diff options
| author | Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> | 2020-09-27 22:38:26 -0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> | 2020-11-23 18:36:21 -0500 |
| commit | 3df98d79215ace13d1e91ddfc5a67a0f5acbd83f (patch) | |
| tree | 3e0db692f0d85f9a73ec0e2dd4298bda62f57b8b /security/selinux | |
| parent | b2d99bcb27225fe420a8923b21861aef2bb43d9b (diff) | |
lsm,selinux: pass flowi_common instead of flowi to the LSM hooks
As pointed out by Herbert in a recent related patch, the LSM hooks do
not have the necessary address family information to use the flowi
struct safely. As none of the LSMs currently use any of the protocol
specific flowi information, replace the flowi pointers with pointers
to the address family independent flowi_common struct.
Reported-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/include/xfrm.h | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/xfrm.c | 13 |
3 files changed, 10 insertions, 9 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 943c2693cec7..a515abdf115b 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -5437,9 +5437,9 @@ static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void) } static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req, - struct flowi *fl) + struct flowi_common *flic) { - fl->flowi_secid = req->secid; + flic->flowic_secid = req->secid; } static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security) diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h index a0b465316292..0a6f34a7a971 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x); int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir); int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_policy *xp, - const struct flowi *fl); + const struct flowi_common *flic); #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM extern atomic_t selinux_xfrm_refcount; diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c index 7314196185d1..c367d36965d4 100644 --- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c +++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c @@ -175,9 +175,10 @@ int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir) */ int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_policy *xp, - const struct flowi *fl) + const struct flowi_common *flic) { u32 state_sid; + u32 flic_sid; if (!xp->security) if (x->security) @@ -196,17 +197,17 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, return 0; state_sid = x->security->ctx_sid; + flic_sid = flic->flowic_secid; - if (fl->flowi_secid != state_sid) + if (flic_sid != state_sid) return 0; /* We don't need a separate SA Vs. policy polmatch check since the SA * is now of the same label as the flow and a flow Vs. policy polmatch * check had already happened in selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup() above. */ - return (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - fl->flowi_secid, state_sid, - SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, - NULL) ? 0 : 1); + return (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, flic_sid, state_sid, + SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, + NULL) ? 0 : 1); } static u32 selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_egress(struct sk_buff *skb) |