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author | Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> | 2024-09-24 15:02:57 +0000 |
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committer | Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> | 2024-10-01 11:47:05 +0200 |
commit | ab9a9a9e9647392a19e7a885b08000e89c86b535 (patch) | |
tree | a1459d6153629dc225628a0994b929b7251e227a /net/dccp | |
parent | c20029db28399ecc50e556964eaba75c43b1e2f1 (diff) |
net: add more sanity checks to qdisc_pkt_len_init()
One path takes care of SKB_GSO_DODGY, assuming
skb->len is bigger than hdr_len.
virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() does not fully dissect TCP headers,
it only make sure it is at least 20 bytes.
It is possible for an user to provide a malicious 'GSO' packet,
total length of 80 bytes.
- 20 bytes of IPv4 header
- 60 bytes TCP header
- a small gso_size like 8
virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() would declare this packet as a normal
GSO packet, because it would see 40 bytes of payload,
bigger than gso_size.
We need to make detect this case to not underflow
qdisc_skb_cb(skb)->pkt_len.
Fixes: 1def9238d4aa ("net_sched: more precise pkt_len computation")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/dccp')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions