summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/tools/perf/scripts/python/syscall-counts-by-pid.py
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorAlexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>2015-08-31 17:09:28 +0300
committerIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>2015-09-13 11:27:22 +0200
commitd2878d642a4edd1d57c691dc3e4d7847cbf9d442 (patch)
tree7eb6b29412ee022b6e64dec4cb81080513bfa713 /tools/perf/scripts/python/syscall-counts-by-pid.py
parenta09d31f45224c219a4d5c728fa40150dc9d3e3e5 (diff)
perf/x86/intel/bts: Disallow use by unprivileged users on paranoid systems
BTS leaks kernel addresses even in userspace-only mode due to imprecise IP sampling, so sometimes syscall entry points or page fault handler addresses end up in a userspace trace. Now, intel_bts driver exports trace data zero-copy, it does not scan through it to filter out the kernel addresses and it's would be a O(n) job. To work around this situation, this patch forbids the use of intel_bts driver by unprivileged users on systems with the paranoid setting above the (kernel's) default "1", which still allows kernel profiling. In other words, using intel_bts driver implies kernel tracing, regardless of the "exclude_kernel" attribute setting. Signed-off-by: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@infradead.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Cc: hpa@zytor.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1441030168-6853-3-git-send-email-alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/perf/scripts/python/syscall-counts-by-pid.py')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions