diff options
| author | Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> | 2018-05-04 01:08:15 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> | 2018-05-08 02:04:23 -0400 |
| commit | 326bee0286d7f6b0d780f5b75a35ea9fe489a802 (patch) | |
| tree | f1eb4381cc90194fe772decba3168e578981993e /include/linux/audit.h | |
| parent | ea6eca778500b0aaf6e5f10dac4d2cd745c2a50b (diff) | |
seccomp: Don't special case audited processes when logging
Seccomp logging for "handled" actions such as RET_TRAP, RET_TRACE, or
RET_ERRNO can be very noisy for processes that are being audited. This
patch modifies the seccomp logging behavior to treat processes that are
being inspected via the audit subsystem the same as processes that
aren't under inspection. Handled actions will no longer be logged just
because the process is being inspected. Since v4.14, applications have
the ability to request logging of handled actions by using the
SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG flag when loading seccomp filters.
With this patch, the logic for deciding if an action will be logged is:
if action == RET_ALLOW:
do not log
else if action not in actions_logged:
do not log
else if action == RET_KILL:
log
else if action == RET_LOG:
log
else if filter-requests-logging:
log
else:
do not log
Reported-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/linux/audit.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | include/linux/audit.h | 10 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 9 deletions
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h index d4e35e7a80c0..b639cf1f55ff 100644 --- a/include/linux/audit.h +++ b/include/linux/audit.h @@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ extern void __audit_file(const struct file *); extern void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent, const struct dentry *dentry, const unsigned char type); -extern void __audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code); +extern void audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code); extern void audit_seccomp_actions_logged(const char *names, const char *old_names, int res); extern void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t); @@ -304,12 +304,6 @@ static inline void audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent, } void audit_core_dumps(long signr); -static inline void audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code) -{ - if (audit_enabled && unlikely(!audit_dummy_context())) - __audit_seccomp(syscall, signr, code); -} - static inline void audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t) { if (unlikely(!audit_dummy_context())) @@ -500,8 +494,6 @@ static inline void audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent, { } static inline void audit_core_dumps(long signr) { } -static inline void __audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code) -{ } static inline void audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code) { } static inline void audit_seccomp_actions_logged(const char *names, |