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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2018-08-14 09:46:06 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2018-08-14 09:46:06 -0700
commit958f338e96f874a0d29442396d6adf9c1e17aa2d (patch)
tree86a3df90304cd7c1a8af389bcde0d93db7551a49 /include/asm-generic
parent781fca5b104693bc9242199cc47c690dcaf6a4cb (diff)
parent07d981ad4cf1e78361c6db1c28ee5ba105f96cc1 (diff)
Merge branch 'l1tf-final' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Merge L1 Terminal Fault fixes from Thomas Gleixner: "L1TF, aka L1 Terminal Fault, is yet another speculative hardware engineering trainwreck. It's a hardware vulnerability which allows unprivileged speculative access to data which is available in the Level 1 Data Cache when the page table entry controlling the virtual address, which is used for the access, has the Present bit cleared or other reserved bits set. If an instruction accesses a virtual address for which the relevant page table entry (PTE) has the Present bit cleared or other reserved bits set, then speculative execution ignores the invalid PTE and loads the referenced data if it is present in the Level 1 Data Cache, as if the page referenced by the address bits in the PTE was still present and accessible. While this is a purely speculative mechanism and the instruction will raise a page fault when it is retired eventually, the pure act of loading the data and making it available to other speculative instructions opens up the opportunity for side channel attacks to unprivileged malicious code, similar to the Meltdown attack. While Meltdown breaks the user space to kernel space protection, L1TF allows to attack any physical memory address in the system and the attack works across all protection domains. It allows an attack of SGX and also works from inside virtual machines because the speculation bypasses the extended page table (EPT) protection mechanism. The assoicated CVEs are: CVE-2018-3615, CVE-2018-3620, CVE-2018-3646 The mitigations provided by this pull request include: - Host side protection by inverting the upper address bits of a non present page table entry so the entry points to uncacheable memory. - Hypervisor protection by flushing L1 Data Cache on VMENTER. - SMT (HyperThreading) control knobs, which allow to 'turn off' SMT by offlining the sibling CPU threads. The knobs are available on the kernel command line and at runtime via sysfs - Control knobs for the hypervisor mitigation, related to L1D flush and SMT control. The knobs are available on the kernel command line and at runtime via sysfs - Extensive documentation about L1TF including various degrees of mitigations. Thanks to all people who have contributed to this in various ways - patches, review, testing, backporting - and the fruitful, sometimes heated, but at the end constructive discussions. There is work in progress to provide other forms of mitigations, which might be less horrible performance wise for a particular kind of workloads, but this is not yet ready for consumption due to their complexity and limitations" * 'l1tf-final' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (75 commits) x86/microcode: Allow late microcode loading with SMT disabled tools headers: Synchronise x86 cpufeatures.h for L1TF additions x86/mm/kmmio: Make the tracer robust against L1TF x86/mm/pat: Make set_memory_np() L1TF safe x86/speculation/l1tf: Make pmd/pud_mknotpresent() invert x86/speculation/l1tf: Invert all not present mappings cpu/hotplug: Fix SMT supported evaluation KVM: VMX: Tell the nested hypervisor to skip L1D flush on vmentry x86/speculation: Use ARCH_CAPABILITIES to skip L1D flush on vmentry x86/speculation: Simplify sysfs report of VMX L1TF vulnerability Documentation/l1tf: Remove Yonah processors from not vulnerable list x86/KVM/VMX: Don't set l1tf_flush_l1d from vmx_handle_external_intr() x86/irq: Let interrupt handlers set kvm_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d x86: Don't include linux/irq.h from asm/hardirq.h x86/KVM/VMX: Introduce per-host-cpu analogue of l1tf_flush_l1d x86/irq: Demote irq_cpustat_t::__softirq_pending to u16 x86/KVM/VMX: Move the l1tf_flush_l1d test to vmx_l1d_flush() x86/KVM/VMX: Replace 'vmx_l1d_flush_always' with 'vmx_l1d_flush_cond' x86/KVM/VMX: Don't set l1tf_flush_l1d to true from vmx_l1d_flush() cpu/hotplug: detect SMT disabled by BIOS ...
Diffstat (limited to 'include/asm-generic')
-rw-r--r--include/asm-generic/pgtable.h12
1 files changed, 12 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h b/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h
index b081794ba135..a75cb371cd19 100644
--- a/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h
+++ b/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h
@@ -1083,6 +1083,18 @@ int phys_mem_access_prot_allowed(struct file *file, unsigned long pfn,
static inline void init_espfix_bsp(void) { }
#endif
+#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_PFN_MODIFY_ALLOWED
+static inline bool pfn_modify_allowed(unsigned long pfn, pgprot_t prot)
+{
+ return true;
+}
+
+static inline bool arch_has_pfn_modify_check(void)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+#endif /* !_HAVE_ARCH_PFN_MODIFY_ALLOWED */
+
#endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
#ifndef io_remap_pfn_range