_of_ntlmssp_blob(ses, sizeof(NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE)); + *pbuffer = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!*pbuffer) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + cifs_dbg(VFS, "Error %d during NTLMSSP allocation\n", rc); + *buflen = 0; + goto setup_ntlm_neg_ret; + } + sec_blob = (NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE *)*pbuffer; + + memset(*pbuffer, 0, sizeof(NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE)); + memcpy(sec_blob->Signature, NTLMSSP_SIGNATURE, 8); + sec_blob->MessageType = NtLmNegotiate; + + /* BB is NTLMV2 session security format easier to use here? */ + flags = NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56 | NTLMSSP_REQUEST_TARGET | + NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128 | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE | + NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SEC | + NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_ALWAYS_SIGN | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL | + NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN; + if (!server->session_estab || ses->ntlmssp->sesskey_per_smbsess) + flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_XCH; + + tmp = *pbuffer + sizeof(NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE); + ses->ntlmssp->client_flags = flags; + sec_blob->NegotiateFlags = cpu_to_le32(flags); + + /* these fields should be null in negotiate phase MS-NLMP 3.1.5.1.1 */ + cifs_security_buffer_from_str(&sec_blob->DomainName, + NULL, + CIFS_MAX_DOMAINNAME_LEN, + *pbuffer, &tmp, + nls_cp); + + cifs_security_buffer_from_str(&sec_blob->WorkstationName, + NULL, + CIFS_MAX_WORKSTATION_LEN, + *pbuffer, &tmp, + nls_cp); + + *buflen = tmp - *pbuffer; +setup_ntlm_neg_ret: + return rc; +} + +/* + * Build ntlmssp blob with additional fields, such as version, + * supported by modern servers. For safety limit to SMB3 or later + * See notes in MS-NLMP Section 2.2.2.1 e.g. + */ +int build_ntlmssp_smb3_negotiate_blob(unsigned char **pbuffer, + u16 *buflen, + struct cifs_ses *ses, + struct TCP_Server_Info *server, + const struct nls_table *nls_cp) +{ + int rc = 0; + struct negotiate_message *sec_blob; + __u32 flags; + unsigned char *tmp; + int len; + + len = size_of_ntlmssp_blob(ses, sizeof(struct negotiate_message)); + *pbuffer = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!*pbuffer) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + cifs_dbg(VFS, "Error %d during NTLMSSP allocation\n", rc); + *buflen = 0; + goto setup_ntlm_smb3_neg_ret; + } + sec_blob = (struct negotiate_message *)*pbuffer; + + memset(*pbuffer, 0, sizeof(struct negotiate_message)); + memcpy(sec_blob->Signature, NTLMSSP_SIGNATURE, 8); + sec_blob->MessageType = NtLmNegotiate; + + /* BB is NTLMV2 session security format easier to use here? */ + flags = NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56 | NTLMSSP_REQUEST_TARGET | + NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128 | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE | + NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SEC | + NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_ALWAYS_SIGN | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL | + NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_VERSION; + if (!server->session_estab || ses->ntlmssp->sesskey_per_smbsess) + flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_XCH; + + sec_blob->Version.ProductMajorVersion = LINUX_VERSION_MAJOR; + sec_blob->Version.ProductMinorVersion = LINUX_VERSION_PATCHLEVEL; + sec_blob->Version.ProductBuild = cpu_to_le16(SMB3_PRODUCT_BUILD); + sec_blob->Version.NTLMRevisionCurrent = NTLMSSP_REVISION_W2K3; + + tmp = *pbuffer + sizeof(struct negotiate_message); + ses->ntlmssp->client_flags = flags; + sec_blob->NegotiateFlags = cpu_to_le32(flags); + + /* these fields should be null in negotiate phase MS-NLMP 3.1.5.1.1 */ + cifs_security_buffer_from_str(&sec_blob->DomainName, + NULL, + CIFS_MAX_DOMAINNAME_LEN, + *pbuffer, &tmp, + nls_cp); + + cifs_security_buffer_from_str(&sec_blob->WorkstationName, + NULL, + CIFS_MAX_WORKSTATION_LEN, + *pbuffer, &tmp, + nls_cp); + + *buflen = tmp - *pbuffer; +setup_ntlm_smb3_neg_ret: + return rc; +} + + +int build_ntlmssp_auth_blob(unsigned char **pbuffer, + u16 *buflen, + struct cifs_ses *ses, + struct TCP_Server_Info *server, + const struct nls_table *nls_cp) +{ + int rc; + AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE *sec_blob; + __u32 flags; + unsigned char *tmp; + int len; + + rc = setup_ntlmv2_rsp(ses, nls_cp); + if (rc) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "Error %d during NTLMSSP authentication\n", rc); + *buflen = 0; + goto setup_ntlmv2_ret; + } + + len = size_of_ntlmssp_blob(ses, sizeof(AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE)); + *pbuffer = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!*pbuffer) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + cifs_dbg(VFS, "Error %d during NTLMSSP allocation\n", rc); + *buflen = 0; + goto setup_ntlmv2_ret; + } + sec_blob = (AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE *)*pbuffer; + + memcpy(sec_blob->Signature, NTLMSSP_SIGNATURE, 8); + sec_blob->MessageType = NtLmAuthenticate; + + flags = ses->ntlmssp->server_flags | NTLMSSP_REQUEST_TARGET | + NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_TARGET_INFO | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_WORKSTATION_SUPPLIED; + + tmp = *pbuffer + sizeof(AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE); + sec_blob->NegotiateFlags = cpu_to_le32(flags); + + sec_blob->LmChallengeResponse.BufferOffset = + cpu_to_le32(sizeof(AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE)); + sec_blob->LmChallengeResponse.Length = 0; + sec_blob->LmChallengeResponse.MaximumLength = 0; + + sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.BufferOffset = + cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer); + if (ses->user_name != NULL) { + memcpy(tmp, ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE, + ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE); + tmp += ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE; + + sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.Length = + cpu_to_le16(ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE); + sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.MaximumLength = + cpu_to_le16(ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE); + } else { + /* + * don't send an NT Response for anonymous access + */ + sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.Length = 0; + sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.MaximumLength = 0; + } + + cifs_security_buffer_from_str(&sec_blob->DomainName, + ses->domainName, + CIFS_MAX_DOMAINNAME_LEN, + *pbuffer, &tmp, + nls_cp); + + cifs_security_buffer_from_str(&sec_blob->UserName, + ses->user_name, + CIFS_MAX_USERNAME_LEN, + *pbuffer, &tmp, + nls_cp); + + cifs_security_buffer_from_str(&sec_blob->WorkstationName, + ses->workstation_name, + ntlmssp_workstation_name_size(ses), + *pbuffer, &tmp, + nls_cp); + + if ((ses->ntlmssp->server_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_XCH) && + (!ses->server->session_estab || ses->ntlmssp->sesskey_per_smbsess) && + !calc_seckey(ses)) { + memcpy(tmp, ses->ntlmssp->ciphertext, CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE); + sec_blob->SessionKey.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer); + sec_blob->SessionKey.Length = cpu_to_le16(CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE); + sec_blob->SessionKey.MaximumLength = + cpu_to_le16(CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE); + tmp += CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE; + } else { + sec_blob->SessionKey.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer); + sec_blob->SessionKey.Length = 0; + sec_blob->SessionKey.MaximumLength = 0; + } + + *buflen = tmp - *pbuffer; +setup_ntlmv2_ret: + return rc; +} + +enum securityEnum +cifs_select_sectype(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, enum securityEnum requested) +{ + switch (server->negflavor) { + case CIFS_NEGFLAVOR_EXTENDED: + switch (requested) { + case Kerberos: + case RawNTLMSSP: + return requested; + case Unspecified: + if (server->sec_ntlmssp && + (global_secflags & CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLMSSP)) + return RawNTLMSSP; + if ((server->sec_kerberos || server->sec_mskerberos) && + (global_secflags & CIFSSEC_MAY_KRB5)) + return Kerberos; + fallthrough; + default: + return Unspecified; + } + case CIFS_NEGFLAVOR_UNENCAP: + switch (requested) { + case NTLMv2: + return requested; + case Unspecified: + if (global_secflags & CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLMV2) + return NTLMv2; + break; + default: + break; + } + fallthrough; + default: + return Unspecified; + } +} + +struct sess_data { + unsigned int xid; + struct cifs_ses *ses; + struct TCP_Server_Info *server; + struct nls_table *nls_cp; + void (*func)(struct sess_data *); + int result; + + /* we will send the SMB in three pieces: + * a fixed length beginning part, an optional + * SPNEGO blob (which can be zero length), and a + * last part which will include the strings + * and rest of bcc area. This allows us to avoid + * a large buffer 17K allocation + */ + int buf0_type; + struct kvec iov[3]; +}; + +#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_ALLOW_INSECURE_LEGACY +static int +sess_alloc_buffer(struct sess_data *sess_data, int wct) +{ + int rc; + struct cifs_ses *ses = sess_data->ses; + struct smb_hdr *smb_buf; + + rc = small_smb_init_no_tc(SMB_COM_SESSION_SETUP_ANDX, wct, ses, + (void **)&smb_buf); + + if (rc) + return rc; + + sess_data->iov[0].iov_base = (char *)smb_buf; + sess_data->iov[0].iov_len = be32_to_cpu(smb_buf->smb_buf_length) + 4; + /* + * This variable will be used to clear the buffer + * allocated above in case of any error in the calling function. + */ + sess_data->buf0_type = CIFS_SMALL_BUFFER; + + /* 2000 big enough to fit max user, domain, NOS name etc. */ + sess_data->iov[2].iov_base = kmalloc(2000, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!sess_data->iov[2].iov_base) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto out_free_smb_buf; + } + + return 0; + +out_free_smb_buf: + cifs_small_buf_release(smb_buf); + sess_data->iov[0].iov_base = NULL; + sess_data->iov[0].iov_len = 0; + sess_data->buf0_type = CIFS_NO_BUFFER; + return rc; +} + +static void +sess_free_buffer(struct sess_data *sess_data) +{ + struct kvec *iov = sess_data->iov; + + /* + * Zero the session data before freeing, as it might contain sensitive info (keys, etc). + * Note that iov[1] is already freed by caller. + */ + if (sess_data->buf0_type != CIFS_NO_BUFFER && iov[0].iov_base) + memzero_explicit(iov[0].iov_base, iov[0].iov_len); + + free_rsp_buf(sess_data->buf0_type, iov[0].iov_base); + sess_data->buf0_type = CIFS_NO_BUFFER; + kfree_sensitive(iov[2].iov_base); +} + +static int +sess_establish_session(struct sess_data *sess_data) +{ + struct cifs_ses *ses = sess_data->ses; + struct TCP_Server_Info *server = sess_data->server; + + cifs_server_lock(server); + if (!server->session_estab) { + if (server->sign) { + server->session_key.response = + kmemdup(ses->auth_key.response, + ses->auth_key.len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!server->session_key.response) { + cifs_server_unlock(server); + return -ENOMEM; + } + server->session_key.len = + ses->auth_key.len; + } + server->sequence_number = 0x2; + server->session_estab = true; + } + cifs_server_unlock(server); + + cifs_dbg(FYI, "CIFS session established successfully\n"); + return 0; +} + +static int +sess_sendreceive(struct sess_data *sess_data) +{ + int rc; + struct smb_hdr *smb_buf = (struct smb_hdr *) sess_data->iov[0].iov_base; + __u16 count; + struct kvec rsp_iov = { NULL, 0 }; + + count = sess_data->iov[1].iov_len + sess_data->iov[2].iov_len; + be32_add_cpu(&smb_buf->smb_buf_length, count); + put_bcc(count, smb_buf); + + rc = SendReceive2(sess_data->xid, sess_data->ses, + sess_data->iov, 3 /* num_iovecs */, + &sess_data->buf0_type, + CIFS_LOG_ERROR, &rsp_iov); + cifs_small_buf_release(sess_data->iov[0].iov_base); + memcpy(&sess_data->iov[0], &rsp_iov, sizeof(struct kvec)); + + return rc; +} + +static void +sess_auth_ntlmv2(struct sess_data *sess_data) +{ + int rc = 0; + struct smb_hdr *smb_buf; + SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *pSMB; + char *bcc_ptr; + struct cifs_ses *ses = sess_data->ses; + struct TCP_Server_Info *server = sess_data->server; + __u32 capabilities; + __u16 bytes_remaining; + + /* old style NTLM sessionsetup */ + /* wct = 13 */ + rc = sess_alloc_buffer(sess_data, 13); + if (rc) + goto out; + + pSMB = (SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *)sess_data->iov[0].iov_base; + bcc_ptr = sess_data->iov[2].iov_base; + capabilities = cifs_ssetup_hdr(ses, server, pSMB); + + pSMB->req_no_secext.Capabilities = cpu_to_le32(capabilities); + + /* LM2 password would be here if we supported it */ + pSMB->req_no_secext.CaseInsensitivePasswordLength = 0; + + if (ses->user_name != NULL) { + /* calculate nlmv2 response and session key */ + rc = setup_ntlmv2_rsp(ses, sess_data->nls_cp); + if (rc) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "Error %d during NTLMv2 authentication\n", rc); + goto out; + } + + memcpy(bcc_ptr, ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE, + ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE); + bcc_ptr += ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE; + + /* set case sensitive password length after tilen may get + * assigned, tilen is 0 otherwise. + */ + pSMB->req_no_secext.CaseSensitivePasswordLength = + cpu_to_le16(ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE); + } else { + pSMB->req_no_secext.CaseSensitivePasswordLength = 0; + } + + if (ses->capabilities & CAP_UNICODE) { + if (!IS_ALIGNED(sess_data->iov[0].iov_len, 2)) { + *bcc_ptr = 0; + bcc_ptr++; + } + unicode_ssetup_strings(&bcc_ptr, ses, sess_data->nls_cp); + } else { + ascii_ssetup_strings(&bcc_ptr, ses, sess_data->nls_cp); + } + + + sess_data->iov[2].iov_len = (long) bcc_ptr - + (long) sess_data->iov[2].iov_base; + + rc = sess_sendreceive(sess_data); + if (rc) + goto out; + + pSMB = (SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *)sess_data->iov[0].iov_base; + smb_buf = (struct smb_hdr *)sess_data->iov[0].iov_base; + + if (smb_buf->WordCount != 3) { + rc = -EIO; + cifs_dbg(VFS, "bad word count %d\n", smb_buf->WordCount); + goto out; + } + + if (le16_to_cpu(pSMB->resp.Action) & GUEST_LOGIN) + cifs_dbg(FYI, "Guest login\n"); /* BB mark SesInfo struct? */ + + ses->Suid = smb_buf->Uid; /* UID left in wire format (le) */ + cifs_dbg(FYI, "UID = %llu\n", ses->Suid); + + bytes_remaining = get_bcc(smb_buf); + bcc_ptr = pByteArea(smb_buf); + + /* BB check if Unicode and decode strings */ + if (bytes_remaining == 0) { + /* no string area to decode, do nothing */ + } else if (smb_buf->Flags2 & SMBFLG2_UNICODE) { + /* unicode string area must be word-aligned */ + if (!IS_ALIGNED((unsigned long)bcc_ptr - (unsigned long)smb_buf, 2)) { + ++bcc_ptr; + --bytes_remaining; + } + decode_unicode_ssetup(&bcc_ptr, bytes_remaining, ses, + sess_data->nls_cp); + } else { + decode_ascii_ssetup(&bcc_ptr, bytes_remaining, ses, + sess_data->nls_cp); + } + + rc = sess_establish_session(sess_data); +out: + sess_data->result = rc; + sess_data->func = NULL; + sess_free_buffer(sess_data); + kfree_sensitive(ses->auth_key.response); + ses->auth_key.response = NULL; +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_UPCALL +static void +sess_auth_kerberos(struct sess_data *sess_data) +{ + int rc = 0; + struct smb_hdr *smb_buf; + SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *pSMB; + char *bcc_ptr; + struct cifs_ses *ses = sess_data->ses; + struct TCP_Server_Info *server = sess_data->server; + __u32 capabilities; + __u16 bytes_remaining; + struct key *spnego_key = NULL; + struct cifs_spnego_msg *msg; + u16 blob_len; + + /* extended security */ + /* wct = 12 */ + rc = sess_alloc_buffer(sess_data, 12); + if (rc) + goto out; + + pSMB = (SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *)sess_data->iov[0].iov_base; + bcc_ptr = sess_data->iov[2].iov_base; + capabilities = cifs_ssetup_hdr(ses, server, pSMB); + + spnego_key = cifs_get_spnego_key(ses, server); + if (IS_ERR(spnego_key)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(spnego_key); + spnego_key = NULL; + goto out; + } + + msg = spnego_key->payload.data[0]; + /* + * check version field to make sure that cifs.upcall is + * sending us a response in an expected form + */ + if (msg->version != CIFS_SPNEGO_UPCALL_VERSION) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "incorrect version of cifs.upcall (expected %d but got %d)\n", + CIFS_SPNEGO_UPCALL_VERSION, msg->version); + rc = -EKEYREJECTED; + goto out_put_spnego_key; + } + + kfree_sensitive(ses->auth_key.response); + ses->auth_key.response = kmemdup(msg->data, msg->sesskey_len, + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ses->auth_key.response) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "Kerberos can't allocate (%u bytes) memory\n", + msg->sesskey_len); + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto out_put_spnego_key; + } + ses->auth_key.len = msg->sesskey_len; + + pSMB->req.hdr.Flags2 |= SMBFLG2_EXT_SEC; + capabilities |= CAP_EXTENDED_SECURITY; + pSMB->req.Capabilities = cpu_to_le32(capabilities); + sess_data->iov[1].iov_base = msg->data + msg->sesskey_len; + sess_data->iov[1].iov_len = msg->secblob_len; + pSMB->req.SecurityBlobLength = cpu_to_le16(sess_data->iov[1].iov_len); + + if (ses->capabilities & CAP_UNICODE) { + /* unicode strings must be word aligned */ + if (!IS_ALIGNED(sess_data->iov[0].iov_len + sess_data->iov[1].iov_len, 2)) { + *bcc_ptr = 0; + bcc_ptr++; + } + unicode_oslm_strings(&bcc_ptr, sess_data->nls_cp); + unicode_domain_string(&bcc_ptr, ses, sess_data->nls_cp); + } else { + /* BB: is this right? */ + ascii_ssetup_strings(&bcc_ptr, ses, sess_data->nls_cp); + } + + sess_data->iov[2].iov_len = (long) bcc_ptr - + (long) sess_data->iov[2].iov_base; + + rc = sess_sendreceive(sess_data); + if (rc) + goto out_put_spnego_key; + + pSMB = (SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *)sess_data->iov[0].iov_base; + smb_buf = (struct smb_hdr *)sess_data->iov[0].iov_base; + + if (smb_buf->WordCount != 4) { + rc = -EIO; + cifs_dbg(VFS, "bad word count %d\n", smb_buf->WordCount); + goto out_put_spnego_key; + } + + if (le16_to_cpu(pSMB->resp.Action) & GUEST_LOGIN) + cifs_dbg(FYI, "Guest login\n"); /* BB mark SesInfo struct? */ + + ses->Suid = smb_buf->Uid; /* UID left in wire format (le) */ + cifs_dbg(FYI, "UID = %llu\n", ses->Suid); + + bytes_remaining = get_bcc(smb_buf); + bcc_ptr = pByteArea(smb_buf); + + blob_len = le16_to_cpu(pSMB->resp.SecurityBlobLength); + if (blob_len > bytes_remaining) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "bad security blob length %d\n", + blob_len); + rc = -EINVAL; + goto out_put_spnego_key; + } + bcc_ptr += blob_len; + bytes_remaining -= blob_len; + + /* BB check if Unicode and decode strings */ + if (bytes_remaining == 0) { + /* no string area to decode, do nothing */ + } else if (smb_buf->Flags2 & SMBFLG2_UNICODE) { + /* unicode string area must be word-aligned */ + if (!IS_ALIGNED((unsigned long)bcc_ptr - (unsigned long)smb_buf, 2)) { + ++bcc_ptr; + --bytes_remaining; + } + decode_unicode_ssetup(&bcc_ptr, bytes_remaining, ses, + sess_data->nls_cp); + } else { + decode_ascii_ssetup(&bcc_ptr, bytes_remaining, ses, + sess_data->nls_cp); + } + + rc = sess_establish_session(sess_data); +out_put_spnego_key: + key_invalidate(spnego_key); + key_put(spnego_key); +out: + sess_data->result = rc; + sess_data->func = NULL; + sess_free_buffer(sess_data); + kfree_sensitive(ses->auth_key.response); + ses->auth_key.response = NULL; +} + +#endif /* ! CONFIG_CIFS_UPCALL */ + +/* + * The required kvec buffers have to be allocated before calling this + * function. + */ +static int +_sess_auth_rawntlmssp_assemble_req(struct sess_data *sess_data) +{ + SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *pSMB; + struct cifs_ses *ses = sess_data->ses; + struct TCP_Server_Info *server = sess_data->server; + __u32 capabilities; + char *bcc_ptr; + + pSMB = (SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *)sess_data->iov[0].iov_base; + + capabilities = cifs_ssetup_hdr(ses, server, pSMB); + if ((pSMB->req.hdr.Flags2 & SMBFLG2_UNICODE) == 0) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "NTLMSSP requires Unicode support\n"); + return -ENOSYS; + } + + pSMB->req.hdr.Flags2 |= SMBFLG2_EXT_SEC; + capabilities |= CAP_EXTENDED_SECURITY; + pSMB->req.Capabilities |= cpu_to_le32(capabilities); + + bcc_ptr = sess_data->iov[2].iov_base; + /* unicode strings must be word aligned */ + if (!IS_ALIGNED(sess_data->iov[0].iov_len + sess_data->iov[1].iov_len, 2)) { + *bcc_ptr = 0; + bcc_ptr++; + } + unicode_oslm_strings(&bcc_ptr, sess_data->nls_cp); + + sess_data->iov[2].iov_len = (long) bcc_ptr - + (long) sess_data->iov[2].iov_base; + + return 0; +} + +static void +sess_auth_rawntlmssp_authenticate(struct sess_data *sess_data); + +static void +sess_auth_rawntlmssp_negotiate(struct sess_data *sess_data) +{ + int rc; + struct smb_hdr *smb_buf; + SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *pSMB; + struct cifs_ses *ses = sess_data->ses; + struct TCP_Server_Info *server = sess_data->server; + __u16 bytes_remaining; + char *bcc_ptr; + unsigned char *ntlmsspblob = NULL; + u16 blob_len; + + cifs_dbg(FYI, "rawntlmssp session setup negotiate phase\n"); + + /* + * if memory allocation is successful, caller of this function + * frees it. + */ + ses->ntlmssp = kmalloc(sizeof(struct ntlmssp_auth), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ses->ntlmssp) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + ses->ntlmssp->sesskey_per_smbsess = false; + + /* wct = 12 */ + rc = sess_alloc_buffer(sess_data, 12); + if (rc) + goto out; + + pSMB = (SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *)sess_data->iov[0].iov_base; + + /* Build security blob before we assemble the request */ + rc = build_ntlmssp_negotiate_blob(&ntlmsspblob, + &blob_len, ses, server, + sess_data->nls_cp); + if (rc) + goto out_free_ntlmsspblob; + + sess_data->iov[1].iov_len = blob_len; + sess_data->iov[1].iov_base = ntlmsspblob; + pSMB->req.SecurityBlobLength = cpu_to_le16(blob_len); + + rc = _sess_auth_rawntlmssp_assemble_req(sess_data); + if (rc) + goto out_free_ntlmsspblob; + + rc = sess_sendreceive(sess_data); + + pSMB = (SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *)sess_data->iov[0].iov_base; + smb_buf = (struct smb_hdr *)sess_data->iov[0].iov_base; + + /* If true, rc here is expected and not an error */ + if (sess_data->buf0_type != CIFS_NO_BUFFER && + smb_buf->Status.CifsError == + cpu_to_le32(NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED)) + rc = 0; + + if (rc) + goto out_free_ntlmsspblob; + + cifs_dbg(FYI, "rawntlmssp session setup challenge phase\n"); + + if (smb_buf->WordCount != 4) { + rc = -EIO; + cifs_dbg(VFS, "bad word count %d\n", smb_buf->WordCount); + goto out_free_ntlmsspblob; + } + + ses->Suid = smb_buf->Uid; /* UID left in wire format (le) */ + cifs_dbg(FYI, "UID = %llu\n", ses->Suid); + + bytes_remaining = get_bcc(smb_buf); + bcc_ptr = pByteArea(smb_buf); + + blob_len = le16_to_cpu(pSMB->resp.SecurityBlobLength); + if (blob_len > bytes_remaining) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "bad security blob length %d\n", + blob_len); + rc = -EINVAL; + goto out_free_ntlmsspblob; + } + + rc = decode_ntlmssp_challenge(bcc_ptr, blob_len, ses); + +out_free_ntlmsspblob: + kfree_sensitive(ntlmsspblob); +out: + sess_free_buffer(sess_data); + + if (!rc) { + sess_data->func = sess_auth_rawntlmssp_authenticate; + return; + } + + /* Else error. Cleanup */ + kfree_sensitive(ses->auth_key.response); + ses->auth_key.response = NULL; + kfree_sensitive(ses->ntlmssp); + ses->ntlmssp = NULL; + + sess_data->func = NULL; + sess_data->result = rc; +} + +static void +sess_auth_rawntlmssp_authenticate(struct sess_data *sess_data) +{ + int rc; + struct smb_hdr *smb_buf; + SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *pSMB; + struct cifs_ses *ses = sess_data->ses; + struct TCP_Server_Info *server = sess_data->server; + __u16 bytes_remaining; + char *bcc_ptr; + unsigned char *ntlmsspblob = NULL; + u16 blob_len; + + cifs_dbg(FYI, "rawntlmssp session setup authenticate phase\n"); + + /* wct = 12 */ + rc = sess_alloc_buffer(sess_data, 12); + if (rc) + goto out; + + /* Build security blob before we assemble the request */ + pSMB = (SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *)sess_data->iov[0].iov_base; + smb_buf = (struct smb_hdr *)pSMB; + rc = build_ntlmssp_auth_blob(&ntlmsspblob, + &blob_len, ses, server, + sess_data->nls_cp); + if (rc) + goto out_free_ntlmsspblob; + sess_data->iov[1].iov_len = blob_len; + sess_data->iov[1].iov_base = ntlmsspblob; + pSMB->req.SecurityBlobLength = cpu_to_le16(blob_len); + /* + * Make sure that we tell the server that we are using + * the uid that it just gave us back on the response + * (challenge) + */ + smb_buf->Uid = ses->Suid; + + rc = _sess_auth_rawntlmssp_assemble_req(sess_data); + if (rc) + goto out_free_ntlmsspblob; + + rc = sess_sendreceive(sess_data); + if (rc) + goto out_free_ntlmsspblob; + + pSMB = (SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *)sess_data->iov[0].iov_base; + smb_buf = (struct smb_hdr *)sess_data->iov[0].iov_base; + if (smb_buf->WordCount != 4) { + rc = -EIO; + cifs_dbg(VFS, "bad word count %d\n", smb_buf->WordCount); + goto out_free_ntlmsspblob; + } + + if (le16_to_cpu(pSMB->resp.Action) & GUEST_LOGIN) + cifs_dbg(FYI, "Guest login\n"); /* BB mark SesInfo struct? */ + + if (ses->Suid != smb_buf->Uid) { + ses->Suid = smb_buf->Uid; + cifs_dbg(FYI, "UID changed! new UID = %llu\n", ses->Suid); + } + + bytes_remaining = get_bcc(smb_buf); + bcc_ptr = pByteArea(smb_buf); + blob_len = le16_to_cpu(pSMB->resp.SecurityBlobLength); + if (blob_len > bytes_remaining) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "bad security blob length %d\n", + blob_len); + rc = -EINVAL; + goto out_free_ntlmsspblob; + } + bcc_ptr += blob_len; + bytes_remaining -= blob_len; + + + /* BB check if Unicode and decode strings */ + if (bytes_remaining == 0) { + /* no string area to decode, do nothing */ + } else if (smb_buf->Flags2 & SMBFLG2_UNICODE) { + /* unicode string area must be word-aligned */ + if (!IS_ALIGNED((unsigned long)bcc_ptr - (unsigned long)smb_buf, 2)) { + ++bcc_ptr; + --bytes_remaining; + } + decode_unicode_ssetup(&bcc_ptr, bytes_remaining, ses, + sess_data->nls_cp); + } else { + decode_ascii_ssetup(&bcc_ptr, bytes_remaining, ses, + sess_data->nls_cp); + } + +out_free_ntlmsspblob: + kfree_sensitive(ntlmsspblob); +out: + sess_free_buffer(sess_data); + + if (!rc) + rc = sess_establish_session(sess_data); + + /* Cleanup */ + kfree_sensitive(ses->auth_key.response); + ses->auth_key.response = NULL; + kfree_sensitive(ses->ntlmssp); + ses->ntlmssp = NULL; + + sess_data->func = NULL; + sess_data->result = rc; +} + +static int select_sec(struct sess_data *sess_data) +{ + int type; + struct cifs_ses *ses = sess_data->ses; + struct TCP_Server_Info *server = sess_data->server; + + type = cifs_select_sectype(server, ses->sectype); + cifs_dbg(FYI, "sess setup type %d\n", type); + if (type == Unspecified) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "Unable to select appropriate authentication method!\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + + switch (type) { + case NTLMv2: + sess_data->func = sess_auth_ntlmv2; + break; + case Kerberos: +#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_UPCALL + sess_data->func = sess_auth_kerberos; + break; +#else + cifs_dbg(VFS, "Kerberos negotiated but upcall support disabled!\n"); + return -ENOSYS; +#endif /* CONFIG_CIFS_UPCALL */ + case RawNTLMSSP: + sess_data->func = sess_auth_rawntlmssp_negotiate; + break; + default: + cifs_dbg(VFS, "secType %d not supported!\n", type); + return -ENOSYS; + } + + return 0; +} + +int CIFS_SessSetup(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_ses *ses, + struct TCP_Server_Info *server, + const struct nls_table *nls_cp) +{ + int rc = 0; + struct sess_data *sess_data; + + if (ses == NULL) { + WARN(1, "%s: ses == NULL!", __func__); + return -EINVAL; + } + + sess_data = kzalloc(sizeof(struct sess_data), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!sess_data) + return -ENOMEM; + + sess_data->xid = xid; + sess_data->ses = ses; + sess_data->server = server; + sess_data->buf0_type = CIFS_NO_BUFFER; + sess_data->nls_cp = (struct nls_table *) nls_cp; + + rc = select_sec(sess_data); + if (rc) + goto out; + + while (sess_data->func) + sess_data->func(sess_data); + + /* Store result before we free sess_data */ + rc = sess_data->result; + +out: + kfree_sensitive(sess_data); + return rc; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_CIFS_ALLOW_INSECURE_LEGACY */ |