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authorDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>2019-01-19 10:09:59 -0800
committerDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>2019-01-19 10:09:59 -0800
commite266afa9c7afc51deaaf1e1566a8dfbc6f632b07 (patch)
tree706b013a6ff1715d81bd3054721a8ecdaf9aa16d /net/core/net_namespace.c
parent133bbb18ab1a2f5549435c5a3126413344ddbcb8 (diff)
parent0c4056ee8433487cfcc19621b85586c88ec927c0 (diff)
Merge branch 'net-use-strict-checks-in-doit-handlers'
Jakub Kicinski says: ==================== net: use strict checks in doit handlers This series extends strict argument checking to doit handlers of the GET* nature. This is a bit tricky since strict checking flag has already been released.. iproute2 did not have a release with strick checks enabled, and it will only need a minor one-liner to pass strick checks after all the work that DaveA has already done. Big thanks to Dave Ahern for help and guidence. v2: - remove unnecessary check in patch 5 (Nicolas); - add path 7 (DaveA); - improve messages in patch 8 (DaveA). ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/core/net_namespace.c')
-rw-r--r--net/core/net_namespace.c38
1 files changed, 36 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/net/core/net_namespace.c b/net/core/net_namespace.c
index b02fb19df2cc..17f36317363d 100644
--- a/net/core/net_namespace.c
+++ b/net/core/net_namespace.c
@@ -778,6 +778,41 @@ nla_put_failure:
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
+static int rtnl_net_valid_getid_req(struct sk_buff *skb,
+ const struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
+ struct nlattr **tb,
+ struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
+{
+ int i, err;
+
+ if (!netlink_strict_get_check(skb))
+ return nlmsg_parse(nlh, sizeof(struct rtgenmsg), tb, NETNSA_MAX,
+ rtnl_net_policy, extack);
+
+ err = nlmsg_parse_strict(nlh, sizeof(struct rtgenmsg), tb, NETNSA_MAX,
+ rtnl_net_policy, extack);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ for (i = 0; i <= NETNSA_MAX; i++) {
+ if (!tb[i])
+ continue;
+
+ switch (i) {
+ case NETNSA_PID:
+ case NETNSA_FD:
+ case NETNSA_NSID:
+ case NETNSA_TARGET_NSID:
+ break;
+ default:
+ NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Unsupported attribute in peer netns getid request");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int rtnl_net_getid(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
{
@@ -793,8 +828,7 @@ static int rtnl_net_getid(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
struct sk_buff *msg;
int err;
- err = nlmsg_parse(nlh, sizeof(struct rtgenmsg), tb, NETNSA_MAX,
- rtnl_net_policy, extack);
+ err = rtnl_net_valid_getid_req(skb, nlh, tb, extack);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (tb[NETNSA_PID]) {